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THEORY    OF 


THOUGHT  AND  KNOWLEDGE 


BY 
BORDEN   p.  BOWNE 

PROFBSSOR   OF  PHILOSOPHY   IN   BOSTON    UNIVERSnT 


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AMERICAN    BOOK    COMPANY 


Copyright,  1897,  by  Harper  &  BROTBSRa. 


All  rigliU  reserved. 

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PKEFACE 


This  work  does  not  aim  to  give  an  elaborate  system  of 
j^  philosophy,  but  only  to  expound  and  recommend  a  certain 
K  way  of  looking  at  the  problems  of  thought  and  knowledge. 
^Q  If  we  get  the  right  point  of  view  we  can  see  for  ourselves 
f-4  without  waiting  to  be  told.  There  are  certain  fundamental 
lij  principles  which  underlie  the  problems  in  question,  and  the 
aim  has  been  to  bring  them  to  light.  The  things  which 
c^  might  be  said  are  numberless,  but,  having  due  regard  to  the 
""  shortness  of  life,  it  has  seemed  to  me  that  the  discussion  of 
c^  principles  is  more  profitable  at  present  than  the  bulkiest  col- 
^  lections  of  details.     Besides,  we  have  them  already. 

The  root  thought  of  the  work  is  that  thought  is  an  or- 
ganic activity  which  unfolds  from  within,  and  can  never  be 
o,  put  together  mechanically  from  without.  Persons  on  the 
I  sense  plane  perpetually  seek  to  build  up  thought  from  with- 
out by  the  mechanical  juxtaposition  and  association  of  sense 
impressions.  This  is  the  perennial  source  of  that  unthink- 
ing thinking  which  tends  to  deprive  thought  of  all  authority, 
and  finally  to  dissolve  it  into  a  shadow  of  physical  mechan- 
ism. This  unprofitable,  and  sometimes  pernicious,  external- 
ism  can  be  overcome  only  by  an  insight  into  the  activity  and 
organic  unity  of  thought  itself.  When  this  insight  is  reached, 
not  a  few  crude  and  even  gross  fancies  which  underlie  pop- 


o 


249587 


iv  PBEFACBi 

ular  speculation  in  this  field  disappear  of  themselves,  and 
the  entire  problem  assumes  a  different  aspect.  Knowledge 
IS  no  longer  something  originating  outside  of  the  mind,  pos- 
sibly in  the  nerves,  and  passed  along  ready-made  into  the 
mind ;  it  is  rather  something  built  up  by  the  mind  within 
itself  in  accordance  with  principles  immanent  in  the  mental 
nature. 

Nothing  is  nearer  to  us  than  thought,  and  yet  nothing  is 
harder  to  grasp.  The  reason  is  that  spontaneous  thought 
deals  with  its  objects  rather  than  with  itself,  and  the  work 
of  reflection  is  difficult.  Thought  hides  behind  itself,  and 
takes  its  own  products  for  original  data  from  without. 
Hence,  for  a  long  time,  knowledge  is  taken  for  granted,  and 
there  is  no  suspicion  of  the  existence,  to  say  nothing  of  the 
complexity,  of  the  knowing  process.  Then,  when  knowledge 
becomes  a  problem,  it  is  solved  in  terms  of  the  imagination, 
and  without  any  careful  analysis  of  the  subject.  In  this  way 
various  theories  of  knowledge  gain  currency,  being  picked 
up  on  the  plane  of  sense  thinking  and  superficial  reflec- 
tion, and  without  being  subjected  to  any  searching  criticism. 
Many  of  these  are  suicidal,  but  that  does  not  matter  much, 
so  long  as  they  can  be  pictured  to  the  uncritical  imagination 
and  fall  in  with  the  prevailing  fashion.  Here,  I  conceive,  is 
one  of  the  great  weaknesses  of  popular  speculation,  espe- 
cially of  the  physiological  type.  It  has  not  advanced  far 
enough  in  reflection  to  see  that  the  possibility  of  knowledge 
is  a  real  problem,  and  that  speculative  theories  must  be 
tested,  among  other  ways,  by  their  bearing  on  this  problem. 
In  this  connection  attention  is  called  to  what  is  said  con- 
cerning the  speculative  significance  of  freedom,  the  suicidal 
character  of  all  mechanical  systems  of  mind  and  funda- 


PREFACE  ▼ 

mental  existence,  and  the  impossibility  of  any  tenable  theory 
of  knowledge  except  on  a  theistic  basis. 

Apart  from  these  deeper  speculative  questions  I  have 
emphasized  two  points  the  knowledge  of  which  is  of  great 
importance,  if  not  absolutely  necessary,  for  our  intellectual 
salvation.  The  first  point  is  the  volitional  and  practical 
nature  of  belief.  Persons  living  on  the  plane  of  instinct 
and  hearsay  have  no  intellectual  difiiculty  here,  or  any- 
where else ;  but  persons  entering  upon  the  life  of  reflection 
without  insight  into  this  fact  are  sure  to  lose  themselves  in 
theoretical  impotence  or  in  practical  impudence.  The  im- 
potence manifests  itself  in  a  paralyzing  inability  to  believe, 
owing  to  the  fancy  that  theoretical  demonstration  must 
precede  belief.  The  impudence  shows  itself  in  ruling  out 
with  an  airy  levity  the  practical  principles  by  which  men 
and  nations  live,  because  they  admit  of  no  formal  proof. 
These  extremes  of  unwisdom  can  be  escaped  only  by  an  in- 
sight into  the  volitional  and  practical  nature  of  belief. 

The  second  point  referred  to  is  the  almost  universal  illu- 
sion arising  from  what  I  have  called  the  structural  fallacies 
of  uncritical  thought.  Spontaneous  thought  is  pretty  sure 
to  take  its  own  operations  as  the  double  of  reality.  Thus 
arises  the  fallacy  of  the  universal,  the  parent  of  a  very  large 
part  of  popular  speculation.  And  when  to  this  are  added 
the  omnipresent  imposture  and  deceit  of  language,  there  re- 
sults a  great  world  of  abstract  and  verbal  illusion  against 
which  we  cannot  be  too  much  on  our  guard,  seeing  that  it 
is  the  source  both  of  so  much  theoretical  error  and  of  so 
much  practical  menace  and  aberration.  It  is  incredible,  in 
advance  of  investigation,  how  much  of  what  is  said  or  writ- 
ten  is  pompous  nothingness.     Many  a  grave  and  dignified 


Ti  PKEFACE 

phrase  when  reduced  to  its  lowest  terms  sinks  to,  or  below, 
the  wisdom  of  the  nursery.  Goldsmith  gives  two  rules  for 
becoming  a  connoisseur  in  art,  one  of  which  is  always  to 
remark  that  the  picture  would  have  been  better  if  the  artist 
had  taken  more  pains.  A  great  deal  of  current  wisdom  is 
equally  cheap.  Again,  it  is  amazing  on  looking  through 
philosophical  speculation  to  discover  how  much  of  it  is 
nothing  but  a  shadow  of  our  logical  processes,  in  which  the 
abstractions  of  logic  are  mistaken  for  the  facts  of  existence. 
Finally,  it  gives  ground  for  sober  reflection,  on  listening  to 
the  heated  discussion  of  social  problems,  to  observe  how 
largely  verbal  and  abstract  it  is,  having  little  contact  with 
reality  and  being  carried  on  mainly  in  a  mirage  of  rhetoric 
and  question-begging  epithets.  I  doubt  if  students  at  pres- 
ent have  any  greater  or  more  pressing  duty  than  to  strive 
to  exorcise  these  logical  spectres  and  verbal  illusions,  so  that 
we  shall  see  our  problems  as  they  are. 

The  theory  of  thought  and  knowledge  and  the  theory  of 
reality,  or  metaphysics,  cover  the  field  of  fundamental  spec- 
ulation. And  they  belong  together  in  such  a  way  that 
neither  can  be  fully  discussed  Avithout  the  other.  On  this 
account  some  of  the  discussions  of  the  present  volume  are 
preparatory,  and  must  be  handed  over  to  metaphysics  for 
final  adjudication.  This  is  especially  the  case  with  the 
ontological  categories  to  which  I  have  given  little  more 
than  a  formal  treatment.  They  must  first  be  seen  as  formal 
principles  of  thought  before  the  question  of  their  meta- 
physical significance  can  be  dealt  with.  But  the  discussion 
must  have  an  air  of  incompleteness  until  it  is  carried  into 
the  metaphysical  realm. 

Much  of  this  work  has  been  done  in  my  earlier  treatise 


PREFACE  Vll 


on  metaphysics.  I  am  now  engaged  on  the  revision  of  that 
work  so  as  to  adjust  it  to  the  present  volume,  and  also  with 
the  aim  of  improving  the  discussion.  This  involves,  among 
other  things,  some  redistribution  of  the  matter,  and  this  in 
turn  explains  the  appearance  in  the  present  volume  of  some 
matters  treated  in  the  earlier  work.  When  the  revision  is 
completed,  the  two  volumes  will  form  a  kind  of  whole,  and 
will  set  forth  a  general  way  of  looking  at  things  which,  I 
trust,  will  be  found  consistent  with  itself  and  with  the  gen- 
eral facts  of  experience. 

BOKDEN    P.   BOWNE. 

BoBTON,  March,  1897. 


CONTENTS 


INTRODUCTION Page  3 

Aim  of  Philosophy,  p.  3.  —  Classes  of  Philosophical  Theories,  p.  3. — 
Ground  of  their  Division,  p.  4. — Order  and  Division  of  Philosophic 
study,  p.  6. 

PART  I. -THEORY  OF  THOUGHT 

CHAPTER  I 

The  General  Nature  of  Thought  .  .  .  Page  8 

Definition  of  Logic,  p.  8.— Thought  Defined,  p.  9.— Thought  Distinguished 
from  Sense  and  Association,  p.  10. — Objectivity  of  Thought  Definai 
and  Illustrated,  p.  13. 

CHAPTER  II 

General.  Conditions  of  Thought    .    .     .    Page  19 

Consciousness  Nothing  by  Itself,  p.  19. — The  Unity  of  the  Mental  Subject, 
p.  20. — Objections  Considered,  p.  31. — Substitutes  for  the  Mental 
Unity,  p.  25.— Tricks  of  Language,  p.  28. — Law  of  Identity,  p.  30. — 
Difficulty  in  this  Law,  p.  31. — ^The  Positive  Principle  of  Thought, 
p.  33. 

CHAPTER  III 
How  Does  the  Mind  Get  Objects?    .     .    .  Page  36 

The  Mind  Active  and  Constitutive  in  Sensation,  p.  38. — Recurrence  of 
Experience  Possible  only  to  a  Universalizing  Intelligence,  p.  41. — 
Work  of  Memory  in  Recurrent  Experience,  p.  44. — The  Passage  from 
Impressions  to  Things  Impossible  to  Sense,  p.  46. — Problem  of  Per- 
ception, p.  49. — Metaphorical  Solutions,  p.  50. — Perception  as  Due  to 
Interaction,  p.  51. — Perception  as  Mental  Construction,  p.  53 — Ideal- 
ism and  Perception,  p.  54. 


X  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  IV 

The  Categories Page  59 

DiflBculties  in  Recognizing  the  Categories,  p.  59. — Time,  p.  66.— Time  a 
Principle  of  Tliougbt,  p.  68.— Number  a  Mental  Product,  p.  70.— Space 
a  Mental  Principle,  p.  73.— Motion,  p.  77.— Quantity,  p.  78.— Being  as 
Formal  Category,  p.  82.— Being  as  Metaphysical  Category,  p.  83.— 
Quality,  p.  85.— Identity,  Formal  and  Metaphysical,  p.  87— Causal- 
ity, p.  89.— Interaction,  p.  92.— Causality  of  Sequence,  p.  93.— Em- 
pirical Causation,  p.  96.— Freedom,  p.  96. — Necessity,  p.  100.— Possi- 
bility, p.  103. — Purpose,  p.  104.— Relation  of  Purpose  to  the  Mechan- 
ical Categories,  p.  108. — Difficulties  in  the  Empirical  Perception  of 
Purpose,  p.  109.— How  the  Understanding  Makes  Nature,  p.  113. 

CHAPTER  V 

The  Notion Page  117 

Current  Doctrine  of  the  Notion,  p.  119.— Antithesis  of  Individual  and  Uni- 
versal, p.  119. — Inconsistencies  of  the  Traditional  View,  p.  121. — The 
Concept  and  its  Marks,  p.  125.— Subject  and  Predicate  Notions,  p.  126. 
— The  Concept  as  Symbol,  p.  128. — Nominalism  and  Realism,  p.  129. 
— Berkeley's  View,  p.  132.— Does  Logic  Deal  with  Thoughts  or  Things' 
p.  134.— Definition,  p.  138.— Uncertainties  of  Classification,  p.  141.— 
Thought  and  Language,  p.  145. — Illusions  Arising  from  Language,  p. 
147. 

CHAPTER  VI 

The  Judgment Page  150 

Uncertainty  in  the  Traditional  Treatment  of  the  Judgment,  p.  151. — The 
Judgment  Commonly  Defined  with  Reference  to  the  Syllogism  rather 
than  to  Logical  Fact,  p.  153.— Categorical,  Conditional,  and  Disjunctive 
Judgments,  p.  157. — Conditions  of  Applying  the  Judgment,  p.  163, — 
Symbolic  Logic,  p.  164. 

CHAPTER  VII 

Inference Page  166 

Inference  Defined,  p.  166.— Classes  of  Inference,  p.  167.— Principles  of 
Inference,  p.  169 —Traditional  Rules  of  the  Syllogism,  p.  171.— Aris- 
totle's Dictum,  p.  172.— Mood  and  Figure,  p.  174.— Peculiarities  of 
Mathematical  Reasoning,  p.  175.— Objections  to  the  Syllogism,  p.  175. 
—Informal  Reasoning,  p.  179. 


CONTENTS  il 

CHAPTER  VIII 

Proof Page  183 

Nature  of  Proof,  p.  183.— Relation  of  Proof  to  Truth,  p.  183.— Probability 
as  the  Guide  of  Life,  p. 185. — Calculus  of  Probabilities,  p. 186. — Misuse 
of  the  Doctrine,  p.  189. — Difficulty  in  Application,  p.  189. 

CHAPTER  IX 

Deduction  and  Induction    ....    Page  193 

Nature  of  Deduction,  p.  193. — No  Deductive  Science  of  Nature  Possible, 
p.  193. — Problem  of  Induction,  p.  194. — The  Fruitful  Principle  of  In- 
duction, p.  196. — Inductive  Methods,  p.  300. — Difficulties  of  Inductive 
Reasoning,  p.  301. — Induction  and  Deduction  in  Research,  p.  306. — 
Hypotheses,  p.  207. — Meaning  of  Law,  p.  309. 

CHAPTER  X 

Explanation Page  211 

Distinction  of  Pact  and  Theory,  p.  311. — Difficulty  in  Reaching  any  Pinal 
Theory,  p.  313. — Explanation  as  Classification,  p.  217. — Scientific  Ex- 
planation, p.  331. — Its  Importance  and  its  Superficiality,  p.  333. — 
Metaphysical  Explanation,  p.  337. — Its  Unprogressive  Character  when 
Mechanical,  p.  330. — Source  of  the  Illusion,  p.  231.— Explanation  by 
Intelligence,  p.  233. — The  Several  Types  of  Explanation  form  a  Series, 
p.  236. 

CHAPTER  XI 

Some  Structural  Pallacies    ....  Page  239 

The  Problem  of  Error,  p.  240. — Suicidal  Implications  of  Necessity,  p.  241. — 
Only  Solution  in  Freedom,  p.  243. — The  Fallacy  of  the  Universal,  p. 
244. — Its  Prevalence  in  Popular  Speculation,  p.  345. — Its  Ravages  in 
Psychology,  p.  347.— The  Fallacy  of  the  Abstract,  p.  351.— The  Fal- 
lacy in  Morals,  in  Philanthropy,  in  Social  Questions,  p.  253. — The 
Fallacy  of  Language,  p.  259. 


XU  CONTENTS 


PART  II.— THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE 

CHAPTER  I 

Philosophic  Scepticism Page  267 

Conditions  of  Rational  Scepticism,  p.  269. — Meaning  of  Scepticism,  p.  272. 
— The  Doubt  of  Reason,  p.  274.— The  Doubt  of  Sensationalism,  p.  274. 
—Formal  Doubt,  p  275  —Doubt  of  Objective  Knowledge,  p.  279. — Its 
Foundation  in  Kantian  Doctrine,  p.  280 — Its  Presuppositions,  p.  281. 
— Its  Suicidal  Character,  p.  285.— Relation  of  the  Phenomenal  to  the 
Real,  p.  290. 

CHAPTER  II 

Thought  and  Thing Page  296 

Dualism  in  Human  Knowing,  p.  296.— Attempt  of  Materialism  to  Remove 
the  Dualism,  p.  298— Ambiguity  and  Irrelevance  of  Idealism  as  Es- 
caping the  Dualism,  p.  301  —Absolute  Idealism,  p.  302. — Its  Origin 
and  Development,  p.  302.— Its  Irrelevance,  p.  305.— Its  Failure,  p. 
308. — The  Necessity  of  a  Basal  Monism,  p.  311. — False  Monisms,  p. 
312. — Active  Intelligence  the  Only  True  Monism,  p.  313. — Aids  to 
Reflection,  p.  316. 

CHAPTER  III 

Realism  and  Idealism Page  318 

Many  Forms  of  Idealism,  p.  318. — Realism  Admits  of  no  Proof,  p.  320. — 
Hasty  Idealism,  p  324. — Idealism  Founded  on  the  Knowing  Process 
Alone  Falls  into  Solipsism,  p.  326.— What  is  Idealism?  p.  328.— Extra- 
mental  Existence,  p.  330. — Difficulties  of  Transfigured  Realism,  p. 
334. — Phenomena  and  Nouraena,  p.  336.— The  Phenomenality  of 
Space,  p.  338.— The  Contradiction  in  the  Notion  of  an  Ontological 
Space:  p.  338.— The  World  as  Thought  and  Act,  p.  342. 

CHAPTER  IV 

Apriorism  and  Empiricism    ....     Page  344 

Empiricism  not  an  Inductive  Study  of  Mind,  p.  345.— The  Empiricist's 
Conception  of  Experience  Ambiguous,  p.  347. — Mutual  Incompatibil- 
ity of  Empiricism  and  Materialism,  p.  348.— The  Origin  of  Experience 
and  the  Warrant  of  Knowledge,  p.  351.— Oversights  of  Empiricism,  p. 


CONTENTS  XUI 

853. — Empiricism  and  Race  Experience,  p.  857. — Empiricism  and 
Mathematics,  p.  362. — Knowledge  of  the  Contingent  Finds  no  Sufii- 
cient  Basis  in  either  Empiricism  or  Apriorism,  p.  364. 

CHAPTER  V 

Knowledge  and  Belief Page  8^7 

Knowledge  and  Belief  Distinguished,  p.  368. — Subjective  and  Objective 
Grounds  of  Belief,  p.  369.— Practical  Nature  of  Belief,  p.  370.— Most 
Belief  Necessarily  a  Matter  of  Hearsay,  p.  372. — Demonstration  Inap- 
plicable to  Reality,  p.  373. — Practical  Bearing  {he  Test  of  Concrete 
Truth,  p.  374.— Belief  as  Product  of  Life,  p.  376.— Belief  as  Related 
to  Will  and  Action,  p.  380  —Distinction  of  Real  Beliefs  from  Verbal 
and  Notional  Assents,  p.  381. 

CHAPTER  VI 
The  Formal  and  Relative  Elements  in  Thought    .    Page  386 


part  IF 

THEORY  OF  THOUGHT 


THEOKY  OF  THOUGHT  AND  KNOWLEDGE 


INTRODUCTION 

Philosophy  aims  at  a  rational  and  systematic  compre- 
hension of  reality.  Or,  since  experience  is  the  fundamental 
fact  in  all  theorizing,  and  since  reality  can  be  known  only 
in  experience,  in  the  largest  sense  of  that  word,  we  may 
say  that  philosophy  aims  at  a  rational  and  systematic  com- 
prehension and  interpretation  of  experience. 

This  aim,  however,  is  only  an  ideal  which  is  very  im- 
perfectly realized.  Philosophy  is  militant,  not  triumphant. 
As  it  has  required  the  labor  of  many  generations  to  bring 
the  system  of  thought  to  its  present  development,  so  it  will 
require  the  labor  of  many  more  to  bring  that  system  to 
anything  like  completion.  Meanwhile  only  general  outlines 
and  partial  views  are  possible.  These,  however,  may  be 
valuable,  if  they  begin  with  admitted  facts  and  make  good 
their  claims  as  they  go  along. 

Philosophic  theories  fall  into  two  great  classes,  theories 
of  knowing  and  theories  of  being.  This  results  from  the 
nature  of  the  case.  The  theory  of  being  is  the  ultimate 
aim  of  philosophy,  but  that  theory  cannot  be  completed 
without  a  theory  of  knowing.  A  philosophic  system  is 
determined  and  characterized  by  its  position  on  these  two 
points. 


4  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE 

In  the  doctrine  of  knowledge,  the  fundamental  division 
of  theories  turns  upon  their  conception  of  the  mind  as  active 
or  passive  in  knowing.  However  complicated  the  theories 
may  seem  in  their  application,  the  essential  question  is  this. 
Is  the  mind  active  or  passive  in  knowledge?  Perhaps  we 
may  think  that  the  terra  mind  smacks  too  much  of  meta- 
physics, and  then  the  question  takes  another  form,  Is 
knowing  an  active  process  determined  by  laws  within 
thought  itself,  or  is  it  only  a  mechanical  reflection  of  objects 
in  a  passive  consciousness?  The  answer  to  this  question 
gives  direction  to  our  philosophy ;  and  a  long  train  of 
speculative  consequences  depends  upon  it. 

In  the  doctrine  of  being,  the  deepest  distinction  of 
theories  turns  upon  the  conception  of  fundamental  being, 
whether  it  be  conceived  as  mechanical  and  unintelligent, 
or  as  purposive  and  intelligent.  Unwittingly,  often,  but 
none  the  less  really,  philosophic  debate  revolves  around  the 
antitheses  of  freedom  and  necessit}^  of  purpose  and  mechan- 
ism, of  intelligence  and  non-intelligence.  In  addition,  as 
already  suggested,  the  theories  of  knowing  and  of  being 
mutually  affect  one  another. 

There  are,  then,  certain  typical  theories  of  knowing  and 
of  being,  each  of  which  has  its  peculiar  implications;  and 
whoever  would  understand  the  problems  and  the  historj^  of 
philosophy  must  master  these  typical  theories.  When  this 
is  done,  particular  systems  may  be  understood  in  their  essen- 
tial worth,  or  worthlessness,  as  soon  as  we  get  their  relation 
to  the  typical  theory.  When  we  know  the  logic  of  the  gen- 
eral view  we  need  not  waste  time  in  studying  its  particular 
forms.  If  they  are  logical  we  know  where  they  must  come 
out.  If  they  are  not  logical  we  have  no  system  but  disjointed 
observations.  They  are  systems  only  in  the  catalogue  or 
advertisement. 

Hence,  epistemology,  or  the  doctrine  of  knowledge,  and 


INTRODUCTION 


metaphysics,  or  the  doctrine  of  real  existence,  are  the  two 
grand  divisions  of  philosophy.  As  already  pointed  out, 
these  do  not  admit  of  any  absolute  separation,  as  if  the  the- 
ory of  one  could  be  completed  without  a  theory  of  the  other. 
They  are,  then,  different  aspects  of  the  whole  question  rather 
than  mutually  independent  factors.  At  the  same  time,  they 
are  sufficiently  distinct  to  make  it  desirable  to  treat  them 
separately. 

Historically,  systems  of  philosophy  have  commonly  em- 
phasized one  or  the  other  of  these  two  questions  so  as  to  be- 
come predominantly  either  theories  of  knowing  or  theories 
of  being.  Thus  the  systems  of  Locke,  Hume,  and  Kant  are 
pre-eminently  theories  of  knowing.  The  systems  of  Spinoza 
and  Leibnitz  are  fundamentally  theories  of  being.  In  the 
historical  development  of  thought,  theories  of  being  come 
first.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  mind  is  objective  in 
its  first  activities,  and  becomes  reflective  only  at  a  later  date. 
Knowledge  is  really  determined  both  by  the  subject  and  by 
the  object ;  but  the  object  is  the  only  determinant  for  unre- 
flective  thought.  The  full  significance  of  the  subject  for 
knowledge  was  first  proclaimed  by  Kant.  Thought  first 
goes  straight  to  things,  and  if  it  stumbled  on  no  contradic- 
tions among  its  conceptions  it  would  probably  never  suspect 
the  existence  and  complexity  of  its  own  processes. 

In  estimating,  then,  a  philosophical  system,  we  must  get 
its  position  on  these  fundamental  points  of  knowing  and 
being.  All  else,  so  far  as  it  is  logical,  results  from  that  po- 
sition. It  we  have  a  knowledge  of  the  typical  theories,  w^e 
may  spare  ourselves  the  trouble  of  reading  new  works  be- 
yond the  point  necessary  to  determine  their  fundamental 
position.  For  instance,  if  one  has  mastered  the  logic  of  sen- 
sationalism in  Hume,  there  is  no  need  to  waste  time  on  the 
pathetic  efforts  of  later  sensationalists  to  galvanize  their 
dead  philosophy  into  some  semblance  of  life. 


6  THEORY  OF  THOUGHT  AND  KNOWLEDGE 

Philosophy  aims  at  a  rational  comprehension  of  reality. 
But  the  instrument  of  philosophy  is  thought  itself.  All  sys- 
tems of  whatever  kind,  even  systems  of  doubt  and  denial, 
must  recognize  the  existence  of  laws  of  thought  whereby 
the  normal  processes  and  results  of  thinking  are  distin- 
guished from  the  abnormal.  Without  such  recognition 
there  is  no  distinction  between  rational  and  irrational,  and 
naught  remains  but  caprice,  obstinacy,  and  infatuation. 

Hence  the  logical  order  of  philosophical  study  is  logic, 
episteraology,  and  metaphysics.  The  first  treats  of  the  laws 
of  normal  thinking,  or  the  science  of  thought.  The  second 
applies  these  laws  to  the  problem  of  knowledge,  and,  by 
analyzing  the  idea  of  knowledge,  aims  to  discover  its  gen- 
eral conditions  and  implications.  These  two  are  only  dif- 
ferent aspects  of  the  one  question.  The  third  asks  after  the 
final  conceptions  reached  by  thought  concerning  real  exist- 
ence, or,  more  specifically,  concerning  man,  nature,  and  the 
fundamental  reality. 

We  have,  then,  as  the  most  significant  divisions  of  phil- 
osophic study  the  following : 

1.  Logic,  or  the  Theory  of  Thought ; 

2.  Epistemology,  or  the  Theory  of  Knowledge ; 

3.  Metaphysics,  or  the  Theory  of  Being. 

The  first  two  divisions  will  be  discussed  in  the  pres- 
ent volume.  The  third  will  be  postponed  to  a  second  vol- 
ume. 

The  first  topic,  then,  is  logic,  or  the  theory  of  thought. 
The  treatment  will  differ  somewhat  from  that  of  the  tra- 
ditional formal  logic,  because  thought  itself  is  differently 
conceived.  We  agree  with  the  traditional  logician  that 
logic  cannot  deal  with  particular  and  concrete  objects  of 
knowledge,  but  should  confine  itself  to  the  general  forms 
and  principles  of  thought  which  apply  to  all  objects.     At 


INTRODUCTION  « 

the  same  time,  however,  we  conceive  thnt  thought  has  many 
forms  besides  those  of  the  notion,  the  jiulgment,  and  the 
inference.  The  entire  system  of  categories  bek>ngs  to  the 
forms  of  thought,  and  must  be  treated  in  any  adequate  ex- 
position. Furthermore,  unless  logic  is  to  sink  into  a  barren 
shuffling  of  artificial  notions,  without  any  significance  for 
truth  or  knowledge,  it  must  take  some  account  of  its  own 
metaphysical  presuppositions. 

A  detailed  and  exhaustive  discussion  is  not  aimed  at  in 
the  present  work.  The  plan  is  rather  to  select  such  funda- 
mental points  for  discussion  as  shall  give  the  reader  some 
idea  of  the  essential  nature  of  thought,  and  of  the  essential 
factors  of  the  thought  process.  An  insight  into  principles 
often  dispenses  with  the  discussion  of  details  ;  and  the  study 
of  details  without  a  knowledge  of  principles  can  come  to 
no  conclusion  beyond  barren  reflections  and  desultory  obser- 
vations. 


CHAPTER  I 
TEE   GENERAL   NATURE   OF    THOUGHT 

There  is  no  fixed  definition  of  logic.  Accordingly,  its 
field  is  extended  all  the  way  from  formal  reasoning  to  met- 
aphysics, according  to  the  pleasure  of  the  speculator.  Even 
those  who  agree  in  defining  it  as  the  science  of  thought  do 
not  agree  as  to  the  limits  of  thought,  and  thus  the  differ- 
ence reappears.  This  is  due  to  the  organic  nature  of  rea- 
son, which  forbids  any  hard  and  fast  divisions.  Hence,  in- 
stead of  engaging  in  barren  disputes  concerning  the  exact 
limits  of  logic,  it  is  better  to  recognize  that  those  limits 
must  always  have  something  arbitrary  in  them,  and  to  aim 
at  consistency,  relevance,  and  significance  in  our  specula- 
tions, whatever  we  call  them. 

We  define  logic  as  the  science  of  thought,  and  proceed 
to  show  what  we  mean  by  thought.  Of  course,  our  im- 
mediate concern  is  with  our  human  thinking.  Whether 
"  Thought,"  or  "  Consciousness,"  or  "  Cosmic  Thought "  be 
a  presupposition  of  our  thinking  must  be  postponed  to  the 
Theory  of  Knowledge.  Meanwhile,  we  limit  our  attention 
to  our  human  thinking. 

This  limitation  must  be  carefully  noted,  as  oversight 
thereof  has  been  a  fruitful  source  of  verbal  disputes.  It  is 
plain  that  many  things  may  be  true  for  cosmic  thought 
which  are  not  true  for  our  human  thinking;  and  many 
limitations  may  be  affirmed  of  the  latter  which  must  be 


THE  GENERAL  NATDKE  OF  THOUGHT  9 

denied  of  the  former.  The  confusion  of  the  two  points  of 
view  can  only  result  in  further  confusion. 

For  the  present,  then,  we  occupy  the  human  standpoint; 
and  our  first  work  must  be  to  gain  some  idea  of  what  our 
human  thought  is. 

The  life  of  consciousness,  as  occurring,  is  neither  true  nor 
false,  but  simply  fact.  Misconceptions  are  as  much  facts  as 
correct  conceptions,  and  arise  equally  in  accordance  with 
mental  laws.  But  this  life  has  another  aspect,  according  to 
which  it  is  not  merely  a  mental  event,  but  an  apprehension 
of  truth.  In  this  respect  it  is  also  subject  to  laws  which 
claim  to  be  the  laws  of  normal  thinking  and  the  conditions 
of  reaching  truth.  The  mental  life,  considered  as  fact,  be- 
longs to  psychology;  the  mental  life,  considered  as  appre- 
hending truth,  belongs  to  logic.  This  form  of  activity  we 
call  thought. 

Thought,  then,  is  that  form  of  mental  activity  whose  aim 
is  truth  or  knowledge.  The  nature,  laws,  and  implications 
of  this  activity  are  the  subject  of  our  study. 

For  the  better  understanding  of  this  definition,  it  should 
be  remembered  that  the  term  thought  is  often  used  with 
two  entirely  distinct  meanings.  Thought  may  signify  the 
mental  activity,  and  it  may  signify  the  contents  grasped 
through  that  activity.  In  the  latter  sense,  of  course, 
thought  includes  everything  which  can  exist  for  us.  Sen- 
sations, feelings,  the  whole  universe,  indeed,  so  far  as  it 
is  known,  belong  to  thought.  From  this  point  of  view, 
thought  has  no  antithesis,  but  is  all-inclusive.  Oversight  of 
this  ambiguity  has  been  the  source  of  not  a  little  sterile  and 
tedious  logomachy,  something  like  that  resulting  from  con- 
founding thought  and  "  Thought." 

We  have  defined  thought  from  the  subjective  standpoint 
as  that  form  of  mental  activity  whose  aim  is  truth  or 
knowledge.     The  reality  and  peculiarity  of  thought  as  a 


10  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE 

special  form  of  activity  will  further  appear  if  we  contrast 
it  with  the  affections  of  sense. 

The  human  mind  never  rests  in  impressions  of  the  sensi- 
bility, but  works  them  over  into  forms  inherent  in  its  own 
nature.  In  so  doing  it  transcends  the  sense  fact  entirely, 
and  it  does  this  on  its  own  warrant.  Thus,  suppose  I  am 
struck  by  a  stone.  The  sense  fact  is  simply  certain  visual, 
tactual,  and  painful  sensations.  If  I  say  the  stone  hit  me, 
I  have  transcended  the  sense  experience,  and  attributed  ob- 
jective existence  and  causal  efficiency  to  the  stone.  Sub- 
tract these  ideas,  and  there  is  nothing  left  but  a  succession 
of  sensations  in  my  own  consciousness. 

Again,  if  I  suppose  I  see  a  moving  body,  the  sense  fact 
is  only  a  continuous  set  of  visual  appearances  at  adjacent 
points  of  space  in  successive  moments  of  time.  To  trans- 
form this  into  a  moving  body,  I  must  pass  from  the  fact  of 
sense  to  the  notion  of  an  objective  and  identical  thing.  Or 
if  I  suppose  I  have  successive  experiences  of  the  same  thing, 
the  sense  fact  is  merely  a  similarity  of  successive  sensa- 
tions ;  and  I  should  never  get  beyond  this,  unless  I  inter- 
preted the  sense  fact  by  the  notion  of  an  abiding  and  iden- 
tical thing. 

Thus  in  these  simplest  and  most  elementary  experiences 
we  find  a  peculiar  mental  activity  manifesting  itself.  There 
is  a  surplusage  over  the  sensations.  Here  are  ideas  which 
are  not  sensations,  nor  any  possible  modifications  of  sensa- 
tion. They  do  not  admit  of  being  sensuously  presented, 
but  belong  to  the  unpicturable  notions  of  intelligence.  Yet 
the  sensations  become  an  intelligible  object  for  us  only  as 
these  ideas  are  superinduced  upon  them  by  the  action  of 
the  understanding.  This  surplusage  in  experience  beyond 
the  contribution  of  the  senses  was  recognized  by  Hume, 
and  attributed  to  a  mental  "propensity  to  feign." 

There  is,  then,  a  great  distinction  between  what  is  in 


THE  GENERAL  NATURE  OF  THOUGHT  H 

sense  and  what  is  in  thought.  Of  course,  we  at  first  sup- 
pose that  all  those  things  are  in  sense  which  we  perceive 
through  sense ;  but  a  small  amount  of  reflection  serves  to 
dispel  this  illusion.  In  dealing  with  paintings  and  draw- 
ings, or  with  printed  and  written  matter,  the  eye  gives  only 
lines  and  colors ;  the  mind  adds  the  meaning.  But  there 
can  be  no  doubt  that  in  all  visual  perception  the  meaning  is 
contributed  by  the  mind  in  like  manner.  What  the  eye 
gives  is  one  thing;  what  we  see  or  perceive  is  quite  another. 
Since  the  publication  of  Berkeley's  New  Theory  of  Vision 
this  fact  has  been  a  commonplace  of  psychology. 

In  hearing  and  the  other  senses  the  distinction  is  equally 
manifest.  When  we  come  to  scientific  study,  the  distinction 
between  what  is  in  sense  and  what  is  in  thought  is  apparent 
even  to  the  dullest.  Even  the  sciences  which  have  to  do 
with  physical  objects  live  and  move  and  have  their  being 
mainly  in  a  world  of  rational  conceptions  which  can  be  en- 
tered only  by  thought.  Very  few  scientific  conceptions 
admit  of  being  sensuously  presented  or  sensuously  verified. 

Thus,  along  with  the  receptivity  of  sense,  but  distinct  from 
it,  we  see  a  special  order  of  mental  activity  which  works 
over  sense  data  into  rational  forms.  From  this  point  of 
view,  thought  might  be  defined  as  the  process  whereby  the 
mind  works  over  the  raw  material  of  the  sensibility  into  the 
forms  of  intelligence.  This  would  not  be  a  complete  defini- 
tion, but  it  would  call  attention  to  one  of  the  most  impor- 
tant aspects  and  functions  of  the  thought  activity  in  our  ex- 
perience. 

Once  more  we  may  illustrate  the  reality  and  peculiarity 
of  the  thought  movement  by  contrasting  it  with  the  associ- 
ational  movement. 

We  find  two  orders  of  movement  and  combination  in  con- 
sciousness. Many  things  or  events  are  found  together  or 
occur  together  in  experience  without  any  inner  connection. 


12  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

But  when  they  have  thus  come  together  in  experience  they 
tend  thereafter  to  recur  together  by  virtue  of  the  laws  of 
association.  The  most  unlike  things  which  have  occurred 
together  tend  to  recur  together ;  and  sometimes  the  connec- 
tion becomes  so  intimate  as  to  seem  a  matter  of  course. 
Language  furnishes  a  good  example.  The  words,  spoken  or 
Avritten,  have  absolutely  no  likeness  to  the  thought,  and  no 
fitness  to  express  just  that  thought  rather  than  any  other; 
yet  when  once  joined  they  seem  to  belong  together,  so  that 
we  even  fancy  we  see  or  hear  the  thought  itself.  This  fact 
underlies  the  order  of  reproduction.  Memory  reproduces 
the  order  of  occurrence  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  asso- 
ciation. Tliis  is  the  first  order  of  movement.  It  is  a  me- 
chanical grouping  and  reproduction  of  elements  which  have 
come  together,  and  implies  no  internal  connection. 

The  second  order  is  of  a  different  kind.  It  aims  to 
reach  not  accidental  conjunction,  but  rational  connection. 
The  distinction  between  the  two  is  that  in  the  former  case 
the  elements  only  come  together,  whereas  in  the  latter 
they  belong  together.  Thus,  sound  and  idea  come  together ; 
but  the  properties  of  a  triangle,  or  cause  and  effect,  belong 
together.  The  former  might  conceivably  be  separated  ;  the 
latter  are  fixed  in  changeless  relations.  Now,  the  second 
order  of  mental  movement  referred  to  aims  to  transform 
the  occurrences  and  accidental  conjunctions  of  experience 
into  rational  connections,  so  that  our  thought  shall  repre- 
sent not  merely  the  chance  order  of  coming  together,  but 
the  fixed  order  of  belonging  together.  The  associational 
order  repeats  indifferently  the  conjunctions  of  experience; 
the  thought  order  subjects  them  to  a  rational  ideal. 

This  antithesis  between  thought  and  sensation,  or  be- 
tween the  thought  movement  and  the  associational  move- 
ment, has  not  al  wavs  been  allowed.  Thus,  Hume  reco£:nized 
only  conjunction  and  denied  connection.     In  this  he  has 


THE  GENERAL  NATURE  OF  THOUGHT  13 

generally  been  followed  by  the  sensationalists.  They  have 
sought  by  means  of  association  working  upon  sensations 
to  evolve  thought  itself;  so  that  finally  all  that  is  native 
to  the  mind  is  the  passive  sensibility  and  the  laws  of  as- 
sociation. Given  these,  they  aim  to  exhibit  all  else  as 
product. 

In  so  far  as  this  claim  admits  the  present  existence  of 
laws  of  thought,  it  is  irrelevant  to  our  present  purpose.  It 
is  an  attempt  not  to  deny  those  laws,  but  to  explain  them 
on  a  psychological  basis.  The  laws  are  evolved  but  valid. 
The  thought  life  roots,  indeed,  in  the  sense  life,  but  has  its 
special  forms  nevertheless.  In  so  far  as  the  associational 
claim  contains  a  denial  of  the  laws  of  thought,  we  shall 
consider  it  in  connection  with  particular  cases.  We  shall 
see  hereafter  that,  if  the  antithesis  of  thought  and  sensation 
is  to  be  denied,  it  must  be  from  the  side  of  thought  rather 
than  from  that  of  sensation.  It  may  turn  out  that  sensa- 
tion itself  is  in  a  very  important  sense  a  thought  product. 

We  come  now  to  a  point  of  the  highest  importance  in 
studying  the  nature  of  thought.  Reference  has  already 
been  made  to  it  in  speaking  of  thought  as  related  to  truth. 
Some  amplification  is  in  order  here. 

Thought  may  be  viewed  as  a  mental  event  which  ends 
in  itself,  and  it  may  be  viewed  as  apprehending  or  report- 
ing a  truth  or  reality  bevond  the  mental  event.  Manv  of 
our  conscious  experiences  are  only  mental  events.  They 
report  nothing,  and  their  whole  duty  is  simply  to  be  what 
they  are.  As  such  they  are  simply  accidents  of  the  indi- 
vidual, and  have  no  relation  to  truth.  As  Ferrier  has  it,  they 
represent  or  apprehend  nothing  which  is  "  common  to  all "; 
they  are  simply  an  experience  which  is  "special  to  me." 
But  the  distinguishing  mark  of  thought  is  that,  in  addi- 
tion to  being  a  mental  event,  it  claims  to  represent  a  truth 


14  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

which  is  independent  of  the  mental  event.  Of  course, 
thinking,  as  a  process,  is  particular ;  and  the  entire  contents 
of  consciousness  as  mental  events  are  particular;  but  our 
thoughts,  though  mental  events,  claim  to  be  valid  for  an 
order  of  fact  or  reason  which  our  thoughts  do  not  make 
but  discover,  and  which  is  common  to  all  and  not  merely 
special  to  me. 

But  there  are  some  mental  events  which  are  only  special 
to  me,  as  feelings,  moods,  and  all  mental  states  which  end  in 
themselves ;  yet  in  dealing  with  these  the  same  fact  comes 
out.  For  while  these  mental  events  are  special  to  me  in 
their  occurrence,  thought  treats  them  as  actual  happenings 
in  the  total  system  of  reality,  and  thus  constitutes  them 
a  possible  object  of  knowledge  for  all,  and  fixes  them  as 
actual  components  of  the  total  reality. 

How  thought  can  do  this,  how  the  particular  thought 
which,  as  mental  event,  is  special  to  me  can  nevertheless 
aflBrm  and  apprehend  something  valid  for  all  is  no  doubt 
a  great  mystery ;  but  the  fact  is  so  involved  in  the  nature 
of  thought  that  thought  vanishes  altogether  with  its  denial. 

It  is  this  fact  which  constitutes  the  universality  and 
objectivity  of  thought,  and  distinguishes  the  judgment — at 
least,  in  its  intention — from  a  subjective  union  of  ideas. 

Of  course,  this  does  not  hinder  that  thought  may  often 
be  mistaken.  Chance  conjunctions  are  put  forward  as  fixed 
connections.  Accidents  of  the  individual  are  assumed  to 
have  universal  validity.  The  special  to  me  is  mistaken  for 
the  common  to  all.  But  this  very  fact  only  illustrates  once 
more  that  universality,  or  objective  validity,  is  the  essen- 
tial form  of  thought. 

This  conclusion  finds  further  support  in  a  consideration 
of  the  judgment.  "What  does  any  judgment  mean  ?  It 
always  involves  the  assumption  of  objective  validity,  and 
would  be  absurd  or  frivolous  without  it. 


THE    GENERAL    NATL'RE    OF    THOUGHT  15 

Thus,  suppose,  for  instance,  that  a  geometrical  judgment 
is  in  question — say,  the  sum  of  the  angles  of  a  triangle  is 
equal  to  two  right  angles.  No  one  would  admit  that  by 
this  judgment  he  meant  only  that  in  his  own  consciousness 
the  subject  and  predicate  come  together.  Possibh^  under 
polemical  stress,  a  sensational  philosopher  might  momen- 
tarily take  such  a  position ;  and  then  the  sufficient  answer 
would  be.  Well,  what  of  it?  The  judgment  being  by  hy- 
pothesis an  accident  of  the  individual,  no  one  else  need  con- 
cern himself  about  it.  But  the  bare  fact  of  living  together 
and  of  being  mutually  inteUigible  makes  such  a  position 
impossible  except  as  a  verbal  pretence.  The  geometrical 
judgment,  then,  carries  with  it  a  reference  to  a  fixed  order 
of  reason  which  is  common  to  all,  and  assumes  to  set  forth 
some  truth  concerning  that  order. 

Or  we  may  take  a  judgment  in  physics — say,  that  water 
rises  thirty-three  feet  in  a  pump  under  a  certain  barometric 
pressure.  However  many  mental  events  may  occur  in 
reaching  and  announcing  this  judgment,  no  one  would  have 
the  courage  to  sav  that  it  means  only  that  certain  notions 
cohere  in  his  own  consciousness.  Even  the  most  determined 
sensationalist  or  idealist  would  have  to  admit  a  world  of 
coexistent  minds  and  a  universal  order  according  to  which 
all  particular  consciousness  is  determined.  "Without  this 
admission  the  unlucky  speculator  would  fall  a  prey  to 
solipsism.  Thus,  the  physical  judgment  contains  a  neces- 
sary reference  to  an  order  of  fact  which  is  not  an  accident 
of  the  individual,  but  is  common  to  all.  The  nature  of  this 
common  fact  may  remain  highly  mysterious,  but  its  exist- 
ence cannot  be  questioned  without  absurdity. 

If,  finally,  we  take  an  historical  judgment — say,  Washing- 
ton crossed  the  Delaware — we  see  the  same  objective  impli- 
cation. Here  an  order  of  historical  fact  is  assumed ;  and 
however  necessary  our  thoughts  as  mental  events  may  be 


16  THEORY  OF  THOUGHT  AND  KNOWLEDGE 

for  the  grasping  of  the  fact,  they  can  never  be  identified 
with  the  fact. 

Thus,  in  the  essential  nature  and  intention  of  the  judg- 
ment, we  see  thought  transcending  itself  as  mental  event, 
and  positing  a  system  for  which  our  thought  is  valid,  but 
which  it  does  not  make.  The  universality  and  community 
of  the  object  have  at  bottom  this  meaning;  not  that  every 
one  grasps  it,  but  that  the  apprehending  thought  repro- 
duces an  order  which  is  independent  of  itself.  If  it  should 
occur  to  some  one  of  idealistic  tendencies  to  suggest  that 
this  objective  system  is  itself  only  a  thought,  the  answer 
would  be  that,  if  it  were  so,  it  could  not  be  identified  with 
the  thought  of  the  finite  individual,  but  would  be  indepen- 
dent of  any  and  all  of  our  thinking.  For  us,  then,  it  would 
be  something  which  we  do  not  make  but  find.  If,  finally, 
any  one  should  insist  that  thought  cannot  recognize  any- 
thing beyond  itself,  that  might  well  be  true  for  "  Thought," 
but  it  is  not  true  for  our  thinking.  For,  whether  philoso- 
phy can  make  anything  of  it  or  not,  we  are  constantly 
recoofnizino^  an  order  of  fact  which  we  cannot  view  as  de- 
pendent  on  our  thinking,  or  as  vanishing  Avhen  we  go  to 
sleep. 

This  objective  reference  of  thought  is  especially  to  be 
dwelt  upon,  as  it  is  commonly  overlooked  by  sensational- 
ism and  various  cheap  idealisms.  They  assume  that  im- 
pressions are  the  raw  material  of  knowledge,  and  that  all 
that  has  to  be  done  is  to  group  the  impressions.  But  they 
fail  to  make  clear  to  themselves  either  the  problem  or  the 
data  of  their  own  theory.  Now,  in  strictness,  the  data  are 
particular,  unqualified  impressions ;  that  is,  they  are  im- 
pressions of  nobody  by  nothing.  If  we  relax  the  strictness 
enough  to  allow  the  passive  subject,  then  we  have  particu- 
lar impressions  in  the  consciousness  of  a  particular  individ- 
ual ;  and  these  admit  of  being  variously  associated.     Then 


THE  GENERAL  NATURE  OF  THOUGHT  17 

the  problem  is  out  of  these  data  to  generate  the  subjective 
form  of  knowledge  and  its  objective  validity. 

The  insolubility  of  this  problem  is  manifest  as  soon  as 
we  comprehend  what  is  to  be  done.  If  we  succeeded  in 
generating  the  subjective  form  of  thought  from  particular 
impressions,  we  should  still  have  made  no  provision  for  the 
objective  reference  and  objective  validity.  For  associated 
impressions,  after  all,  are  only  impressions  associated,  and 
remain  accidents  of  the  individual  after  association  has 
done  its  best  or  worst.  A  solipsistic  group  of  impressions 
is  the  only  outcome ;  and  the  judgment  sinks  into  a  men- 
tal event  which  reports  nothing.  We  are  freed  from  these 
whimsies  by  remembering  the  objective  reference  implicit 
in  thought  from  the  beginning. 

But  this  affirmation  of  an  objective  reference  in  thought 
must  not  be  mistaken  for  the  claim  that  all  parts  of  the 
thought  process  have  their  double  in  reality.  Thought,  the 
product,  is  objectively  valid  ;  thought,  the  process,  is  no 
part  of  the  object.  Hence  a  double  inquiry.  This  con- 
cerns, first,  the  nature  and  laws  of  the  thought  process 
considered  as  a  form  of  mental  activity ;  and,  secondly, 
the  nature  and  extent  of  the  validity  of  our  thought  for 
the  independent  object.  In  the  latter  part  of  the  inquiry, 
logic  passes  into  epistemology.  Our  immediate  concern 
is  with  the  thought  process,  its  conditions  and  laws. 

The  thought  movement,  when  it  becomes  self-conscious 
and  reflective,  rises  into  freedom,  in  distinction  from  the  me- 
chanical movement  of  association.  The  thought  life  is  rooted 
in  our  nature,  and  begins  without  our  reflective  volition. 
But  this  spontaneous  thought  remains  on  the  surface  of 
things,  and  needs  to  be  rendered  more  profound  and  exact. 
This  is  the  work  of  freedom.  All  earnest  study,  all  science 
and  philosophy,  rest  upon  a  will  to  know,  and  a  direction  of 
our  powers  to  this  end.     Science  and  all  the  higher  forms 


18  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE 

of  knowledge  are  no  mechanical  product,  but  a  free  achieve- 
ment of  the  truth-loving  mind.  Nature  presents  us  with  a 
few  things  in  the  mental  life ;  but  only  free  work  and  devo- 
tion can  make  us  rulers  over  many. 

Thus,  we  have  sought  to  show  that  within  our  experience 
there  is  a  special  order  of  mental' activity  with  laws  and  aims 
of  its  own,  which  is  to  be  distinguished  from  the  mechanical 
order  of  association  and  from  the  passiveness  of  mere  impres- 
sibility. If  in  our  further  study  we  find  reason  for  doubting 
this  conclusion  we  promise  to  withdraw^  it.  Pending  such 
discovery,  we  pass  to  consider  the  general  logical  conditions 
of  thought. 


CHAPTER  II 

GENEEAL  CONDITIONS  OF  THOUGHT 

There  are  multitudinous  conditions  of  concrete  thought 
of  an  accidental  sort,  both  physiological  and  psychological ; 
and  there  are  certain  other  conditions  given  in  the  very 
structure  of  thought  itself.    Only  the  latter  concern  us  here. 

And  as  consciousness  is  the  absolute  condition  of  all 
thought,  it  seems  as  if  a  discussion  of  consciousness  were  a 
necessary  preliminary  to  the  theory  of  thought.  This  seem- 
ing, however,  is  misleading.  Since  consciousness  is  an  accom- 
paniment of  all  mental  states,  it  is  easy  to  think  that  it  is  a 
distinct  element  by  itself.  This  is  a  logical  illusion.  The 
spatial  figures  also  in  which  we  speak  of  consciousness  lead 
to  the  fancy  that  consciousness  is  something  which  contains 
other  mental  states,  or  which  furnishes  the  stage  for  their 
operations.  But  in  fact  consciousness  is  no  simple,  homo- 
geneous mental  state  antecedent  to  objects,  or  apart  from 
objects ;  it  arises  only  in  connection  with  particular  objects, 
and  is  nothing  by  itself.  When  consciousness  is  empty  of 
objects  there  is  nothing  left. 

Consciousness  may,  indeed,  exist  in  varying  grades  of 
clearness,  from  a  vague  sense  of  subjectivity  and  objectivity 
up  to  the  distinct  consciousness  of  self  and  the  definite  appre- 
hension of  an  object ;  but  in  every  case  the  vagueness  of  the 
consciousness  is  the  vagueness  of  the  apprehension ;  and  an 
attempt  to  make  the  consciousness  more  distinct  could  only 
direct  itself  to  making  the  conception  more  distinct.    If  there 


20  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

be  a  vague,  undifferentiated,  unrecognized  somehowness  of 
feeling  which  we  choose  to  call  consciousness,  it  is  plainly 
nothing  for  intelligence  so  long  as  it  remains  in  this  state. 
In  order  to  attain  to  rationality  this  general  consciousness, 
which  is  a  consciousness  of  nothing,  must  in  some  way  be- 
come a  consciousness  of  something.  Hence  the  question, 
How  we  come  to  rational  and  articulate  consciousness,  is 
identical  with  the  question.  How  we  get  objects  of  thought 
and  knowledge. 

Thought,  as  apprehending  trutli,  exists  only  in  the  form 
of  the  judgment.  The  presence  of  ideas  in  consciousness, 
or  their  passage  through  it,  is  neither  truth  nor  error,  but 
only  a  mental  event.  Truth  or  error  emerges  only  when 
we  reach  the  judgment.  The  fundamental  conditions  of 
the  judgment,  therefore,  must  be  fundamental  conditions 
of  thought  itself.  These  are  three:  the  unity  and  identity 
of  the  thinking  self,  the  law  of  identity  and  contradiction, 
and  the  fact  of  connection  among  the  objects  of  thought. 
The  first  is  the  condition  of  any  rational  consciousness 
whatever.  The  second  is  the  condition  of  our  thoughts 
having  any  constant  and  consistent  meaning.  The  third 
refers  to  that  objective  connection  which  thought  aims  to 
reproduce,  and  without  which  thought  loses  all  reference  to 
truth.  As  the  first  relates  to  the  constitution  of  the  sub- 
ject, it  might  be  called  the  subjective  condition ;  the 
second  might  be  called  the  formal  condition ;  and  the  third, 
as  relating  to  the  constitution  of  the  object,  might  be  called 
the  objective  condition.  Or,  without  too  great  inaccuracy, 
they  might  be  called,  respectively,  the  psychological,  the 
logical,  and  the  ontological  condition  of  thought.  The 
name,  however,  is  of  no  moment,  provided  we  understand 
the  thing;. 

We  consider  first  the  unity  of  the  mental  subject  as  the 
condition  of  thought. 


GENERAL    CONDITIONS    OF    THOUGHT  21 

Let  US  take  the  judgment  a  is  5,  where  a  and  h  are  any 
two  particular  states  of  consciousness.  How  is  this  judg- 
ment possible  ? 

The  answer  is,  It  is  possible  only  as  there  is  a  conscious 
subject  Jf,  which  is  neither  a  nor  J,  but  embraces  both  in 
the  unity  of  its  own  consciousness.  Then,  by  distinguishing, 
comparing,  and  uniting  them  in  the  unity  of  one  conscious 
act,  it  reaches  the  judgment  a  is  1>.  But  so  long  as  we 
have  only  the  particular  states  a  and  J,  they  remain  ex- 
ternal to  each  other,  and  the  judgment  is  non-existent  and 
impossible. 

A  demurrer  is  sometimes  raised  against  this  conclusion. 
That  the  external  juxtaposition  of  particular  thoughts  can 
never  become  a  thought  of  the  particulars  in  their  mutual 
relations  is  manifest.  A  conception  of  all  the  parts  of  a 
watch  in  separation  is  not  a  conception  of  the  watch.  The 
conception  of  the  watch  is  not  a  congeries  of  component 
conceptions,  but  it  is  rather  a  single,  unitary  conception.  In 
like  manner,  it  is  urged,  the  judgment  is  also  one.  It  is 
not  built  out  of  particular  states,  and  needs  nothing  beyond 
the  one  judging  act  itself. 

This  claim  is  subtle  rather  than  profound.  There  is  a 
clear  conception  of  the  impossibility  of  building  complex 
conceptions  out  of  simple  ones  by  mere  juxtaposition ;  but 
along  with  this  there  is  a  confusion  of  logical  simplicity 
with  psychological  simplicity.  Psychologically,  no  doubt, 
the  conception  of  plurality  is  as  truly  a  single  act  as  the 
conception  of  unity.  The  conception  of  a  watch  is  as  truly 
one  as  the  conception  of  a  single  wheel.  But  logically  the 
one  conception  has  a  plurality  of  elements ;  and  there  can 
be  no  true  thought  until  the  unity  of  the  conception  is 
distinguished  into  the  plurality  of  its  implications.  Over 
against  the  plurality  we  must  affirm  a  unity  ;  and,  equally, 
over  against  the  unity  we  must  affirm  plurality.     Analysis 


22  THEORY  OF  THOUGHT  AND  KNOWLEDGE 

is  as  necessary  as  synthesis.  The  judgment,  then,  may  be 
psychologically  one,  but  logically  it  involves  the  distinction 
of  a  and  h  as  well  as  their  union.  Without  this  distinction 
the  judgment  is  impossible.  And  for  this  logical  distinc- 
tion and  union  alike  we  need  something  which  is  neither 
a  nor  J,  but  which  comprehends  and  acts  upon  both.  This 
something  we  call  the  self.  By  it  we  mean  not  anything 
sensuously  or  imaginatively  presentable,  but  only  that  uni- 
tary and  abiding  principle  revealed  in  thought,  and  without 
which  thought  is  impossible. 

The  judgment  as  an  act  is  unique  and  lonel3\  Physical 
images  only  serve  to  obscure  it,  or,  rather,  contradict  it. 
The  field  of  consciousness  is  spaceless  and  partitionless. 
Our  objects  are  separated,  but  not  in  space  or  time.  They 
are  united,  but  not  spatially  or  temporally.  The  relation 
is  logical,  not  physical,  and  does  not  admit  of  being  pict- 
ured. The  attempt  to  construe  it  to  the  imagination  misses 
its  true  nature,  and  leads  to  that  mechanical  externalisra 
which  seeks  to  build  up  mind  from  without.  How  the 
judging  act  is  possible  is  the  unparalleled  mystery  of  con- 
sciousness. But  then  it  is  a  fact ;  and  the  unity  of  the 
thinking  self  is  not  an  hypothesis  for  its  explanation,  but 
its  analytically  necessary  condition.  Without  this  a  and  h 
fall  asunder,  and  the  judgment  is  impossible. 

Over  against  the  plurality  of  coexistent  particular  states 
the  self  must  be  one ;  over  against  the  plurality  of  succes- 
sive particular  states  the  self  must  be  both  one  and  abid- 
ins:.  The  latter  necessity  is  as  manifest  as  the  former.  For 
if  we  suppose  the  particular  states  to  be  in  time,  they  van- 
ish as  fast  as  they  are  born  ;  and  if  there  be  nothing  which 
abides  across  this  flow  and  unites  the  past  and  the  present 
in  the  unity  of  its  continuous  and  identical  existence,  once 
more  the  judgment  becomes  impossible. 

We  conclude,  then,  that  the  unity  and  identity  of  the 


GENERAL  CONDITIONS  OF  THOUGHT  38 

thinking  self  is  an  absolutely  necessary  condition  of  the 
simplest  and  most  elementary  judgment. 

This  account  of  the  matter  is  not  accepted  by  all.  A 
very  general  claim  of  the  sensational  and  physiological 
school  is  that  a  simple  passive  consciousness  is  possible 
which  is  made  up  of  particular  units  of  feeling  or  impres- 
sions; and  these  impressions,  when  united  by  association, 
are  supposed  to  give  us  the  judgment  as  a  matter  of  course. 
On  this  view  there  is  no  unitary  self  which  judges ;  but 
there  are  particular  impressions  grouped  by  association, 
and  this  grouping  is  the  judgment. 

"We  have  already  pointed  out  that  this  view  overlooks 
the  objective  reference  of  the  judgment,  and  that  in  its 
best  estate  it  can  reach  only  a  fictitious  objectivity,  the 
reality  always  being  only  particular  associated  impressions 
in  some  particular  consciousness.  In  addition,  the  view  has 
no  inner  consistency.  To  begin  with,  its  particular  states 
of  consciousness  which  have  no  reference  to  self  in  them 
are  fictions  of  abstraction,  and  no  data  of  experience,  real 
or  possible.  By  the  time  experience  becomes  anything 
articulate,  it  must  be  owned  by  somebody.  Besides,  if  we 
allow  those  states,  we  are  not  advanced.  For,  by  hypoth- 
esis, no  one  knows  itself,  to  say  nothing  of  knowing  its 
neighbors ;  and  thus  the  conditions  of  the  judgment  are 
not  given.  For  this  we  need,  not  simpl}^  states  of  con- 
sciousness, but  a  consciousness  of  states ;  and  this  is  a  very 
different  thing. 

Nor  will  association  help  us.  Indeed,  association  itself 
means  nothing  except  for  a  consciousness  which  is  not 
composed  of  particular  states,  but  which  in  its  unity  com- 
prises particular  states  as  belonging  to  itself.  In  other 
words,  the  association  of  sensations  is  nothing  in  the  in- 
tellectual world  except  for  an  abiding  self.  To  see  this 
we  need  only  ask  where,  or  for  what,  the  sensations  are 


24  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE 

associated.  To  say  that  they  are  associated  for  one  another 
is  to  endow  them  with  mutual  consciousness.  To  say  that 
they  are  associated  in  the  nerves  is  to  plunge  into  unin- 
telligible cerebral  mythology.  If  there  were  an  indepen- 
dent consciousness  which  embraced  them,  we  might  say 
that  sensations  are  associated  in  consciousness  ;  but  this 
will  not  apply  to  a  view  wTiich  recognizes  only  states  of 
consciousness,  and  no  consciousness  of  states.  Thus  the 
doctrine  has  no  assignable  relevant  meaning  whatever,  ex- 
cept with  reference  to  an  abiding  self. 

Two  naive  and  traditional  oversights  have  always  helped 
this  doctrine  of  association  out  of  its  chief  dithculties.  How 
to  get  particular  impressions  to  recognize  one  another, 
and  how  from  the  juxtaposition  of  particular  units  of  feel- 
ing to  evolve  a  knowledge  of  their  relations  without  invok- 
ing some  superior  principle,  have  always  been  problems  of 
exceeding  difficulty.  The  theorist,  however,  manages  beau- 
tifidly  by  mistaking  his  own  knowledge  of  w^hat  is  to  be 
done  for  a  development  of  that  knowledge  by  the  impres- 
sions themselves.  Accordingly,  when  he  has  fairly  con- 
fused himself  with  learned  phrases  about  assimilative,  suc- 
cessive, complicative,  and  other  association,  he  announces 
that  the  work  is  done.  But  when  we  insist  on  walking 
by  sight  rather  than  by  faith,  it  turns  out  that  nothing  is 
done,  and  that  his  apparent  success  is  due  to  mixing  him- 
self up  with  the  problem. 

The  other  oversight  is  the  one  by  which  sensationalism 
saves  itself  from  nihilism.  The  traditional  means  of  es- 
cape from  this  collapse  consists  in  the  traditional  ambi- 
guity of  the  terms  sensation  and  impression.  Impression 
may  mean  a  simple,  unqualified,  unrelated  state  of  con- 
sciousness, and  it  may  mean  an  impression  of  something 
by  something.  Sensation  is  similarly  ambiguous.  With 
the  former  meaning  the  issue  is  nihilism ;  with  the  latter 


GENERAL    CONDITIONS    OF   THOUGHT  25 

meaning  we  have  a  fair  set  of  rational  ideas  latent  in  the 
sense  data.  This  ambiguity  is  sensationalism's  most  pre- 
cious heirloom  and  its  chief  stock  in  trade.  This  has  been 
shown  with  most  painful  thoroughness  by  Green  in  the 
introduction  to  his  edition  of  Hume's  works. 

The  necessity  of  the  unitary  and  abiding  self  is  strin- 
gent, but  sometimes  attempts  are  made  to  avoid  the  ad- 
mission by  changing  the  name.  Thus,  it  is  said,  what  is 
really  necessary  is  not  the  unity  of  self,  but  tlie  unity  of 
consciousness.  This  turns  out,  however,  to  be  only  another 
name  for  the  same  thing.  For  this  consciousness  which  is 
one  is  no  sum  or  function  of  particular  states.  On  the 
contrary,  it  has  states,  distinguishes  itself  from  them,  dis- 
criminates, compares,  and  unites  them,  and  abides  through 
them  as  self-identical.  But  that  which  does  all  this  is  pre- 
cisely what  we  mean  by  the  self.  The  names  differ,  but 
the  meaning  is  the  same. 

Or  suppose  we  venture  a  still  airier  abstraction  and  say 
that  the  only  unity  in  the  case  is  the  self-distinguishing, 
self-identifying  thought.  Here  again  it  is  plain  either  that 
we  have  nonsense,  or  else  an  odd  description  of  the  self. 
So  long  as  this  thought  is  conceived  as  a  particular  and 
passing  conception  we  have  nonsense.  That  a  particular 
conception,  sa}^  inkstand,  should  so  distinguish  or  identify 
itself  as  to  become  aware  of  other  particular  concei)tions,  as 
chair,  table,  tree,  house,  and  have  opinions  about  them, 
would  be  a  performance  worth  seeing.  But  if  our  view  is 
to  escape  this  tedious  imbecility,  then  our  self-distinguish- 
ing, self-identifying  thought  must  be  conceived  as  some- 
thing above  particular  thoughts,  as  having,  comparing,  and 
judging  them,  and  as  abiding  through  them.  To  be  sure, 
we  should  have  a  very  doubtful  use  of  language,  but  this 
curious  "thought"  would  be  what  we  mean  by  the  unitary' 
and  abiding  self. 


36  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

This  fact  deserves  emphasis,  as  a  weak  dread  of  recog- 
nizing the  self  is  a  prominent  feature  of  current  psychologi- 
cal speculation.  Ambitious  clergymen  and  magazine  scien- 
tists are  fond  of  affecting  an  acquaintance  with  science  for 
the  sake  of  giving  greater  weight  to  their  own  rather 
cloudy  utterances.  The  result  is  a  body  of  doctrine  which, 
in  distinction  from  science  proper,  might  well  be  called 
pulpit  and  magazine  science.  Latterly  psychologists  have 
been  falling;  into  the  same  bad  wav.  Doctrines  like  the 
conservation  of  energy  have  been  picked  up  by  hearsay 
and  verbally  exegeted  without  any  suspicion  of  their  limi- 
tations. In  this  way  we  have  been  forbidden  to  think 
that  our  thought,  or  purpose,  or  volition,  has  anything 
to  do  with  the  direction  of  our  bodies,  under  penalty  of 
being  unscientific.  Again,  a  good  many  physical  inquiries 
may  be  pursued  on  a  phenomenal  basis;  and  metaphysical 
questions  are  rightly  excluded  as  irrelevant.  Accordingly 
the  half-educated,  with  whom  a  little  learning  has  been 
unusually  disastrous,  give  out  that  metaphysical  notions 
are  unscientific ;  and  unscientific  in  turn  passes  for  ficti- 
tious. 

Under  the  pressure  of  such  verbal  intimidations,  some  of 
the  weaker  brethren  among  the  psychologists  have  such 
fear  of  the  "  scientist "  before  their  eyes  that  they  are  ready 
to  ignore  facts  in  order  to  be  scientific.  It  is  supposed  to 
be  metaphysical,  and  hence  unscientific,  to  speak  of  a  real 
self;  and  hence  they  hesitate  to  do  so  for  fear  of  losing 
caste  with  the  "  scientists."  These  weak  brethren  need  to 
be  both  enlightened  and  encouraged  by  being  told  that  it  is 
a  false  science  which  owes  allegiance  to  anything  but  fact 
and  logic,  and  that  it  is  metaphysical  to  speak  of  a  real 
anything.  A  real  world,  a  real  atom,  a  real  force,  a  real 
energy,  a  real  existence  are  highly  metaphysical  notions ; 
and  it  excites  surprise  to  find  persons  who  are  devout  be- 


GENERAL   CONDITIONS    OF    THOUGHT  37 

lievers  in  such  things  suddenly  shying  at  the  notion  of  a 
real  self  on  the  ground  of  its  being  metaphysical. 

Only  a  theoretical  prude,  therefore,  or  one  so  anxious  for 
the  purity  of  science  as  to  forget  that  science  itself  must 
be  subordinated  to  fact,  will  take  offence  at  the  notion  of 
the  self  if  the  facts  call  for  it.  But  in  affirming  the  self 
we  affirm  nothing  picturable  or  sensuously  presentable,  but 
only  what  we  mean  and  experience  when  we  say  "I."  And 
this  self,  so  far  from  being  a  questionable  fact,  is  one  of  the 
surest  items  of  experience.  The  sun  in  the  heavens,  as  ob- 
jective reality,  is  far  more  questionable.  If  science  is  to 
deal  with  facts  without  distortion,  no  fact  can  well  be  more 
scientific  than  the  one  thus  described  by  Thomas  Reid  : 
"I  am  not  thought,  I  am  not  action,  I  am  not  feeling;  I 
am  something  '  that  thinks  and  acts  and  feels.'  The  self 
or  I  is  permanent,  and  has  the  same  relation  to  all  the 
succeeding  thoughts,  acts,  and  feelings  which  I  call  mine." 
However  we  may  change  the  name,  we  are  forced  to  re- 
tain the  tiling,  or  the  thought  life  falls  asunder  and  van- 
ishes. 

Sundry  metaphysical  questions  may  indeed  be  raised 
concerning  the  nature  of  this  self  and  in  what  its  perma- 
nence consists ;  but  they  do  not  touch  the  fact  of  perma- 
nence. The  fact  is  revealed  in  thought  itself;  and  no  one 
has  ever  succeeded  in  more  than  a  verbal  denial  of  it. 
Moreover,  the  metaphysical  questions  apply  equally  to  all 
reality,  and  are  no  special  difficulties  of  psychology.  On 
the  plane  of  ordinary  thinking,  where  for  action  we  de- 
mand an  agent,  and  for  changing  states  an  abiding  subject, 
there  is  nothing  which  can  show  a  better  title  to  be  called 
real  and  abiding  than  the  thinking  self.  And  if  we  raise  the 
deeper  metaphysical  questions  we  find  the  apparent  reali- 
ties of  sense  perception  vanishing  into  phenomena,  while 
selfhood  seems  to  be  the  only  thing  that  can  show  any 


2b  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

claim  to  abiding  existence.  But  these  deeper  problems  we 
hand  over  to  metaph^'sics.  Here  it  suffices  to  point  out 
that,  whatever  mystery  the  reality  and  permanence  of  the 
self  may  involve,  they  cannot  be  denied  without  wrecking 
thought  altogether.  As  to  the  fact,  the  uninitiated  will 
hnd  some  help  in  deciding  from  remembering  that  the  claim 
is  simply  that  I  am  not  thoughts  but  I  think,  and  that  I 
who  now  think  am  the  same  who  thought  yesterday. 

That  the  self  is  not  independent  of  all  conditions  in  the 
performance  of  its  synthetic  function  of  consciousness  is 
known  by  experience.  Here  belong  all  the  facts  of  mental 
dependence  on  normal  physical  conditions.  But  the  unity 
of  the  mental  subject  is  demonstrated  by  the  fact  of  any 
rational  consciousness.  It  is  not  the  consciousness  that  we 
are  one  which  is  decisive,  but  that  we  are  conscious  at  all. 

The  oversight  of  this  fact,  common  among  sensationalists, 
is  due  to  several  reasons  :  (1)  The  unity  denied  is  commonly 
restored  in  some  figure  of  speech,  or  is  assumed  in  the  lan- 
guage employed ;  (2)  the  speculator  performs  the  synthetic 
acts  involved  in  the  judgment  himself,  and  mistakes  this  for 
their  performance  by  the  sensations ;  (3)  he  mistakes  the 
external  union  of  sensations  by  association  for  their  logical 
union  in  a  judgment.  Thus  he  is  led  on  to  a  naive  denial  of 
the  self ;  a  denial  which,  in  one  way  or  another,  he  is  perpet- 
ually recanting.  It  is  interesting  to  trace  the  figures  of 
speech  whereby  the  exiled  self  is  recalled  from  banishment. 
Indeed,  the  abiding  self  has  never  been  denied  except  ver- 
bally. 

The  trick  of  language  whereby  the  self  denied  is  assumed 
in  order  to  express  its  own  denial  is  well  illustrated  in  the 
following  passage  from  Hume,  in  which  he  proclaims  the 
reduction  of  the  self  to  a  flux  of  impressions : 

"  For  my  part,  when  I  enter  most  intimately  into  what  I 
call  myself.  I  always  stumble  on  some  particular  perception 


UENKKAL   CONDITIONS    OF    THOUGHT  29 

or  other,  of  heat  or  cold,  light  or  shade,  love  or  hatred,  pain 
or  pleasure.  1  never  can  catch  myself  at  any  time  without 
a  perception,  and  never  can  observe  anything  but  the  per- 
ception. ...  If  any  one,  upon  serious  and  unprejudiced  re- 
flection, thinks  he  has  a  different  idea  of  himself,  I  must 
confess  I  can  reason  no  longer  with  him.  All  I  can  allow 
him  is  that  he  may  be  in  the  right  as  well  as  I,  and  that  we 
are  essentially  different  in  this  particular.  He  may,  per- 
haps, perceive  something  simple  and  continued,  which  he 
calls  himself ;  though  I  am  certain  there  is  no  such  principle 
in  me."  * 

We  shall  get  a  realizing  sense  of  the  advantage  of  ex- 
pressing a  theory  in  language  which  hides  its  true  nature  if 
we  will  be  at  the  pains  to  substitute  for  the  personal  pro- 
nouns in  this  passage  the  vanishing  impressions  required  by 
the  theory.  As  none  of  these  abides  beyond  the  instant  of 
its  occurrence,  and  all  are  perpetually  dissolving  into  some- 
thing else,  it  follows  that  the  first  I  is  not  the  same  as  the 
second  I,  and  that  of  the  later  I's  no  one  has  any  identity 
with  any  other.  The  Hume  of  the  beginning  of  the  passage 
dissolves  into  any  number  of  other  Humes  before  it  ends. 
But  the  humorous  nonsense  of  the  doctrine  is  concealed  from 
the  reader  b}'^  the  language  employed,  which  throughout  im- 
plies the  denial  of  the  theory.  Indeed,  the  view  cannot  be 
set  forth  in  any  form  of  human  speech  without  hopeless 
contradiction.  If  Hume  had  been  compelled  to  use  the  lan- 
guage of  his  own  theory  it  would  have  needed  no  other  crit- 
icism. When  with  such  a  conception  of  mind  he  can  write, 
"The  mind  has  the  command  over  all  its  ideas,  and  can  sepa- 
rate, unite,  mix,  and  vary  them  as  it  pleases,"  one  can  hardly 
resist  the  impression  that  Hume  is  trying  to  see  how  far  the 
game  of  logical  hide-and-seek  can  be  carried  with  human 
dulness. 

*  Treatise  of  Human  Nature,  Part  IV.,  Sect.  VI. 


30  THEORY  OF  THOUGHT  A^D  KMOWLEDGE 

We  conclude,  then,  that  thought  exists  only  in  relation 
to  a  conscious  and  abiding  subject.  Apart  from  this  rela- 
tion it  is  an  unreal  abstraction. 

The  second  general  condition  of  thought  is  the  law  of 
identity  and  contradiction;  that  is,  our  conceptions  must 
have  fixed  meanings  and  must  be  used  consistently  there- 
with.    This  we  express  symbolically : 

First,  positively,  A  is  A. 

Second,  negatively,  A  is  not  B. 

In  its  positive  form  it  is  called  the  law  of  identity ;  in 
its  negative  form  the  law  of  contradiction.  These  are  not 
separate  and  independent  laws,  but  opposite  sides  of  the 
one  fact  that  no  valid  thought  is  possible  without  fixed 
conceptions  and  consistency  in  their  use.  And  the  forms 
are  always  to  be  interpreted  with  reference  to  this  prin- 
ciple ;  otherwise  they  become  barren  or  misleading.  That 
A  is  A,  or  that  everything  is  equal  to  itself,  is  .1  tautology. 
That  everything  is  its  own  predicate  is  a  form  of  empty 
words.  That  A  is  not  B  is  generally  false ;  for  the  great 
mass  of  affirmative  categorical  judgments  have  for  their 
formula  A  is  B.  But  we  readily  find  our  way  through 
these  verbalisms  by  remembering  that  the  logical  law  in 
question  only  demands  fixed  meanings  for  our  conceptions 
and  consistency  in  their  use. 

A  second  law  is  commonly  given  as  the  law  of  the  ex- 
cluded middle.  According  to  this  law,  a  given  subject  must 
either  have  or  not  have  a  given  predicate.  Any  third  pos- 
sibility is  excluded.  But  so  far  as  logical  form  is  concerned 
this  is  no  independent  law,  but  only  an  implication  of  the 
law  of  identity  and  contradiction. 

In  concrete  application  these  laws  are  often  in  appear- 
ance rightly  violated ;  and  thus  it  might  seem  that  they  are 
not  really  laws  of  thought.    A  is  often  not  A;  and  between 


GENEKAL  CONDITIONS  OF  THOUGHT  31 

B  and  non -5  there  are  often  many  middles  which  are  not 
excluded.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that,  in  actual  thinking, 
both  affirmation  and  negation  are  often  limited  and  rela- 
tive. In  such  cases  the  contradiction  is  only  apparent,  and 
in  no  way  aflfects  the  validity  of  the  logical  law.  Living 
speech  abounds  in  such  contradiction,  but  only  the  un- 
happy verbalist  finds  any  diflSculty  therein.  All  others  take 
the  language  as  it  is  meant,  and  regard  the  implied  limita- 
tions. 

The  law  of  identity  in  its  double  aspect,  and  with  its 
implication  of  the  excluded  middle,  is  the  only  one  recog- 
nized by  the  traditional  formal  logic — a  logic  which  has 
nothing  to  do  with  truth  or  knowledge,  but  only  with 
formal  consistency  in  statement.  Such  logic  may  be  good 
as  far  as  it  goes,  but  that  it  does  not  go  far  is  evident. 

This  formal  principle  of  consistency  is  to  be  distin- 
guished from  the  metaphysical  category  of  identity.  The 
failure  to  do  so  is  at  the  bottom  of  some  confusion  in  the 
history  of  thought.  The  Eleatics  made  it  affirm  the  impos- 
sibility of  any  change,  and  Hegel  denied  that  it  is  a  law  of 
thought  at  all.  However  this  may  be  metaphysically,  the 
necessity  of  the  law  as  a  formal  condition  of  thought  is 
manifest,  as  without  it  nothing  would  mean  anything,  and 
both  affirmation  and  denial  would  be  emptied  of  all  signifi- 
cance or  distinction. 

The  real  diflQculty  in  the  case  is  this:  If  our  thought 
absolutely  created  its  objects,  it  could  fix  and  define  them 
on  its  own  warrant ;  or  if  our  thought  were  concerned 
only  Avith  a  system  of  changeless  ideas,  the  law  of  identity 
would  present  no  difficulty.  But  this  is  the  case  with  us  to 
a  very  slight  degree.  For  the  most  part,  our  thought  is 
engaged  in  grasping  an  existence  which  it  does  not  make 
and  which  is  constantly  changing.  In  order  to  do  this  the 
mind  must  of  course  impose  its  own  laws  upon  the  inde- 


32  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE 

pendent  existence.  And  here  the  fact. appears  of  a  certain 
antithesis  between  the  laws  of  our  thought  and  the  nature 
of  many  of  its  objects.  In  thought  itself  there  must  be 
no  flow.  The  contents  of  ideas  must  be  constant  quanti- 
ties. If  there  be  change  in  reality  the  mind  must  stiffen 
even  the  change  into  fixity.  The  thought  of  change  must 
be  as  changeless  as  the  thought  of  the  unchanging.  It  was 
this  fixity  of  the  ideas  with  which  Socrates  overcame  the 
scepticism  which  sprang  out  of  the  dissolving  flux  of  the 
sophists;  but  in  turn  it  gives  rise  to  the  problem  how  to 
express  a  changing  existence  by  changeless  ideas,  and  this 
problem  involves  some  special  puzzles. 

For  instance,  what  fixed  conception  would  truly  express 
the  reality  of  any  developing  thing — say,  a  human  being  ^ 
If  the  conception  had  no  parallax  with  the  fact  at  the  age 
of  thirty,  what  of  it  at  the  age  of  fifteen  ?  or  fifty?  It  would 
seem  that  we  should  need  a  new  conception  for  each  new 
increment  of  change,  and  in  that  case  each  conception 
would  become  invalid  as  soon  as  formed.  Of  course  spon- 
taneous thouo-ht  recoo-nizes  no  difficultv,  for  it  does  not 
even  understand  the  problem  ;  but  reflection  finds  it  diffi- 
cult. If  we  think  to  mend  the  matter  by  including  the  en- 
tire cycle  of  development  in  the  conception,  and  saying  the 
thing  is  all  that  it  is  to  become,  we  unwittingly  take  a  long 
step  in  the  direction  of  idealism,  besides  seriously  scandaliz- 
ing common-sense.  The  boy  is  allowed  to  be  the  father  of 
the  man,  but  how  can  we  say  that  the  boy  is  the  man  ?  or 
that  the  acorn  is  the  oak  \  To  be  sure,  we  cannot  adequate- 
ly define  the  acorn  without  reference  to  the  oak ;  but  the 
acorn  is  just  acorn,  and  all  else  is  idea.  But  when  we  de- 
clare that  the  idea  of  the  completed  thing  is  its  true  reality, 
then  the  reality  lies  in  a  world  of  changeless  ideas ;  and  the 
world  of  changing  things,  where  most  of  us  find  reality,  be- 
comes only  a  temporal  manifestation  of  the  changeless  ideas. 


GENERAL    CONDITIONS    OF    THOUGHT  33 

The  problem  here  is  simple,  almost  elementary ;  but  the 
solution  lies  pretty  deep.  We  shall  find  an  advantage  in 
postponing  its  further  consideration  for  the  present.  Hav- 
ing looked  the  difficulty  boldly  in  the  face,  we  pass  by  on 
the  other  side.  Meanwhile  it  is  plain  that  no  valid  thought 
is  possible  unless^  equals  J.,  and  no  knowledge  is  possible 
unless  the  changing  things  allow  themselves  to  be  grasped 
by  fixed  ideas. 

The  law  of  identity  is  but  the  negative  condition  of 
thought.  If  it  were  the  only  law,  thought  would  come  to 
a  standstill.  Tliis  was  early  shown  by  the  Megarians.  The 
law  sets  objects  apart  in  hard  and  fast  isolation.  A  is  A, 
B  is  B,  C  is  C.  And  the  Megarians  claimed  that  only  such 
identical  judgments  and  the  negative  judgment,  A  is  not 
B,  are  possible.  Thus  they  shut  thought  up  to  identical 
and  negative  judgments  without  motion  or  progress. 

This  necessary  result  of  the  law  of  identity,  when  taken 
abstractly  and  alone,  leads  us  to  the  third  fundamental  con- 
dition of  thought,  or  what  we  have  called  the  objective  or 
ontoloffical  condition.  If  the  law  of  identity  be  the  negative 
principle  of  thought,  we  may  call  this  the  positive  principle. 

A 

The  need  of  some  principle  beyond  the  law  of  identity 
has  long  been  apparent ;  but  the  principle  has  never  been 
satisfactorily  formulated,  or  reduced  to  a  single  and  ade- 
quate  expression.  Leibnitz  called  it  the  law  of  the  suffi- 
cient reason,  but  this  is  generally  recognized  as  an  unsatis- 
factory formulation.  But  whatever  the  formulation,  the 
positive  principle  which  is  necessnry  to  enable  thought  to 
move  at  all  is  the  assumption  of  rational  and  systematic 
connection  among  the  elements  of  that  independent  order 
which  thought  must  assume,  if  it  is  to  be  more  than  a 
meaningless  mental  event;  that  is,  the  objects  of  thought 
must  not  be  isolated  and  unrelated,  but  must  be  variously 


34  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

connected  in  rational  relations.  The  mind  is  impelled  by 
its  nature  to  seek  such  connection,  and  without  assuming 
it  thought  cannot  begin  at  all.  This  is  simply  our  old  as- 
sumption of  belonging  together  once  more  in  distinction 
from  simply  being  or  happening  together. 

This  connection  on  which  thought  depends  may  be  of 
various  kinds.  It  may  be  (1)  of  objects  in  a  class,  (2)  of 
different  classes,  (3)  of  substance  and  attribute,  (4)  of  cause 
and  effect,  (5)  of  ground  and  consequence,  (6)  of  the  suc- 
cessive states  of  a  thing,  etc.  The  necessity  of  such  connec- 
tion is  apparent  if  thought  is  to  be  possible.  Without  the 
connection  of  objects  in  a  common  class,  every  judgment 
becomes  singular.  Without  the  connection  of  inherence, 
the  attributive  judgment  is  baseless.  Without  the  com- 
munication of  classes,  the  subsumptive  judgment  is  impossi- 
ble. Without  the  connection  of  cause  and  effect,  the  causal 
judgment  is  worthless.  Without  the  connection  of  reci- 
procity or  mutual  determination,  existence  breaks  up  into 
unrelated  elements,  and  no  judgment  can  find  its  way  from 
one  thing  to  another.  Without  the  continuity  of  existence, 
past  and  future  fall  hopelessly  asunder,  and  nothing  is  left 
but  vanishing  and  groundless  shadows. 

From  all  this  we  can  understand  the  significance  of 
Hume's  denial  of  connection  between  coexistent  properties 
in  what  we  call  things,  and  between  antecedent  and  con- 
sequent in  time.  Thus  the  outer  world  of  coexistences 
broke  up  into  groups  of  qualities  without  any  inner  union, 
and  the  world  of  cause  and  effect  vanished  into  an  un- 
connected series  of  groundless  events.  Thus  science  was 
made  impossible,  as  its  fundamental  notions  of  law  and 
causation  were  denied.  Finally,  even  the  externality  of 
the  world  and  the  existence  of  other  minds  disappear,  and 
nothing  is  left  but  a  groundless  and  vanishing  phantasma- 
goria in  the  consciousness  of  nobody.     Hence  we  conclude 


GENERAL    CONDITIONS    OF    THOUGHT  35 

once  more  that,  if  there  is  to  be  any  thought,  the  objects 
of  thought  must  form  a  system  or  exist  in  systematic  con- 
nection. 

It  is  a  tradition  with  the  formal  logicians  that  this  law 
of  connection  belongs  to  metaphysics  rather  than  to  logic. 
Of  course  one  may  limit  logic  to  suit  himself,  and  logic 
may  be  limited  to  the  one  law  of  consistency  in  statement. 
Such  logic  is  good  in  its  place  as  a  pedagogical  discipline, 
and  is  always  negatively  valuable.  But  it  ought  not  to  be 
called  the  science  of  thought,  as  it  ignores  the  most  vital 
feature  of  thought.  Such  a  conception  of  thought  is  a  relic 
of  the  period  when  it  was  held  that  perception  is  a  simple 
process  complete  in  itself,  and  independent  of  thought  al- 
together. 

If  it  be  said  that  the  law  of  connection  is  a  law  of  ex- 
istence rather  than  of  thought,  the  answer  is  that  it  could 
never  be  known  as  a  law  of  existence  if  it  were  not  also  a 
law  of  thought.  Since  the  time  of  Kant  it  cannot  be  ques- 
tioned as  a  law  of  thought:  the  onlv  doubt  is  to  what  ex- 
tent  it  is  a  law  of  existence.  This  objection  also  rests  on 
a  precritical  conception  of  knowledge.  The  mind  is  sup- 
posed to  grasp  the  reality  directl}'-  without  any  mediation 
of  thought ;  or,  rather,  the  reality  is  supposed  to  report  it- 
self without  any  mental  activity  whatever. 

Thought,  then,  which  has  any  relation  to  truth  and 
knowledge,  or  which  concerns  itself  at  all  with  its  own 
presuppositions  and  implications,  can  never  escape  making 
a  general  metaphysical  assumption  about  its  objects  and 
their  systematic  connection. 

The  unity  of  the  self,  the  law  of  identity,  and  the  fact 
of  objective  connection  are  the  fundamental  conditions  of 
thought.  In  themselves,  however,  they  give  us  no  objects, 
but  only  the  conditions  of  having  and  dealing  with  objects 
in  general.     How  the  mind  gets  objects  is  our  next  inquiry. 


CHAPTER  III 
HOW    DOES   THE    MIND   GET   OBJECTS  ? 

A  MIND  is  conceivable  which  should  create  its  objects 
outright  by  pure  self-activity  and  without  dependence  upon 
anything  beyond  itself.  Such  is  our  conception  of  the 
Creator's  relation  to  his  objects.  But  this  is  not  the  case 
wnth  us  except  to  a  very  slight  extent.  Our  mental  life 
itself  begins,  and  we  come  only  gradually  to  a  knowledge 
of  things  and  of  ourselves.  In  some  sense  our  objects  are 
given ;  that  is,  we  cannot  have  objects  at  will  or  var}^  their 
properties  at  our  pleasure.  In  this  sense  we  are  passive 
in  knowledge,  and  no  idealism  can  remove  this  fact.  But 
in  some  sense,  also,  our  objects  are  our  own  products ;  for 
an  existing  object  becomes  an  object  for  us  only  as  we  think 
it,  and  thus  make  it  our  object.  In  this  sense  knowledge 
is  an  active  process,  and  not  a  passive  reception  of  ready- 
made  information  from  without.  Formal  logic  only  tells 
what  we  do  witli  objects  after  we  get  them,  but  not  how  we 
get  them.  Empiricism  tells  us  that  we  get  objects  only  by 
experience,  but  fails  to  perceive  that  experience  itself  rests 
upon  a  complex  rational  activity. 

We  have,  then,  to  study  that  activity  of  thought  whereby 
rational  consciousness  and  articulate  experience  are  made 
possible.  Our  study,  however,  has  nothing  to  do  with  the 
temporal  order  of  mental  development,  but  only  with  its 
immanent  logical  principles.  These  remain  the  same,  what- 
ever the  order   and   rate  of  development.      The   present 


HOW    DOES   THE   MIND   GET   OBJECTS?  37 

chapter  aims  only  to  give  a  general  conception  of  the  proc- 
ess of  getting  objects  as  a  form  of  internal  activity.  The 
next  chapter  will  treat  of  the  factors  of  thought  more  in 
detail.  The  trained  reader  will  lose  nothing  in  passing  at 
once  to  that  chapter.  But  the  natural  man  has  such  diffi- 
culty in  grasping  knowledge  as  anything  but  a  passive  re- 
ception of  knowledge  comj^letely  determined  from  without 
that  the  more  general  discussion  seems  pedagogically  neces- 
sary. This  misconception  also  is  the  prolific  mother  of  so 
much  confusion  and  misunderstanding  in  popular  philosophy 
that  some  prolixity  and  repetition  may  be  excused  if  they 
even  tend  toward  its  removal. 

At  the  base  of  our  thought  life  is  the  life  of  sense. 
This  is  something  given.  By  no  effort  of  ours  can  we  pro- 
duce this  life  or  modify  its  laws.  This,  however,  does  not 
mean  that  sensations  are  poured  into  the  mind  from  with- 
out, as  if  things  threw  them  off,  or  as  if  they  were  pro- 
duced by  the  nerves  and  furnished  ready-made  to  conscious- 
ness. On  the  contrary,  the  sensation  itself  is  purely  a 
mental  product,  an  elementary  reaction  of  our  sensibility 
against  external  action.  But  these  reactions  are  no  prod- 
ucts of  thought.  They  result  from  the  structure  of  our 
sensibility,  and  are  strictly  a  datum  for  the  rational  nature. 
If  they  were  not  given  they  could  never  be  produced. 

Because  of  the  elementary  and  factual  nature  of  the 
sense  life,  most  theories  of  human  thought  have  started 
from  it  as  a  common  ground ;  and  the  sensational  theory 
has  aimed  to  exhibit  the  thought  life  as  only  a  modification 
of  sense.  The  untenability  of  this  view  has  already  ap- 
peared. Even  in  the  simplest  judgment  of  sense  we  have 
found  not  an  interaction  of  sensations,  but  an  action  upon 
sensations,  a  unique  synthesis  by  thought.  It  is,  however, 
a  very  natural  view  that  the  sensations  are  already  com- 
pletely determined  in  themselves,  so  that  thought  does  not 


1^49587 


38  THEORY   OF   THOUGHT   AND   KNOWLEDGE 

constitute  them  in  any  sense,  but  finds  them  ready-made. 
If,  then,  we  can  find  some  principle  of  movement  and  group- 
ing among  the  sensations  whereby  they  may  be  united  into 
orders  of  coexistence  and  sequence,  we  need  not  look  be- 
yond them  for  any  special  thought  principle. 

This  view  of  the  complete  passivity  of  the  mind,  at  least 
in  sensation,  is  about  self-evident  to  all  minds  on  the  sense 
plane.  Nevertheless,  it  is  mistaken.  The  constitutive  ac- 
tion of  thought  penetrates  even  into  sensation  as  an  ar- 
ticulate experience ;  and  sensations  become  anything  for 
thought  only  through  the  action  of  thought  itself.  This 
is  to  be  shown. 

A  sensation  in  itself,  or  apart  from  thought,  is  simply  a 
peculiar  affection  of  the  sensibility.  But  the  sensation  as 
occurring  has  no  unity  and  no  identity.  As  temporal,  its 
successive  phases  are  mutually  external  and  mutually 
other,  or  different.  Like  an  exploding  Catherine  -  wheel, 
the  occurring  impression  sputters  all  around  the  circle ;  and 
Avhen  we  attempt  to  grasp  it  only  a  mental  blur  results, 
unless  the  mind  fixes  the  dissolving  impression  into  a  sin- 
gle and  abiding  meaning.  Only  thus  can  a  sensation  be- 
come an  object  for  thought. 

We  have,  say,  a  color  sensation,  and  in  this  the  mind 
seems  to  be  purely  passive  and  receptive.  Of  course  we  can- 
not have  sensations  at  will,  and  in  this  sense  we  are  passive. 
But  even  in  this  passive  experience  the  mind  does  more 
than  simply  read  off  what  is  given.  For  in  calling  it  a 
sensation,  whether  in  distinction  from  the  self  or  from 
other  sensations,  we  already  posit  it  as  a  definite  and  self- 
identical  content.  The  impression,  apart  from  this  act  of 
fixation,  involves  an  indefinite  multiplicity  in  itself,  just  as 
the  motion  of  a  body  from  ^  to  ^  is  no  simple  and  single 
thing,  but  an  indefinite  number  of  movements  through  all 
the  intervening  points.     And  as  this  motion  becomes  a  sin- 


HOW   DOES    THE    MIND    GET   OBJECTS?  39 

gle  one  only  as  the  mind  constitutes  it  such,  so  the  indef- 
inite manifold  involved  in  a  sense-impression  becomes  a  sin- 
gle and  simple  sensation  only  as  the  mind  constitutes  it 
such.  Hence  the  experience  of  a  single  sensation  as  any- 
thing articulate  implies,  as  its  absolute  condition,  that  the 
mind  constitute  it  one  and  identical.  Until  this  is  done 
the  impression  is  as  good  as  nothing  for  us.  Sensations 
must  be  fixed  and  defined  with  reference  to  a  permanent 
meaning  before  they  can  be  anything  for  thought.  In 
other  words,  the  color  sensation  must  become  a  sensation 
of  color. 

Now  to  the  sense-bound  mind  this  must  seem  to  be  the 
veriest  trifling.  The  sensation  is  one  as  a  matter  of  course; 
for  who  would  think  of  calling  it  two?  As  to  the  distinc- 
tion between  a  color  sensation  and  a  sensation  of  color, 
nothing  could  well  be  imagined  more  utterly  verbal  and 
barren. 

AVithout  doubt  so  it  must  seem  ;  for  the  work  of  thought 
is  so  quick  and  subtle  that  it  requires  some  care  to  recog- 
nize it.  Thought  is  amazingly  successful  in  hiding  behind 
itself.  "We  must  make  an  effort  to  unmask  it  and  bring  it 
to  self-recognition. 

And,  first,  as  to  the  unity  of  the  sensation.  Let  us  sup- 
pose the  impression  to  last  through  a  certain  time.  It  is 
plain  that  the  earlier  parts  of  this  time  are  not  the  later 
parts.  The  time,  therefore,  as  occurring  is  not  one  but  an 
indefinite  manifold.  Left  to  itself  it  would  never  become 
one,  for  it  has  no  unity  in  it.  Such  unity  as  the  time  has 
it  owes  to  the  intellect. 

But  the  impression  as  occurring  is  equally  an  indefinite 
manifold.  The  impression  as  occurring  in  the  earlier  parts 
of  the  time  is  not  the  impression  as  occurring  in  the  later 
parts  of  the  time.  Each  impression  as  existing  vanishes 
with  its  date,  and  as  the  time  admits  of  indefinite  division 


40  THEORY  OF  THOUGHT  AND  KNOWLEDGE 

the  impression  becomes  indefinitely  many.  "Where,  then,  is 
its  unity?  Manifestly  it  has  none  in  itself;  it  acquires  it 
only  through  the  act  of  thought  which  constitutes  it  one. 
The  impression  as  occurring  is  a  continuous  flow,  and 
thought  transforms  it  into  a  fixed  idea. 

And  now  it  should  not  surprise  us  to  hear  common-sense 
claiming  that  it  is  one  and  the  same  impression  throughout 
the  whole  period  of  its  occurrence.  But  this  only  illus- 
trates once  more  the  difficultv  which  untrained  thought  has 
in  recognizing  itself.  For  the  impression  is  not  the  same 
as  occurring ;  it  is  the  same  only  in  the  sense  that  a  fixed 
intellectual  meaning  is  illustrated  or  expressed  in  all  its 
phases.  But  before  this  can  be  recognized  the  fixed  mean- 
ing must  be  distinguished  from  the  flowing  impression  ; 
that  is,  once  more  the  color  sensation  must  become  a  sensa- 
tion of  color,  which  is  really  a  verj-  different  thing.  The 
former  is  the  color  impression  as  occurring;  the  latter  is 
the  color  impression  as  the  bearer  of  an  abiding  and  recog- 
nizable meaning.  The  former  is  a  flowing  affection  of  the 
sensibility  ;  the  latter  is  a  timeless  idea  of  the  intellect. 

This  conclusion  we  reach  by  a  simple  analysis  of  the 
facts  and  their  implications.  It  is  not  claimed  that  there 
is  no  period  of  passive  sensibility  preceding  the  action  of 
thought,  A  great  deal  is  imagined  about  that,  but  not 
much  is  known,  and  the  imaginings  are  largely  inconsist- 
ent. But  whatever  the  fact  may  be  in  this  respect,  those 
sensitive  states  become  something  for  thought  only  through 
the  constitutive  activity  of  intelligence.  For  any  who  think 
otherwise  we  propose  the  problem ;  Given  a  flow  of  states, 
each  of  which  perishes  as  fast  as  it  is  born,  to  deduce,  or  in 
any  way  reach,  any  articulate  conception  whatever.  It  is 
respectfully  suggested  that  all  who  undertake  the  problem 
should  carefully  refrain  from  falsifying  the  question  by  im- 
porting their  own  knowledge  of  what  is  to  be  deduced  into 


HOW    DOES   THE    MIND   GET    OBJECTS  ?  41 

the  data  of  the  problem.  If  this  care  be  exercised  it  will 
appear  that  the  temporal,  as  such,  eludes  all  knowledge 
until  it  is  brought  under  the  control  of  a  timeless  idea. 

There  is,  then,  an  implicit  logical  activity  in  the  simplest 
sensation  by  the  time  it  is  anything  for  intelligence.  This 
activity  finds  further  and  more  manifest  illustration  in  the 
fact  of  recurrent  experience,  of  which  the  associationalist 
makes  so  much  in  his  theory,  and  which  common -sense 
finds  quite  a  matter  of  course.  It  appears  that  this  fact 
involves  a  complex  logical  activity,  and  is  possible  only  for 
an  intelligence  which  has  transformed  its  particular  experi- 
ences into  general  conceptions  of  abiding  significance. 

How  is  recurrence  in  experience  possible  ?  The  answer 
is  that  on  the  plane  of  fact,  or  as  a  psychological  event,  re- 
currence is  not  possible.  All  that  is  possible  on  this  plane 
is  the  occurrence  of  similar  experiences,  the  similarity  re- 
maining unrecognized.  Recurrence,  however,  implies  iden- 
tity or  continuity,  and  there  is  no  identity  between  the 
sensation  occurring  yesterday  and  the  similar  one  occur- 
ring to-day.  As  the  recurring  day  is  another  day,  so  the 
recurring  sensation  is  another  sensation.  In  the  field  even 
of  simple  sensation  recurrence  is  impossible  for  a  merely 
registering  intellect — it  is  possible  only  for  a  universaliz- 
ing intellect ;  that  is,  for  an  intellect  for  which  the  simple 
experiences  are  not  merely  particular  vanishing  mental 
events,  but  also  bearers  of  an  abiding  rational  meaning 
which  is  common  to  all  and  identical  in  all.  In  other 
words,  they  must  be  at  least  implicitly  classified  and  dis- 
tinguished from  the  universal  as  its  concrete  specifications. 

If,  then,  we  speak  of  recurring  sensations,  we  have,  at 
least  tacitly,  risen  above  the  sensations  as  particular  impres- 
sions, and  are  operating  with  the  logical  universal.  We 
have  reached  the  universal,  unwittingly  indeed,  but  we  have 


42  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE  ' 

reached  it  nevertheless.    This  is  equally  true  when  we  speak 
of  associated  sensations.     A  sensation  as  event  admits  of  no  i 

recall.     The  actual  sensation  in  its  own  particular  existence  i 

can  recur  as  little  as  past  time  can  recur.     The  new  sensa-  ! 

tion  also  which,  as  event,  is  here  for  the  first  time  has  never  ■ 

been  associated  with  anything,  and  could  never  recall  any-  I 

thing.  The  new  event  has  as  little  association  with  past 
events  as  the  new  day  has  with  past  days.  Thus  the  doc- 
trine stands  still,  or  vanishes  into  a  grotesque  psychological  : 
mythology,  unless  we  transfer  our  thought  from  the  vanish-  I 
ing  event  to  its  abiding  logical  equivalent ;  and  in  order  to 
do  that  we  must  already  have  passed  beyond  the  particular 
to  the  universal.                                                                                    . 

Now  all  this  is  so  foreign  to  our  spontaneous  thought  j 

that  it  might  easily  seem  absurd.     The  work  of  thought,  \ 

we  have  said,  is  so  subtle  and  so  quick  that  we  fail  to  recog- 
nize it.  How  foreign  this  is  to  uncritical  thought  appears  j 
especially  from  the  course  of  the  associational  philosophy.  ; 
That  philosophy  operates  from  the  start  with  universals,  ! 
but  it  naively  supposes  it  is  dealing  with  the  unmodified  ; 
particulars.  Its  apparent  success  depends  largely  upon  this 
confusion. 

But  a  scruple  remains  behind  and  presses  for  utterance. 
One  is  uneasy  at  this  liberal  attribution  of  logical  work  of  j 

which  we  are  by  no  means  conscious.     One  is  inclined,  then,  , 

to  lessen  the  amount  of  this  work  by  saying  that  in  recurrent  i 

experience  the  particular  experiences  are  all,  and  that  the  I 

only  further  fact  is  a  certain  similarity  among  them.     Ee-  j 

currence  in  experience  means  simply  the  occurrence  of  sim-  i 

ilar  experiences.  i 

There  are  cases  where  this  seems  to  express  the  objective 
fact  fairly  well.  It  could  not,  indeed,  be  applied  to  our  suc- 
cessive experiences  of  the  same  thing  without  landing  us  in 
the  abysses ;  but  it  seems  to  describe  the  objective  fact  in 


HOW    DOES    THE    MIND    GET    OBJECTS?  43 

recurrent  sensation  well  enough.  But  it  does  not  describe 
the  subjective  fact  at  all.  The  assumed  similarity  of  the 
occurring  experiences  implies  all  that  has  been  said  about 
the  implicit  presence  of  the  universal.  The  similarity  itself 
can  onl}'  mean  that  an  identical  or  common  content  finds 
expression  in  the  many  experiences ;  and  however  much  it 
may  be  in  the  things,  it  can  exist  for  us  only  through  a 
logical  activity  whereby  the  one  element  in  the  many  is 
abstracted  and  fixed  as  an  abiding  meaning. 

And  thus  it  turns  out  that  recurrence,  even  in  sense  ex- 
perience, is  not  the  simple,  unraediated  thing  it  appears  to 
be,  but  involves  a  deal  of  implicit  logical  work. 

But,  we  may  further  ask,  considering  the  separateness  of 
all  experiences  as  events,  how  can  there  be  any  recurrence 
whatever  in  experience  ?  As  the  same  thing  cannot  happen 
twice,  it  would  seem  that  recurrence  is  altogether  impossi- 
ble. This  conclusion,  as  we  have  pointed  out,  is  correct  on 
the  plane  of  fact,  or  of  a  simply  registering  intelligence. 
Recurrence  is  possible  only  on  the  plane  of  the  universaliz- 
ing intelligence.  Even  recurrence  of  thought  is  possible 
only  to  a  universalizing  intelligence;  and  then  it  depends  on 
our  distinction  of  thought  as  a  mental  event  from  thought 
as  having  contents  and  validity.  Thought  as  an  event  can 
never  recur;  but  the  logical  contents  may  be  reproduced. 
Thus,  suppose  I  think  triangle  in  the  morning  and  again  in 
the  afternoon.  The  two  acts  are  not  identical.  They  are 
separated  by  time,  by  their  psychological  context,  and  by 
their  own  individuality ;  but  the  contents  are  the  same. 
The  acts  are  double  as  events ;  they  are  one  in  their  signifi- 
cance. As  events,  they  are  two  occurrences ;  as  having 
meaning,  the  second  occurrence  is  a  recurrence  of  the  first. 
But  the  recurrence  consists  entirely  in  the  identity  of  mean- 
ing. It  belongs  to  the  ideal  world  of  logic,  and  is  impossi- 
ble in  the  factual  world  of  psychology. 


44  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

So  much  for  the  recurrence  of  experience.  It  is  almost 
disheartening  after  all  this  to  learn  that  even  yet  we  have 
made  no  provision  for  the  experience  of  recurrence.  This 
demands,  in  addition  to  the  previous  work,  that  we  relate 
the  experiences  to  self  and  to  one  another  under  the  form 
of  time. 

This  work  is  commonly  supposed  to  be  provided  for  by 
memorv.  Sensations  occur  in  succession,  and  hence  are 
known  in  succession,  and  hence  are  re})roduced  in  succes- 
sion as  a  matter  of  course.  But  succession  in  experience  is 
so  little  an  experience  of  succession  that  the  former  by  it- 
self would  make  the  latter  impossible.  Memory  also,  as  a 
mental  event,  is  in  the  present,  and  all  the  contents  of  con- 
sciousness are  in  the  present.  To  introduce  time  distinc- 
tions into  consciousness  would  make  consciousness  impossi- 
ble.  Hence,  if  we  are  to  have  any  experience  of  recurrence, 
the  mind  must  first  give  the  form  of  time  to  its  experience, 
and  by  relating  the  elements  of  its  experience  under  the  form 
of  time,  make  the  distinction  of  past  and  present  j)ossible. 

Thus  it  appears  that  for  an  experience  of  recurrence, 
even  of  sensation,  we  need  (1)  to  relate  our  sensations  under 
the  form  of  time,  (2)  to  raise  the  sensation  from  a  particu- 
lar event  into  an  abiding  logical  meaning,  and  (3)  to  assim- 
ilate the  later  exjierience  to  the  earlier  by  identifying  the 
contents  common  to  both. 

Thus  in  this  most  elementary  experience — so  elementary, 
indeed,  as  to  seem  to  lie  below  thought  altogether — we  find 
a  subtle  logical  activity  implicit.  The  work  is  not  reflec- 
tively done,  but  is  really  done,  nevertheless.  The  mind 
does  not  yet  possess  reason,  but  reason  possesses  the  mind. 
Under  the  guidance  of  the  immanent  reason  we  see  the 
mind  lifting  itself  above  the  flux  of  impressions  into  a 
rational  world  which,  while  potential  in  it  from  the  begin- 
ning, only  slowly  becomes  its  conscious  possession. 


HOW   DOES    THE    MIND   GET    OBJECTS?  45 

What  has  been  said  thus  far  applies  to  impressions 
simply  as  states  of  consciousness;  and  we  find  that  they 
become  anvthins'  for  intellif2:ence  only  throuo^h  a  constitu- 
five,  organizing,  classifying  activit}'  of  thought  upon  the 
impressions.  These  as  occurring  have  to  be  transformed 
before  they  are  usable  by  thought.  Thus  it  ap])ears  that 
articulate  sensations  are  by  no  means  data  of  })assive  ex- 
perience which  deliver  themselves  unmodified  in  a  passive 
consciousness ;  and  thus  it  further  appears  that  sensations, 
which  are  often  looked  upon  as  the  elements  out  of  which, 
by  association,  intellect  is  built,  are  really  products  of  in- 
tellect, so  far  as  they  are  anything  intelligible.  The  raw 
material  itself  must  receive  a  mental  form  before  it  can 
enter  into  the  mental  structure. 

Succession  is  pre-eminently  the  law  of  the  cosmical  and 
psychological  fact  considered  in  abstraction  from  intelli- 
gence. It  is  now  clear  that  such  a  fact  can  never  be  an 
object  of  knowledge,  except  through  the  mediation  of  some 
superior  principle.  Two  fixities  are  needed  to  make  a 
knowledge  of  the  successive  possible :  the  fixity  of  the  self 
and  the  fixity  of  the  idea.  With  the  denial  of  either  of 
these  the  knowledge  of  the  successive  vanishes  altogether. 

Here  it  may  occur  to  some  one  who  has  heard  of  the 
ideality  of  time  that  there  is  no  real  succession  because 
there  is  no  real  time.  This  is  at  best  an  unfruitful  refine- 
ment at  this  place,  and,  moreover,  the  doctrine  is  not  very 
clear  in  its  bearings  on  the  present  question.  For  whether 
time  be  ontologically  real  or  not,  apparent  time  is  an  un- 
deniable element  of  experience,  and  the  present  problem 
would  receive  no  simplification.  For  supposing  that  events 
are  really  successive,  we  have  only  to  explain  how  a  knowl- 
edge of  succession  is  possible.  But  if  we  suppose  that 
events  are  not  successive  we  have  to  explain  the  appear- 
ance of  succession,  as  well  as  the  possibility  of  knowing  it. 


46  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

Besides,  it  is  not  easy  to  admit  that  day  and  night  occur 
together  or  that  the  earth  is  on  all  sides  of  the  sun  at 
once.  The  ideality  of  time  must  have  some  other  mean- 
ing than  this,  and  that  meaning  lies  too  deep  in  the  ob- 
scurities of  metaphysics  for  present  discussion.  The  rela- 
tion of  the  absolute  being  to  the  cosmic  order  is  involved, 
and  our  present  concern  is  with  our  human  life  and  knowl- 
edge. 

The  immanent  activity  of  thought  in  sense  experience 
finds  further  illustration  in  the  interpretation  of  the  impres- 
sions. For  thought  does  not  rest  in  the  apprehension  of 
sensations  as  having  simple  and  identical  qualitative  con- 
tents; it  proceeds  to  relate  them  variously  and  interpret 
them.  Only  thus  does  thought  reach  a  world  of  reality 
and  of  rational  system. 

And  here  again  untrained  thought  finds  it  hard  to  recog- 
nize itself.  As  it  seems  a  matter  of  course  that  sensation 
should  be  complete  in  itself  without  any  qualifying  action  of 
intelligence,  so  it  seems  equally  a  matter  of  course  that  sen- 
sation should  interpret  itself.  And  so  it  is,  after  thought 
has  given  sensation  a  rational  significance.  After  thought 
has  projected  sensation  as  the  effect  or  quality  of  a  thing  it 
is  very  easy  to  find  the  notions  of  thing,  quality,  and  causa- 
tion in  sensation.  After  thought  has  related  sensation  to 
self,  there  is  no  difficulty  in  abstracting  the  notion  of  self 
from  the  sense  life.  But  to  get  these  ideas  from  the  impres- 
sion as  occurring  is  a  problem  of  another  order  of  difficulty. 
It  is,  however,  the  real  problem  for  those  who  view  mind  as 
the  passive  recipient  of  sensations  completely  qualified  from 
without. 

The  insolubility  of  this  problem  has  been  manifest  to  all 
with  eyes  to  see  since  the  time  of  Hume.  The  immediate 
outcome  of  such  a  view  is  nihilism,  in  which  both  subject 


HOW    DOES    THE    MIND    GET    OBJECTS?  47 

and  object  disappear  in  an  indistinguishable  haze.  Even 
solipsism  is  impossible ;  for  the  mind  reaches  itself  only 
through  its  own  rational  activity.  But  crude  thought  never 
dreams  of  distinguishing  between  the  original  properties  of 
the  impressions  and  the  qualifications  they  receive  from  the 
mind  itself.  Hence  it  seems  to  find  a  great  many  things  in 
passive  experience  which  were  never  there.  Sensationalism 
recognizes  the  distinction  only  in  a  hesitating  and  uncertain 
way.  From  the  naive  empiricism  of  Locke  to  the  more  so- 
phisticated associationalism  of  our  day  the  doctrine  has 
found  its  chief  support  in  the  verbal  ambiguity  thence  result- 
ing. We  have  already  referred  to  this  ambiguity  as  the 
traditional  means  of  escape  from  the  nihilism  implicit  in  a 
consistent  sensationalism. 

Impressions  organized  and  interpreted  by  thought  may 
well  be  a  source  of  information  ;  but  impressions  left  to 
themselves  are  nothing  intelligible,  and  reveal  nothing  intel- 
ligible. Articulated  sound  when  informed  and  interpreted 
by  thought  becomes  rational  speech  ;  but  in  and  by  itself  it 
is  only  noise.  Whatever  meaning  it  has  is  given  to  it ;  it 
can  have  no  meaning  for  itself.  If,  now,  some  speculator 
should  propose  to  develop  language  by  allowing  sounds  to 
associate  and  evolve  meaning  for  themselves,  we  should  have 
an  exact  parallel  of  the  philosophy  which  aims  to  build  in- 
telligence out  of  sensation.  And  if  our  speculator  should  be 
chronically  uncertain  whether,  by  language,  he  means  artic- 
ulated noise  or  speech  informed  by  thought,  he  would  per- 
fectly illustrate  the  ambiguity  of  the  sensational  philosophy. 
If,  finally,  he  should  conclude  from  the  rationality  of  speech 
that  the  thought  is  in  the  words  and  needs  no  mind  to  put 
it  there,  since  any  one  with  ears  can  hear  the  thought,  he 
would  also  illustrate  the  difficulty  crude  thought  is  under  in 
recognizing  itself.  It  requires  more  wit  than  is  always  pres- 
ent to  distinguish  between  sound  and  sense,  and  to  see  that 


48  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

noise,  however  loud  or  long,  can  never  of  itself  become  ra- 
tional speech. 

If  we  should  suppose  sensations  universally  quahfied  by 
reference  to  self  as  their  subject,  and  to  fixed  ideas  as  ex- 
pressing their  qualitative  contents,  we  should  still  remain 
within  the  sphere  of  the  individual  consciousness.  But  a 
large  part  of  the  interpretation  of  impressions  consists  in 
transcending  this  subjective  circle  by  relating  our  sensations 
to  a  world  of  real  objects  which  exist  apart  from  our  con- 
sciousness or  knowledge  of  them.  How  this  is  possible  we 
have  now  to  consider. 

How  do  we  pass  from  subjective  and  discontinuous  im- 
pressions to  objective  and  identical  things?  A  formal  an- 
swer is  that  we  get  objects  by  perception.  But  this  is  only 
a  name  for  the  process ;  it  does  not  tell  us  how  perception 
arises  or  is  possible.  In  popular  thought  perception  is  only 
a  passive  reflection  of  objects ;  in  opposition  to  this  view 
we  seek  to  show  that  perception  is  really  an  active  process 
by  which  the  mind  builds  its  objects  for  itself. 

Perception  is  no  problem  for  spontaneous  thought;  it 
becomes  such  only  on  the  development  of  reflective  specu- 
lation. Here  again  thought  hides  behind  itself;  and  thus 
it  comes  to  pass  that  perception,  which  is  a  marvellous 
achievement  of  thought,  is  looked  upon  as  a  matter  of 
course.  Things  exist,  and  the  mind  reflects  them  as  passive- 
ly as  a  mirror  reflects  the  objects  before  it. 

This  concentration  of  the  mind  upon  its  objects  rather 
than  upon  its  own  processes  is  a  most  fortunate  circum- 
stance for  both  mental  health  and  progress.  Because  of  it, 
the  mind  is  taken  out  of  itself  and  introduced  to  the  world 
of  things  without  being  delayed  among  the  obscure  and  in- 
tricate processes  of  knowledge.  Had  we  been  left  to  argue 
our  way  from  the  self  to  the  not-self  we  should  certainly 
have  made  sorry  work  of  it,  as  especially  appears  from  the 


HOW    DOES   THE   MIND   GET   OBJECTS?  49 

fact  that  we  are  not  over-successful  in  speculatively  con- 
struing the  passage  after  it  is  made.  If  we  had  to  learn  to 
walk  from  a  knowledge  of  our  muscles,  we  should  certainly 
never  get  under  way ;  and  if  we  had  to  learn  to  perceive 
by  a  speculative  analysis  of  the  process,  we  should  never 
progress.  Fortunately  the  elements  have  been  kindlier 
mixed.  Our  objects  seem  so  immediately  reflected  in  our 
passively  receptive  consciousness  that  we  assume  that  the 
system  has  only  to  be  in  order  to  be  both  knowable  and 
known.  We  also  seem  to  be  entirely  passive  in  perception, 
and  the  object  appears  to  impose  itself  in  its  objective  real- 
it}^  upon  the  mind.  As  for  any  mysterious  processes  under- 
lying perception,  they  so  little  manifest  themselves  in  con- 
sciousness that  we  must  view  them  as  fictions  of  speculative 
fancy. 

This  is  how  the  matter  presents  itself  to  spontaneous 
thought.  But  a  little  reflection  serves  to  disturb  this  easy 
faith.  The  existence  of  the  object  is  not  a  knowledge  of 
the  object.  The  object  itself  cannot  pass  bodily  into  con- 
sciousness, and  consciousness  cannot  expand  itself  and  em- 
brace the  existing  object.  The  mind  can  do  nothing  but 
think,  and  the  object  can  do  nothing  but  be.  Hence,  unless 
perception  is  to  be  viewed  as  pure  magic,  we  must  contrive 
some  way  of  bringing  the  subject  and  the  object  together. 
Thus  perception  becomes  a  problem.  Our  first  care  must 
be  to  get  a  clearer  conception  of  the  problem. 

Common-sense  assumes  that  a  world  of  things  exists  in 
space  and  time,  altogether  apart  from  mind  and  conscious- 
ness, and  we  know  this  world  by  perception.  The  assump- 
tion itself  may  be  open  to  doubt  in  tlie  form  given,  but  it 
becomes  impregnable  when  changed  to  read  that  a  cosmic 
order  exists  apart  from  our  individual  thought  and  con- 
sciousness. The  first  form  is  a  natural  exaggeration  of  the 
objectivity  of  thought,  which  crude  thinking  is  sure  to  fall 

4 


50  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE 

into.  The  modification  proposed  rescues  the  assumption 
from  the  objections  of  the  idealist,  and  leaves  it  open  to  us 
to  believe  upon  evidence  that  that  world,  which  exists  apart 
from  our  intelligence,  after  all  exists  only  in,  for,  and  by  a 
supreme  intelligence,  instead  of  existing  in  hard  and  fast 
lumpishness,  and  externality  to  all  intelligence  as  common- 
sense  dreams. 

But  admitting  the  existence  of  an  order  beyond  our- 
selves,  our  knowledge  is  not  explained.  The  question  re- 
mains. How  it  can  become  an  object  for  us ;  and  the  answer 
is.  Only  by  thinking  it,  or  constructing  it  in  thought,  and 
thus  making  it  our  object. 

Two  questions  are  to  be  kept  distinct:  first, the  existence 
and  nature  of  the  independent  order ;  and,  secondly,  the 
process  by  which  it  becomes  an  object  for  us.  Only  the 
latter  question  is  now  under  discussion. 

This  problem  has  diificulties  which  do  not  exist  for  our 
knowledge  of  states  of  consciousness.  There  we  needed 
an  activity  of  fixation,  definition,  and  classification,  but  we 
were  not  called  upon  to  transcend  our  consciousness  by 
passing  to  a  world  beyond  it.  But  here  we  have  to  reach 
a  world  of  thinofs  from  states  of  consciousness  which  are 
not  things.  This  demands  some  new  categories,  and  gives 
rise  to  some  special  difficulties. 

There  are  two  general  conceptions  of  the  nature  of  the 
object — realistic  and  idealistic;  but  both  alike  compel  the 
assumption  of  a  complex  constructive  activity  by  the  know- 
ing mind  as  the  condition  of  knowledge. 

Naive  realism  generally  solves  the  problem  by  figures 
of  speech.  For  a  long  time  men  amused  and  confused  them- 
selves by  speaking  of  images  which  are  thrown  off  by  the 
object,  and  which  pass  into  the  mind  and  mediate  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  things  from  which  they  proceed.  This  is  in- 
telligible only  when  applied  to  visual  objects.     When  ap- 


HOW   DOES   THE   MIND   GET   OBJECTS';"  51 

plied  to  the  other  senses,  and  especially  when  applied  to 
the  rational  relations  which  exist  among,  if  they  do  not 
really  constitute,  objects,  the  conception  has  no  intelligible 
meaning,  even  as  a  figure  of  speech.  The  image  of  sound, 
of  hardness,  of  causal  relations  has  no  meaning  whatever. 
And  even  for  visual  objects,  the  notion  is  not  to  be  taken 
literally.  No  one  could  tell  what  he  means  by  the  passage 
of  such  images  into  the  mind  except  as  a  figurative  way 
of  describing  the  fact  of  knowledge  —  a  way,  moreover, 
which  throws  no  light  upon  the  process. 

Equally  worthless  are  the  theories  which  describe  the 
object  as  impressing,  or  stamping,  or  photographing  it- 
self upon  the  mind.  These  too  are  figurative  descrip- 
tions of  the  fact,  which  throw  no  light  upon  the  process. 
If  we  should  take  these  figures  in  earnest,  we  should 
need  to  know  where  is  the  extended  mental  surface  upon 
which  the  stamps  or  impressions  are  made,  and  how 
an  impression  on  the  mind,  conceived  as  extended  sub- 
stance, becomes  an  impression  in  the  mind,  conceived 
as  knowing  subject.  Such  views  lose  all  credit,  except  as 
rhetorical  devices,  as  soon  as  we  reflect  upon  the  physiolog- 
ical conditions  of  perception  and  upon  the  fact  that  knowl- 
edge can  never  be  passed  along  ready-made,  but  arises  and 
exists  only  in  and  through  the  cognitive  act. 

In  all  developed  realistic  views  which  do  not  call  in  God 
as  the  mediator  of  knowledge,  perception  rests  in  some  way 
on  an  interaction  between  the  mind  and  the  object.  We 
get  from  subject  to  object,  it  is  said,  by  the  category  of 
cause  and  effect.  This  is  open  to  many  doubts  when,  by 
the  object,  we  understand  not  merely  something  indepen- 
dent of  ourselves,  but  the  apparently  perceived  object.  To 
all  appearance,  the  latter  is  in  the  passive  voice ;  and  it 
requires  some  ingenuity  to  make  it  the  cause  of  its  own 
perception.     We   pass   over  these    scruples,  however,  and 


52  THEORY  OF  THOUGHT  AND  KNOWLEDGE 

point  out  that  in  all  interaction  nothing  passes  between 
the  agents  ;  but  each  reacts  according  to  its  own  nature, 
so  that  tlie  reaction  in  every  case  is  nothing  carried  into 
the  agent  from  without,  but  is  rather  an  expression  of  the 
agent's  nature  under  the  circumstances.  If,  then,  a  mind  re- 
act against  external  action  by  generating  feelings,  thoughts, 
and  knowledge  within  itself,  these  are  not  to  be  viewed  as 
carried  into  the  mind,  but  as  generated  by  the  mind.  This 
is  true  even  for  sensations. 

This  abstract  argument  is  not  strengthened,  but  is  made 
concrete  for  the  imagination  by  considering  the  physical 
antecedents  of  perception,  as  they  are  reported  by  the 
physiologists.  By  universal  agreement  these  antecedents 
consist  in  some  form  of  nervous  change ;  and  this  is  totally 
unlike  things,  on  the  one  hand,  and  thoughts,  on  the  other. 
If,  then,  thought  does  actually  follow  upon  the  nervous 
change,  we  can  only  view  it  as  something  generated  by  the 
mind  within  itself.  As  the  spoken  word  or  the  printed 
page  contains  no  thought,  but  is  only  the  occasion  upon 
which  a  living  mind  thinks  out  of  itself,  so  the  nervous 
changes  contain  no  thought,  but  are  only  the  occasion  upon 
which  a  living  mind  thinks  out  of  itself.  One  who  does 
not  know  how  to  read  would  look  in  vain  for  meaning  in 
a  printed  page,  and  in  vain  would  he  seek  to  help  his  fail- 
ure by  using  strong  spectacles.  Language  has  no  meaning 
except  for  one  who  furnishes  the  meaning  out  of  himself. 
Where  the  mental  insight  is  lacking,  eye-glasses  and  ear- 
trumpets  are  of  no  avail. 

And  here  is  a  great  wonder.  That  a  mind,  without 
pattern  or  copy,  upon  occasion  of  nervous  changes,  of 
which,  moreover,  it  knows  directly  nothing  and  commonly 
knows  nothing  whatever,  should  develop  out  of  itself  the 
vision  and  knowledge  of  the  world  is  the  wonder  of  wonders. 
But  we  hide  it  from  ourselves  for  the  most  part  by  ignor- 


HOW    DOES   THE   MIND   GET   OBJECTS?  53 

ing  it,  or,  rather,  by  being  ignorant  of  it.  If  the  fact  be 
called  to  our  attention,  we  seek  to  reduce  the  w^onder,  first, 
by  identifying  the  nervous  change  with  the  subjective  im- 
pression, and,  secondly,  by  regarding  the  impression  as 
already  the  impression  of  things.  But  the  impression  itself, 
so  far  as  subjective,  is  already  a  mental  reaction ;  and  the 
interpretation  of  its  objective  significance  is  the  wonder  in 
question.  The  naive  notion  that  we  know  reality  immedi- 
ately and  compare  our  thoughts  with  it,  and  thus  find  a 
standard  for  our  copying  needs  no  consideration. 

Even  if  we  should  view  perception  as  an  immediate  reve- 
lation there  would  be  the  same  necessity  for  a  constructive 
activity  on  the  part  of  the  percipient ;  for  a  revelation  can 
take  place  only  by  stimulating  the  mind  to  think  the 
thought  to  be  revealed.  Xothing  could  be  revealed  to  a 
stone,  even  if  the  matter  were  chiselled  into  it.  No  high 
truth  could  be  revealed  to  an  idiot,  however  fluent  he  might 
become  in  the  repetition  of  the  verbal  forms.  In  order  to 
the  reception  of  any  knowledge  wiiatever  the  appropriate 
activity  of  the  subject  is  as  necessary  as  the  existence  of 
the  object. 

And  yet,  in  spite  of  this  exposition,  common-sense  con- 
tinues uneasy.  The  object  seems  so  immediately  and  un- 
deniably given,  and  we  are  so  little  conscious  of  any  com- 
plex activity  in  perception,  that  we  conclude  there  must  be 
some  mistake.  It  cannot  be  that  we  have  been  talking 
prose  all  our  lives  without  knowing  it. 

The  difficulty  here  arises  from  a  double  oversight.  First, 
we  suppose  that  the  existence  of  the  object  is  in  question. 
Hence  we  suppose  that,  if  we  are  sure  of  that  existence, 
there  is  no  further  question.  The  illusion  is  apparent.  No 
conviction  of  the  reality  of  the  object  throws  any  light  on 
the  process  of  perception. 

Secondly,  we  fail  to  distinguish  Avhat  is  in  the  sense  from 


54  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

what  is  in  thought,  and  thus  we  easily  delude  ourselves  into 
thinking  that  the  unaided  sense  puts  the  object  bodily 
before  us.  But  a  glance  at  any  painting  or  drawing,  or 
even  at  a  mirror,  serves  to  dispel  this  illusion.  Here  the 
thing  seen — that  is,  the  thing  that  is  in  the  sense — common- 
ly drops  out  of  perception  altogether,  and  thought  busies 
itself  with  the  meaning.  In  such  cases  we  have  a  clear 
illustration  of  how  the  mind  puts  before  itself  a  group  of 
related  objects  which  are  not  in  the  sense  at  all.  The  objects 
are  before  the  mind,  but  they  are  not  in  the  sense ;  and  they 
are  before  the  mind  through  its  own  constructive  activity. 
Thus  far  on  the  realistic  view  of  the  object. 

In  the  idealistic  view  there  is  no  thought  of  an  interac- 
tion  between  the  mind  and  its  object.  The  object  itself  is 
already  conceived  as  a  thought;  not  yours  or  mine,  indeed, 
but  a  divine  thought.  But  this  view  as  little  explains  per- 
ception as  the  previous  one.  The  problem  how  to  make 
that  thought  ours  forthwith  emerges,  and  we  are  as  badly 
off  as  ever.  Yague  references  to  an  eternal  or  absolute 
consciousness  contain  no  solution  as  long  as  that  conscious- 
ness is  other  than  our  own.  We  have  a  new  theory  of  the 
object,  but  not  much  light  on  the  problem  of  knowledge. 
The  dualism  inherent  in  human  knowing  is  untouched ;  for, 
whereas  on  the  realistic  view  we  have  a  world  of  things 
over  against  our  thought,  on  the  idealistic  view  we  have  an 
objective  divine  thought  over  against  our  thought.  On 
both  views  w^e  have  the  problem  of  reproducing  in  human 
thought  the  objective  fact,  be  it  real  or  ideal ;  and  this  prob- 
lem admits  of  only  one  solution  on  either  view.  That  the 
world  should  exist  as  a  divine  thought  does  not  imply  its 
existence  for  my  thought  any  more  than  the  possession  of 
knowledge  by  the  teacher  implies  its  possession  by  the 
pupil.     Some  provision  must  be  made  for  impartation. 


HOW    DOES    THE    MINI)    GET    OBJECTS?  55 

And  here  idealism  has  too  often  contented  itself  with 
figures  of  speech.  We  are  said  to  share  or  participate  in 
the  divine  thought,  or  to  enter  into  it ;  but  we  are  not  told 
how  this  is  to  be  done.  There  can  be  no  sharing  in  the 
sense  that  the  thought  is  broken  up  and  parcelled  out.  The 
only  way  in  which  I  can  share  or  enter  into  another's 
thought  is  by  thinking  his  thought  for  myself;  and  until  I 
do  this  the  thought  is  non-existent  for  me.  In  conversation 
no  thoughts  pass  between  the  speakers,  but  each  mind 
thinks  and  thus  grasps  the  other's  thought. 

With  similar  unclearness  it  is  said  that  the  eternal  con- 
sciousness reproduces  itself  in  the  finite  consciousness,  and 
sometimes  the  divine  thought  and  our  thought  are  iden- 
tified outright.  Different  mathematicians  have  not  many 
geometries,  but  only  one ;  so  all  thinkers  have  not  many 
truths,  but  the  one  truth,  which  is  the  divine  thought  com- 
mon to  them  all.  But  this  identity  at  best  is  only  a  logical 
one;  i  in  no  way  removes  the  fact  that  the  common  truth 
can  be  grasped  only  through  a  series  of  special  activities  by 
each  individual  thinker.  If  we  should  venture  the  further 
suffffestion  that  each  thinker  and  all  his  thinkings  are 
phases  of  the  divine  thinking,  we  should  lose  ourselves  in 
hopeless  nonsense.  All  our  confusion,  blundering,  and  error 
would  thereby  be  made  divine. 

If,  then,  the  world  be  essentially  God's  thought,  it  be- 
comes our  thought  only  as  we,  by  our  own  mental  activity, 
build  up  that  thought  for  ourselves,  and  thus  share  or  par- 
ticipate in  it.  This  work  can  never  be  done  for  us  by  any 
outside  party,  and  still  less  by  any  figure  of  speech. 

The  difficulty  with  all  views  which  deny  or  ignore  the 
activity  of  the  mind  in  perception  is  that  they  turn  thought 
into  a  kind  of  thing  which  can  exist  apart  from  thinking, 
and  can  be  passed  bodily  along.  Such  views  find  ready  ac- 
ceptance in  that  stage  of  thought  where  only  sense  forms 


5G  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

are  conceivable ;  but  they  vanish  of  themselves  as  soon  as  it 
is  seen  that  knowledge  arises  and  exists  only  in  and  through 
the  knowing  act,  and  that  this  act  can  be  performed  by  no 
one  for  another,  but  only  by  each  for  himself. 

The  conclusion  is  that  a  world  of  things  can  exist  for  us 
only  as  the  mind  reconstructs  it  as  a  world  of  thought.  If 
we  prefer  to  say  that  the  real  world  is  already  a  world  of 
thought,  then  the  conclusion  is  that  the  w^orld  of  objective 
thought  becomes  anything  for  us  only  as  we  rethink  it  and 
thus  constitute  it  our  object.  However  real  or  ideal  the 
world  may  be,  it  becomes  an  object  for  us  only  as  the  mind 
builds  up  in  consciousness  a  system  of  conceptions,  and  re- 
lates their  contents  under  the  various  forms  of  intelligence. 

This  conclusion  is  valid  for  even  the  simplest  forms  of 
perception.  Not  even  the  sense  elements  of  knowledge 
pass  bodily  from  the  object  into  the  mind.  Primarily,  they 
are  only  reactions  of  our  sensitive  nature  against  external 
action  ;  and,  in  fact,  it  turns  out  that  there  is  nothing  cor- 
respotiding  to  them  in  external  reality.  They  are  only 
projections  of  our  sensitive  states,  and  have  no  existence 
apart  from  consciousness. 

In  organized  knowledge  the  constructive  mental  activity 
is  still  more  manifest.  This  knowledge  is  so  far  from  pass- 
ing ready-made  from  the  object  into  the  mind,  that  it  is 
not  given  even  in  our  perceptions  themselves,  but  is  con- 
structed onh'  at  great  expense  of  time  and  labor.  Simple 
perception  rests  on  the  sur-face  and  grasps  only  appear- 
ances. It  reaches  no  science  and  no  system.  Reflection, 
on  the  other  hand,  seeks  to  pass  behind  the  visible  forms, 
and  in  so  doing  it  profoundly  modifies  all  our  spontaneous 
convictions.  To  see  this  we  need  only  reflect  on  the  differ- 
ence between  the  physicist's,  or  chemist's,  or  geologist's,  or 
astronomer's  thought  of  reality  and  that  of  the  child  or 
boor.     The   conceptions  are    incommensurable.     In   all   of 


HOW    DOES    THE    MIND    GET    OBJECTS  ?  57 

this  work  we  see  the  mind  constituting,  correcting,  revising, 
enlarging  its  conceptions,  and  thus  building  itself  into  a 
truer  knowledge  of  its  objects. 

In  its  perceptive  activity  the  mind  finds  its  objects  in 
the  world  of  things.  But  it  also  finds  a  highly  complex 
system  of  objects  in  itself,  or  in  its  own  subjective,  social, 
and  historical  manifestations.  The  great  sciences  which 
belong  to  this  field,  as  ethics,  economics,  law,  politics,  phi- 
losophy were  not  discovered  ready-made,  but  are  rather  the 
slow  product  of  generations  of  mental  activity,  in  which 
the  mind  has  sought  to  fix,  define,  and  systematize  its  con- 
ceptions for  the  better  expression  and  understanding  of  its 
own  experience. 

An  abiding  order,  independent  of  our  finite  and  indi- 
vidual thinking,  and  in  this  sense  a  real  order,  is  the  neces- 
sary presupposition  and  implication  of  our  thinking.  And 
this  order  becomes  our  subject  or  our  mental  possession  only 
through  our  own  activity.  In  this  way  existence  slowly 
passes  into  knowledge. 

And  now  we  must  have  a  parting  word  with  the  child 
of  the  dragon's  teeth,  as  Plato  calls  the  disciple  of  the 
senses.  After  all,  he  asks,  does  this  complex  activity  you 
speak  of  mean  anything  more  than  this,  that  we  are  able 
to  know  things?  The  reply  is  that  it  means  nothing  more 
than  that.  At  the  same  time  it  is  worth  while  to  add  that 
this  abilitv  to  know  thino;s,  which  our  friend  thinks  so  sira- 
pie,  really  implies  this  complex  activity. 

In  leaving  this  subject,  however,  it  must  be  pointed  out 
that  the  previous  discussion  is  not  meant  in  any  way  as  an 
explanation  of  knowledge,  as  if  it  were  a  recipe  by  follow- 
ing which  knowledge  might  be  compounded.  It  describes 
the  process  and  some  of  the  implications  of  knowing;  but 
no  reflection  and  no  analysis  of  notions  will  ever  enable  us 
to  deduce  knowledge  from  that  which  is  not  knowledge. 


58  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

Knowledge  is  knowledge,  and  knowledge  must  be  its  own 
vindication.  But  knowledge  has  conditions  and  implica- 
tions, and  these  may  be  discovered.  In  the  deepest  sense 
of  the  term,  we  must  be  content  with  knowing,  not  how 
knowledge  is  possible,  but  that  it  is  possible. 

Nevertheless,  the  thought  activity  involved  in  knowing 
is  beyond  all  question.  We  pass  now  to  consider  the  lead- 
ing forms  and  laws  of  this  activity  more  in  detail. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE    CATEGORIES 

We  have  now  to  study  those  immanent  mental  principles 
which  underiie  articulate  experience  and  make  it  possible. 
They  are  the  norms  by  which  the  mind  proceeds,  implicitly 
or  explicitly,  in  fixing,  defining,  and  relating  its  objects. 
They  constitute  the  framework  of  thought,  and  form  the 
contents  of  the  pure  reason.  These  principles,  in  accord 
ance  with  a  philosophic  tradition  of  long  standing,  we  call 
the  categories;  but  any  other  name  will  do  as  well,  pro- 
vided the  thing  be  understood.  In  adopting  this  name, 
however,  we  assume  no  responsibility  for  any  historical 
scheme  of  the  categories  such  as  that  of  Aristotle  or  Kant. 
The  only  contention  is  that  there  are  immanent  principles 
underlying  experience,  and  these  we  proceed  to  study. 

The  recognition  of  the  categories  as  immanent  principles 
determining  mental  procedure  is  exceedingly  difficult  to 
two  classes  of  persons,  the  naive  disciples  of  common-sense 
and  the  professional  empiricists.  The  former  think  it  suffi- 
cient to  say  that,  on  looking  over  our  system  of  objects, 
we  find  them  existing  in  certain  general  relations,  as  space 
and  time,  cause  and  effect,  quantity  and  quality.  These 
classes  are  the  categories ;  but  instead  of  being  principles 
which  determine  experience,  they  are  manifestly  given  in 
experience,  and,  as  formal  principles,  they  are  only  abstrac- 
tions from  experience.  Many  empiricists  would  agree  with 
this  view ;  others  would  simply  add  the  claim  that  the  cate- 


60  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

gories  are  products  or  precipitates  of  sense  experience  under 
the  principle  of  association. 

Both  of  these  views  rest  on  an  inability  to  grasp  thought 
as  an  organic  activity.  Common- sense  finds  no  activity 
in  thought  whatever,  but  only  a  passive  reflection  of  exist- 
ing objects  and  relations.  Empiricism  attempts  to  reach 
thought  by  a  mechanical  juxtaposition  of  mutually  external 
elements,  and  fails  to  see  that  there  can  be  no  thought 
without  an  organic  synthesis  within  the  unity  of  the  mind 
itself.     Both  of  these  views  have  been  already  set  aside. 

Apart  from  this  fundamental  difficulty,  another  obstacle 
to  insight  on  the  part  of  these  classes  arises  from  a  mis- 
taken expectation.  There  seems  to  be  a  demand  that  the 
categories  as  principles  should  reveal  themselves  as  such  in 
consciousness.  This  is  a  mistake.  As  we  walk  in  entire 
ignorance  of  our  muscles,  so  we  often  think  in  entire  igno- 
rance of  the  principles  which  underlie  and  determine  think- 
ing. But  as  anatomy  reveals  that  the  apparently  simple 
act  of  walking  involves  a  highly  complex  muscular  activity, 
so  analysis  reveals  that  the  apparently  simple  act  of  think- 
ing involves  a  system  of  mental  principles.  In  neither  of 
these  cases  is  the  appeal  to  the  uneducated  consciousness,  but 
to  the  indications  of  analysis.  The  anatomist  shows  the 
muscles  and  the  part  they  play,  although  they  do  not  reveal 
themselves  in  consciousness.  In  like  manner,  the  anato- 
mist of  thought  shows  the  implicit  principles  by  analyzing 
the  products  of  thought.  The  validity  of  his  results  can 
never  be  tested  by  appealing  to  the  "  natural  or  unsophisti- 
cated consciousness,"  but  only  by  examining  his  analysis. 
It  is  important  to  bear  this  fact  in  mind  in  the  present  in- 
quiry, as  it  often  happens  that  superficial  students  fancy 
the  categories,  as  determining  principles  of  intelligence,  are 
sufficiently  discredited  by  the  fact  that  they  are  not  re- 
vealed in  the  unreflective  consciousness. 


THE    CATEGORIES  61 

The  exceeding  difficulty  which  minds  on  the  sense  plane 
experience  in  grasping  the  immanent  principles  of  intelli- 
gence leads  us  to  attempt  another  illustration.  A  law  of 
growth  cannot  be  sensuously  presented  ;  ic  can  only  be  in- 
tellectually apprehended.  Nevertheless,  the  facts  of  organic 
growth  cannot  be  understood  without  affirming  an  immanent 
law  in  the  organism  which  determines  the  order  and  kind  of 
development.  The  law  cannot  be  seen  in  itself,  but  it  is 
manifested  in  its  results.  The  law  is  not  something  in  the 
organism  which  the  organism  uses  to  grow  with,  but  it  is 
rather  that  immanent  principle  of  growth  without  which 
the  unfolding  of  the  organism  could  not  be  understood.  It  is 
indeed  conceivable  that  some  one,  low  in  the  scale  of  mental 
development,  should  call  for  a  sight  of  the  law,  and,  in  default 
of  such  vision,  should  denounce  the  conception  of  a  law  of 
growth  as  fictitious  or  mythological;  but  even  common-sense 
would  recognize  that  his  difficulty  was  purely  subjective. 

The  categories  are  such  immanent  principles.  They  are 
nothing  which  can  be  shown  to  the  senses ;  they  are  mani- 
fested in  the  mental  product.  They  are  not  principles  which 
the  mind  uses  to  know  with,  but  they  determine  the  form 
of  knowing.  They  are  not  empty  forms  of  the  pigeon-hole 
type  into  which  the  mind  sorts  its  experience ;  but  they  are 
the  organic  principles  by  which  experience  is  built  up. 
They  are  as  necessary  to  the  understanding  of  experience  as 
the  law  of  growth  is  necessary  to  the  understanding  of  or- 
ganic form,  and  they  are  equally  unpicturable. 

Whoever  will  duly  reflect  upon  these  things  will  see  that 
the  categories  are  not  set  aside  by  inventing  terms  and 
phrases  of  dislike  and  impatience,  or  even  by  inflicting  upon 
them  the  indignity  of  inverted  commas.  For  thinking  does 
involve  a  highly  complex  activity  of  determination  and  re- 
lation, and  the  norms  of  this  activity  must  be  immanent  in 
the  activity  itself. 


62  THEORY   OF   THOUGHT   AND   KNOWLEDGE 

With  expressions  of  apology  to  those  who  feel  the  tedium 
of  this  incessant  repetition,  we  venture  to  set  forth  the  old 
claim  from  a  slightly  different  angle  of  view. 

Thought  is  to  a  very  great  extent  a  relating  activity, 
and  the  progress  of  thought  consists  largely  in  establishing 
rational  relations  among  the  raw  materials  of  our  experience. 
Indeed,  our  objects  are  so  largely  defined  and  constituted  by 
their  relations  that  nothing  articulate  would  remain  if  the 
element  of  relation  were  eliminated.  But  the  natural  assump- 
tion of  spontaneous  thought  is  that  objects  are  given  with- 
out any  qualifying  action  on  the  part  of  the  mind,  and  these 
objects  exist  in  relations  and  are  known  in  relations  as  a 
matter  of  course.  The  existent  relation  explains  the  known 
relation. 

This  view  is  at  once  natural  and  erroneous.  The  rela- 
tions of  things,  so  far  as  they  exist  for  thought,  are  insti- 
tuted by  thought,  and  the  relations  instituted  can  only  be 
viewed  as  objective  expressions  of  principles  immanent  in 
thought  itself. 

Two  questions  are  to  be  distinguished  here :  (1)  How  do 
objects  come  to  be  related  in  existence  ?  (2)  How  do  they 
become  related  for  us  or  for  our  thought  ? 

The  former  question  does  not  now  concern  us.  Respect- 
ing it  many  metaphysical  scruples  might  be  raised.  We 
might  claim  with  Locke  that  relations  are  only  the  work  of 
the  mind,  and  are  non-existent  apart  from  mind,  so  that 
things  in  themselves  are  unrelated.  Or  w^e  might  hold  with 
others  that  relations  are  the  work  of  mind,  and  that  thino^s 
are  really  related ;  and  then  the  conclusion  would  follow 
that  the  world  of  related  things  can  exist  only  in  and 
through  a  relating  cosmic  intelligence.  Locke  drew  the 
wrong  conclusion  from  his  premises.  But  we  forbear  to 
raise  these  questions,  and  consider  solely  the  condition  of 
things   being   related   for  us,  whatever   they  may  be   in 


THE    CATEGORIES  '  63 

themselves,  or  however  they  came  to  be  related  in  them- 
selves. 

In  answer  to  this  question  we  must  say  that,  as  the  ex- 
istence of  objects  is  not  a  knowledge  of  the  objects,  so  the 
existence  of  objects  in  relations  is  not  a  knowledge  of  the 
relations.  Things  can  be  related  for  our  thought  only  as 
they  are  related  by  our  thought.  If  we  insist  that  our 
thought  grasps  relations  already  existing  we  must  also 
insist  that  it  does  so  only  by  reinstituting  them,  just  as 
the  mind  grasps  thoughts  already  existing  only  by  rethink- 
ing thera.  The  fact  of  relation  is  revealed  only  in  the  act 
of  relation. 

This  would  be  true  if  all  the  relations  of  thought  could 
be  found  in  the  sensations  themselves.  As  existing  ob- 
jects become  known  objects  only  by  constructing  them 
in  thought,  so  existent  relations  become  known  relations 
only  by  constructing  them  in  thought.  But,  in  fact,  the 
most  important  relations  by  which  knowledge  is  constituted 
do  not  exist  among  sensations  as  mental  states  at  all ;  nei- 
ther are  they  like  the  simple  relations  of  qualitative  resem- 
blance or  difference  which  we  might  think  the  mind  simply 
reads  off  from  sense  experience;  they  are  rather  contrib- 
uted by  the  understanding  to  the  formation  and  interpre- 
tation of  experience.  Thus,  relations  of  space,  causation, 
identity  do  not  exist  among  sensations  as  mental  states ; 
they  are  the  form  which  the  mind  gives  its  experience  in 
passing  from  impressions  to  objects. 

In  treating  the  categories  several  ways  are  open  to  us. 
We  might  begin  with  (1)  the  logically  first,  (2)  the  psycho- 
logically first,  and  (3)  the  logically  simplest.  In  the  first 
case,  we  should  begin  with  being  as  the  basal  conception 
upon  which  all  others  depend,  and  should  then  proceed  to 
the  other  categories  in  the  supposed  order  of  their  depend- 


64  THEORY   OF   THOUGHT  AND   KNOWLEDGE 

ence.  In  the  second  case,  we  should  have  to  guess  a  little, 
but  should  probably  begin  with  being  under  the  special 
form  of  thing.  Sensations  may  be  temporally  first  in  the 
history  of  the  individual,  but  they  certainly  are  not  the 
primary  objects  of  consciousness.  Indeed,  until  the  power 
of  abstraction  has  been  developed  to  some  extent,  the  con- 
ception of  a  sensation  except  as  the  quality  of  an  object  is 
impossible.  In  the  third  case,  we  begin  with  categories 
which  are  involved  in  oui-  mental  tastes  themselves,  and 
then  proceed  to  the  metaphj'sical  categories  which  lie  out- 
side of  the  mental  states  altogether. 

The  psychological  method  is  here  irrelevant.  Whatever 
the  psychological  order  of  development  may  be,  the  sig- 
nificance of  the  thought  factor  is  unchanged.  As  between 
the  other  two  methods,  the  question  of  chief  importance 
is  not  which  category  we  discuss  first,  but  what  we  say, 
whichever  we  discuss  first.  The  third  method,  however, 
has  the  advantage  of  enabling  us  to  begin  with  categories 
on  which  all  agree,  and  to  note  the  parting  of  the  ways 
when  we  reach  it.  On  this  account  we  adopt  it.  We  are 
not  to  be  understood,  however,  as  holding  that  the  catego- 
ries are  really  unfolded  in  a  corresponding  temporal  order. 
On  the  contrary,  the  organic  nature  of  reason  would  lead 
us  to  expect  that  all  the  categories  are  implicit  from  the 
start.  And  this  expectation  is  justified  by  analysis.  The 
simpler  phenomenal  categories  admit  of  no  application  ex- 
cept in  connection  with  the  deeper  metaphysical  principles. 
We  treat  them  successively,  but  they  really  coexist. 

The  simplest  relation  possible  among  our  objects  is  that 
of  likeness  and  unlikeness.  Not  even  this  is  passively  re- 
ceived from  without,  as  it  involves  an  activity  of  fixation, 
disciimination,  comparison,  and  judgment.  There  is  no 
likeness  which  delivers  and  registers  itself  upon  a  passive 
consciousness.     There  may  be  feelings  which  accompany 


THE   CATEGORIES  65 

the  perception  of  likeness,  but  such  feelings  would  not  be 
the  perception.  Without  raising  the  scruple  whether  like- 
ness as  such  can  even  exist  apart  from  intelligence,  it  suf- 
fices here  to  point  out  that  in  any  case  the  existence  of  like- 
ness is  quite  distinct  from  its  recognition.  The  latter  is 
possible  only  through  the  activity  of  inteUigence. 

The  judgment  of  likeness  may  be  in  very  simple  matter, 
and  the  likeness  itself  may  be  only  vaguely  qualitative,  as 
in  the  case  of  many  sensations  and  feelings.  A  mind  which 
could  form  such  a  judgment  would  be  said  to  have  the 
power  of  perceiving  likeness  and  difference.  Or  the  judg- 
ment may  be  in  very  complex  and  abstract  matter,  as  in  sci- 
entific or  historical  analogies.  Such  a  judgment  also  might 
be  said  to  rest  on  a  power  of  perceiving  likeness  and  differ- 
ence ;  and  hence  it  might  be  concluded  that  the  essential 
power  of  the  mind  is  the  power  of  perceiving  likeness  and 
difference.  This  has  seemed  to  many  a  great  simplification, 
and  to  make  it  simpler  still  they  have  fixed  their  thought 
on  the  perception  of  likeness  and  difference  in  the  field  of 
simple  sensation,  and  here  it  seemed  to  be  almost  a  matter 
of  course. 

But  this  simplification  is  illusive.  The  power  of  perceiv- 
ing likeness  and  difference  is  no  simple,  homogeneous  facul- 
ty ;  it  is  as  complex  as  the  mind  itself.  Likeness  and  un- 
likeness  are  not  independent  ideas  ;  they  imply  some  special 
relation  under  which  they  are  discerned.  Things  may  be 
like  in  form,  or  date,  or  quality,  or  quantity,  or  function,  or 
causal  relation ;  and  no  one  can  discern  these  several  kinds 
of  likeness  who  is  not  furnished  with  the  corresponding 
ideas.  There  is,  therefore,  no  simplification  in  declaring 
that  the  mind  has  simply  the  power  of  discerning  likeness 
and  difference,  for  the  points  in  which  they  are  discovered 
may  form  a  highly  complex  system.  It  is  like  the  claim 
sometimes  made  that  the  essential  mental  faculty  is  that  of 


66  THEORY  OF  THOUGHT  AND  KNOWLEDGE 

generalization.  This  claim  may  be  allowed  if  we  recognize 
that  this  faculty  acts  in  incommensurable  fields,  producing 
temporal,  spatial,  causal,  and  other  generalizations.  But 
with  this  rider  the  claim  reduces  to  a  purely  verbal  simpli- 
fication. 

Kesemblance,  then,  may  be  the  great  category  of  science. 
Knowledge  may  be  only  a  detection  of  likenesses  and  dif- 
ferences. Science  itself  may  be  but  the  discovery  of  the 
one  in  the  many,  or  of  the  identical  in  the  different.  But 
such  propositions,  however  true  they  ma}'  be,  or  whatever 
their  rhetorical  value,  contain  no  real  simplification  of  logi- 
cal processes,  and  are  barren  of  any  valuable  insight. 

Time 

Time  is  the  first  independent  relation  we  consider.  It 
is,  in  brief,  the  form  under  which  we  relate  events.  Its 
essential  elements  are  antecedence  and  sequence ;  and  its 
dimensions  are  past,  present,  and  future. 

Concerning  the  relation  itself  there  is  very  general  agree- 
ment. All  are  content  to  accept  this  category  as  simple  and 
irreducible.  Disputes  concern  chiefl}^  the  source  of  the  idea 
and  the  metaphysical  nature  of  time. 

On  the  former  point  there  are  several  views : 

1.  It  is  said  that  events  occur  in  succession,  and  hence 
are  known  in  succession  as  a  matter  of  course.  The  mind 
simply  reads  off  the  succession  as  given  in  experience. 

2.  The  idea  of  time  is  derived  by  abstraction  from  the 
experience  of  objective  sensation  revealed  in  memory. 

3.  Time  is  primarily  a  law  of  thought  whereby  the  mind 
relates  events  under  the  form  of  antecedence  and  sequence, 
and  thus  makes  the  temporal  experience  possible.  Given 
the  temporal  experience,  we  may  by  abstraction  get  the  idea 
of  time ;  but  the  temporal  experience  itself  is  possible  only 
through  a  peculiar  relating  activity  of  thought. 


THE    CATEGORIES  67 

Of  the  first  view  it  is  to  be  said  that  the  occurrence  of 
events  in  succession  does  not  provide  for  our  knowledge  of 
them  as  successive.  However  real  the  objective  relation 
may  be  in  itself,  it  must  in  some  way  become  real  for  us  be- 
fore it  can  become  an  object  of  knowledge.     * 

But  this  seems  provided  for  by  the  second  view.  The 
succession  in  the  world  beyond  us  gives  rise  to  successive 
impressions  in  consciousness,  and  this  succession  of  impres- 
sions is  of  course  temporal,  and  notliing  is  needed  but  to 
read  off  the  fact  as  revealed  in  memory. 

This  is  so  sun-clear  that  it  seems  almost  like  an  affront 
to  good  sense  to  question  it.  And  yet  upon  reflection  the 
clearness  proves  to  be  an  illusion.  It  is  plain  to  any  one  on 
a  little  thought  that  simple  succession  in  experience  is  far 
from  being  an  experience  of  succession.  If  each  event 
Avere  forgotten  with  its  date,  no  conception  of  the  past 
could  ever  arise.  There  would  be  succession  of  experiences, 
but  no  experience  of  succession.  Thus  even  common-sense 
can  be  made  to  see  that  without  memory  there  could  be 
no  temporal  experience  for  us,  whatever  there  might  be  for 
lookers-on  from  the  outside. 

But  memory  becomes  memory  proper  only  as  the  tem- 
poral relation  is  presupposed.  Memory  as  an  act  or  event, 
if  it  be  in  time  at  all,  must  be  in  the  present,  and  all  its 
data  must  be  in  the  present.  There  is  no  temporal  rela- 
tion among  these  data  considered  as  states  of  conscious- 
ness. To  admit  such  relation  would  make  consciousness 
impossible.  The  fact  can  only  be  some  quahtative  feature 
of  the  states  of  consciousness,  and  this  feature  becomes 
the  stimulus  to  the  mind  to  relate  the  contents  of  con- 
sciousness to  the  self  and  to  one  another  under  the  temporal 
form.  Until  this  is  done  we  have  no  memory  and  no  tem- 
poral experience.  And  this  relating  act  can  never  be  done 
for  the  mind;  it  must  alwa3^s  be  done  by  the  mind  and  by 


68  THEORY  OF  THOUGHT  AND  KNOWLEDGE 

each  mind  for  itself.  However  time  may  exist  by  itself, 
it  can  exist  for  us  only  as  we  relate  our  objects  to  the  unity 
and  identity  of  self-consciousness  under  the  temporal  form. 

Of  course  this  does  not  mean  that  the  temporal  category 
is  applied  to  events  already  known  as  such.  This  would 
indeed  be  a  work  of  supererogation.  It  rather  means  that 
the  events  become  known  as  sucli  only  through  the  act  of 
relation.  Apart  from  this  act,  they  are  non-existent  for 
thought. 

Thus  the  second  view  of  the  source  of  the  temporal  idea 
breaks  down.  The  experience  from  which  the  idea  of  time 
is  abstracted  is  one  which  contains  it,  and  it  contains  it  only 
because  the  mind  has  already  given  its  experience  the  tem- 
poral form. 

We  are  shut  up,  then,  to  the  third  view.  The  essential 
relation  of  antecedence  and  sequence  is  established  by  the 
mind  itself,  and  only  thus  does  it  become  a  relation  for 
mind.  The  necessity  of  the  relation  does  not  lie  primarily 
in  the  events,  but  in  the  mind ;  and  the  properties  of  time 
are  to  be  understood  from  the  side  of  this  relatino:  act.  As 
all  events  are  related  by  the  same  law  and  in  a  common 
scheme,  time  is  said  to  be  one.  The  unity  consists  entirely 
in  the  fact  of  a  single  system  of  relations  according  to  the 
same  law,  so  that  from  any  point  whatever  in  the  system  we 
can  find  our  way  to  any  other  by  a  continuous  process.  If 
there  were  any  events  which  could  not  be  related  in  one 
scheme,  time  would  not  be  one.  But  as  no  event  can  be 
conceived  which  cannot  be  thus  related,  time  is  not  only 
one ;  it  is  also  infinite  and  all-embracing.  But  the  unity  and 
infinity  of  time  are  only  consequences  of  the  fact  that  the 
law  of  synthesis  is  one  and  extends  to  all  events. 

Ordinarily  we  do  not  extend  the  temporal  synthesis  be- 
yond adjacent  events.  We  give  these  the  relation  of  ante- 
cedence and  sequence,  and  ignore  their  relation  to  other 


THE    CATEGORIES 


events  or  groups  of  events.     The  unity  and  infinity  of  time 
commonly  lie  latent  in  the  background  of  our  thought. 

The  consciousness  of  time,  then,  is  not  a  passive  mirroring 
of  an  objective  succession.  It  rests  ultimately  upon  a  mental 
activity  whereby  the  contents  of  consciousness  are  tempo- 
rally related  to  one  another  and  to  the  abiding  self.  This 
gives  us  the  consciousness  of  subjective  time.  This  form  of 
relation  is  next  extended  to  the  cosmic  order,  and  thus  the 
belief  in  objective  time  arises. 

It  would  be  hard  to  announce  a  view  more  scandalous  to 
uncritical  thought.  Do  not  events  really  succeed  one  an- 
other? it  wiU  ask;  and  do  we  not  remember  events  in  their 
succession  ?  Is  not,  then,  this  notion  of  a  law  of  synthesis, 
or  relation,  immanent  in  intelligence,  purely  gratuitous,  to 
say  the  least  ?  It  will  certainly  seem  so,  in  spite  of  our  ex- 
position, to  all  who  are  naturally  a  little  dull.  The  difficulty 
which  others,  more  favored,  feel  is  due  to  a  failure  to  grasp 
the  real  problem.  It  is  not  now  a  question  whether  events 
really  succeed  one  another,  but  what  is  involved  in  their 
being  successive  for  us.  It  is  not  a  question  whether  we  can 
remember  events  in  their  succession,  but  what  such  memory 
implies.  The  objector  takes  as  data  the  results  of  our 
mental  activity,  and  when  we  point  out  that  these  alleged 
data  are  possible  only  through  previous  mental  processes,  he 
seems  to  fancy  that  the  data  are  in  some  way  denied.  When 
finally  he  is  brought  to  consider  the  problem  how  to  trans- 
form succession  in  experience  into  experience  of  succession, 
he  promptly  confuses  his  own  knowledge  that  the  sensations 
are  successive  with  the  emergence  of  that  knowledge  among 
the  sensations  themselves,  and  the  problem  is  victoriously 
solved. 

Questions  concerning  the  nature  of  objective  time  we 
postpone  to  metaphysics.  There  are  a  good  many  reasons 
for  thinking  that  time  is  only  a  category  of  experience  and 


70  THEORY  OF  THOUGHT  AND  KNOWLEDGE 

not  an  ontological  fact.  But  here  it  suffices  to  have  shown 
that  time  is  primarily  a  law  of  mental  synthesis  whereby 
we  relate  events.  If  there  be  no  objective  time,  of  course 
it  is  a  mental  product ;  and  if  there  be  an  objective  time,  we 
can  know  it  only  through  a  subjective  activity  according  to 
a  subjective  law. 

The  determination  of  the  units  and  measures  of  time  be- 
longs to  the  special  sciences. 

Numher 

Relations  of  time  make  possible  the  development  of 
the  relation  of  number.  The  succession  of  moments  and 
events  gives  us  the  basis  of  number.  On  this  account  Kant 
called  number  the  science  of  time,  as  geometry  is  the  sci- 
ence of  space.  In  this  view  he  was  led  on  by  his  desire  for 
symmetry  rather  than  by  the  facts  themselves.  The  ob- 
jective basis  of  number  is  the  distinctness  of  objects,  and 
not  merely  the  sequence  of  moments  or  events.  The  dis- 
criminated difference  is  the  essential  thing,  and  this  is  as 
possible  with  differences  in  space,  or  degree,  or  unpicturable 
consciousness  as  with  differences  in  time. 

It  is  a  very  natural  fancy  of  crude  thought  that  number 
exists  in  the  objects,  and  that  all  the  mind  has  to  do  is  to 
read  off  the  existinor  number,  dumber  adheres  so  closelv 
to  the  objects  that  to  know  them  seems  to  be  the  same  as 
knowing  their  number.  But  this  seeming  is  illusory.  How- 
ever countable  experience  may  be  in  itself,  it  becomes  the 
counted  only  through  a  new  and  peculiar  form  of  action 
upon  that  experience.  This  involves  the  establishment  of  a 
unit  and  a  process  of  counting.  Neither  of  these  operations 
is  anything  which  does  itself. 

The  unit  does  not  establish  itself ;  for  one  and  the  same 
object  may  be  one  or  many,  according  to  the  point  of  view 
or  the  mental  aim.     Even  spatial  objects  have  no  inherent 


THE    CATEGORIES  71 

unity,  while  ia  most  cases,  as  in  scientific  measurements, 
the  units  are  purely  arbitrary.  The  unit  of  work,  of  tem- 
perature, of  time,  of  space,  not  only  does  not  determine  it- 
self, but  its  determination  is  a  matter  of  great  difficulty. 

Supposing  units  established,  they  do  not  count  them- 
selves. Eyes  cannot  see  the  number.  Simple  staring  at  a 
group  of  objects  will  never  report  their  number.  Number 
is  grasped  only  through  a  process  of  counting,  and  number 
exists  only  as  things  are  united  by  the  mind  in  numerical 
relations. 

And  here  two  sets  of  very  worthy  persons  will  begin  to 
grow  uneasy  if  not  impatient.  First,  the  naive  disciple  of 
common-sense  will  ask  if  counting  things  does  anything  to 
the  things — if  it  makes  their  number  or  reveals  it.  To 
which  the  reply  is  that  these  questions  reveal  once  more 
the  chronic  difficulty  common-sense  has  in  recognizing  that 
thought  is  an  active  process.  Accordingly,  when  the  claim 
is  made  that  counting  is  a  mental  activity,  and  that  number 
exists  not  for  sense  but  for  thought,  common-sense  fancies 
that  number  has  been  denied.  Then  it  proceeds  to  count 
the  objects  in  order  to  prove  that  things  really  have  num- 
ber. Schelling  was  quite  right  in  saying  that  philosophy  is 
not  everybody's  affair. 

The  traditional  empiricist  also  insists  on  getting  the 
floor.  He  has  quite  a  list  of  stories  about  savages  who  can- 
not count  beyond  their  fingers,  or  who  cannot  even  count 
at  all,  but,  like  the  lower  animals,  remember  each  thing  in- 
dependently. Now  what,  he  asks,  is  the  significance  of 
these  facts  in  their  bearing  upon  the  origin  of  number? 
We  answer.  Their  significance  is  nothing.  For  the  question 
is  not  how  the  numerical  activity  begins,  or  whether  it  al- 
ways begins,  or  whether  it  often  has  only  a  crude  and  ob- 
scure development.  These  are  psychological  questions  which 
concern  only  the  temporal  order  of  development ;  they  do 


72  THEORY  OF  THOUGHT  AND  KNOWLEDGE 

not  touch  the  logical  question  as  to  what  is  involved  in  the 
numerical  activity,  whenever  and  however  it  may  begin. 
Our  claim  is  simply  that  whatever  the  temporal  and  psy- 
chological history  of  the  numerical  function  may  be,  it  is 
something  forever  distinct  from  any  passive  affection  of  the 
sensibility.     Its  source  and  its  law  are  to  be  sought  within. 

In  numerical  science  the  unit  is  the  abstract  form  of  an 
act  of  position,  and  number  arises  from  the  repetition  of 
this  act  under  the  synthetic  form  of  counting.  In  this 
way  we  reach  the  numerical  series  of  the  so-called  natural 
numbers,  and  by  varying  the  processes  we  reach  the  ele- 
mentary numerical  operations.  These,  however,  soon  be- 
come so  complicated  that  special  processes  have  to  be  in- 
vented. In  this  way  the  mind  builds  up  a  great  ideal  world 
of  number  where  the  notions,  processes,  methods,  and  tests 
are  all  purely  mental  creations  without  any  analogue  in  ob- 
jective experience.  Powers,  roots,  logarithms,  differentials, 
integrals,  limits,  and  rates  are  illustrations.  Here  the  mind 
creates  its  own  data  and  processes  and  problems,  and  tests 
them  all  by  its  own  insight.  Sense  is  so  far  from  being  the 
source  of  these  matters  that  it  cannot  even  test  them  after 
they  are  created. 

To  develop  the  idea  of  number  and  unfold  its  forms  and 
implications  belongs  to  arithmetic  and  algebra. 

The  concrete  application  of  number  presupposes  classifi- 
cation. Otherwise  there  is  neither  one  nor  many.  The 
determination  of  the  unit  also  is  a  difficult  matter  when 
number,  which  is  essentially  discontinuous,  is  used  to  meas- 
ure the  continuous.  Units  of  time,  distance,  energy,  inten- 
sity, work  are  illustrations.  Such  units  are  relative  and 
formal  only.  This  is  the  case,  indeed,  with  most  of  our 
units.  They  are  units  only  with  reference  to  our  aim  or 
standard  of  reference,  and  may  be  one,  or  many,  as  the 
point  of  view  changes.     This  is  particularly  the  case  with 


THE    CATEGORIES  73 

spatial  and  temporal  units.  The  mutual  externality  of  parts 
and  the  resulting  indefinite  divisibility  of  any  assumed  unit 
forbid  us  to  find  any  ultimate  unit  in  space  and  time.  What 
constitutes  real  substantial  unity  in  distinction  from  formal 
and  relative  unity  is  a  metaphysical  problem  of  some  diffi- 
culty. 

A  history  of  the  units  employed  in  weighing  and  measur- 
ing would  be  a  large  part  of  the  history  of  physical  science 
and  an  important  chapter  in  the  history  of  civilization. 

Space 

The  relations  of  time  and  number  may  be  said  to  be 
founded  in  the  mental  states  themselves.  These  states  are 
events,  and  they  are  a  manifold.  In  the  temporal  and 
numerical  synthesis,  therefore,  the  mind  may  seem  to  add 
nothing  to  the  events,  but  only  to  read  off  what  is  there. 
It  is  otherwise  Avith  the  relations  of  space.  These  do  not 
exist  among  our  impressions  as  states  of  the  sensibility,  but 
only  among  our  objects.  That  is,  impression  a  is  not  along- 
side of  impression  J,  but  the  objects  a  and  h  are  projected 
in  mutual  externality. 

Of  course,  unreflective  thought  identifies  the  existence 
of  things  in  space  with  a  knowledge  of  the  same.  But  here 
ao-ain  reflection  on  the  general  fact  that  a  relation  can  ex- 
ist  for  the  mind  only  in  and  through  the  relating  act  dis- 
poses of  this  view.  Reflection  also  on  the  physiological 
conditions  of  perception  shows  that  if  out  of  them  a  concep- 
tion of  objects  in  space  relations  is  ever  to  emerge,  it  can  be 
only  as  the  mind  posits  its  objects  and  gives  them  space  rela- 
tions on  its  own  account. 

The  possibility  of  doing  this,  even  when  there  is  no  ques- 
tion of  a  real  space  and  real  objects,  is  seen  in  ever}'^  vivid 
dream.  Dream  objects  are  not  in  space,  but  have  the  form 
of  space ;  and  the  space  in  which  they  appear  is  not  some- 


74  THEOKY  OF  THOUGHT  AND  KNOWLEDGE 

thing  which  contains  them ;  it  is  rather  the  form  of  the 
dream.  In  such  cases  we  have  a  perfect  illustration  of  the 
space  -  relating  activity  of  thought  whereby  spatial  expe- 
rience is  produced.  We  need  a  space  to  hold  things  as 
little  as  we  need  a  space  to  dream  in. 

However  real,  then,  space  may  be  as  an  objective  fact, 
it  can  exist  for  the  mind  only  as  we  give  our  objects  space 
relations.  Until  we  relate  them  spatially  they  are  not  in 
space  for  us.  Space,  like  time,  is  primarily  a  law  of  mental 
synthesis,  whereby  the  mind  relates  its  coexistent  objects 
under  the  form  of  mutual  externality.  Secondarily,  space 
is  the  abstract  form  of  external  experience.  "What  space- 
is  ontologically  we  leave  to  metaphysics. 

The  fact  that  space  relations  do  not  exist  among  states 
of  consciousness  but  only  among  objects  has  caused  the  sen- 
sationalists no  small  embarrassment.  For  all  those  who 
identify  existence  in  relations  with  a  knowledge  of  the  re- 
lations, the  claim  is  plausible  that  the  temporal  idea  may  be 
deduced  from  the  successions  of  experience.  But  to  deduce 
a  spatial  externality  from  sensations  which  are  not  mutually 
external  is  a  task  of  another  order  of  difficulty. 

Those  who  need  it  may  find  some  help  to  a  better  appre- 
ciation of  the  problem  and  its  difficulties  in  the  following 
exposition :  The  stream  of  thought  as  a  psychological  proc- 
ess has  no  spatial  qualities.  There  may  be  ideas  of  bulk, 
but  there  are  no  bulky  ideas.  There  may  be  ideas  of  dis- 
tance, but  there  are  no  distances  between  ideas.  The 
thought  of  triangle  is  as  little  triangular  as  the  thought  of 
sugar  is  sweet,  or  the  thought  of  fire  is  hot.  To  introduce 
spatial  qualities  bodily  into  consciousness  would,  of  course, 
be  incompatible  with  the  unity  of  consciousness — that  is, 
with  the  possibility  of  consciousness ;  and  it  would  lead  to 
such  nonsense  as  that  the  thought  of  the  distance  of  the 
earth  from  the  sun  is  ninety-five  millions  of  miles  long. 


THE    CATEGORIES  75 

Plainly,  we  have  to  distinguish  between  the  qualities  of  the 
thought,  considered  as  a  mental  act,  and  the  qualities  of  the 
object  which  the  thought  grasps.  The  stream  of  thought, 
then,  as  conscious  process,  has  no  spatial  qualities ;  and  thus 
the  problem  arises.  How  can  the  ideas  of  bulk,  distance, 
direction,  emerge  in  that  which  has  no  bulk,  or  distance,  or 
direction  ?  We  have  to  deduce  spatial  properties  and  spatial 
relations  from  that  which  is  spaceless. 

In  this  strait,  sensationalism  has  had  recourse  to  two  de- 
vices. One  is  to  identify  the  idea  of  space  with  the  idea  of 
time,  complicated  with  certain  muscular  and  tactual  sensa- 
tions. The  other  is  to  evolve  the  idea  as  a  resultant  of  in- 
teracting temporal  sensations.  Neither  device  has  been 
clearly  conceived  or  steadily  distinguished  from  the  other. 
Both  ahke  are  failures.  There  is  no  way  of  expressing  a 
logarithmic  spiral,  or  a  cycloidal  curve,  or  an  elliptical 
function  in  terms  of  time  and  touch  ;  and  there  is  no  as- 
signable reason  why  sensations  which  are  purely  temporal 
should  ever  give  rise  to  something  incommensurable  with 
them. 

The  conclusion  is  that  space  relations  exist  for  the  mind 
only  as  it  estabhshes  them  among  its  objects,  and  the  neces- 
sity for  their  establishment  lies  primarily  in  the  mind  itself. 
How  the  mind  can  do  this  of  course  there  is  no  telling. 
How  non-spatial  thought  can  have  spatial  intuition  is  quite 
beyond  us.  We  have  to  content  ourselves  with  recognizing 
the  fact  that  it  can  have  such  intuition  because  it  does  have 
it,  and  with  showing  the  fatuity  of  looking  for  the  source  of 
the  intuition  elsewhere  than  in  a  law  of  the  mind  itself. 

We  have,  then,  in  space  and  spatial  qualities,  not  a  read- 
ing off  of  the  properties  of  sense  impressions  considered  as 
qualitative  states  of  the  sensibilit}^  but  a  peculiar  form  im- 
posed upon  them  by  the  mind  itself. 

What  was  said  of  the  unity  and  infinity  of  time  applies 


76  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE 

equally  to  space.  We  relate  our  objects  in  a  common 
scheme,  and  thus  space  appears  to  be  one.  We  relate  all 
our  objects  in  the  one  scheme,  and  thus  space  appears  to  be 
all-embracing.  Finally,  the  form  of  relation  admits  of  in- 
definite repetition,  and  thus  space  appears  to  be  infinite. 
But  the  unity  is  simply  the  unity  of  the  law.  The  all- 
embracing  character  of  space  means  simply  the  applica- 
bility of  this  law  to  all  external  objects.  The  infinitude 
of  space  is  only  the  inexhaustibility  of  the  spatial  synthesis. 
None  of  these  properties  is  a  direct  apprehension  of  ob- 
jective fact,  but  only  an  implication  of  the  space  law. 

In  daily  experience  we  seldom  extend  the  spatial  syn- 
thesis beyond  surrounding  objects.  These  we  relate  in 
mutual  externality  and  relative  position.  Beyond  this  we 
seldom  go.  The  unity  and  infinity  of  space  lie  latent  in 
thought  and  only  emerge  upon  occasion.  Often  we  leave 
our  objects  so  unrelated  that  we  do  not  seem  to  be  in  space 
at  all.  At  other  times  we  fail  to  relate  our  several  groups, 
and  seem  to  have  several  spaces.  The  objects  of  succes- 
sive creations  of  the  imagination  are  alike  spatial  in  that 
they  have  the  space  form,  but  they  cannot  be  united  in  any 
common  space.  We  experience  something  of  the  same  kind 
in  travelling  w4ien  we  drop  out  the  intermediate  links  be- 
tween successive  spatial  groups.  We  believe  that  they 
could  be  united  in  a  common  space  intuition,  but  so  far 
as  the  experience  itself  goes  there  is  nothing  to  compel  it 
or  even  to  suggest  it.  For  this  there  is  needed  a  certain 
continuity  of  experience,  and  it  is  quite  conceivable  that 
our  experience  should  have  been  such  that  we  should  never 
have  united  our  objects  in  a  single  spatial  scheme. 

It  seems  amazingly  clear  that  things  are  in  space  rather 
than  in  space  relations,  but  when  we  attempt  to  tell  what 
the  deeper  meaning  is  in  the  former  expression  we  find  our- 
selves groping.     The  truth  seems  to  be  that  the  two  ex- 


THE    CATEGORIES  77 

pressions  reduce  to  the  same.  The  fact,  however,  is  to  be 
noticed  that  the  actual  relations  of  objects  do  not  exhaust 
the  possible  ones ;  and  thus  arises  the  conception  of  infinite 
possible  relations,  of  which  the  actual  are  only  a  limited 
number.  This  conception  of  other  possible  relations  may  be 
the  underlying  thought  in  saying  that  things  are  in  space 
rather  than  in  space  relations. 

As  in  the  case  of  number,  the  spatial  synthesis  may  go 
on  in  pure  abstraction  from  concrete  objects.  In  this  way 
we  reach  the  conception  of  space  as  a  whole.  In  the  con- 
tinuous synthesis  of  abstract  positions  we  become  aware 
that  the  process  has  no  end,  and  that  from  any  point  in 
the  scheme  the  way  is  open  to  any  other.  Thus  we  come 
to  the  consciousness  of  the  unity  and  all-embracing  nature 
of  space.  In  this  same  abstract  activity  the  mind  gener- 
ates the  conceptions  of  pure  geometr}'— the  point,  the  line, 
the  angle,  the  surface,  the  solid,  etc.  To  unfold  the  con- 
tents of  the  pure  space  intuition  in  this  abstract  sense  is 
the  function  of  geometry  in  its  various  forms. 

In  our  every -day  determinations  of  space  there  is  a  curi- 
ous relativity  due  to  the  fact  that  we  make  ourselves,  and 
more  particularly  our  own  heads,  the  centre  of  our  space,  or 
the  origin  of  the  axes  of  reference.  Here  and  there,  up  and 
down,  right  and  left,  before  and  behind,  are  illustrations. 
These  terms  have  no  meaning  for  the  pure  space  intuition, 
but  only  for  that  intuition  as  modified  by  the  experience  of 
a  physical  organism. 

Motion 

A  mixed  category,  implying  both  space  and  time,  yet  not 
given  in  either  or  both,  is  motion.  It  implies  both  ;  for  mo- 
tion is  unthinkable  apart  from  space  and  time ;  and  yet  it  is 
undefinable  in  terms  of  anything  but  itself.  If  we  think 
only  of  coexistent  points  of  space,  we  have  no  motion.     If 


78  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGP: 

we  think  only  of  successive  moments  of  time,  again  we  have 
no  proper  motion.  If  we  define  motion  as  change  of  place, 
or  as  the  passage  of  a  body  from  one  place  to  another,  we 
only  give  the  meaning  of  the  word ;  the  idea  is  implied  in 
the  definition. 

Quantity 

In  'comparing  some  experiences  we  become  aware  of  a 
qualitative  likeness  or  unlikeness.  In  comparing  some  oth- 
ers we  become  aware  at  once  of  a  qualitative  likeness  and  of 
another  order  of  likeness  or  unlikeness.  The  experience  of 
this  second  order  is  the  fundamental  fact  in  the  experience 
of  quantity.  Quantity  refers  to  an  order  of  likeness  and 
difference  within  qualitative  likeness,  and  the  changes  with- 
in qualitative  constancy  are  quantitative.  "When  there  is 
no  qualitative  likeness  there  can  be  no  quantitative  com- 
parison. A  noise  is  neither  greater  nor  less  than  a  color ; 
the  two  are  incommensurable.  We  might  possibly  think  a 
clap  of  thunder  greater  than  a  flash  of  lightning,  but  only 
as  we  subsumed  both  under  a  common  point  of  view — say, 
the  amount  of  subjective  disturbance  or  shock. 

Quantity  cannot  be  defined  in  terms  of  anything  but 
itself,  and  we  have  to  go  back  to  the  original  compari- 
son of  experiences  of  like  quality  to  get  the  fundamental 
meaning.  This  is  true  for  quantity  itself,  and  for  its  three 
dimensions  of  equal,  greater,  or  less. 

The  quantity  of  anything  is  primarily  its  magnitude, 
whether  of  extension,  duration,  or  intensity.  In  this  there  is 
nothing  relative  any  more  than  there  is  in  a  simple  quality. 
Without  quantity  in  this  sense  the  conception  of  both  being 
and  quality  would  vanish.  In  this  general  sense  we  may 
say  that  all  concrete  things  and  qualities  are  quanta.  But 
when  we  come  to  measure  quantity  then  an  element  of  rel- 
ativity appears.      This  is  seen  in  the  fact  that  there  is  no 


THE    CATEGORIES  79 

absolute  unit  of  quantity,  and  that  nothing  is  absolutely 
great  or  small.  All  magnitudes  depend  for  their  numerical 
value  upon  the  unit  of  measure ;  and  this  is  relative  to  our 
aim,  or  convenience,  or  some  feature  of  our  experience. 
From  this  it  further  follows  that  in  any  concrete  case  of 
continuous  quantity  the  magnitude  is  really  a  ratio  of  one 
quantity  to  another,  for  the  assumed  unit  is  itself  quantity. 

It  is  common  to  speak  of  quantity  as  continuous  and 
discontinuous.  Continuous  quantity  exists  in  the  three 
forms  of  extension,  duration,  and  intensity.  The  first  two 
forms  relate  respectively  to  spatial  and  temporal  magni- 
tudes, the  third  relates  to  whatever  qualities  have  degree. 
All  three  of  these  forms  are  measured  by  number.  How 
much  ?  means,  How  many  ?  When  no  definite  number  is 
given  there  is  an  implicit  reference  to  some  standard,  and 
the  quantity  is  simply  determined  as  large  or  small,  or  as 
equal,  greater,  or  less. 

Discontinuous  quantity  consists  of  numbers  and  of  dis- 
crete objects  which  may  be  counted.  These  have  all  the 
dimensions  of  quantity.  They  may  be  large  or  small,  equal, 
greater,  or  less. 

In  the  study  of  social  and  economic  questions  quantity 
appears  in  the  form  of  statistics,  giving  rates,  ratios,  aver- 
ages, etc. 

The  notion  of  quantity  moves  entirely  within  the  field 
of  qualitative  likeness.  When,  then,  unlike  qualities  appear, 
they  defy  any  common  quantitative  treatment  unless  they 
can  be  reduced  to  quantitative  variations  of  a  common 
unit.  Hence  the  joy  in  the  scientific  world  when  appar- 
ently unlike  phenomena  are  reduced  to  phases  of  one  quan- 
titative process. 

When  the  notion  of  quantity  can  be  applied,  and  the 
quantity  itself  accurately  measured,  an  exactness  of  con- 
ception becomes  possible  which  is  otherwise  unattainabl*^ 


80  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND   KNOWLEDGE 

It  is  then  possible  to  apply  the  science  of  number  to  the 
matter  and  develop  our  data  to  any  desired  extent.  It  is 
this  fact  which  makes  quantity  so  prominent  a  category 
in  physical  science,  and  which  leads  to  the  hasty  assertion 
that  nothing  is  science  which  is  not  quantitative.  It  is 
not,  however,  the  bare  notion  of  quantity  which  is  so  fruit- 
ful, but  rather  the  possibility  of  exact  measurement.  Where 
this  is  not  given  we  may  still  insist  that  all  things  and 
qualities  and  activities  are  quanta,  extensive  or  intensive, 
but  we  are  no  better  off  than  before.  We  must  also  be 
on  our  guard  against  a  false  show  of  quantitative  accuracy 
when  the  case  does  not  admit  of  it,  as  when  one  reports 
his  health  on  a  scale  of  one  hundred.  Number  is  exact, 
but  it  cannot  make  vagueness  accurate  or  sense  out  of 
nonsense. 

The  development  of  the  units,  measures,  and  relations  of 
quantity  belongs  to  the  special  sciences.  It  suffices  here 
to  have  shown  the  significance  of  the  category,  and  to  point 
out  that  the  great  quantitative  sciences,  pure  and  applied, 
are  not  picked  up  ready-made  on  the  field  of  sense  experi- 
ence, neither  are  they  the  precipitate  of  any  random  asso- 
ciation. On  the  contrary,  they  are  the  magnificent  product 
of  thought  in  its  effort  to  master  experience  and  rise  into 
self-possession. 

Space,  time,  motion,  and  quantity,  with  number  for  their 
measure,  are  the  great  elementary  categories  of  mechanical 
science.  They  contain  the  basis  of  pure  mathematics  and 
kinematics,  and  thus  furnish  the  groundwork  of  physical 
science. 

But  all  of  these  categories  resemble  the  law  of  identity, 
in  that  they  set  the  objects  apart  without  any  internal 
connection.  The  events  which  are  formally  related  in  time 
have  no  inner  bond.  In  like  manner  the  phenomena  united 
in  space  are  left  mutually  external  without  any  substantial 


THE    CATEGORIES  81 

bond  or  reciprocal  connection.  These  categories  alone  would 
not  carry  us  beyond  groundless  events  and  disconnected 
appearances.  If  we  leave  out  the  metaphysical  categories 
the  visual  world  is  not  a  world  of  things,  but  a  set  of 
shifting  and  dissolving  appearances  without  unity  or  iden- 
tity. The  tem})oral  world  also  has  no  continuity,  but  is  a 
ceaseless  and  groundless  flux  of  beginning  and  perishing 
events,  and,  as  such,  is  strictly  nothing  for  intelligence. 
Motion  too  becomes  a  delusive  phantom,  without  the  notion 
of  a  continuous  and  permanent  subject.  We  should  have 
successive  appearances  at  adjacent  points,  but  no  motion. 
This  is  the  point  to  which  Hume  reduced  sensationalism, 
and  beyond  which  it  cannot  go.  The  mind,  however,  saves 
itself  from  this  collapse  through  its  raetaph\'sical  cate- 
gories. 

In  treating  first  of  the  categories  of  phenomena,  then, 
we  do  not  intend  to  imply  that  they  come  first,  or  that 
they  can  be  applied  apart  from  metaphysical  principles. 
Any  category  by  itself  is  an  abstraction  from  a  rational 
whole  of  which  all  the  factors  coexist. 

The  metaphvsical  categories,  such  as  being,  identity, 
causality,  cannot  be  presented  in  sense  at  all.  They  are 
rather  the  unpicturable  notions  of  intelligence,  and  are  the 
chief  means  whereby  the  mind  transforms  the  fleeting  and 
unintelligible  impressions  of  sense  into  an  abiding-  object 
for  thought.  Of  course,  formal  logic  insists  on  turning 
these  categories  over  to  metaphysics,  on  the  ground  that 
they  concern  existence  rather  than  thought.  But  it  is 
plain  that  they  concern  existence  for  us  only  because  they 
are  primarily  thought  principles.  In  the  articulate  concep- 
tion of  objects  they  are  the  leading  factor.  It  is  only  the 
logic  of  formal  consistency  which  is  absolved  from  con- 
sidering them,  and  this  logic  is  a  small  matter. 

6 


82  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

Being 

Being,  or  existence,  or  reality,  is  the  first  of  the  meta- 
physical categories.  In  the  world  of  events  all  occurrences 
are  real ;  their  occurrence  is  their  reality.  In  the  world  of 
ideas  any  conceptual  object  whatever  has  a  sort  of  exist- 
ence. In  this  sense  the  centaur  and  chimera,  Rosinante  and 
Alborak,  exist.  In  the  world  of  consciousness  actual  thoughts 
and  feelings  are  real,  in  distinction  from  others  which,  as 
not  actual,  are  unreal.  In  this  sense,  also,  error  and  con- 
fusion exist  as  well  as  truth  and  clearness;  that  is,  they 
are  actual  forms  of  experience.  In  the  broadest  sense,  then, 
being  includes  everything,  thought  and  its  objects  alike  ; 
for  all  of  these  do  in  some  fashion  exist. 

In  this  general  use  of  the  term,  the  mind  only  posits  itself 
and  all  its  acts  and  objects  as  members  of  a  system  of  re- 
ality without  further  specification.  All  that  is  involved  in 
it  is  a  possible  objectivity  for  thought.  This  act  of  posit- 
ing results  necessarily  from  the  antithesis  between  thought 
and  its  object.  Thought  as  act  does  not  make,  but  reveals 
its  object;  and  even  when  thought  grasps  itself,  it  reveals 
itself  as  a  real  activity.  Even  the  special  to  me  has  an 
aspect  which  makes  it,  at  least  potentially,  common  to  all ; 
for  it  is  one  phase  or  factor  of  the  real  system  of  things  and 
events.  In  this  sense  thought  presupposes  being,  and  has 
no  siijnificance  without  the  reference  to  being.  In  this 
reference  we  have  the  most  general  expression  of  that  ob- 
jectivity which  we  have  seen  to  inhere  in  the  nature  of 
thought. 

This  use  of  the  term  being  implies  a  possible  objectivity 
for  thought,  but  it  does  not  necessarily  imply  any  substan- 
tiality or  identity  in  the  object;  neither  does  it  carry  us 
beyond  solipsism.  These  objects  might  all  exist  only  as 
phenomena  of  the  individual  subject ;  and  thus  we  should 


THE    CATEGORIES  83 

miss  anything  substantial,  or  any  abiding  ground.  Hence, 
another  and  more  metaphysical  use  of  the  term,  in  which 
the  mind  distinguishes  between  being  as  substantive  exist- 
ence and  being  as  applied  to  events,  between  being  as  the 
abiding  reality  and  being  as  objective  appearance  which 
exists  only  in  its  perception.  We  deal  now  with  being  in 
the  metaphysical  sense. 

Of  the  subjective  demand  for  this  category  there  can  be 
no  doubt.  It  is  the  fundamental  category  with  spontaneous 
thought.  Even  causation  is  secondary.  Qualities  are  qual- 
ities of  something ;  attributes  are  attributes  of  something ; 
and  that  something  is  commonly  supposed  to  be  in  sight. 
The  manifest  objectivity  of  things  leaves  no  room  for  ques- 
tion. Doubt  on  this  point  is  simply  unintelligible  to  com- 
mon-sense. For  popular  thought  things  are  undeniably 
there,  apart  from  our  thought,  and  continuously  existent, 
whether  we  think  of  them  or  not.  This  is  the  form  which 
the  objectivity  of  thought  necessarily  takes  on  in  spontane- 
ous thinking. 

Of  the  logical  necessity  of  this  category  there  can  be 
equally  no  doubt.  Our  objective  experience  is  absolutely 
inarticulate  and  nothing  for  intelligence  until  it  is  fixed  and 
defined  with  reference  to  an  abiding  and  independent  mean- 
ing. The  distinction  between  the  real  and  the  imaginary, 
the  actual  and  the  fantastic,  depends  upon  the  same  refer- 
ence. As  long  as  the  thinker  remains  shut  up  with  only  his 
own  mental  states  as  his  objects,  he  not  only  never  emerges 
from  solipsism,  he  never  emerges  into  articulate  thought  at 
all.  For  this  he  must  have  at  least  the  form  of  indepen- 
dent objectivity  and  permanence.  This  is  the  truth  in 
Kant's  otherwise  rather  unsuccessful  disproof  of  idealism. 

Of  the  metaphysical  validity  of  this  category,  finally, 
there  can  be  no  question  other  than  a  verbal  one.  Perhaps 
it  might  occur  to  us  to  claim  that,  while  the  form  of  inde- 


84  THEORY  OF  THOUGHT  AND  KNOWLEDGE 

pendent  objectivity  and  permanence  is  necessary  to  thought, 
the  fact  itself  is  not  thus  necessary ;  and  the  world  of 
objective  but  unsubstantial  phenomena  might  be  offered 
in  illustration.  But  this  illustration  would  onlv  show  that 
the  category  of  being  may  be  applied  to  unsubstantial 
phenomena,  not  that  it  is  unreal  or  unnecessary.  For  if 
we  deny  the  category  outright,  not  even  solipsism  is  left ; 
and  even  if  we  should  allow  the  solipsistic  subject  and  his 
phenomena,  those  phenomena  would  reveal  nothing,  would 
have  no  ground  or  bond  or  inner  connection  whatever,  and 
would  thus  elude  all  rational  apprehension. 

By  the  form  of  objective  existence  the  mind  transcends 
itself  and  reaches  a  common  to  all.  By  affirming  the  meta- 
physical reality  of  objective  existence  the  mind  secures,  in 
addition  to  objectivity,  real  ground  and  connection.  The 
former  is  given  in  the  essential  nature  of  the  judgment. 
The  latter  is  necessary  to  save  thought  from  disappearing 
in  a  mirage  of  dissolving  phantoms.  Thus  the  objectivity 
of  thought  and  the  demand  for  ground  and  connection  meet 
in  the  notion  of  being. 

The  categor}'^  of  being  appears  in  three  leading  forms — 
thing,  soul,  and  God.  But  in  all  three  it  stands  for  the 
real  ground  and  principle  of  unity  in  the  manifestations  of 
the  respective  realms. 

The  critical  miso^ivintjs  concernino:  this  cateD:orv  which 
now  and  then  appear  in  speculation  arise  from  a  miscon- 
ception, or  they  relate  to  its  application.  Sometimes  being 
has  been  identified  with  extended  substance  and  limited  to 
material  thinos.  Sometimes  search  has  been  made  for  the 
extended  substance  in  distinction  from  properties,  and  the 
failure  to  find  it  has  led  to  a  denial  of  being.  Such  difficul- 
ties vanish  when  being  is  understood  as  the  abiding  ground 
and  source  of  manifestation. 

Other  scruples  relate  to  the  application  of  the  category. 


THE    CATEGORIES  85 

In  our  experience  being  falls  into  the  two  classes  of  minds 
and  things,  both  of  which  for  spontaneous  thought  seem 
equally  real ;  or  if  there  be  any  difference  it  is  in  favor  of 
things.  But  the  idealists  have  given  a  good  many  reasons 
for  thinking  that  the  world  of  things  has  only  a  phenom- 
enal existence,  and  hence  is  without  substantial  reality. 
But  this  only  concerns  the  location  of  the  category.  Being 
is  still  affirmed,  but  it  is  limited  to  personal  existence.  Im- 
personal things  are  said  to  exist  only  in  and  for  thought ; 
but  all  the  more  are  the  mental  subjects  affirmed,  for  with- 
out mind  there  would  be  no  world  at  all.  The  objection, 
too,  is  metaphysical  rather  than  epistemological.  For,  in 
any  case,  being  and  quality  are  the  great  forms  under  which 
we  comprehend  even  the  alleged  phenomena  of  the  exter- 
nal world,  and  this  distinction  is  contributed  by  thought. 

Quality 

The  thought  of  being  in  abstraction  is  only  the  empty 
form  of  objectivity  and  ground.  Considered  as  actual,  the 
thought  vanishes  entirely  unless  Ave  proceed  to  give  the 
being  qualities  or  attributes.  Pure  being,  or  being  without 
attributes,  is  objectively  nothing.  Subjectively  it  is  the 
bare  category  of  objective  position.  In  the  concrete  act 
of  position  there  is  always  a  double  aspect.  First  some- 
thing is  posited  as  real,  and  thus  being  is  affirmed.  But  if 
we  ask  what  this  real  thing  is,  we  can  only  tell  in  terras 
of  its  qualities.  The  act  is  not  complete  without  this 
double  aspect,  as  a  judgment  is  nothing  w^ithout  both  sub- 
ject and  predicate.  In  the  judgment  we  posit  a  subject 
which  we  unfold  in  the  predicate,  and  neither  is  anything 
apart  from  the  other.  So  reality  is  conceived  only  through 
its  attributes,  and  the  attributes  exist  only  in  the  reality. 
Either  is  an  unreal  abstraction  apart  from  the  other. 

This  relation  of  being  and  quality,  or  of  substance  and 


86  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

attribute,  underlies  our  attributive  judgments.  "We  get 
some  idea  of  its  importance  when  we  remember  that  the 
relation  of  thing  and  quality  underlies  all  of  our  sponta- 
neous thinking  about  the  outer  world,  and  in  its  grammat- 
ical form  of  noun  and  adjective  is  one  of  the  fundamental 
factors  of  language. 

The  category  of  being  has  been  a  source  of  great  anxiety 
to  the  sensationalists,  and  they  have  oscillated  somewhat 
uncertainly  between  denying  it  and  reducing  it  to  terms 
of  quality.  As  the  senses  do  not  give  it,  an  equivalent  has 
been  sought  as  follows : 

The  senses  do  indeed  give  us  only  qualities ;  but  these 
qualities  form  groups  by  association,  and  all  that  we  mean 
by  a  thing  is  simply  such  a  group.  The  contents  of  a 
sense  object  are  expressed  in  a  series  of  sense  qualities. 
Primarily,  these  qualities  were  unrelated,  and  there  is  noth- 
ing in  any  one  that  implies  any  other;  but  from  frequent 
coming  together  thev  are  united  bv  contiguous  association 
into  a  fixed  group.  Hence,  instead  of  saying  that  the  thing 
A  has  the  quality  B,  we  may  say  that  B  is  one  member  of 
the  group  we  call  A  ;  and  this  is  really  all  the  attributive 
judgment  means. 

This  claim  has  some  plausibility  when  w'e  are  dealing 
with  purely  sense  objects,  but  none  when  dealing  -with 
rational  objects.  And  even  in  the  case  of  sense  objects 
the  claim  overlooks  the  intention  of  the  judgment.  The 
association  of  sensations  can  only  give  associated  sensations, 
and  these  are  necessaril}'  special  to  the  individual.  They 
contain  no  common  to  all ;  and  even  the  fictitious  objec- 
tivity ascribed  to  them  can  be  explained  only  by  invoking 
a  mental  "  propensity  to  feign  "  to  account  for  the  surplus- 
age. Association,  too,  expresses  merely  a  coming  together 
of  subjective  states  in  a  particular  experience,  and  not  a 
belonging  together  in  a  common  reality.    But  this  objective 


THE    CATEGORIES  .  87 

connection  is  the  meaning  of  the  judgment.  If  there  be 
no  such  connection,  the  judgment  is  baseless ;  and  if  there 
be  such  connection,  it  can  be  reached  only  by  thought.  If, 
however,  these  groups  of  qualities  exist  objectively  and  are 
objectively  connected,  then,  like  Mr.  Mill's  "permanent 
possibilities  of  sensation,"  they  are  only  strange  names  for 
things. 

If,  then,  we  are  asked  what  the  notion  of  being  adds  to 
the  sense  contents,  we  reply,  It  adds  nothing  that  can  be 
sensuously  presented.  It  adds  only  independent  objectivity, 
or  an  objective  principle  of  ground  and  unity.  The  form 
under  which  the  principle  is  to  be  thought  is  a  problem 
for  metaphysics,  but  the  principle  itself  cannot  be  ques- 
tioned without  destroying  thought  altogether.  Metaphysics 
finds  reasons  for  thinking  that  the  category  of  being  can 
be  adequately  thought  only  in  the  form  of  free  personality, 
but  being  in  some  form  is  a  necessity  of  thought. 

Our  thought  is  primarily  and  largely  occupied  with  sense 
objects.  Hence  our  conceptions  of  qualities  are  mainly  of 
the  passive  and  spatial  type.  But  as  the  thought  of  being 
grows  more  dynamic,  or  as  we  rise  to  the  conception  of 
spiritual  being,  our  thought  of  qualities  takes  on  the  form 
of  powers,  energies,  capacities,  faculties,  etc. 

Identity 

Identity  may  signify  sameness  of  meaning,  or  equivalence 
of  logical  value,  and  it  may  signify  metaphysical  continuity 
of  existence.  In  the  former  sense  we  affirm  identity  of 
ideas,  however  separate  in  time  they  may  be,  considered 
as  mental  events.  But  when  things  are  separate,  no  matter 
how  identical  their  definition  might  be,  we  affirm  similarity, 
not  identity.  Chemical  elements  are  not  made  identical  by 
the  exact  similarity  of  their  properties.  The  principle  of 
consistency,  also,  which  we  have  treated  as  the  law  of 


88  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

identity,  provides  only  that  our  thoughts  shall  have  fixed 
meanings,  not  that  things  must  be  metaphysically  continu 
ous.     Hence  the  distinction  between  the  principle  of  con 
sistency  and  the  category  of  identity.     The  former  might 
suffice  for  dealing  with  a   system  of  changeless  ideas,  but 
we  need  the  latter  when  treating  of  concrete  reality. 

The  necessity  of  this  category  is  plain.  Without  it  ex- 
perience would  vanish  into  a  groundless  flux  of  perishing 
events.  There  would  be  no  connection  between  the  past 
and  future  of  a  thing ;  in  fact,  there  would  be  no  thing. 
Thus  the  thought  of  being  itself  would  vanish.  If  we  think 
to  help  ourselves  by  saying  that  the  thing  is  while  it  lasts, 
we  fall  into  the  puzzle  of  the  infinite  divisibility  of  time,  and 
our  things  become  infinite  in  number  if  not  infinitely  vari- 
ous in  quality ;  and  each  of  these  is  groundless  in  its  coming 
and  going. 

From  this  abyss  the  mind  saves  itself  by  its  category  of 
identity.  When  there  is  temporal  or  spatial  continuity  of 
manifestation  the  mind  affirms  sameness  of  existence.  Thus 
it  is  the  same  sun  day  after  day,  and  matter  is  the  same 
under  all  phenomenal  changes.  The  meaning  of  this  same- 
ness admits  of  some  debate,  but  it  certainly  implies  at  least 
continuity  of  existence.  In  this  sense  it  is  an  implication  of 
the  law  of  connection,  and  in  this  sense  it  is  a  necessity  of 
thought. 

Scruples  similar  to  those  attaching  to  the  category  of 
being  attach  also  to  the  category  of  identity,  and  the  same 
general  reply  must  be  made.  Either  they  concern  the  appli- 
cation of  the  category,  or  they  are  metaphysical  rather  than 
epistemological.  Thus,  it  may  be  said  that  there  is  no  onto- 
logical  identity  in  the  physical  world,  but  only  a  phenomenal 
similarity  in  the  successive  manifestation.  A  continuously 
produced  musical  note  is  not  the  same  for  any  two  instants, 
but  it  has  throughout  an  equivalent  acoustic  value.     This 


THE   CATEGORIES  89 

equivalence  of  value  is  its  only  identity.  In  like  manner  the 
world  of  things  is  only  a  phenomenal  process,  and  has  no 
identity  beyond  its  constant  form. 

This  scruple  is  not  wholly  gratuitous.  Metaphysics  shows 
that  the  notion  of  real  identity  in  distinction  from  formal 
identity  abounds  in  obscurity.  Yet  still  the  objection  con- 
cerns primarily  the  location  of  the  category,  and  not  its 
reality.  For  if  we  reduce  nature  to  a  flowing  form  with  no 
proper  identity,  all  the  more  must  we  afRrm  metaphysical 
continuity  somewhere  to  make  this  flowing  form  possible. 
And  this  flowing  form,  again,  becomes  manageable  by  us 
only  as  we  reduce  it  to  the  form  of  an  abiding  thing.  If, 
then,  there  be  no  true  identity  in  things,  a  question  we  post- 
pone to  metaphysics,  all  the  more  does  the  category  of  iden- 
tity appear  as  a  mental  imposition  necessary  to  any  artic- 
ulate conception  of  the  flowing  world  of  change. 

Spontaneous  thought  never  has  any  question  about  the 
identity  of  things.  Its  only  difficulty  is,  first,  in  seeing  how 
any  question  as  to  its  meaning  can  possibly  arise,  and,  sec- 
ondlv,  in  seeing  that  the  relation  is  not  found  in  sense,  but  is 
contributed  by  thought.  It  will  help  to  insight  to  reflect 
upon  this  problem  :  Given  discontinuous  sensitive  states  to 
construct  an  objectively  existing  and  continuous  thing;  or 
given  discontinuous  subjective  experiences  to  infer  a  contin- 
uously and  objectively  existing  thing.  Crude  thought,  of 
course,  will  have  no  difficulty ;  for  the  experiences  will  be 
assumed  to  be  experiences  of  things  from  the  start,  and  thus 
the  problem  will  be  solved  with  neatness  and  despatch. 

Causality 

It  is  a  very  natural  illusion  of  spontaneous  thought  that 
we  can  think  of  being  independently  of  all  other  categories. 
But  if  we  eliminate  from  the  notion  the  ideas  of  quality, 
identity,  and  permanence,  being  itself  vanishes.     Being  as 


90  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT   AND   KNOWLEDGE 

thus  conceived  is  only  an  abstraction,  or  the  empty  form 
of  thoug-ht  without  contents,  or  the  bemnnino^  of  a  thought 
which  awaits  completion.  And  for  this  completion  the  fur- 
ther category  of  causality  is  needed ;  without  it  being  van- 
ishes into  a  baseless  phantom.  Causality  is  not  something 
added  to  the  notion  of  being,  but  something  contained  in 
that  notion. 

The  disaster  involved  in  denying  the  causal  element  ap- 
pears from  the  following  considerations :  Things,  if  real, 
would  be  mutually  indifferent  and  non-existent.  Events 
would  be  groundless,  and  experience  would  fall  asunder 
into  chaos.  Perception,  if  it  were  otherwise  possible,  would 
become  solipsism  ;  for  our  perceptions,  having  no  cause, 
could  never  be  related  to  a  real  world.  Indeed,  even  the 
idea  of  being  itself,  as  anything  beyond  the  individual  and 
momentary  presentation,  would  vanish,  and  thus  nihilism 
would  be  the  outcome. 

The  essential  meaning  of  causation  is  dynamic  determina- 
tion. It  ma}^  be  illustrated  (1)  by  the  self-determination  of 
a  free  agent,  (2)  by  the  determination  of  the  consequent  by 
the  antecedent,  and  (3)  by  the  mutual  determination  of 
different  things.  In  the  first  form  we  have  freedom  ;  in 
the  second  we  have  the  causal  connection  of  sequences ;  and 
in  the  third  we  have  the  causal  connection  of  coexistences, 
or  the  interaction  of  things. 

Several  questions  may  be  asked  concerning  this  idea. 
They  concern  (1)  its  source,  (2)  its  validity,  and  (3)  the  form 
of  its  application. 

On  the  first  point  we  must  regard  the  mind  as  the 
source  of  the  idea.  Even  Hume  admitted  this  in  a  left- 
handed  way.  A  mind  with  no  category  but  time  can  dis- 
cern only  sequence ;  but  since  our  mind  does  affirm  more, 
this  excess,  along  with  many  other  excesses,  Rume  ascribed 
to  a  mental  "  propensity  to  feign/' 


THE    CATEGORIES  91 

As  to  the  second  point,  to  deny  the  reality  of  causal 
connection  would  cancel  objective  thought  entirely,  and, 
moreover,  would  vacate  sensationalism  altogether;  for  all 
its  explanations  consist  in  showing  how  the  past  has  deter- 
mined belief  according  to  the  laws  of  association.  Of  course 
if  there  be  no  determination,  all  this  is  hopelessly  incon- 
sistent. Some  beliefs  were  and  some  others  are;  but  to 
think  of  any  ground  or  connection  is  to  abandon  our  theory. 

The  third  point  remains  in  uncertainty  until  this  day. 
The  necessity  of  affirming  a  causal  ground  is  stringent,  but 
it  is  by  no  means  easy  to  fix  the  form  and  place  of  that 
ground,  or  to  fix  the  form  in  which  causality  itself  must 
be  conceived.  The  traditional  intuitionalist  has  rightly 
affirmed  causal  connection,  but  has  been  a  little  hasty  in 
locating  it.  In  particular  he  has  located  it  with  all  assur- 
ance between  the  physical  antecedent  and  the  physical 
consequent.  Under  the  influence  of  his  crude  realism  he 
has  regarded  both  of  these  as  things  in  real  space,  and  as 
he  could  see  nothing  else  in  the  neighborhood  of  course 
the  antecedent  must  be  the  efficient  cause.  But  meta- 
physical considerations  make  this  assumption  doubtful. 
All  that  we  see  in  such  a  case  is  the  temporal  order ;  and 
when  one  has  sufficiently  reflected  upon  the  antithesis  of 
the  phenomenal  and  the  real,  it  becomes  a  question  whether 
true  causality  can  be  found  in  the  phenomenal  at  all,  and  not 
rather  in  a  power  beyond  the  phenomenal  order  which  in- 
cessantly posits  and  continues  that  order  according  to  rule. 
Thus  the  seasons,  or  day  and  night,  do  not  cause  one 
another,  although  they  succeed  according  to  rule ;  they  are 
rather  all  alike  resultants  of  another  order  which  is  the 
ground  of  their  changes.  In  the  same  way,  we  might  possi- 
bly view  the  physical  series  as  being  only  a  temporal  order 
without  any  causal  connection  between  its  members,  and  as 
having  its  causal  ground  in  something  beyond  it.     These 


92  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE 

considerations  show  that  the  absolute  certainty  that  an 
event  has  a  causal  ground  somewhere  by  no  means  enables 
us  with  equal  certainty  to  locate  that  ground  and  determine 
its  nature.  Popular  thought  on  this  subject  rests  entirely 
on  crude  realism.  The  physicists  speak  much  of  the  an- 
tithesis of  the  phenomenal  and  the  real,  but  they  have  at- 
tained to  no  consistent  thought  or  expression  on  this  matter. 

Again,  both  the  problem  of  interaction  and  that  of  causal 
sequence  have  some  special  obscurities.  In  thinking  of  an 
ideal  system,  the  unity  of  the  mind  is  the  supreme  condi- 
tion of  the  system.  The  members  exist  only  in  and  through 
the  unitary  thought.  The  members  also  are  determined 
with  reference  to  one  another,  and  thus  may  be  said  to 
exist  in  reciprocal  relations.  Without  such  reciprocity 
there  would  be  no  system  at  all,  but  only  disjointed  ideas. 
But  this  reciprocity  is  merely  logical  and  not  dynamic,  and 
is  possible  only  in  the  unity  of  consciousness.  But  when  we 
think  of  a  real  system  we  understand  a  system  which  ex- 
ists apart  from  our  thinking,  and  then  the  question  arises, 
How  shall  the  reciprocity  which  the  thought  of  system 
demands  be  realized  in  actuality  ?  If  the  real  S3^stem  were 
also  a  thought  system  whose  members  are  produced  and 
related  by  thought,  there  would  be  no  difficulty ;  but  com- 
mon-sense finds  such  a  view  altogether  too  airy.  All  the 
more,  then,  must  we  ask  what  it  is  beyond  our  thought 
which  takes  the  place  of  the  unity  of  consciousness  and 
binds  the  system  together. 

The  common  answer  is  that  the  unity  of  consciousness 
is  replaced  by  the  dynamic  interaction  of  things,  and  thus 
they  reciprocally  determine  one  another.  But  this  is  a 
hasty  application  of  the  idea  of  causality  ;  for  it  is  conceiv- 
able that,  instead  of  reciprocally  determining  one  another, 
they  are  reciprocally  determined  by  something  which  is 
not  the  things,  but  which  embraces  all  the  things,  as  the 


THE    CATEGOKIKS  93 

mind  embraces  all  its  thoughts.  Of  course,  if  we  are  to 
think  of  the  system  at  all,  the  reciprocal  logical  relation 
is  necessary.  The  members  must  be  thought  in  mutual 
relativity  ;  but  how  this  relation  is  dynamically  founded  is 
not  easily  discerned.  Indeed,  the  difficulties  of  the  popular 
view  are  so  great  that  thought  has  long  been  drifting  about 
among  mere  verbal  solutions,  as  that  things  are  united  by 
forces  or  exercise  mutual  influence,  or  else  oscillating  con- 
fusedly between  the  pre-established  harmony  of  Leibnitz 
and  some  monistic  doctrine  of  causation.  In  fact,  this  is 
a  problem  of  such  grave  difficult}'^  that  science  and  even 
logic  do  well  to  leave  it  to  metaphysics,  and  confine  them- 
selves to  observing  the  laws  of  reciprocal  change  among 
things,  in  the  full  conviction  that  the  ground  of  these 
changes  will  find  out  for  itself  how  to  solve  the  problem. 

For  practical  purposes,  then,  the  fact  of  reciprocal  change 
among  things  may  be  called  their  interaction,  and  the  laws 
of  that  change  may  be  called  the  laws  of  their  interaction. 
In  this  way  the  practical  and  inductive  problem  will  be 
simplified  ;  and  no  harm  will  be  done,  unless  we  mistake 
this  postponement  of  the  speculative  problem  for  its  theo- 
retical solution. 

Thus  all  that  we  bring  away  from  the  consideration  of 
the  interaction  of  things  is  the  conviction  that  there  is  a 
causal  ground  for  their  reciprocity,  but  without  having 
decided  the  form  under  which  that  ground  is  to  be  thought. 
We  have  also  found  a  practical  problem  to  which  logic  and 
science  may  devote  themselves  without  raising  the  meta- 
physical question.  Meanwhile  they  remain  under  bonds 
not  to  declare  that  question  answered  because,  in  practice, 
it  may  be  ignored. 

The  causality  of  sequence  has  similar  puzzles.  Confining 
ourselves  for  the  present  to  the  field  of  necessary  causation, 
we  have  the  following  specimen  difficulties  ; 


94  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE 

First,  it  is  plain  that  if  the  future  is  to  be  the  product  of 
the  past,  or  is  to  be  explained  by  the  past,  it  must  in  some 
way  be  included  in  the  past ;  otherwise  it  is  a  groundless 
becoming,  and  the  law  of  connection  vanishes.  If  we  could 
exhaustively  think  the  past  without  finding  the  future  in  it, 
the  future  would  be  groundless ;  and  if,  on  the  other  hand, 
we  find  the  future  in  the  past,  we  are  at  a  loss  to  know 
what  the  difference  between  past  and  future  may  be. 

Out  of  this  puzzle  the  mind  seeks  to  help  itself  by  the 
notion  of  potentiality.  The  future  was  potential  in  the  past. 
But  unless  this  potentiality  is  an  actuality  of  some  kind,  it 
can  do  nothing ;  and  how  to  represent  a  potential  as  actual, 
or  what  the  difference  would  be  between  a  potential  actual 
and  an  actual  actual,  is  quite  beyond  us. 

If,  now,  we  have  recourse  to  description  and  say  that  po- 
tential means  only  that  future  conditions  develop  out  of  past 
conditions,  we  see  at  once  that  "  develop  out  of  "  in  a  strict 
sense  has  the  same  difficulties,  for  how  can  that  come  out 
which  was  in  no  sense  in  ?  But  if  we  mean  only  that  new 
conditions  temporally  follow  old  conditions,  then  we  affirm 
mere  succession  and  miss  the  idea  of  ground  and  connection 
altogether. 

These  difficulties  meet  us  whether  we  try  to  work  the 
problem  with  one  or  several  causes.  In  both  cases  we  oscil- 
late between  connectionless  succession  and  unintelligible 
potentialities. 

This  consideration  of  the  causality  of  sequence  leaves  us 
with  the  conviction,  first,  that  some  bond  of  connection  must 
be  found,  and,  secondly,  that  it  is  by  no  means  easy  to  deter- 
mine in  an  off-hand  way  the  nature  and  place  of  this  bond. 
The  theories  of  spontaneous  thought  are  mainly  expressions 
of  the  former  conviction  without  any  insight  into  the  deeper 
mysteries  of  the  problem.  The  same  is  true  of  the  tradi- 
tional intuitionalism. 


THE    CATEGORIES  95 

Finally,  the  notion  of  causality  itself  is  not  perfectly 
transparent.  To  many  it  will  seem  enough  to  say  that  cau- 
sality is  action,  and  that  is  the  end  of  the  matter.  "We  trace 
effects  to  causes,  and  there  we  must  stop.  But  this  satisfac- 
tion is  somewhat  disturbed  by  the  reflection  that  the  action 
must  at  least  be  grounded  in,  and  conditioned  by,  the  nature 
of  the  agent ;  else  it  would  not  be  explained  by  the  agent, 
and  anything  might  be  the  cause  of  anything.  Hence  we 
have  to  describe  and  define  our  causes  in  terms  of  their 
effects,  and  we  get  effects  from  causes  only  by  including 
them  in  the  notion.  If  we  can  think  the  cause  exhaustively 
without  finding  the  effect  in  it,  the  effect  is  not  provided 
for;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  how  to  find  the  effect  in  it  is  a 
problem  of  exceeding  diflBculty.  The  necessity  of  thinking 
the  effect  in  relation  to  the  cause  is  no  more  stringent  than 
the  necessity  of  thinking  the  cause  in  relation  to  the  effect. 

Thus  the  law  of  identity  avenges  itself  upon  the  law  of 
connection.  The  former,  in  its  conviction  that  A  is  A,  for- 
bids us  to  say  anything  of  A  which  is  not  contained  in  the 
notion  of  A.  The  latter  also  has  to  admit  that  no  motion 
is  possible  unless  A  be  really  A  +  X.  Without  this  admis- 
sion the  new  phases  are  groundless,  and  with  this  admis- 
sion the  only  progress  is  from  potentiality  to  actuality, 
which  progress,  moreover,  is  a  very  obscure  affair. 

Luckily,  life  can  go  on  without  solving  this  riddle,  but 
it  is  doubtful  if  there  be  any  speculative  solution  on  the 
plane  of  necessary  causation.  Necessity  has  clear  meaning 
only  as  rational  necessity ;  that  is,  where  we  see  that  the 
premises  imply  the  conclusion,  or  that  the  antecedents  con- 
tain the  consequent.  But  metaphysical  necessity  is  an  ex- 
ceedingly dark  notion  ;  in  fact,  it  is  purely  negative  without 
any  positive  content.  Men  are  led  to  it  by  the  fancy  that 
the  alternative  is  chance  and  the  denial  of  connection,  and 
hence  they  link  event  to  event  by  necessity.     It  is  conceiv- 


96  THEORY  OF  THOUGHT  AND  KNOWLEDGE 

able,  however,  that  the  alternative  is  not  chance,  but  uni- 
formity administered  by  freedom. 

In  like  manner  potentiality  is  a  clear  notion  only  on  the 
plane  of  freedom.  Here  it  means  the  self-determination  of 
the  free  agent.  But  on  the  plane  of  the  necessary  it  is 
pure  opacity.  It  must  be  something  which  is  at  once  real 
and  not  real,  actual  and  not  actual.  Unless  we  can  master 
this,  the  alternative  is  to  refer  all  motion,  progress,  devel- 
opment, evolution,  to  a  supreme  self-determination  which 
ever  lives  and  ever  founds  the  order  of  thinors.  In  that 
case  the  past  is  not  potential  of  the  future  any  more  than 
the  summer  is  potential  of  the  winter,  or  the  setting  of  the 
sun  is  potential  of  the  rising  of  the  moon  ;  but  both  past 
and  future  are  phases  of  a  movement  which  abuts  on  free- 
dom, and  of  which  the  successive  phases  are  but  implica- 
tions and  manifestations  of  the  one  thouo'ht  which  is  the 
law  and  meaning  of  the  whole. 

For  practical  purposes  these  metaphysical  difficulties 
may  be  outflanked  by  an  empirical  theory  of  causation. 
We  find  that  events  occur  under  certain  empirical  condi- 
tions. The  total  group  of  conditions  may  be  called  the 
cause,  and  any  member  of  the  group,  upon  occasion,  may 
be  called  the  cause.  Again,  we  find  an  order  of  concomi- 
tant variation  in  different  things.  This  we  may  call  their 
interaction,  and  may  study  its  laws.  It  is  this  conception 
of  causation  which  underlies  inductive  science  and  a  great 
deal  of  popular  language.  It  is  not  properly  efficient  cau- 
sation at  all,  but  only  a  rule  of  being  or  happening.  This 
limitation  of  field  must  not  be  forbidden,  and  it  must  not 
be  mistaken  for  a  solution  of  the  metaphysical  problem. 

The  causality  of  freedom  means  self-determination.  This 
is  a  causality  which  looks  to  the  future  and  is  not  driven 
by  the  past.  It  is  a  causality  which  forms  ideals  and  plans, 
and   devotes  itself  to  their  realization.     Instead  of   being 


THE    CATEGORIES  97 

snoved  out  of  the  past,  it  is  self- moving  into  the  future. 
It  may  posit  an  order  and  maintain  it.  It  may  conceive 
purposes  and  realize  them.  Our  experience  of  such  causal- 
ity is  limited  to  the  inner  life,  but  it  is  in  fact  the  only  form 
of  proper  causality  of  which  we  have  any  experience  what- 
ever. And  there  are  reasons  for  thinking  that,  instead  of 
being  a  special  case  of  causation,  it  is  really  the  typical 
form  to  which  all  cases  of  real  causation  must  be  assimi- 
lated. Metaphysics  shows  that  the  metaphysical  categories 
elude  any  real  apprehension  or  presentation,  except  in  terms 
of  personal  experience,  and  this  is  especially  the  case  with 
the  category  of  causality.  When  we  do  not  conceive  it 
under  the  volitional  type  we  have  the  bare  form  of  ground 
without  any  possibility  of  representing  our  meaning. 

Several  facts  make  this  conception  difficult.  First,  we 
tend  to  think  causation  only  under  the  form  of  time.  We 
seek  the  ground  of  that  which  is  in  something  that  was ; 
and  thus  the  idea  of  the  new  beginning,  involved  in  voli- 
tional causality,  is  rendered  strange  and  portentous.  That 
the  other  view  loses  itself  in  the  infinite  regress  escapes  us. 

Secondly,  our  reflective  activity  is  largely  directed  to 
material  and  spatial  relations,  and  our  notion  of  causality 
takes  on  a  corresponding  character.  Dealing  with  mate- 
rial and  impersonal  phenomena,  we  naturally  conceive  the 
causality  to  be  of  a  material  and  impersonal  type.  Here 
we  mistake  our  certainty  that  there  is  a  causal  ground  for 
a  conception  of  the  form  in  which  that  ground  must  be 
conceived.  But  the  progress  of  speculation  is  making  the 
notion  of  physical  causation  increasingly  difficult,  and  is 
reducing  the  physical  to  a  phenomenal  order  whose  cause 
must  be  sought  beyond  itself. 

Thirdly,  volitional  causality  itself  is  commonly  conceived 
in  connection  with  a  variety  of  psychological  and  even 
physiological  limitations,  which  are  no  necessary  part  of  the 

7 


98  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

notion.  In  this  way  it  acquires  a  certain  grotesqueness 
when  applied  to  cosmic  causality.  But  mental  illumination 
will  disperse  these  whims. 

Because  of  these  facts  a  one-sided  conception  of  causality 
takes  possession  of  the  mind,  and  is  not  easily  ejected. 
However,  when  thought  becomes  more  critical  and  pro- 
found, it  not  only  appears  that  the  conception  of  free  or 
volitional  causation  is  as  possible  as  that  of  necessary  causa- 
tion, but  it  becomes  at  least  doubtful  if  it  be  not  the  es- 
sential type  of  causation  proper,  in  distinction  from  those 
uniformities  of  sequence  which  are  popularly  called  causa- 
tion. With  this  conception,  if  we  seek  for  explanation  we 
are  not  sent  toiling  back  along  a  line  of  infinite  regress, 
as  in  the  case  of  necessary  causation,  but  we  find  what  w^e 
seek  in  the  free  and  purposive  agent,  the  only  real  explana- 
tion of  anything.  From  this  conception,  also,  the  difficulty 
concerning  actual  potentialities  disappears,  and  some  pro- 
vision is  made  for  progress.  Of  course  it  is  impossible  to 
tell  how  such  causality  is  made  or  is  possible,  but  no  more 
so  than  to  tell  how  any  causality  is  made  or  is  possible. 
Any  ultimate  fact  is  mysterious — that  is,  it  is  something  to 
be  admitted  rather  than  comprehended ;  but  still  there  is 
a  choice  in  mysteries.  Some  may  be  forced  upon  us  by 
the  facts  and  may  illumine  all  other  facts,  while  some  may 
not  be  required  by  the  facts,  or  ma}'-  leave  the  facts  as 
opaque  and  unintelligible  as  ever.  It  ought  not  to  be  hard 
to  choose  between  the  two  classes. 

The  general  conception  of  causal  determination  is  one 
with  which  the  mind  can  in  no  way  dispense  in  rational- 
izing its  experience.  The  extent  to  which  it  enters  into 
our  thought  appears  when  we  reflect  upon  the  dynamic 
substantives  and  adjectives  in  language,  and  especially  upon 
the  active  verbs  which  make  up  so  much  of  speech.  All 
of  these  are  but  specifications  of  the  causal  idea  and  rela- 


THE    CATEGORIES  99 

tion.  The  same  may  be  said  of  the  science  of  mechanics. 
But  the  establishment  of  the  formal  relation  by  no  means 
involves  an  insight  into  its  metaphysical  nature.  We  con- 
tent ourselves  with  showing  the  general  significance  of  the 
relation  for  thought,  and  its  origin  in  thought  rather  than 
in  sense.  The  deeper  inquiry  we  leave  to  metaphysics.  It 
is  with  this  category  as  with  that  of  being:  there  is  prac- 
tical unanimity  as  to  the  necessity  of  the  formal  category, 
with  much  uncertainty  as  to  the  metaphysical  form  in 
which  it  is  realized. 

Among  those  who  have  defined  causation  as  invariable 
sequence  there  has  been  chronic  uncertainty  whether  such 
sequence  is  the  meaning  or  the  mark  of  causation.  This 
ambiguity  has  greatly  increased  their  speculative  resources. 

These  are  the  categories  which  underlie  our  elementary 
objective  experience.  Experience  becomes  experience,  or 
becomes  articulate,  only  as  these  categories  appear  in  the 
flux  of  impressions.  They  are  not  applied  to  a  something 
given  to  consciousness,  but  the  mind  gets  objects  or  con- 
sciousness acquires  definite  contents  only  as  they  are  ap- 
plied to  the  raw  material  of  impressions.  Of  course  they 
are  not  to  be  viewed  as  primarih^  conscious  possessions  of 
the  mind,  but  rather  as  immanent  principles.  They  become 
conscious  possessions  at  a  later  date,  when  the  mind,  by 
reflection  on  its  own  work,  finds  that  it  has  been  consti- 
tuting its  objects  under  the  categories,  and  then,  by  ab- 
straction, gets  them  in  the  form  of  ideas. 

These  categories  also  give  the  form  or  framework  of 
elementary  experience.  If  we  conceive  the  specific  con- 
tingent contents  of  experience  removed,  there  would  remam 
the  framework  of  space,  time,  number,  quantity,  qualit}', 
substance  and  attribute,  cause  and  effect,  etc.,  and  all 
possible  experiences  would  necessarily  take  on  some  of  these 
general  forms  in  becoming  anything  for  us. 


100  THKORY    OF   THOUGHT   AND   KNOWLEDGE 

Necessity 

This  is  a  much  more  doubtful  category  than  the  preced- 
ing ones.  Its  prominence,  however,  in  uncritical  thought, 
both  popular  and  scientific,  is  patent  to  every  reader.  That 
necessity  rules  in  nature,  that  natural  laws  are  necessary, 
that  all  things  are  included  in  a  system  of  necessity,  are 
among  the  most  familiar  propositions.  That  the  meaning 
of  this  necessity  is  sun-clear  is  assumed  as  beyond  question. 

Yet,  after  all,  it  is  not  so  clear.  As  we  have  before 
pointed  out,  the  only  clear  necessity  is  rational  necessity ; 
that  is,  necessity  of  thought.  But  uncritical  thought  de- 
mands more  than  this :  it  insists  upon  a  necessity  of  things, 
or  a  metaphysical  necessity. 

It  is  plain,  however,  that  if  there  be  any  such  necessity 
it  must  manifest  itself  to  us  as  a  necessity  of  thought. 
We  must,  then,  examine  the  latter  to  see  if  we  find  any  trace 
of  the  former. 

Necessity  of  thought  may  mean  simply  a  factual  condi- 
tion of  thought  without  which  thought  could  not  go  on. 

Again,  it  may  express  merely  a  logical  relation,  as  of 
premise  and  conclusion,  or  of  subject  and  predicate.  The 
premises  necessitate  the  conclusion,  or  the  subject  implies 
the  predicate. 

Or  a  necessity  of  thought  may  be  a  proposition  which 
cannot  be  denied  without  contradiction  or  without  violating 
some  clear  intuition  of  reason.  •» 

In  none  of  these  cases  do  we  certainly  come  upon  any- 
thing metaphysical.  We  are  concerned  only  with  thought 
itself. 

But  necessities  of  thought  may  involve  necessities  of 
things,  and  the  mind  seeks  to  import  necessity  into  things 
themselves.  This  has  been  attempted  in  two  ways — by  way 
of  logic  and  by  way  of  explanation. 


THE   CATEGORIES  101 

In  the  former  case  the  argument  has  always  been  from 
the  necessity  of  an  affirmation  to  the  affirmation  of  a  neces- 
sity. This  is  a  hopeless  fallacy.  The  utmost  possible  con- 
clusion from  a  set  of  conditioned  facts  is  an  unconditioned 
fact,  A  basal  and  absolute  necessity  is  simply  a  spectre 
evoked  by  bad  logic. 

The  introduction  of  necessity  into  things  by  way  of 
explanation  appears  in  connection  with  our  conception  of 
the  nature  of  things  and  in  our  thought  of  the  laws  of 
things.  Neither  of  these  represents  any  absolute  necessity, 
for  there  is  no  assignable  necessity  for  the  things.  We  may 
fancy,  however,  that  there  is  a  necessity  in  the  things.  This 
fancy  is  a  fiction. 

In  the  case  of  the  laws  it  is  plain  that  all  that  experience 
gives  is  uniformity.  How  this  is  produced  is  a  problem. 
The  uncritical  mind  assumes  necessity  as  a  matter  of  course ; 
but  all  that  it  means  is  the  negative  conviction  that  the  fact 
could  not  be  otherwise.  Of  course  it  might  conceivably  be 
otherwise,  but  there  is  some  hypothetical  necessity  which 
forbids  it. 

In  the  case  of  the  nature  of  things  the  thought  of  a  neces- 
sary connection  has  apparently  more  justification.  Here  it 
is  closely  connected  with  the  thought  of  identity.  To  think 
of  a  thing  at  all  we  must  think  of  it  as  what  it  is,  as  A  / 
and  hence  it  seems  as  if  there  must  be  some  necessity 
whereby  A  is  A.  To  be  sure,  A  need  not  be  at  all ;  but  so 
long  as  it  exists  there  is  some  necessary  principle  whereby 
it  is  A  and  not  something  else.  This,  however,  is  a  question 
which  cannot  be  solved  without  some  conception  of  the  rela- 
tion of  A  to  the  unconditioned  reality.  A  might  conceiva- 
bly be  the  expression  of  an  unpicturable  necessity,  and  it 
might  be  the  expression  of  a  thought. 

In  short,  this  category  of  necessity  in  its  metaphysical 
use  is  simply  a  superficial  application  of  the  principle  of 


102  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

ground  and  connection.  The  general  assumption  has  been 
that  the  alternative  is  to  deny  connection,  and  hence  the 
notion  of  necessity  has  taken  possession  of  uncritical  thought. 
Our  thought  also  is  vacillating,  our  wills  are  capricious, 
our  effort  weak  and  discontinuous  ;  and  thus  again  it  is  easy 
to  fall  into  the  notion  that  some  impersonal  necessity  is  the 
only  adequate  administrator  of  existence  both  in  its  details 
and  in  its  totality. 

The  ease  with  which  the  uncritical  mind  satisfies  itself 
finds  striking  illustration  in  this  fancy.  Will  and  intellect 
are  not  thought  to  be  deep  enough  and  steady  enough  to 
maintain  the  system  and  its  constant  on-going,  and  hence 
we  fall  back  on  necessity.  But  this  necessity  is  not  only 
hypothetical  in  its  existence,  it  is  equally  hypothetical  in  its 
contents  and  direction.  That  the  present  order  is  necessary 
we  know  by  hypothesis.  That  it  will  continue  we  know  by 
hypothesis.  So  far  as  any  insight  is  concerned,  the  future 
is  absolutely  hidden  from  us ;  we  can  only  be  sure  that  the 
fact,  whatever  it  may  be,  will  be  necessary.  So  far  as  the 
rational  founding  of  objective  knowledge  is  concerned,  no 
doctrine  of  chance  or  arbitrariness  could  leave  us  in  a  worse 
plight.  But  we  escape  these  difficulties  by  naively  mistak- 
ing our  psychological  expectation  for  a  logical  warrant. 

An  additional  reason  for  care  in  the  application  of  this 
category  of  necessity  is  found  in  its  bearing  upon  the  prob- 
lem of  error.  We  have  already  pointed  out  the  element  of 
freedom  involved  in  the  nature  of  thought  itself.  Here- 
after it  will  appear  that  the  denial  of  freedom  leads  to  the 
collapse  of  reason  itself.  Meanwhile  it  is  plain  that,  while 
reason  is  impelled  by  its  own  nature  to  seek  for  fixed  con- 
nection, the  nature  and  ground  of  that  connection  form  a 
deep  speculative  problem  which  can  by  no  means  be  settled 
in  an  off-hand  manner. 


THE    CATEGORIES  103 

Possibility 

Possibility  is  another  of  the  doubtful  categories.  Its 
only  clear  meaning  is  based  upon  the  self-determination 
of  a  free  agent ;  apart  from  this  it  is  metaphysically 
nothing.  As  used  in  popular  speech  it  has  a  variety  of 
meanings. 

Thus,  that  is  possible  which  involves  no  contradiction. 
This  is  logical  possibility,  and  means  only  conceivability. 

Or,  that  is  possible  which,  for  all  we  know,  may  happen 
or  may  have  happened.  This  possibility  is  only  an  expres- 
sion of  our  ignorance. 

Or,  that  is  possible  which  would  happen  if  certain  con- 
ditions were  fulfilled.  This  possibility  is  merely  an  ex- 
pression of  the  order  of  conditioned  events.  But  as  long 
as  the  condition  is  unfulfilled  the  event  is  impossible,  and 
when  it  is  fulfilled  the  event  is  not  only  possible  but 
actual. 

In  reality,  apart  from  the  sphere  of  freedom,  the  only 
possible  is  the  implications  of  the  actual.  Many  other 
things  may  be  conceived,  but  they  are  impossible  as  not 
founded  in  the  real.  If,  then,  we  would  know  what  is  con- 
cretely or  reallj'-  possible  we  must  have  a  complete  insight 
into  the  nature  and  implications  of  reality  itself. 

A  good  deal  of  wild  work  has  been  done  in  the  field  of 
speculation  through  confusing  these  several  forms  of  possi- 
bility. A  favorite  confusion  has  been  the  fancy  that  all 
possibles  must  finally  become  actual ;  for,  it  was  sagely 
questioned,  how  can  anything  be  called  even  possible  if  it 
will  never  become  actual  ?  Ever  is  the  symbol  of  positive 
necessity,  and  never  is  the  symbol  of  negative  necessity. 
What  will  never  happen  is  impossible.  This  wisdom  van- 
ishes when  we  decide  which  possibility  we  mean. 


104  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE 

Purpose 

The  categories  of  being,  space,  time,  causation,  are  neces- 
sary in  order  to  have  any  articulate  experience  whatever. 
It  is  through  them  that  we  reach  inteUigible  objects,  or 
that  world  of  facts  which  seems  to  be  given  to  us  ready- 
made  in  sense  perception.  But  these  categories  alone  would 
keep  us  among  isolated  things  and  events.  Space  and  time 
separate  rather  than  unite ;  and  causality,  at  least  in  its 
mechanical  form,  provides  for  no  system.  For  the  further 
systematization  and  unification  of  our  objects  a  higher  cate- 
gory is  needed ;  and  this  we  find  in  purpose,  or,  rather,  in 
the  elevation  of  causality  to  intelligent  and  volitional  causal- 
ity, with  its  implication  of  plan  and  purpose. 

Kant  pointed  out  that  the  application  of  the  categories 
of  the  understanding  under  the  conditions  of  space  and 
time  reaches  no  totality  and  comes  to  no  end.  The  tem- 
poral and  spatial  synthesis  can  never  be  exhausted,  and 
leaves  us  toiling  hopelessly  in  the  infinite  regress.  In  the 
same  way  the  joining  of  sequences  under  the  law  of  causa- 
tion is  an  endless  process,  and  hence  an  irrational  one.  As 
a  relief  from  this  sterile  task,  Kant  proposed  ideas  of  the 
reason  above  the  categories  of  the  understanding.  These 
were  to  enable  thought  to  reach  some  systematic  totality 
and  thus  find  some  rest.  For  objective  experience  the 
ideal  pro])osed  he  called  the  world.  This  ideal  is  no  datum 
of  experience,  but  the  conception  of  a  completed  whole,  by 
means  of  which  thought  is  enabled  to  give,  at  least  formal- 
ly, systematic  completeness  to  its  labors. 

Kant's  deduction  of  this  ideal  of  the  reason  leaves  much 
to  be  desired,  but  in  the  fact  itself  he  is  by  no  means  so  far 
from  the  beaten  track  as  it  might  seem.  The  terms  "  Nat- 
ure," "  Cosmos,"  "  Universe,"  are  familiar  expressions  of 
the  same  idea.     In  all  alike  there  is  the  notion  of  a  finished 


THE   CATEGORIES  105 

whole,  whose  parts  or  factors  exist  in  systematic  relations 
determined  by  the  nature  of  the  whole.  The  part  played 
by  "Nature"  in  the  history  of  thought  is  patent  to  every 
reader,  but  it  has  not  been  equally  plain  that  this  "  Nature" 
is  primarily  the  shadow  of  our  systematizing  and  architec- 
tonic thought. 

The  demand  of  thought  for  systematic  totality  is  mani- 
fest, and  that  this  demand  will  always  get  itself  recognized, 
wittingly  or  unwittingly,  is  clearly  shown  in  the  history  of 
speculation.  But,  as  in  the  case  of  the  other  categories, 
the  form  in  which  the  demand  shall  be  met  is  not  imme- 
diately evident.  Kant  has  simply  given  a  name  to  the  de- 
mand rather  than  a  proper  conception.  He  saw,  indeed, 
that  time  and  space  and  causation,  as  the  linking  of  events, 
neither  singly  nor  collectively  could  meet  this  demand  ; 
and  after  he  had  furnished  a  name  for  the  higher  principle 
he  left  its  nature  and  ground  quite  undetermined,  except 
to  suggest  its  purely  regulative  character.  Had  Kant  writ- 
ten the  Critique  of  the  Piore  Reason  after  he  had  thought 
his  system  through  to  the  Critique  of  the  Judgment  he 
would  probably  not  have  been  content  with  the  verbal 
unity  and  totality  reached  in  the  notion  of  the  world. 

The  principle  we  need  here  can  never  be  found  in  any 
impersonal  or  mechanical  conception  whatever.  Metaphys- 
ics shows  that  every  such  system  fails  to  reach  any  true 
unity,  while  mechanical  causation  loses  itself  in  the  infinite 
regress.  Verbal  classifications  from  without  are  only  ex- 
ternal impositions  and  hang  in  the  air.  The  unity  and 
system  demanded  must  be  internal,  and  this  true  inward- 
ness can  be  found  only  in  self -determining,  self-conscious 
causality,  guiding  itself  according  to  plan  and  purpose. 
Thus  only  do  the  unity  and  totality  of  the  system  become 
possible.  Until  we  advance  to  this  conception  we  either 
contradict  ourselves  or  wander  amono^  verbal  solutions. 


106  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

The  necessity  of  affirming  purpose  has  a  double  root — 
theoretical  and  empirical.  The  former  consists  in  the  dia- 
lectic of  thought,  whereby  reason  is  found  to  be  in  unstable 
equilibrium,  or,  rather,  in  no  equilibrium,  until  it  elevates 
itself  above  the  mechanical  categories  and  rises  to  the  con- 
ception of  self-determining  and  intelligent  personality  as 
the  supreme  category  in  being  and  causation.  Of  course 
this  necessity  can  be  appreciated  only  when  there  is  a  good 
degree  of  original  reflective  power  combined  with  some 
critical  development.  Hence  it  is  commonly  undreamed  of 
by  spontaneous  thought,  which  never  suspects  the  short- 
comings of  its  mechanical  categories  when  viewed  as  abso- 
lute and  final.  The  higher  categories,  like  the  Copernican 
astronomy,  do  not  commend  themselves  to  one  on  the  sense 
plane  of  mental  growth.  In  both  cases  some  intellectual 
range  and  flexibility  are  needed  to  make  the  truth  accept- 
able. 

The  empirical  ground  for  affirming  purpose  lies  primarily 
in  our  experience  of  intelligence,  and,  secondarily,  in  sundry 
peculiarities  of  objective  experience  which  are  said  to  point 
to  intelligence  as  their  cause.  Both  points  call  for  a  word 
of  exposition. 

Several  questions  must  be  distinguished :  (1)  Is  purpose 
a  category  of  thought  ?  (2)  Is  it  so  self-evidently  such  a 
category  as,  say,  the  law  of  causation  ?  (3)  Has  the  subjec- 
tive category  objective  validity  ? 

To  the  first  question  the  answer  must  be  affirmative. 
Purpose  is  a  category  involved  in  the  nature  of  free  intelli- 
gence. The  great  distinction  between  mechanical  and  in- 
tellectual causality  is  that  the  former  is  driven  from  behind 
while  the  latter  is  self-determined  towards  ends  which  lie 
before.  As  looking  towards  future  ends  it  is  called  final 
causality  —  that  is,  it  is  purposive.  Final  causality  is  the 
causality  of  will  informed  by  intelligent  purpose. 


THE    CATEGORIES  107 

Hence  in  our  experience  of  intelligence  we  find  its 
activity  taking  on  the  purposive  form.  The  whole  range  of 
volitional  activity,  whether  in  ourselves  or  in  others,  is  other- 
wise unintelligible.  And  everywhere  the  mind  seeks  to 
relate  its  objects  as  means  and  ends,  or  to  comprise  them  in 
a  scheme  of  purpose  or  an  all-embracing  plan.  Moreover, 
we  experience  a  peculiar  satisfaction  when  we  are  able  to 
trace  relations  of  purpose.  The  universal  teleological  im- 
pulse has  never  left  itself  without  a  witness.  This  is  no- 
where more  marked  than  in  the  writino:s  of  antiteleoloffical 
thinkers.  Nature  is  driven  out  with  a  fork,  but  ever  comes 
running  back.  Thought  must  become  teleological  before 
it  can  complete  itself. 

To  the  second  question  the  answer  must  be  that  the 
categories  are  not  all  on  the  same  plane.  Some  are  neces- 
sary to  even  elementary  experience,  while  others  are  neces- 
sary only  for  the  reflective  systematization  of  experience. 
Hence  it  is  easy  to  think  that  only  the  former  are  properly 
necessities  of  thought ;  but  the  fact  is  that  only  the  former 
are  necessities  of  certain  phases  of  thought.  When  thought 
is  complete,  however,  it  may  even  appear  that  the  higher 
categories  are  the  supreme  laws  of  thought,  and  that  the 
lower  categories  vanish  unless  they  are  taken  up  into  the 
higher. 

The  category  of  purpose  is  not  so  prominent  in  ele- 
mentary experience  as  in  reflective  thought.  All  objects 
are  in  space ;  all  events  are  in  time ;  every  change  demands 
a  cause ;  but  comparatively  few  things  suggest  a  purpose. 
"When  we  take  things  in  isolation,  and  as  they  exist  for 
sense  perception,  it  is  easy  to  ignore  the  relation  of  purpose 
altogether;  and  commonly  it  is  difficult  to  suggest  any 
purpose  whatever.  Thus  we  are  led  to  deny  that  purpose 
has  any  essential  relation  to  thought  and  to  question  its 
application  to  reality. 


108  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

Here  again  our  difficulty  is  double.  First,  we  remain  on 
the  plane  of  the  lower  categories  without  suspicion  of  their 
implications ;  and,  secondly,  we  fail  to  note  that  the  tracing 
of  purpose  is  necessarily  a  far  more  complex  matter  than 
the  tracing  of  causation. 

As  to  the  first  point,  it  is  only  when  thought  becomes 
systematic  and  aims  at  completeness  that  the  rational 
significance  of  purpose  is  seen.  Then  it  appears  that  the 
antithesis  is  not  between  causality  and  non-causality,  but 
between  mechanical  and  volitional  causality.  And  then  it 
further  appears  that  mechanical  causality  is  entangled  with 
unintelligible  potentialities  which  remove  all  progress  from 
it ;  that  without  these  it  stands  still ;  tliat  it  cancels  itself  in 
an  infinite  regress ;  and,  finally,  that  it  involves  reason  itself 
in  hopeless  disaster.  Thus  volitional  causality  at  last  ap- 
pears as  the  only  form  which  can  be  made  basal  without 
speculative  collapse. 

The  necessity  of  purpose  as  a  principle  of  thought,  then, 
is  reflectivel}'  rather  than  intuitively  reached.  Though  ap- 
parently outranked  in  authority  by  the  law  of  causation,  re- 
flection shows  that  the  latter  is  unable  to  maintain  itself  in 
the  form  of  mechanical  causality,  and  reaches  equilibrium 
only  as  it  advances  to  the  form  of  volitional  and  purposive 
pausality. 

From  this  point  of  view  the  affirmation  of  purpose  is 
made  solely  to  enable  thought  to  maintain  itself  and  to  at- 
tain to  systematic  completeness.  It  would  remain  valid 
even  if  we  were  unable  to  trace  the  purpose  in  reality.  As 
we  must  maintain  the  fact  of  law  even  where  we  find 
chaos,  so  we  must  maintain  the  fact  of  purpose  even  if  we 
find  the  purpose  inscrutable.  In  both  cases  alike  we  live  in 
the  faith  that  growing  knowledge  will  reveal  the  existence 
of  that  in  which  meanwhile  we  believe. 

From  the  empirical  standpoint  also  the  negation  of  pur- 


THE    CATEGOKIE8  109 

pose  is  not  entirely  without  apparent  support,  as  the  trac- 
ing of  purpose  is  commonly  far  more  diificult  than  the 
tracinir  of  causation.  In  our  human  activities,  as  soon  as 
our  purposes  become  at  all  complex  or  take  on  the  char- 
acter of  plans,  the  aim  can  be  discerned  only  from  a  com- 
prehensive survey  of  the  whole.  In  such  cases  it  is  easy 
for  ignorance  to  miss  the  governing  law  so  as  to  see  in  the 
means  no  relation  to  the  end,  and  even  no  hint  of  any  end. 
In  the  construction  of  a  great  building,  or  in  the  carrying 
out  of  the  plan  of  a  campaign,  the  subordinates  very  gener- 
ally work  in  accordance  with  a  plan  not  revealed  to  them. 
Their  whole  activity  is  governed  by  the  relation  of  means 
and  ends ;  but  they  remain  in  ignorance,  for  the  relation  is 
not  objectively  revealed  until  the  work  converges  towards 
completion.  To  one  standing  in  the  midst  of  the  work,  and 
especially  in  its  raw  beginnings,  or  to  one  studying  the  de- 
tails singly  and  not  in  their  relations,  the  end  may  well  be 
missed  altogether. 

From  the  nature  of  the  case  we  must  be  largely  in  this 
position  with  regard  to  the  purpose  in  nature.  Our  own 
brevity  makes  it  hard  to  believe  in  purpose  when  it  is 
slowly  realized.  The  distress  which  many  theists  have  felt 
at  the  doctrine  of  the  slow  development  of  cosmic  forms  is 
largely  due  to  this  fact.  In  the  same  way  an  ephemeron 
would  miss  the  purpose  in  the  mass  of  human  activity,  be- 
cause its  range  of  knowledge  and  rate  of  temporal  change 
would  not  enable  it  to  get  any  vivid  impression  of  move- 
ment converging  towards  an  end.  Add  to  this  the  fact  that 
we  may  easily  determine  our  objects  according  to  the  lower 
categories  without  rising  to  the  thought  of  purpose,  and  we 
readily  comprehend  how  purpose  should  seem  to  be  no 
category  of  thought  at  all,  but  only  at  best  a  doubtful  in- 
duction from  experience. 

The  question  concerning  the  objective  validity  of  pur- 


110  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

pose  is  really  double,  according  to  the  standpoint.  It  may 
be  raised  from  the  Kantian  point  of  view  which  makes  all 
the  categories  subjective,  and  in  this  sense  we  remand  it 
to  metaphysics.  It  may  also  mean  that  purpose  is  only  a 
superstition  of  uncritical  thought  and  has  no  validity  in 
fact.  This  view  has  its  foundation  partly  in  the  facts 
already  mentioned,  and  partly,  and  more  especially,  in  the 
supposed  antinomy  between  purpose  and  necessary  causa- 
tion. 

This  puzzle  is  not  altogether  gratuitous,  but  has  its  roots 
in  the  crude  metaphysics  of  common-sense.  A  purpose  as 
such  is  onl}-^  a  conception,  and  demands  some  means  for  its 
realization.  But  those  means,  of  course,  must  be  adequate 
to  its  realization  if  they  are  to  realize  it.  Hence,  when  the 
means  are  given  the  end  results  as  a  matter  of  course ;  and 
then  it  becomes  possible  to  look  upon  the  end,  not  as  pur- 
posed but  only  as  unintended  product. 

In  dealing  with  human  combinations  of  means  this 
puzzle  could  never  arise.  The  realization  of  our  purposes 
through  mechanical  means,  so  that  the  result  is  an  expres- 
sion at  once  of  purpose  and  of  mechanical  necessity,  is  one 
of  the  most  familiar  facts  of  our  experience.  Here  the 
antinomy  between  causation  and  purpose  cannot  arise  be- 
cause we  know  the  causation  is  determined  with  reference 
to  the  purpose.  But  in  dealing  with  cosmic  combinations 
the  puzzle  is  pretty  sure  to  arise  in  the  superficial  stage  of 
reflection.  We  find  effects  emerging  in  a  system  of  law, 
and  the  order  of  necessary  causation  appears  to  provide 
for  all  the  facts.  Nature  is  tacitly  or  explicitly  erected 
into  a  mechanical  and  self-enclosed  system,  and  thus  the 
facts,  which  at  first  impressed  us  as  intended,  now  seem  to 
be  only  the  unpurposed  products  of  mechanical  causation. 

In  the  last  paragraph  we  have  the  natural  history  of 
atheism,  so  far  as  it  has  an  intellectual  origin.      So  long 


THE    CATEGORIES  111 

as  matter  was  regarded  as  inert,  causation  had  to  be  sought 
outside;  but  by  the  d^'namic  theory  of  matter,  causation 
was  provided  in  matter  itself.  A  principle  of  order  was 
next  found  in  the  notion  of  law,  and  nothing  more  seemed 
needed.  Matter  furnished  the  being,  force  furnished  the 
causation,  and  law  provided  the  order.  These  three  to- 
gether formed  the  one  Nature  or  system  of  the  world,  and 
beyond  this  there  was  nothing.  Matter  and  force  are 
already  seen  to  do  much,  and  are  daily  doing  more.  No 
one  can  set  a  limit  to  their  possibilities.  The  reign  of  law 
is  fast  becoming  all-embracing,  and  the  more  law  the  less 
God. 

The  way  out  of  this  puzzle  must  lie  in  a  criticism  of  its 
assumptions.  The  fundamental  antithesis  of  purpose  and 
causation  is  incorrect.  The  true  antithesis  is  that  of  me- 
chanical and  volitional  causality,  and  this  question  is  purely 
a  speculative  one.  Again,  allowing  the  mechanical  causal- 
ity, purpose  is  not  excluded  unless  it  be  shown  that  the 
mechanism  cannot  be  viewed  as  founded  in  or  directed  by 
intelligence.  The  conception  of  nature  as  a  self -enclosed 
and  self-sufficing  mechanism  has  no  support  in  reflective 
thought.  The  necessity  which  rules  in  nature  turns  out  to 
be  uniformity  unwarrantably  transformed  into  necessity, 
and  is,  in  fact,  only  a  shadow  of  our  own  crude  thinking. 
"When  all  these  considerations  are  mastered,  and  the  self- 
destructive  implications  of  necessity  are  also  grasped,  the 
antiteleological  objections  are  seen  in  their  superficiality. 

And,  in  general,  all  that  is  needed  is  that  thought  shall 
understand  itself.  Crude  thought  tends  to  rest  in  the  lower 
and  mechanical  categories,  and  when  it  becomes  reflective 
it  seeks  to  test  all  things  by  those  categories.  In  this  way 
space,  time,  material  being,  and  mechanical  causation  become 
its  supreme  categories  and  its  final  tests  of  reality.  Of 
these  it  has  no  doubt,  and  it  applies  them  unhesitatingly. 


112  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

This  necessarily  results,  when  at  all  thorough-going,  in  cast- 
ing doubt  or  discredit  on  all  the  higher  forms  of  thought 
and  on  spiritual  conceptions  of  existence.  Then  we  have  the 
conflict  of  science  and  religion,  or  of  reason  and  faith.  But 
this  conflict,  so  far  as  it  is  real  and  not  fictitious,  rests  en- 
tirely upon  the  mutual  relations  of  the  categories ;  and  it 
can  be  removed  only  by  a  better  understanding  of  thought 
itself.  We  must  see  that  the  lower  categories  imply  the 
higher,  if  indeed  they  have  any  application  beyond  phenom- 
ena. The  reconciliation  of  science  and  religion  can  never  be 
eifected  by  a  special  chair  established  for  that  purpose ;  the 
reconciliation  is  to  be  found  and  effected  only  by  an  ade- 
quate study  of  thought  itself.  If  the  subject  is  to  be  referred 
to  anv  chair,  it  must  be  the  chair  of  Wic.  The  ease  with 
which  untrained  thought  misses  its  way,  the  practical  im- 
portance of  right  thinking,  and  the  practical  mischief  of 
wrong  thinking  make  philosophy  an  important  practical  dis- 
cipline. 

Thus  we  have  sought  to  give  a  hint  of  the  fundamental 
categories  and  relations  of  pure  thought.  They  constitute 
the  framework  of  intelligence,  and  when  experience  is  built 
into  them  they  give  the  form  of  experience.  As  immanent 
principles,  they  underlie  experience.  As  abstract  ideas,  they 
are  reached  by  abstraction  from  that  experience  which,  as 
principles,  they  make  possible. 

Thought  seeks  system,  not  only  in  dealing  with  its  objects, 
but  also  in  dealing  with  itself.  Hence  the  attempt  to  con- 
nect the  categories  as  necessary  implications  of  one  princi- 
ple. Aristotle  picked  up  his  categories  empirically,  if  not  at 
random,  in  the  field  of  grammar ;  and  his  conception  of  their 
function  has  little  in  common  with  the  modern  one.  Kant 
framed  his  system  of  categories  from  an  analysis  of  the  table 
of  judgments  furnished  by  formal  logic.     His  procedure  has 


THE    CATEGORIES  113 

been  much  criticised,  especially  on  the  ground  that  there  is 
no  deduction  from  one  unitary  principle,  but  only  an  enume- 
ration. Fichte  and  Hegel  made  great  efforts  to  remedy  this 
defect  by  deducing  the  categories  from  a  single  root  and 
showing  their  inner  connection.  These  efforts  were  not 
crowned  with  complete  success.  There  is  connection  among 
the  categories.  The  attempt  to  stop  with  the  lower  catego- 
ries reveals,  upon  reflection,  inadequacies  and  inconsistencies 
which  cannot  be  removed  until  we  advance  to  the  higher 
categories,  or  to  the  hio^hest.  In  so  far  the  analysis  of  rea- 
son  is  fruitful.  But  it  is  not  shown  that  reason  admits  only 
of  the  existing  categories,  no  more,  no  less,  and  no  others. 
Reason — that  is,  our  reason — is  not  able  to  complete  its  own 
system,  and  is  compelled  to  accept  itself  in  many  respects  as 
a  fact  which  is  by  no  means  transparent,  but  rather  abounds 
in  opacities  and  mysteries.  We  make  no  attempt,  therefore, 
at  deduction  or  systematic  completeness.  We  content  our- 
selves with  showing  that  the  mind  does  work  according  to 
these  principles,  and  reaches  knowledge  only  through  them. 

From  all  these  considerations  we  can  understand  the 
importance  of  the  Kantian  question.  How  is  experience  pos- 
sible ?  Locke  had  claimed  that  mental  principles  are  got 
from  experience  ;  but  it  was  an  experience  in  which  those 
principles  were  implicit.  Hume  saw  this,  and  sought  to  re- 
duce experience  to  its  true  dimensions  ;  and  these  he  found 
in  impressions.  It  was  reserved  for  Kant  to  show  that 
such  an  experience  can  never  be,  or  become,  anything  artic- 
ulate without  an  organizing  activity  on  the  part  of  the  mind 
according  to  principles  immanent  in  the  understanding. 

Again,  we  can  find  a  tenable  meaning  for  the  Kantian 
statement  that  the  understanding  makes  nature.  Much  of 
Kant's  writing  is  so  obscure  or  ambiguous  that,  in  deter- 
mining his  view  on  particular  points,  there  is  often  danger 
of  losing  the  philosophical  question  in  a  sterile  exegetical 


114  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE 

squabble.  Commentaries  on  Kant  are  burdened  with  this 
unprofitable  matter.  We  do  not  pretend,  therefore,  to  tell 
just  how  much  Kant  meant  by  this  utterance  ;  and  still  less 
do  we  consent  to  become  responsible  for  the  Kantian  de- 
duction and  conception  of  nature.  Nevertheless,  the  state- 
ment admits  of  an  interpretation  at  once  true  and  impor- 
tant. 

Of  course,  for  us,  the  meaning  cannot  be  that  any  one 
of  us  or  all  of  us  make  the  cosmic  reality.  So  far  as  we 
are  concerned,  that  reality  exists  in  its  own  right.  But  we 
may  still  ask  how  the  existent  nature  becomes  an  object 
of  knowledge  for  us.  And  when  we  remember  that  sense 
alone  can  give  us  nothing  but  discontinuous  sensations,  and 
that  unaided  sense  perception  at  best  could  give  nothing 
more  than  discontinuous  presentations,  we  must  ask.  What 
weaves  this  rather  flimsy  and  unsubstantial  material  into 
a  solid  and  abiding  world  ?  It  is  the  mind  ;  and  the  mind 
can  do  it  only  because  the  pattern  of  nature  is  implicit  in 
the  mind.  For  known  nature  is  primarily  our  own  product ; 
as  another's  thought,  so  far  as  grasped  by  me,  must  be  im- 
mediately my  own  thought.  It  has  in  it,  indeed,  the  neces- 
sity of  referring  to  another's  thought,  of  which  it  grasps  the 
contents ;  but,  nevertheless,  the  thought  is  mine.  In  like 
manner,  my  thought  of  nature  has  in  it  an  objective  refer- 
ence, so  that  I  am  grasping  a  content  independent  of  my 
thought ;  nevertheless,  both  the  form  and  contents  of  nat- 
ure,  so  far  as  they  exist  for  me,  are  my  own  product. 

The  understanding,  then,  makes  nature  in  a  real  and 
important  sense.  It  is  only  through  the  laws  of  nature 
immanent  in  the  understanding  that  any  knowledge  of  an 
objectively  existing  nature  can  possibly  arise.  Whether, 
corresponding  to  the  reason  by  which  nature  exists  for  us, 
there  is  a  Cosmic  Keason  by  which  nature  has  its  real  ex- 
istence is  a  question  we  postpone  for  the  present. 


THE   CATEGORIES  115 

Before  leaving  this  subject  a  word  must  be  said  con- 
cerning a  pair  of  scruples  which  may  well  have  arisen  in 
the  reader's  mind.  Might  we  not,  it  may  be  asked,  by  a 
similar  style  of  reasoning,  deduce  any  number  of  categories, 
so  that  finally  we  should  have  as  many  categories  as  we 
have  objects  ? 

There  is  something  in  this,  but  not  what  the  objector 
thinks.  If  we  take  tlie  matter  in  strict  exactness,  the  fact  is 
the  mind  having  a  multiplicity  of  experiences  and  react- 
ing upon  them  in  a  variety  of  ways.  None  of  these  exists 
except  through  a  special  mental  activity.  Even  the  reac- 
tions of  sensation  are  a  special  form  of  mental  action,  and 
for  different  classes  of  sensation  we  have  to  assume  a  cor- 
responding qualitative  difference  in  the  sensibility  to  ex- 
plain the  difference  in  the  product.  In  this  sense  we  may 
speak  of  apriori  faculties  of  sensation,  and  we  may  multiply 
them  as  long  as  we  find  any  qualitative  difference.  The 
same  is  true  for  the  reactions  of  the  understanding.  There 
is  no  reaction  in  general,  but  there  is  a  special  reaction  for 
each  particular  thing.  In  this  sense  the  knowledge  of  any- 
thing and  everything  is  apriori ;  that  is,  it  is  not  something 
passed  into  the  mind,  but  involves  a  special  activity  of  the 
mind.  However,  in  looking  over  these  activities  we  find 
that  they  fall  into  certain  classes,  and  these  classes  can  only 
be  looked  upon  as  expressing  general  forms  of  mental  ac- 
tion, and  as  founded  in  the  nature  of  the  mind  itself.  When 
any  of  these  forms  can  be  subordinated  to  others,  we  have 
only  subordinate  principles  of  intelligence ;  but  when  they 
are  incommensurable  and  defv  further  reduction,  then  we 
have  the  elementary  and  essential  principles  of  intelligence. 
But  even  in  this  there  is  a  certain  departure  from  the  fact, 
which  is  always  and  onl}''  the  mind  acting  in  various  ways. 
There  is,  then,  no  objection  to  one's  making  as  many  cate- 
gories as  he  pleases,  provided  always  they  represent  real 


116  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT   AND   KNOWLEDGE 

forms  of  mental  activity ;  and  there  is  also  no  objection  to 
making  as  few  as  one  pleases,  provided,  again,  the  cate- 
gories do  not  put  incommensurable  things  together,  and 
do  not  overlook  real  forms  of  mental  activity.  The  point 
to  be  observed  is  that  it  is  not  a  question  of  importing 
ready-made  knowledge  into  a  passively  receptive  mind,  but 
rather  of  best  expressing  the  forms  and  principles  of  a  com- 
plex mental  activity. 

The  otlier  scruple  referred  to  is  this :  In  all  that  we  have 
said  about  the  mental  activity  involved  in  knowing,  the  ob- 
ject has  not  appeared  as  a  determining  factor  at  all.  But 
certainly  the  object  is  the  most  important  factor  in  knowing. 
Knowledge  is  of  the  object,  and  the  object  must  determine 
knowledge.  But  in  our  exposition  it  seems  as  if  knowledge 
were  determining  the  object,  and  thus  it  seems  as  if  there 
were  no  object,  but  only  a  projection  of  our  own  conceptions. 

This  scruple  is  not  entirel}' groundless.  For  spontaneous 
thought  the  object  is  everj'thing  and  thought  is  nothing. 
It  was  therefore  necessary  to  show  that,  however  real  the 
object  may  be,  it  becomes  an  object  for  us  only  through 
our  own  activit}'.  Tiie  thing  world  must  be  reproduced  in 
the  thought  world,  and  the  forms  of  the  thing  world  must 
take  on  the  forms  of  the  thought  world.  This  cannot  be  es- 
caped on  the  most  realistic  theory.  And  if  the  thoughts 
which  arise  do  really  grasp  existing  things,  this  is  possible 
only  as  there  is  essential  identity  between  the  fundamental 
forms  of  thought  and  those  of  things.  That  thought  work- 
ing according  to  its  laws  should  yet  rightly  apprehend 
things  existing  according  to  their  laws  is  impossible  with- 
out this  identity,  and  also  without  a  profound  adjustment 
of  the  interaction  of  thought  and  things.  This  smacks  a 
little  of  pre-established  harmony  ;  but  no  theory  can  escape 
it  which  does  not  lose  itself  in  a  blind  materialism  on  the 
one  hand,  or  in  a  solipsistic  idealism  on  the  other. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE     NOTION 

We  have  delayed  thus  long  to  treat  of  the  traditional 
logical  forms  because  of  the  importance  of  the  logical  prin- 
ciples which  condition  thought.  Formal  logic  of  the  tradi- 
tional type  begins  with  "terms"  or  "names,"  which  are 
supposed  to  be  found  ready-made  in  consciousness,  and  then 
proceeds  to  unite  them  according  to  the  principle  of  consist- 
ency, and  never  suspects,  meanwhile,  that  the  most  impor- 
tant and  vital  work  of  thought  must  be  done  before  this 
w^ork  can  begin.  Thinking  about  a  given  world  is  some- 
thing, but  getting  a  world  to  think  about  is  a  great  deal 
more ;  and  it  is  precisely  this  latter  feat  in  which  the  chief 
work  of  thought  appears.  Hence  the  need  of  the  prelimi- 
nary discussion. 

In  treating  of  the  traditional  forms  we  take  for  granted 
a  certain  acquaintance  with  them  on  the  part  of  the  reader. 
We  shall  attempt,  therefore,  no  detailed  exposition,  but 
shall  confine  our  attention  rather  to  important  points  and 
to  some  general  criticism.  In  this  way  w^e  hope  to  get 
some  insight  into  the  rational  principles  Avhich  underlie  the 
logical  forms,  and  to  escape  the  barren  wastes  of  fruitless 
distinctions  and  meaningless  details  which  make  up  so  large 
a  part  of  traditional  logic. 

Conceiving,  judging,  and  inferring  are  not  three  succes- 
sive forms  of  mental  activity,  so  that  the  first  form  can  be 
complete  in  itself  without  the  others.     On  the  contrary, 


118  THEOKY    OF   THOUGHT   AND   KNOWLEDGE 

each  form  enters  into  and  implies  the  rest.  Of  course  there 
is  some  conceiving  which  precedes  some  judging,  and  some 
judging  which  precedes  some  inferring;  but  as  general 
forms  of  our  thought  activity  each  involves  all.  The  intel- 
lect which  could  not  judge  could  never  conceive.  The  in- 
tellect which  could  not  infer  could  not  judge.  Conceiving, 
judging,  inferring,  then,  are  only  different  phases  of  one  in- 
divisible process.  We  treat  them  successively,  but  they 
are  simultaneous  in  existence.  Of  course  it  is  understood 
that  we  are  speaking  of  human  thinking.  An  intuitive  rea- 
son would  have  no  need  of  inference. 

From  this  standpoint  the  three  factors  of  thought  are 
the  notion,  the  judgment,  and  the  inference.  These,  how- 
ever, are  not  independent  of  the  constitutive  activity  of 
thought,  but  rather  depend  upon  it.  The  present  chapter 
will  treat  of  the  notion. 

For  thought,  of  course,  terms  are  primarily  nothing  but 
vocal  or  visual  signs  of  ideas.  The  meaning  behind  the 
sign  is  the  important  thing.  This  is  variously  called  the 
notion,  the  concept,  the  idea,  the  conception.  We  begin 
with  the  thought  element,  and  postpone  to  a  later  paragraph 
what  we  have  to  say  about  terras  or  language. 

The  logical  aim  in  the  formation  of  the  notion  is  perfect- 
ly simple.  It  is  merely  to  form  fixed  conceptions  which 
shall  enable  us  to  master  and  express  experience.  The  pre- 
supposition is  that  experience  admits  of  being  reduced,  at 
least  to  some  extent,  to  such  fixed  forms.  The  difiiculties 
which  arise  concern  the  realization  rather  than  the  aim. 

And  here  at  the  start  it  may  be  well  to  explain  away  an 
apparent  contradiction  running  through  our  discussion  of 
the  notion.  It  is  spoken  of  as  fixed,  and  yet  its  changing 
nature  perpetually  appears.  This  inconsistency  vanishes  on 
remembering  that  this  fixity  is  the  ideal  form  of  the  notion. 
A  =  A.    It  does  not  forbid  that  A  may  be  increased  by  a 


THE   NOTION  119 

new  factor,  B ;  but  even  then  the  same  law  holds.  The  new 
idea^  +  ^  must  heA  +  B  and  not  something  else.  The 
contents  of  many  notions  undergo  great  changes,  in  which 
case  the  real  fact  is  that  a  new  idea  has  taken  the  place  of 
the  old  ;  but  new  and  old  alike  are  under  the  necessity  of 
beins:  fixed  in  their  meaninof  or  identical  with  themselves. 

The  common  doctrine  of  the  notion  is  as  follows :  The 
mind  begins  with  particular  things,  or  events,  immediately 
given  in  experience.  This  work  precedes  thought.  These 
particulars  are  then  compared,  and  are  seen  to  have  some 
element  in  common.  This  common  feature  is  next  sepa- 
rated by  abstraction  from  the  particular  cases,  and  thus  ap- 
pears as  the  notion,  or  concept,  which  is  defined  as  the 
common  element  in  many  individuals.  Later  on  this  con- 
cept is  extended  by  generalization  to  all  similar  individuals, 
and  the  work  is  complete.  This  is  the  sum  of  the  theory; 
all  else  is  application. 

That  some  concepts  arise  in  this  way  is  clear  enough ; 
and  for  some  purposes  and  from  some  standpoints  the  view 
is  suflBciently  accurate.  Many  things  are  known  as  individ- 
uals long  before  they  are  classified ;  and  often  enough  new 
facts  compel  reclassification.  The  botanists  and  zoologists 
are  constantlv  redistributing:  their  facts  so  as  to  create  and 
uncreate  classes,  yet  without  any  modification  of  the  indi- 
viduals dealt  with.  These  facts  seem  to  show  that  indi- 
viduals are  known  independently,  and  that  the  knowledge 
of  classes  and  class  terms  is  necessarily  a  later  product. 
And  we  might  even  claim  that  a  moment's  reflection  shows 
that  it  must  be  so.  The  knowledge  of  man  can  arise  only 
from  a  knowledge  of  men. 

This  seems  conclusive ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  when  we 
attempt  to  tell  what  these  individuals  are,  the  answer 
always  consists  of  general  terms.  If  we  would  describe 
Socrates  we  have  to  call  him  a  man,  a  Greek,  a  philoso- 


120  THEOKY    OF    THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE 

pher.  Indeed,  language  has  no  significant  terms  which 
are  not  universals ;  and  any  mind  which  is  developed 
enough  to  use  language  is  necessarily  moving  on  the 
plane  of  universals.  When  proper  names  have  no  con- 
notation they  merely  denote  an  object  and  mean  nothing. 
Hence  any  individual  object  whatever,  by  the  time  it  is 
anything  for  thought,  is  included  in  a  system  of  classifica- 
tion, and  is  known  only  as  it  is  subsumed  under  some 
general  notion.  Articulate  perception  involves  assimilation. 
Cognition  is  completed  in  recognition.  The  presence  of 
this  generalizing  tendency  is  manifest  in  the  early  develop- 
ment of  children,  who  are  perpetually  assimilating  new 
objects  to  previous  experience.  It  would  seem,  then,  that 
the  knowledge  of  man  is  an  important  factor  in  the  knowl- 
edge of  men,  and  that  any  articulate  knowledge  of  men 
must  be  a  knowledge  of  man. 

These  things  show  that  the  antithesis  of  individual  and 
universal  is  not  so  simple  and  manifest  as  we  at  first  sup- 
pose. In  fact,  it  has  only  a  limited  validity.  Some  con- 
ceptions are,  indeed,  individual  with  reference  to  some 
others ;  but  these  singular  conceptions  are  themselves  either 
universals  or  functions  of  universals.  The  universalizing 
process  and  the  universal  element  are  present  in  every  in- 
dividual by  the  time  it  is  anything  for  intelligence.  The 
relation  of  the  categories  to  consciousness  makes  this  nec- 
essary. They  furnish  the  fundamental  classifications  with- 
out which  thought  cannot  even  begin.  Hence  no  strictly 
unclassified  thing  can  be  an  object  of  knowledge.  The 
sense  impression  itself,  we  have  seen,  becomes  an  object 
of  thought  only  for  a  universalizing  intelligence.  Finally, 
even  if  an  utterly  singular  conception  of  a  thing  were  pos- 
sible, that  conception  must  at  least  be  a  universal  with 
reference  to  the  successive  phases  of  the  thing.  Nothing 
is   one   in   sense  experience.     A  thing   becomes   one  only 


THE    NOTION  121 

through  the  formation  of  an  abiding  conception  which  is 
the  truth  or  meaning  in  the  successive  experiences.  With- 
out this  conception  there  would  be  only  a  flux  of  impres- 
sions which  would  elude  thought  altogether,  and  this  one 
conception  is  plainly  a  universal  with  reference  to  a  plu- 
rality of  experiences. 

We  conclude,  then,  that  the  current  conception  is  mis- 
taken, according  to  which  the  knowledge  of  the  singular  is 
something  complete  in  itself,  while  the  universal  is  reached 
by  abstraction  from  the  knowledge  of  individuals.  And 
the  professional  logicians  themselves  have  never  succeeded 
in  being  consistent  on  this  point.  After  insisting  that  logic 
has  to  do  only  with  concepts  and  classes,  that  the  concept  is 
the  point  or  points  in  which  many  objects  agree,  that  the 
application  of  the  concept  to  a  knowledge  of  individuals 
is  a  logical  abuse,  they  do  not  hesitate  to  speak  of  concepts 
of  individuals,  of  singular  concepts ;  and,  when  treating  of 
the  extension  of  concepts,  they  not  infrequently  hold  that 
when  the  extension  of  a  concept  becomes  a  minimum  it 
is  called  an  individual.  All  of  these  inconsistencies  are  to 
be  found  in  the  logical  writings  of  Sir  William  Hamilton 
himself.  Such  uncertainty  and  contradiction  necessarily  re- 
sult from  the  failure  to  see  that  a  proper  knowledge  even 
of  the  singular  is  possible  only  to  a  universalizing  intelli- 
gence. A  conception  may  indeed  be  singular  with  refer- 
ence to  some  other  conception,  but  it  can  never  be  abso- 
lutely singular  without  vanishing  from  thought  altogether. 

But  do  we  not  always  begin  with  the  knowledge  of  in- 
dividuals, and  thence  advance  to  the  knowledge  of  univer- 
sals?  Here  it  is  worth  while  to  make  a  distinction.  The 
mind  creates  some  of  its  objects  by  definition  and  invention, 
and  some  of  its  objects  it  discovers  through  perception.  In 
the  former  case  the  universal  precedes  the  singular  as  its 
law.     The  universal  is  the  law  for  forming  and  dealing  with 


123  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE 

individuals.  The  watch  preceded  watches.  The  defini- 
tion of  the  parabola  preceded  parabolas.  And  wherever 
the  mind  acts  creatively  the  general  conception  precedes 
and  determines  the  particulars. 

But  on  the  perceptive  side  we  may  hold  that  we  certainly 
begin  with  individuals,  and  that  universals  are  necessarily  a 
later  product.  If  we  allow  this,  the  question  what  the 
knowledge  of  individuals  implies  still  remains  open.  The 
common  assumption  is  that  either  individuals  must  be  known 
before  universals,  or  universals  must  be  known  before  indi- 
viduals. But  a  third  possibility  remains,  that  the  knowledge 
of  the  two  should  grow  together.  And  it  is  this  third  pos- 
sibility which  is  realized  in  the  case  of  our  developing  intel- 
ligence. The  knowledge  of  the  singular  commonly  develops 
alono'  with  that  of  the  universal.  If  the  universal  is  realized 
only  in  the  singular,  the  singular  is  understood  only  through 
the  universal.  Without  particular  experiences,  thought  is 
empty  ;  and  without  the  universal  form,  thought  is  chaotic 
and  unmanageable.  This  interpenetration  of  the  two  ele- 
ments compels  us  to  regard  the  singular  as  a  specialized  uni- 
versal, and  the  universal  as  a  generalized  singular.  If,  then, 
we  admit  that  knowledge  is  of  individuals,  we  must  also  ad- 
mit that  this  knowledge  is  possible  only  to  and  through  a 
universalizing  intelligence.  Again,  if  we  admit  that  individ- 
uals are  the  only  realities,  we  must  also  admit  that  these 
individuals  become  anything  for  us  only  as  they  are  com- 
prised in  a  general  rational  scheme. 

Hence  the  antithesis  of  singular  and  universal,  in  any 
form  in  which  it  can  exist  for  articulate  thought,  is  by  no 
means  the  antithesis  of  non-logical  data  and  logical  abstrac- 
tions. On  the  contrary,  the  conception  of  the  individual  is 
as  trul}'-  a  logical  product  as  the  conception  of  the  universal, 
and  the  true  antithesis  is  that  of  singular  and  general  con- 
cepts.     In  the  case  of  complex  objects,  these  two  classes 


THE    NOTIOJ^  133 

agree  in  having  the  same  number  of  marks  united  in  the 
same  way,  or  by  a  common  law.  They  differ  solely  in  the 
form  in  which  the  marks  are  given.  In  the  singular  concept 
the  marks  have  specific  values,  and  in  the  general  conce})t 
they  have  general  values  ;  but  in  both  cases  the  internal 
structure  and  law  are  the  same.  This  relation  finds  perfect 
illustration  in  algebra.  A  formula  with  general  quantities 
represents  the  general  concept.  The  same  formula  with 
specific  values  substituted  for  the  general  quantities  illus- 
trates the  singular  concept.  If  we  begin  with  the  universal 
we  specialize  it  and  reach  the  singular.  If  we  begin  with 
the  singular  we  generalize  it  and  reach  the  universal.  In 
both  cases,  however,  the  internal  loi;  cal  structure  is  the 
same. 

The  traditional  logic  has  contented  itself  with  some  very 
superficial  work  in  this  matter.  First,  it  has  supposed  that 
the  individual  may  be  articulately  known  apart  from  and 
before  the  universal.  Secondly,  as  a  specification  of  the 
same  error,  it  has  supposed  that  the  conception  of  the  indi- 
vidual involves  no  proper  logical  work.  Thirdly,  it  has  sup- 
posed that  the  concept  has  arisen  by  simply  abstracting  from 
individuals  their  elements  of  likeness  and  dropping  their  dif- 
ferences. The  mistake  of  the  first  two  suppositions  has 
already  appeared.  The  individual  exists  for  thought  only 
as  it  is  defined  and  fixed  in  a  logical  scheme.  The  mistake 
of  the  third  supposition  appears  on  reflecting  that,  by  such 
a  process  of  abstraction,  thought  would  reach  only  a  zero 
result.  Things  which  are  alike  are  still  different  in  those 
points  in  which  they  are  alike,  and  if  all  the  elements  in 
which  they  differ  were  eliminated  there  would  be  nothing 
left.  The  actual  procedure  of  thought  in  passing  from  indi- 
viduals to  universals  does  not  consist  in  dropping  differences, 
but  rather  in  substituting  for  the  particular  marks  of  the 
individual  the  general  marks  of  the  class.     For  instance. 


124  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

particular  animals  have  particular  forms  of  nutrition  and 
reproduction,  and  these  differ  greatly  from  one  another. 
But  in  forming  the  concept,  animal,  it  would  not  do  to  leave 
out  the  marks  of  nutrition  and  reproduction,  although  ani 
mals  differ  in  these  respects.  On  the  contrary,  the  mind  re- 
tains the  marks,  but  gives  them  a  general  form ;  as  when  we 
generalize  a  particular  problem  in  algebra  we  retain  all  the 
quantities  and  relations,  but  give  them  a  general  form. 

These  considerations  apply  only  to  the  mutual  relation 
of  the  singular  and  universal  as  elements  of  the  thought 
process.  Their  metaphysical  relations  form  a  separate  ques- 
tion. But  with  regard  to  the  former  our  conclusion  is  that 
thought  exists  only  through  a  process  which  is  at  once  a 
generalizing  and  a  particularizing  one.  Without  either  ele- 
ment our  thought  would  come  to  a  standstill.  From  some 
points  of  view  the  traditional  doctrine  presents  the  matter 
well  enough.  Some  individuals  are  known  before  some 
universals,  and  some  universals  are  won  by  abstraction 
from  previously  known  individuals.  This  is  admitted  and 
even  insisted  upon.  At  the  same  time,  these  individuals  are 
functions  of  other  universals ;  and  this  fact  must  not  be 
lost  siffht  of  in  estimating  the  relation  of  the  individual  to 
the  universal,  considered  as  elements  of  the  thought  proc- 
ess. Their  metaphysical  relations  will  be  treated  in  a  later 
paragraph. 

The  essential  nature  of  the  concept,  whether  singular 
or  universal,  consists  in  its  abiding  thought  content.  This 
conception  of  an  abiding  significance  is  the  central  element. 
When  the  experience  is  simple,  as  in  our  elementary  sensa- 
tions, the  concept  itself  is  correspondingly  simple.  Here 
the  logical  work  consists  in  giving  the  form  of  thought  to 
material  which  it  does  not  produce.  In  this  way  the  un- 
manageable flow  of  non-rationalized  sense  impressions  be- 
comes something  for  intelligence.     When    the  concept  is 


THE    NOTION  13'^ 

complex  the  mind  unites  the  elements  into  a  complex  whole 
whose  parts  belong  together,  or  it  analyzes  the  complex 
whole  into  its  implications.  The  former  is  especially  the 
case  in  dealing  with  external  objects ;  the  latter  is  the  rule 
when  dealing  with  subjective  creations.  When  the  marks 
which  go  to  make  up  the  concept  of  a  subject  may  be  sep- 
arately experienced,  as  in  the  reports  of  the  different  senses 
concerning  an  object,  the  mind  unites  these  marks  into  one 
complex  conception.  But  when  the  conception  is  grasped 
as  a  whole  from  the  start,  as  in  a  mathematical  definition, 
the  mind  analyzes  it  into  its  implications.  Thus  the  con- 
cept, triangle,  is  not  made  by  adding  sides,  angles,  and  area ; 
but  the  complex  conception,  triangle,  is  analyzed  into  sides, 
angles,  and  area,  as  implied  in  the  notion. 

Here  again  the  traditional  logic  has  been  too  easily  con- 
tented. Confining  its  attention  mainly  to  concepts  of  ex- 
ternal things,  it  has  tended  to  regard  the  concept  as  merely 
the  sum  of  its  marks.  AS=a-\-h  +  c  +  d-\-,  etc.,  would  be 
the  form  into  which  the  conception  would  fall,  where  ^S* 
stands  for  the  concept,  and  a,  b,  etc.,  stand  for  its  marks 
or  factors.  But  it  is  plain  that  such  a  formula  can  have 
no  application  to  those  cases  in  which  S  is  not  built  up  from 
the  marks  but  rather  implies  them,  or  in  which  ^precedes  and 
determines  the  marks.  Not  even  the  formula  S=f{a,  b,  c,  d) 
would  be  adequate  to  these  cases  ;  for  S  is  the  prior  notion, 
and  the  marks  are  functions  of  S  rather  than  conversely. 
The  concept,  watch,  is  not  a  sum,  nor  even  a  function,  of 
its  parts ;  but,  conversely,  the  parts  are  rather  functions  of 
the  one  law-giving  concept,  watch.  It  is  only  for  certain 
arbitrary  or  artificial  concepts  that  the  marks  are  simply 
co-ordinated,  as  in  the  traditional  scheme.  We  shall  find* 
this  superficiality  underlying  the  empirical  theory  of  pred- 
ication. 

In  spontaneous  thought  everything  turns  on  the  basal 


126  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

antithesis  of  things  and  qualities.  This  arises  naturally 
from  the  form  of  our  sense  experience.  Corresponding  to 
this  fact  we  find  our  notions  falling  into  two  great  classes, 
subject  and  predicate  notions.  The  former  primarily  repre- 
sent things  which  have  a  substantive  existence ;  afterwards 
they  come  to  stand  for  any  conception  which  serves  as  a 
subject  for  predicates.  Predicate  notions  are  those  which 
have  only  an  adjectival  existence;  that  is,  they  represent 
qualities  or  activities,  and  can  be  conceived  as  existing  only 
in  connection  with  a  subject. 

In  language,  substantive  notions  are  represented  by  most 
common  nouns,  and  the  predicate  notions  by  adjectives  and 
verbs.  Predicate  notions  often  take  on  a  substantive  form 
in  the  abstract  and  verbal  nouns  of  a  language,  and  then 
they  become  prolific  sources  of  error.  The  substantive  form 
gives  a  false  show  of  independence  to  the  adjective  idea. 
We  can  guard  against  this  illusion  only  by  returning  to  the 
realities  or  concrete  relations  from  which  the  ideas  were  ab- 
stracted. 

Predicate  notions  are  simple.  The  logical  work  in  get- 
ting them  consists  in  recognizing  the  one  in  the  man}'-,  and 
in  fixing  it  as  a  unit  of  thought.  These  notions  also  form 
the  contents  of  our  subject  notions ;  for  we  define  or  ex- 
press the  latter  only  by  their  attributes,  or  predicates,  or 
marks,  as  they  are  indifferently  called.  Without  predicate 
notions  subject  notions  could  never  be  formed,  and  without 
subject  notions  predicates  would  be  a  flight  of  groundless 
adjectives.  The  necessity  of  finding  ground  and  connection 
forbids  us  to  rest  in  the  thought  of  externally  juxtaposed 
qualities  without  any  internal  bond,  and  thus  we  are  forced 
upon  the  subject  notion.  And  the  impossibility  of  grasping 
or  expressing  being,  except  in  terms  of  quality,  forces  us 
upon  the  predicate  notion.  The  subject  notion  is  only  a 
special  form  of  the  general  demand  for  rational  connection. 


THE   NOTION  137 

What  it  contributes  to  the  predicates  is  just  the  notion  of  a 
unitary  ground  which  transforms  their  external  juxtaposi- 
tion into  a  fixed  and  complex  unity.  The  attributes,  then, 
are  not  attributes  of  one  another,  and  they  do  not  coexist  by 
chance,  but  they  form  a  group  whose  members  belong  to- 
gether in  the  unity  of  a  common  subject. 

In  the  empirical  view  of  the  subject  notion,  as  in  most 
logical  discussion,  there  is  almost  exclusive  attention  to  the 
objects  of  sense  perception.  These,  as  sense  objects,  seem 
to  be  sums  of  qualities,  and  there  seems  to  be  no  other 
connection  between  these  qualities  than  that  of  mere  ex- 
ternal adherence  in  space  or  time.  Hence  the  statement 
often  made  that  things  are  only  bundles  or  groups  of  quali- 
ties ;  and  hence,  also,  the  claim  that  the  subject  notion  is 
but  the  sum  of  its  marks  or  attributes.  Predication,  then, 
means  not  the  affirmation  of  a  mysterious  inherence  of  a 
predicate  in  a  subject,  but  simply  the  declaration  that  cer- 
tain predicates  so  come  together  that  where  one  is  found 
the  rest  are  found.  When,  then,  we  say  A  is  £  the  true 
meaning  is  that  A  and  £  are  always  found  together,  so  that 
from  one  Ave  can  infer  the  other.  And  for  this  result  noth- 
ing but  experience  and  association  are  needed.  Experience 
gives  us  simple  qualities ;  association  unites  them ;  and  the 
judgment  simply  declares  the  result. 

The  shortcomings  of  this  view  have  already  appeared  in 
discussing  the  empirical  doctrine  of  being.  The  simple 
qualities  themselves  are  logical  products  by  the  time  they 
are  anything  for  intelligence.  There  is,  further,  a  mistak- 
ing of  subjective  association  for  objective  connection,  and 
thus  the  essential  aim  of  the  judgment  is  missed  altogether. 
Of  course  the  view  has  no  application  to  the  large  body  of 
notions  where  the  marks  are  not  expressed  in  sense  terms, 
but  in  terms  of  the  understanding.  This  is  increasingly  the 
case  even  in  physical  science,  w^here  there  is  a  growing  in- 


128  THEORY   OF    THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE 

significance  of  sense  terras,  and  a  constant  attempt  to  turn 
them  into  conceptions  of  the  intellect.  The  view  is  equally 
inapplicable  to  those  conceptions  which  the  mind  creates 
for  itself  by  definition,  as  in  most  of  the  subjective  sci- 
ences. 

The  general  notion  expresses  in  one  thought  the  con- 
tents of  many  things.  Man  stands  for  all  men.  As  such 
the  concept  becomes  a  shorthand  expression  for  all  the 
individuals  comprised  under  it.  This  fact,  which  makes 
the  concept  a  great  convenience  and  a  great  time -saver, 
does  not  depend  altogether  on  our  thought.  The  classifi- 
cation involved  in  the  categories  does  indeed  depend  on 
the  structure  of  reason,  but  to  have  any  validity  it  must 
reproduce  the  structure  of  things.  This  classification,  too. 
is  so  general  that,  if  it  were  all,  the  mind  could  never  attain 
to  any  but  the  most  elementary  development.  The  fact 
that  a  more  complex  classification  is  possible  depends,  not 
on  the  mind,  but  on  the  nature  of  its  objects.  These  are 
such  as  to  admit  of  a  complex  system  of  classification,  and 
thus  provision  is  made  for  a  higher  mental  development. 
It  is  quite  conceivable  that  our  objects  should  have  been 
such  as  to  be  as  incommensurate  as  the  data  of  different 
senses.  In  that  case  the  mind  would  have  lost  itself  in  the 
unmanageable  multiplicity  and  incommensurability  of  its 
objects. 

We  need  the  concept  as  a  shorthand  expression  for  the 
many.  We  also  need  a  shorthand  expression  for  the  con- 
cept. We  have  already  seen  that  the  adequate  concept  of 
a  class  must  contain  all  the  marks  common  to  the  individ- 
uals of  the  class,  and  that  the  difference  between  the  gen- 
eral and  the  singular  concept  does  not  consist  in  the  number 
of  marks  or  in  the  order  of  their  union,  but  in  the  manner 
in  which  they  are  given.  This  relation  we  have  illustrated 
by  algebraic  formulas  with  general  and  specific  quantities. 


THE   NOTION  i2£ 

Thus  the  concept  itself,  when  the  object  is  compiex,  b^ 
comes  equally  complex  when  thought  out  into  completion. 

But  in  actual  use  the  concept  is  rarely  thus  completed. 
The  finished  concept,  whether  singular  or  universal,  is  an 
ideal  ratlier  than  an  actual  possession.  Instead  of  thinking 
it  in  its  full  contents,  we  rather  abstract  some  single  feature 
or  factor  and  let  that  stand  for  the  rest.  This  is  the  case 
with  all  complex  singular  concepts  as  well  as  with  universals. 
When  we  pass  from  species  to  genera  the  thought  becomes 
more  and  more  a  bare  outline,  which  is  filled  out  only  upon 
occasion.  AH  complex  thought  tends  to  become  abbre- 
viated, and,  in  that  sense,  symbolic.  The  shorthand  ex- 
pression or  symbol  carries  the  thought  with  suflBcient  ac- 
curacy, and  w^e  need  only  regard  the  proper  treatment  of 
our  symbols,  as  in  algebra  we  need  not  regard  the  mean- 
ing of  our  symbols,  but  only  their  logical  manipulation. 
In  this  way  a  great  economy  of  time  and  strength  is  se- 
cured, and,  indeed,  without  it  thought  would  break  down 
from  the  cumbrousness  of  its  own  operations.  On  the 
other  hand,  this  fact  is  a  most  prolific  source  of  error,  as 
the  mind  easily  loses  itself  among  its  symbols  and  misses 
reality  altogether. 

The  nature  and  meaning  of  the  notion  have  been  the 
subject  of  much  not  over-intelligent  debate  from  very  early 
times.  It  seems  incumbent  on  us  to  glance  at  the  matter 
in  passing.  The  debate  concerns,  first,  the  objective  or 
metaphysical  nature  of  the  notion,  and,  secondly,  its  sub- 
jective or  epistemological  nature. 

The  first  question  led  in  early  philosophy  to  the  dispute 
between  realism  and  nominalism.  The  former  held  that 
universals  are  realities  of  which  individuals  are  only  acci- 
dents. The  latter  held  that  universals  have  only  a  mental 
existence,  and  that  individuals  are  the  only  proper  realities. 


130  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT    AND   KNOWLEDGE 

There  is  much  in  the  order  of  thought  that  lends  itself 
to  the  realistic  view.  We  have  seen  that  particulars  become 
clear  to  us  only  as  they  are  regarded  as  specifications  of  a 
general  conception.  Definition  proceeds  through  the  higher 
genus.  The  singular,  then,  for  our  defining  thought,  is  al- 
w^ays  an  accident  of  the  universal.  From  this  it  is  easy  to 
conclude  that  the  universal  precedes  the  singular  and  con- 
stitutes its  essence.  And  in  an  age  when  the  theory  of 
thought  was  undeveloped,  and  the  order  of  thought  was 
unhesitatingly  taken  for  the  order  of  things,  realism  was  a 
yery  natural  illusion. 

At  the  same  time  the  claim  could  be  held,  even  in  that 
undeveloped  state  of  thought,  only  so  long  as  attention  was 
exclusively  directed  to  the  species  of  natural  history.  So 
long  as  we  speak  of  man,  cow,  horse,  and  similar  strikingly 
distinct  species,  there  is  a  kind  of  plausibility  in  the  notion 
of  essences  or  types ;  but  when  we  pass  to  genera  and  higher 
orders  there  is  not  even  a  sembl^ice  of  meaning.  The  uni- 
versal animal  or  organism  would  be  hard  indeed  to  typify. 
Besides,  as  Plato  saw  and  said,  there  are  many  concepts 
which  are  artificial  and  relative  to  our  own  aims  or  logi- 
cal convenience.  Indeed,  the  majority  of  concepts  are  of 
this  sort,  and  nothing  could  well  be  more  absurd  than  the 
notion  of  an  existing  essence  corresponding  to  them. 

Nominalism,  on  the  other  hand,  looks  upon  classes  as  only 
subjective  conceptions  without  objective  correspondence. 
We  might  illustrate  by  the  parallels  and  meridians  of  geog- 
raphy. These  are  pure  impositions  of  the  mind.  So  with 
our  dates  and  anniversaries  in  time.  No  one  day  is  the  be- 
ginning of  a  new  year  more  than  any  other  in  respect  to  the 
unbroken  continuum  of  the  temporal  flow.  We  are  all  nom- 
inalists, so  far  as  any  objective  significance  of  these  things  is 
concerned.  In  the  same  way,  nominalism  holds  that  all 
classes  are  mental  impositions,  and  not  transcripts  of  facts. 


THE    NOTION  131 


In  this  extreme  form  the  view  cannot  be  held ;  for  then 
all  classification  would  be  arbitrary,  just  as  fixing  the  zero 
meridian  is  arbitrary.  But  all  scientific  classification  pro- 
ceeds on  the  assumption  that  natural  groups  exist,  and  our  aim 
is  to  discover  them.  A  classification  which  threw  red  cows, 
red  horses,  ripe  strawberries,  and  raw  meat  together,  on  the 
ground  that  all  were  alike  red,  would  be  repudiated  by  every 
one  as  overlooking  important  natural  affinities.  Into  how 
many  degrees  we  shall  divide  the  circumference  of  the  circle 
is  our  own  affair,  but  we  have  no  such  liberty  in  classifying 
natural  objects.  Nominalism  is  right  in  saying  that  the  con- 
cept, as  such,  has  only  a  mental  existence.  The  reality  is 
always  singular  and  concrete;  but  the  realities,  though  no 
accidents  of  a  common  or  identical  essence,  still  have  affini- 
ties and  likenesses  among  themselves  which  our  classes  aim 
to  reproduce  and  represent.  The  question  how  these  groups 
are  produced  is  a  separate  one.  The  realistic  notion  of  the 
universals  as  metaphysically  real  is  absurd,  and  the  nomi- 
nalistic  refusal  to  see  anything  but  the  unrelated  individual 
is  equally  so. 

We  might  illustrate  the  question  and  the  shortcomings 
of  both  views  by  a  mathematical  series  whose  members  are 
deduced  each  from  its  antecedent  according  to  some  law. 
The  realist  would  hold  that  the  idea  of  the  series  is  the  re- 
ality, and  not  its  actual  terms.  The  nominalist  would  hold 
that  the  terms  are  the  only  reality,  and  would  deny  the  law 
which  connects  them.  The  fact  would  be  the  terms  related 
according  to  law ;  and  if  we  insisted  on  knowing  hou^  such 
a  series  came  to  be  we  could  find  no  answer  in  hypostasizing 
the  idea  of  the  series,  but  only  in  going  back  to  intelligence, 
the  only  real  universal,  and  the  author  both  of  the  idea  and 
of  the  terms  in  which  it  is  realized. 

It  is  plain  that  this  debate  is  antiquated  in  its  ancient 
form.     No  one  would  longer  maintain  the  existence  of  uni- 


132  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

versals  as  a  species  of  real  essence.  No  one,  on  the  other 
hand,  could  maintain  in  the  face  of  universal  scientific  pro- 
cedure that  the  unrelated  individual  is  all,  and  that  no 
classification  has  any  objective  foundation.  With  regard  to 
many  classes  we  are  all  nominalists,  but  some  we  are  com- 
pelled to  regard  as  natural  groups.  The  origin  of  these 
groups  is  a  question  which  leads  out  into  the  general 
question  of  theism. 

So  much  for  the  objective  significance  of  the  concept, 
supposing  the  concept  itself  possible.  But  this  whole  dis- 
cussion is  vacated  by  an  extension  of  the  nominalistic  de- 
nial to  even  the  subjective  existence  of  the  concept.  It  is 
alleged  that  concepts  are  impossible  even  as  conceptions, 
and  thus  at  one  stroke  both  realism  and  conceptualism  are 
declared  impossible.  This  brings  us  to  the  second  question 
mentioned  :  the  subjective  significance  of  the  concept. 

This  denial  comes  chiefly  from  the  empirical  school.  It 
has  its  root  in  the  desire  to  reduce  the  activity  of  the  mind 
to  a  minimum.  Indeed,  a  consistent  empiricism  cannot 
admit  anything  universal,  whether  subjective  or  objective. 
This  fact  makes  the  denial  intelligible  in  its  origin ;  it  re- 
mains to  inquire  into  its  justification. 

What,  then,  has  the  mind  before  it  in  the  case  of  a  gen- 
eral notion?  Some  extreme  nominalists  have  maintained 
that  the  name  is  the  only  object.  But  if  the  name  have 
no  meaning,  then  bare  noise  or  visual  sensation  is  the  sole 
contents  of  thought.  In  that  case  those  who  use  different 
languages  would  have  no  common  intelligence  whatever, 
and  one  who  knew  two  languages  would  have  two  distinct 
minds.  Others  less  extreme,  as  Berkeley,  have  held  that 
the  mind  has  only  a  particular  object  before  it,  and  that 
on  the  ground  that  a  real  object  always  must  be  particular. 
Any  real  triangle  must  always  be  acute  or  oblique  or  right- 
angled,  and  cannot  be  all  of  these  at  once.     Hence  I  cannot 


THE    NOTION  133 

form  a  conception  of  a  triangle  which  is  all  of  these  at 
once;  and  hence,  again,  I  cannot  form  any  general  notion 
of  a  triangle. 

Some  truth,  some  error,  and  much  confusion  mingle  here. 
It  is  quite  true  that  I  cannot  form  a  general  picture  of  a 
triangle  which  shall  belong  to  all  three  classes  at  once; 
but  it  is  also  true  that  I  can  conceive  a  general  rule  for 
forming  triangles  without  taking  these  classes  into  account. 
It  is  quite  true  that  I  cannot  conceive  of  an  actual  triangle 
which  does  not  belong  to  some  one  of  these  classes,  to  the 
exclusion  of  the  other  two;  but  it  is  equally  true  that  I 
can  so  deal  with  the  conception  of  triangularity  as  to  need 
to  take  no  account  of  the  sizes  or  ratios  of  the  angles,  and 
so  as  to  get  results  valid  for  all  triangles  whatever.  This 
fact  is  the  foundation  of  geometry. 

Besides,  the  objection,  if  good  for  anything,  is  good  for 
more.  The  triangle  must  be  particular  not  only  in  its  an- 
gles, but  also  in  its  other  elements — its  area,  its  sides,  its 
location,  etc.  If,  now,  my  conception  be  particular,  I  ought 
to  be  able  to  tell  the  particular  values  of  all  the  elements 
of  my  conceived  triangle.  The  general  notion  of  man  has 
similar  difficulties;  and  as  I  can  conceive  only  of  particu- 
lar men  I  ought  to  be  able  to  name  my  man,  and  tell  his 
age,  height,  nationalit}',  occupation,  the  color  of  his  eyes 
and  hair.  Thus  the  doctrine  perishes  of  its  own  absurd- 
ity. How  a  conception  which,  as  an  act,  is  particular  and 
individual  can  be  seen  to  be  universal  in  its  validity,  or 
to  be  a  law  for  the  formation  of  other  conceptions,  is  cer- 
tainly beyond  all  telling.  It  suffices  to  see  that  such  is, 
nevertheless,  the  fact. 

Hence  to  the  question,  "What  has  the  mind  before  it  in 
the  case  of  general  notions?  the  answer  is,  Their  meaning; 
and  this  meaning  is  seen  to  apply  indifferently  or  equally 
to  an  indefinite  number  of  special  cases.     This  meaning, 


134  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT   AND   KNOWLEDGE 

however,  is  so  rapidly  grasped,  and,  if  need  be,  dismissed, 
that  it  is  easy  to  persuade  the  uncritical  that  only  the  word 
is  before  the  mind.  The  rapidity  of  the  mental  movement 
in  deahng  with  written  or  spoken  language  defies  all  at- 
tempts of  the  reflective  and  analytic  consciousness  to  keep 
pace  with  it.  Nevertheless,  that  there  is  something  more 
than  the  word  in  play  appears  from  the  fact  that  the  proc- 
ess is  informed  with  meaning,  while  the  word  in  itself  is 
mere  noise  or  a  conventional  sign. 

The  conclusion  is  that  a  general  notion  is  no  actual  or 
possible  metaphysical  existence.  All  real  existence  is  nec- 
essarily singular  and  individual.  The  only  way  to  give  the 
notion  any  metaphysical  significance  is  to  turn  it  into  a 
law  inherent  in  reality,  and  this  attempt  will  fail  unless 
we  finally  conceive  this  law  as  a  rule  according  to  which 
a  basal  intelligence  proceeds  in  positing  individuals.  Such 
a  result  would  recognize  the  truth  in  both  nominalism  and 
realism. 

But,  however  this  may  be,  the  notion  has  a  most  impor- 
tant mental  existence  and  logical  function.  As  a  concep- 
tion or  law  which  is  valid  for  many  particulars,  it  is  an 
undeniable  fact  of  our  experience  and  an  indispensable  con- 
dition of  our  mental  development.  But  this  subjectivity 
has  often  been  misconceived,  with  the  result  of  turning  con- 
ceptualism  into  a  barren  formalism. 

On  the  one  hand,  it  has  been  contended  that  logic  has 
only  to  do  with  thoughts  and  not  at  all  with  things.  On 
the  other,  it  has  been  maintained  that  logic  has  to  do  with 
things  and  not  with  thoughts.  There  is  just  ambiguity 
enough  in  the  terms  to  give  each  of  these  views  a  sem- 
blance of  truth.  That  things  can  exist  for  the  mind  only 
through  the  thoughts  we  form  of  them  is  manifest ;  and, 
therefore,  in  a  sense,  the  mind  has  to  do  only  with  thoughts. 


THE   NOTION  135 

But  thoughts,  again,  have  none  of  the  properties  which  the 
mind  attributes  to  things,  and  these  are  the  great  concern 
of  thought.  Hence  the  mind,  in  its  search  for  truth,  has  to 
do  with  things  and  not  with  thoughts.  In  this  contention 
we  have  the  reappearance  of  the  dual  aspect  of  the  thought 
process  to  which  reference  has  so  often  been  made.  Con- 
sidered as  existing  or  becoming,  the  fact  of  the  mental  life 
is  the  particular  stream  of  consciousness  and  its  specific 
contents.  But  this  life  in  its  thought  aspect  relates  itself 
to  an  independent  order,  and  thought  busies  itself  not  at 
all  with  itself  as  a  mental  event,  but  rather  with  those  in- 
dependent facts  and  relations.  Things  cannot  appear  bod- 
ily in  consciousness.  In  this  sense  the  mind  can  deal  only 
with  thoughts.  But  the  contents  of  these  thoughts  claim 
to  be  independent  of  the  mental  act  whereby  they  are  con- 
ceived. In  this  sense  thought  deals  with  things.  Of  course 
things  here  are  not  limited  to  material  bodies,  for  much  of 
our  thinking  has  to  do  with  immaterial  objects  and  rela- 
tions. These  are  thinks  rather  than  things;  at  the  same 
time,  they  are  fixed  factors  in  that  order  of  reality  which 
we  do  not  make  but  find. 

This  objective  reference  to  a  common  to  all  exists  even 
in  the  case  of  fictitious  objects,  as  the  creations  of  mythol- 
ogy or  the  characters  of  fiction.  These  are,  of  course,  sub- 
jective in  the  sense  that  they  are  no  actual  existences  in 
physical  reality,  but  they  are  not  subjective  in  the  sense 
that  one  is  perfectly  lawless  in  dealing  with  them.  They 
represent  fixed  conceptions  in  the  world  of  fancy,  and  have 
in  this  fact  a  kind  of  objectivity  and  independence ;  and 
whoever  will  deal  with  them  must  recognize  the  laws  of  their 
existence  as  established  by  their  creators.  The  conception 
of  Pegasus  or  Eosinante  may  not  be  applied  indifferently 
to  any  barnyard  animal.  Pecksniff  and  Micawber  likewise 
are  fixed  types  of  which  the  law  must  always  be  regarded. 


136  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE 

The  concept,  then,  has  a  double  aspect.  On  the  one 
hand,  tor  thought  it  expresses  a  fixed  meaning  or  a  rule  for 
dealing  with  objects,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  it  applies  to  a 
set  of  objects.  This  is  recognized  in  the  familiar  distinction 
between  the  intension  and  extension  of  concepts  or  be- 
tween their  connotation  and  denotation.  The  intension  or 
connotation  refers  to  the  meaning ;  the  extension  or  deno- 
tation refers  to  the  objects  to  which  the  meaning  applies. 

This  distinction,  however,  though  manifestly  valid  in 
many  cases,  is  not  easily  made  universal.  To  begin  with, 
it  is  easy  to  fix  the  denotation,  even  formally,  only  in  the 
case  of  objects  which  have  substantial  existence.  When  we 
come  to  objects  which  have  only  conceptual  existence,  it 
has  an  aspect  of  grotesqueness  to  speak  of  the  denotation. 
What,  for  instance,  would  be  the  denotation  of  liberty, 
piety,  knowledge,  reverence,  etc.?  Possibly  some  formal- 
istic  rigorist  would  insist  in  finding  a  denotation  for  these 
terms,  but  it  would  not  pay  expenses. 

The  connotation  is  easily  determined  by  formal  defini- 
tion as  the  meaning  of  the  concept.  In  practice  some 
uncertainty  arises  from  the  fact  that  the  connotation  is 
often  changing  or  enlarging.  In  such  a  case  it  is  easy  to 
raise  a  scruple  whether  the  new  elements  are  a  part  of  the 
connotation  or  not.  If  some  new  property  of  the  triangle 
were  discovered,  it  might  be  claimed  that  that  property 
was  no  part  of  the  connotation,  since  the  connotation  is 
what  we  mean  by  the  term,  and  the  new  property  does  not 
enter  into  the  meaning. 

Two  facts  make  this  scruple  possible.  The  first  is  the 
implicit  assumption  of  a  self-identical  and  universal  system 
of  things  and  ideas  which  our  actual  conceptions  represent. 
Without  this  reference  to  an  abiding  reality  there  would 
not  be  any  possibility  of  a  changing  connotation ;  for  then 
every  notion  would  centre  in  itself,  and  a  changed  conno- 


THE   NOTION  137 

tation  would  be  a  changed  idea;  that  is,  a  new  idea.  We 
are  saved  from  this  conceptual  flux  only  by  reference  to 
the  world  of  abiding  meanings  back  of  our  conceptions. 

The  second  fact  underlying  the  scruple  mentioned  is  the 
gradual  development  of  our  knowledge.  We  first  posit  our 
objects  as  self -identical  and  abiding,  and  then  we  slowly 
determine  their  attributes.  In  this  way  the  notion  which 
represents  these  objects  acquires  a  kind  of  fixity  and  iden- 
tity, however  much  the  contents  of  the  notion  may  change. 
It  is  the  same  notion  through  all  changes  of  connotation, 
because  the  notion  throughout  applies  to  the  same  things ; 
and  this  sameness  of  the  things  is  readily  mistaken  for  the 
sameness  of  the  notion.  When,  finally,  by  the  connotation 
we  understand  only  as  much  as  may  be  necessary  to  mark 
off  the  notion  from  others,  it  is  then  very  easy  to  raise 
difficulties  about  the  connotation. 

In  fact,  however,  this  question  belongs  to  psychology 
and  philology  rather  than  to  logic.  From  the  logical  stand- 
point the  meaning  is  the  connotation,  and  if  anything  be 
added  to  the  marks  of  a  concept  it  becomes  part  of  the 
connotation.  The  fact  that  many  have  not  heard  of  it,  or 
that  the  dictionary-makers  have  not  got  wind  of  it,  does 
not  modify  the  logical  fact. 

The  extension  and  intension  of  notions  are  commonly 
said  to  vary  inversely.  This  is  another  doctrine  which  has 
only  a  limited  validity  and  a  still  more  limited  value.  It 
does  not  apply  at  all  to  the  relation  between  individuals 
and  the  class  next  above  them.  There  is  no  relation  be- 
tween the  marks  which  make  up  the  notion  horse  and  the 
number  of  horses.  The  same  is  true  for  all  other  natural 
kinds.  Neither  does  it  apply  to  the  many  cases  where  two 
or  more  marks  form  a  fixed  group;  for  in  all  such  cases 
the  inclusion  of  one  mark  would  give  the  same  extension 
as  the  inclusion  of  all.     The  doctrine  is  valid  chiefly  for 


138  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

artificial  classifications  where  we  may  add  or  subtract 
marks  at  pleasure,  or  for  those  abstract  classes  which  we 
have  called  symbols  rather  than  conceptions. 

This  consideration  of  the  connotation  leads  to  the  sub- 
ject of  definition.  On  this  point  also  there  is  a  deal  of  con- 
fusion, owing  to  uncertainty  as  to  the  meaning  of  definition. 
If  knowledge  were  complete  the  connotation  would  be  the 
definition,  and  the  definition  would  be  the  connotation. 
But  as  knowledge  is  not  thus  complete  we  have  to  content 
ourselves  with  approximations.  Definitions  vary  all  the 
way  from  conceptions  which  only  serve  to  mark  off  a 
thought  content  from  all  others  to  those  which  give  the 
essential  inner  law  of  the  object.  Of  course  our  concern  is 
with  real  definition.  Nominal  definition  is  only  an  acci- 
dent of  language. 

The  traditional  conception  of  definition  is  that  it  con- 
sists in  giving  the  genus  and  differentia.  This  of  course 
presupposes  that  a  system  of  classification  already  exists. 
Such  a  definition  has  its  chief  value  in  enabling  one  to  lo- 
cate the  object  in  our  mental  system  by  marking  it  off 
from  others,  but  it  does  not  give  much  further  information. 
When  we  define  man  as  a  rational  animal  we  know  that 
he  belongs  to  the  genus  animal,  and  has  rationality  as  his 
specific  mark  or  difference,  whereby  he  is  distinguished 
from  other  species  within  the  same  genus.  This  type  of 
definition  must  always  be  prominent  in  practical  thought. 

But  another  conception  of  definition  is  that  it  gives  the 
essential  nature  of  the  thing.  Here  the  higher  speculative 
tendency  of  thought  is  in  play.  It  is  not  content  with  sur- 
face classifications,  but  seeks  to  penetrate  to  the  essence  of 
things.  Nor  need  we  adopt  the  classification  of  Porphyry 
in  his  famous  tree  to  see  that  there  is  here  a  genuine  specu- 
lative problem.  Things  may  have  many  properties  in  re- 
lation to  ourselves,  but,  apart  from  our  thinking  and  apart 


THK    NOTION  139 

from  us,  they  have  a  law  or  nature  which  determines  what 
they  are  and  do,  and  any  fundamental  knowledge  must 
aim  at  grasping  this  essential  nature. 

This  is  indeed  the  ideal  conception  of  definition,  but  it 
is  an  ideal  which  is  very  rarely  realized.  Even  in  mathe- 
matics differing  definitions  of  the  same  thing,  as  the  ellipse, 
are  possible,  and  there  seems  to  be  no  reason  for  saying 
that  any  one  more  truly  represents  the  essence  than  any 
other.  The  ground  for  choice  lies  in  the  convenience  of 
manipulation  or  elegance  of  exposition.  Really  it  seems 
as  if  we  should  come  nearer  the  truth  of  the  matter  if  we 
should  say  the  ellipse  is  the  ellipse,  and  it  may  be  produced 
in  such  and  such  a  way,  or  it  has  such  and  such  properties. 
Any  inquiry  after  the  essential  ellipse  which  should  go 
beyond  this  statement  would  seem  to  be  idle  if  not  mean- 
ingless. 

In  dealing  with  things,  however  much  we  may  believe 
in  the  abstract  possibility  of  realizing  our  ideal  definition, 
we  have  to  admit  that  most  of  our  definitions  are  purely 
relative  to  our  own  ends  or  convenience.  Such  definitions 
would  not  exist  for  one  studying  the  purely  objective  fact, 
and  hence  can  lay  no  claim  to  express  an  essence.  While, 
then,  a  definition  may  be  possible  from  some  absolute  stand- 
point which  should  express  the  essential  nature,  we  have 
to  content  ourselves  with  a  humbler  point  of  view. 

This  general  conception  of  definition  cancels  the  dis- 
tinction between  essence,  property,  and  accident,  except  as 
relative  to  ourselves.  The  most  remote  and  occult  property 
of  the  triangle  is  as  essential  to  it  as  the  most  famihar  and 
obvious.  Any  distinction  which  is  made  must  be  relative 
to  the  order  or  measure  of  our  knowledge. 

It  seems,  then,  that  definition  is  a  rather  complex  mat- 
ter. If  we  are  not  content  to  define  by  genus  and  differ- 
ence we  must  admit  that  complete  definition  can  never  be 


140  THEOKY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

given.  The  definition  of  the  triangle  becomes  ihc  wliole 
science  of  trigononietry.  The  definition  of  anything  be- 
comes the  complete  science  of  that  thing.  Such  a  concep- 
tion of  definition  is,  of  course,  practically  worthless.  Its 
only  value  lies  in  keeping  alive  the  ideal  of  knowledge,  and 
in  maintaining  the  idea  of  rational  connection  among  all 
the  various  properties  and  manifestations  of  our  objects. 
In  practice,  however,  it  is  always  possible  to  understand 
ourselves  and  one  another,  and  if  Ave  make  sure  of  this 
we  shall  secure  all  that  is  practically  important  in  defini- 
tion. The  theory  may  be  left  in  its  uncertainty,  or,  rather, 
incompleteness,  without  any  practical  loss. 

Classes  also  can  be  classified,  thus  producing  concepts 
of  greater  and  greater  extension  and  abstraction.  In  this 
activity  thought  becomes  more  and  more  svmbolic.  The 
conceptions  become  more  abstract,  and  have  less  and  less 
content.  The  best  illustration  is  found  in  the  natural-his- 
tory sciences.  Here  we  have  a  highly  complex  and  inter- 
esting series  of  classes  ranging  from  the  lowest  species  to 
the  highest  genus.  In  such  cases  the  concept,  which  is  a 
universal  for  one  group,  may  be  an  individual  for  another ; 
and,  finally,  all  classes  may  be  gathered  under  some  one 
inclusive  genus. 

This  fact  has  given  rise  to  the  fancy  that  all  classes 
admit  of  a  linear  or  pyramidal  classification,  so  that  by 
adding  or  subtracting  marks  we  can  pass  from  any  notion 
to  any  other,  and  thus  at  last  embrace  all  classes  in  the 
sphere  of  some  one.  But  this  is  a  mistake.  In  a  general 
classification  of  the  contents  of  thought  we  come  down  to 
notions,  none  of  which  can  be  subsumed  under  any  other 
without  distortion  or  violence.  In  fact,  we  come  down  to 
the  categories,  or  to  those  primal  distinctions  and  classifi- 
cations on  which  thought  is  based.  All  nouns  lead  to  the 
notion  of  thing;  all  adjectives  to  the  general  notion  of  qual- 


THE    NOTION  141 

ity ;  all  variations  of  a  common  quality  to  the  notion  of 
quantity ;  all  active  verbs  to  the  notion  of  causation,  etc. 
Of  course  we  mi^ht  unite  all  these  under  the  one  head 
of  the  thinkable,  but  nothing  would  be  gained.  Wherever 
there  is  any  element  of  similarity  among  individuals  we  may 
make  a  class ;  and  wherever  there  is  any  unlikeness  we 
may  make  a  division.  But  the  value  of  a  classification  is 
not  in  itself,  but  in  what  it  helps  us  to,  and  classifications 
for  form's  sake  are  to  be  avoided. 

The  logical  mechanism  of  classification  is  simple,  and 
from  the  standpoint  of  abstract  theory  its  working  is 
equally  simple.  We  have  only  to  compare  individuals  and 
separate  the  like  from  the  unlike,  and  the  work  is  done. 
In  practice,  however,  the  matter  is  more  difficult.  It  is  not 
always  easy  to  determine  either  the  individual  or  the  com- 
mon mark.  This  mark  may  be  of  the  most  varied  kinds 
—  sense -quality,  form,  relation,  function,  etc.  Whatever 
things  have  a  common  factor  may  be  classed  together ;  but 
it  is  found  that  some  similarities  are  more  important  than 
others,  being  inherent  and  essential,  while  others  are  super- 
ficial, if  not  accidental,  like  the  alphabetical  classification 
of  catalogues  and  dictionaries.  Even  the  latter  cannot  be 
dispensed  with,  for  we  often  have  nothing  to  take  its  place. 
But  if  we  are  not  content  to  form  artificial  classes  only 
we  must  look  for  the  natural  and  essential  affinities,  and 
these  are  not  easily  found.  In  every -day  classification, 
where  we  deal  mainly  with  sense -objects,  individuals  are 
marked  off  from  one  another  by  space  limits,  and  fall  into 
easily  distinguished  groups.  But  when  we  seek  to  make  an 
extended  and  scientific  classification  it  is  not  easy  to  find 
a  common  and  consistent  standard,  or  even  to  determine 
what  the  individual  itself  is.  Illustration  is  found  in  the 
conflicting  uncertainties  and  complexities  of  botanical,  bio- 
logical, and  mineralogical  classification. 


142  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

Moreover,  the  things  which  in  some  respects  are  alike  are 
often  in  other  respects  diiferent.  Minerals  which  have  the 
same  chemical  composition  may  have  very  different  physical 
properties,  as  graphite  and  the  diamond.  A  mineralogical 
classification  according  to  chemical  composition  would  be 
very  different  from  one  determined  by  physical  character- 
istics. Again,  things  are  often  different  in  the  respect  in 
which  they  are  like.  The  color  scale  is  a  case  of  this  kind. 
In  what  we  call  the  same  color  there  is  an  indefinite  variety 
of  shades.  Popular  language  recognizes  only  a  few  classes, 
and  treats  these  shades  as  modifications  of  one  color  or 
assimilates  them  to  the  nearest  lying  class,  as  when  we  speak 
of  a  greenish  yellow  or  a  yellowish  green.  There  is  a  double 
reason  for  this.  One  is  the  feeling  that  the  case  in  hand 
does  not  deserve  to  be  made  an  independent  class.  The 
other  is  the  limitations  of  language  and  the  confusion  which 
arises  from  multiplying  classes  beyond  necessity.  Of  this 
confusion  we  get  some  hint  when  confronted  with  the  be- 
wildering color  terminology  of  trade. 

Of  making  classes,  then,  as  of  making  books,  there  need 
be  no  end,  so  long  as  any  likeness  or  any  difference  remains. 
Both  excess  and  defect  in  this  matter  are  alike  dangerous, 
and  for  hitting  the  golden  mean  there  is  no  apriori  prescrip- 
tion. The  survival  of  the  fittest  will  have  to  look  after  the 
matter. 

The  ideal  of  thought,  Ave  have  said,  is  to  gather  our  expe- 
rience under  concepts  which  shall  be  distinct  and  clear  in 
themselves,  and  also  adequate  to  the  matter  to  be  expressed. 
That  we  are  at  an  indefinite  distance  from  the  attainment 
of  this  ideal  is  plain  upon  inspection.  Our  concepts,  as  a 
whole,  exist  in  all  degrees  of  completeness.  We  find  many 
notions  in  a  state  of  growth  and  without  any  sharp  defini- 
tion.   If  there  is  a  central  point  of  light  there  is  also  a  large 


THE    NOTION  143 

border  of  penumbral  haze.  Art,  life,  society,  culture,  litera- 
ture, and  poetry  are  examples.  Here  also  belong  the  vocabu- 
lary of  superior  persons  in  general  and  a  large  part  of  the 
terminology  of  criticism.  Many  notions  are  only  conceptual 
forms  whose  contents  remain  to  be  determined.  The  form 
may  be  correct,  but  the  values  are  all  given  in  unknown  or 
indefinite  quantities.  With  the  uneducated  most  notions 
beyond  those  denoting  sense  objects  are  in  this  state,  having 
only  a  vague  intimation  of  a  meaning.  None  of  these  are 
completed  conceptions,  although  the}'^  have  the  place  and 
form  of  such.  Here  belongs  the  "  it "  of  impersonal  judg- 
ments. In  this  case  an  almost  formless  matter,  the  bare 
category  of  ground,  is  given  the  place  and  function  of  a  con- 
ditioning subject.  In  such  cases  the  naked  framework  of  the 
categories  holds  the  thought  together,  but  there  is  no  con- 
tent beyond  the  form.  And  what  is  true  of  this  "  it "  is 
equally  true  of  many  other  terms.  The  bare  form  of  thought 
is  present  with  little  or  no  content. 

Much  of  our  sensitive  and  emotional  experience  also  is  so 
fluent  as  to  defy  accurate  definition  or  even  description,  ex- 
cept in  the  most  general  way.  We  may  call  it  feeling,  but 
this  term  only  locates  the  experience  without  saying  much. 
The  material  is  fluent  and  elusive.  In  the  world  of  the  senses 
we  seek  to  escape  from  this  subjective  uncertainty  by  in- 
venting objective  measures  which  shall  enable  us  to  define 
our  objects  in  objective  terms.  In  the  world  of  feeling  this 
is  impossible.  Emotions  shift  as  we  contemplate  them. 
Feelings  fade  into  their  opposites.  This  fact  will  long  for 
bid  any  hard  and  fast  definition  and  classification  in  this 
realm.  Here  thought  only  forms  and  names  a  content  which 
it  cannot  produce,  and  which  can  be  realized  only  in  living 
experience. 

Many  of  our  concepts  have  to  do  with  the  world  of 
reality,  and  the  most  important  function  of  the  concept  is 


144  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

to  mediate  a  knowledge  of  that  world.  Hence  the  doctrine 
of  the  concept  has  been  largely  constructed  along  meta- 
physical lines.  This  is  necessary  when  dealing  with  the 
cosmic  reality.  But  there  is  a  large  body  of  concepts  which 
have  to  do  with  the  world  of  custom  and  convention — that 
is,  with  things  which  have  only  a  notional  existence.  This 
world,  which  embraces  a  large  part  of  the  human  world, 
abounds  in  arbitrariness  and  confusion.  It  represents  no 
fixed  nature  of  things^  no  abiding  rational  connections,  but 
rather  passing  convention,  fancy,  and  caprice.  To  one  fix- 
ing his  attention  upon  this  world  it  might  well  seem  that 
logic  has  nothing  to  do  with  metaphysics,  but  when  we 
view  the  whole  field  of  thought  this  illusion  disappears. 

Hence  our  concepts  vary  all  the  way  from  constructive 
definitions  to  descriptions,  and  even  to  mere  names  which 
may  denote  something  but  which  connote  nothing.  It 
would,  then,  be  a  great  mistake  to  suppose  that  the  con- 
tents of  consciousness  consist  of  sharply  defined  and  clearly 
conceived  ideas.  These  are  really  the  exception  rather  than 
the  rule,  the  ideal  rather  than  the  actual.  They  are  peaks 
which  lift  themselves  above  the  general  cloudiness,  or 
islands  in  the  obscure  flood. 

There  is  somewhat  of  vague  matter  in  the  current  logic 
which  finds  such  justification  as  it  has  in  this  psychological 
fact.  This  appears  especially  in  the  attempt  to  find  some- 
thing between  the  particular  experience  and  the  general 
notion.  Accordingly,  we  are  told  much  about  the  "general 
presentation,"  the  "representative  image,''  the  "abstract 
word,"'  the  "  phantasm,"  etc.  The  little  truth  in  all  this 
is  that  the  concept  is  not  completed  at  once,  but  is  subject 
to  growth.  But  the  concept  in  its  general  representative 
character  is  given  as  soon  as  articulate  intelligence  is  given. 
We  have  abundantly  seen  that  the  particular  becomes  any- 
thing for  intellect  onlv  as  it  comes  under  some  universal. 


THE    NOTION  145 

Thus  far  we  have  treated  only  of  the  concept  as  the 
thought  element,  and  have  taken  no  notice  of  its  expression 
in  language.  As  thus  expressed  the  concept  becomes  the 
term  or  the  name,  with  the  proviso,  however,  that  the  term 
need  not  be  a  single  word.  In  logic  the  term  is  the  lin- 
guistic expression  of  the  conception,  and  ver}'^  often  it  is  a 
single  word ;  but  often  it  consists  of  a  group  of  words,  as 
in  the  logical  subjects  of  grammatical  analysis.  It  seems 
desirable  to  say  here  a  word  about  language  and  its  rela- 
tion to  thought. 

Thought  might  conceivably  be  complete  in  itself  with- 
out language,  and  everj'^  practised  thinker  has  experience 
of  thinkinof  without  words :  but  for  the  communication 
and  preservation  of  thought,  language  is  of  the  highest 
importance.  It  is  the  great  instrument  of  mental  inter- 
course and  the  great  storehouse  of  thought.  Without  it 
there  could  be  only  such  imperfect  society  and  imperfect 
mental  life  as  exist  among  deaf-mutes,  and  even  among 
these  the  union  depends  upon  the  invention  of  some  im- 
perfect substitute  for  language. 

The  use  of  vocal  signs  is  natural  to  man.  The  particular 
signs  used  have  in  them  something  arbitrary  and  con- 
tingent. If  it  were  not  for  the  multiplicity  of  languages 
we  might  be  tempted  to  think  that  there  is  some  pre- 
established  harmony  between  sound  and  sense,  but  the 
facts  forbid  any  such  notion.  The  physiological  and  psy- 
chological factors  which  condition  language  in  general  are 
very  obscure,  and  the  historical  conditions  which  have  led 
to  the  differentiation  of  the  particular  languages  are  even 
more  obscure. 

For  thought,  then,  language  as  a  set  of  vocal  signs  is 
something  extra -logical.  Our  interest  in  language  con- 
cerns solely  its  relation  to  thought. 

10 


U6  THEORY   OF   THOUGHT   AND   KNOWLEDGE 

In  the  fundamental  parts  of  speech  we  observe  the  re- 
appearance of  the  categories.  Noun  and  adjective  repro- 
duce being  and  quality,  or  substance  and  attribute.  The 
active  verb  rests  on  the  notion  of  causality.  Other  parts 
of  speech  represent  other  rational  relations. 

The  root  noises  of  a  language  may  be  looked  upon  as 
extra-logical,  but  the  root  conceptions  are  a  mental  product. 
The  development  of  a  language  bej^ond  its  root  forms  in- 
volves a  deal  of  logical  activity.  Old  terms  have  to  be 
modified,  or  combined,  or  extended  to  new  meanings  to  fit 
them  for  the  expression  of  new  ideas,  and  this  involves 
the  detection  of  analogies  and  a  complex  activity  of  gen- 
eralization. Particularly  is  this  the  case  in  forming  a  lan- 
guage for  the  inner  life.  From  the  nature  of  the  case  this 
must  be  based  upon  physical  images,  and  the  finding  of  fit 
images  is  a  task  demanding  the  labor  of  generations  of 
poets  and  philosophers. 

Language  has  a  double  function — the  communication  and 
the  registration  of  thought.  Its  registering  value  is  very 
greatly  increased  by  the  invention  of  written  language. 
As  a  register  of  thought,  language  very  greatly  abbreviates 
the  work  of  thought.  Every  word  expresses  the  result  of 
a  process  of  abstraction  and  generalization,  and  we  who 
inherit  a  language  find  a  vast  amount  of  mental  work  done 
for  us.  We  have  simply  to  understand  the  language,  not 
to  invent  or  construct  it.  This  convenience  of  language 
has  often  led  to  the  inverted  fancy  that  language  is  the 
generator  of  thought. 

This  fancy  finds  a  kind  of  support  in  a  misinterpretation 
of  the  following  facts :  It  is  often  said  that  no  thought  is 
complete  until  we  have  found  a  word  for  it.  Until  then 
it  remains  a  bodiless  abstraction  with  only  a  shadowy  sub- 
stance.    There  is,  then,  no  thought  without  speech. 

The  mistake  here  lies  in  attributing  to  the  naming  the 


THE    NOTION  147 

effect  of  the  classifying  activity  implicit  in  the  naming. 
Superficial  thought  easily  confounds  the  two,  and  then  it 
is  easy  to  maintain  the  inseparability  of  thought  and  speech. 

The  second  misinterpreted  fact  is  this  :  Individuals  born 
into  a  community  which  has  a  developed  language  find  a 
store  of  words  ready  made  for  their  use.  Thus  the  Avord 
precedes  the  thought,  and  one  of  the  tasks  of  the  educator 
is  to  make  sure  that  the  youthful  thought  shall  overtake 
and  inform  its  words. 

The  mistake  here  lies  in  mistaking  this  accidental  order 
in  the  history  of  the  individual  for  the  essential  order  in 
the  development  of  thought. 

The  true  order  is  most  clearly  seen  in  the  structure  of 
scientific  language.  Here  an  order  of  conceptions  arises 
which,  for  the  most  part,  is  foreign  to  popular  thought 
altogether,  and  for  which  popular  language  has  no  ade- 
quate means  of  expression.  Then  it  becomes  necessary  to 
construct  a  terminology  which  shall  be  adequate  to  the 
matter  and  be  free  from  the  indefiniteness  of  popular 
speech.  Endless  illustration  is  found  in  the  language  of 
the  classificatory  sciences. 

But  language  not  only  serves  thought  by  storing  up  its 
results  and  abbreviating  its  processes ;  it  also  often  misleads 
thought,  and  thus  becomes  responsible  for  much  error. 
Some  of  the  chief  blunders  of  speculation  have  been  dis- 
eases of  language.  Verbal  distinctions  and  identifications 
have  been  mistaken  for  real  ones.  Often  the  figure  in- 
volved in  the  word  is  mistaken  for  the  thing,  and  the  exe- 
gesis of  the  figure  has  been  mistaken  for  an  analysis  of  the 
thing.  In  this  way  psychology,  philosophy,  and  theology 
have  often  been  infested  with  mythological  fancies  born  of 
language.  Often  too,  language  is  used  without  any  defi> 
nite  thought,  and  if  only  the  conventions  of  grammar  are 
regarded  the  fact  is  unnoticed.     In  this  way  phrases  and 


148  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND   KNOWLEDGE 

doctrines  often  acquire  currency  which  are  equally  sono- 
rous and  unsubstantial.  Mere  words  so  often  usurp  the 
place  of  thought  that,  to  many,  to  change  the  word  is  to 
change  the  thing.  In  general,  in  matters  of  abstract 
thought,  it  is  much  safer  to  use  the  same  words  for  very 
different  things  than  to  use  different  words  for  the  same 
thing.  A  political  party  may  change  all  its  principles  and 
remain  the  same  party,  but  a  change  of  name  would  be 
fatal. 

The  great  elementary  experiences  of  humanity  are  identi- 
cal among  all  peoples,  and  for  these  all  languages  of  any 
development  furnish  adequate  equivalent  expression.  But 
when  we  get  away  from  these  simple  facts  there  is  seldom 
a  complete  equivalence  between  the  corresponding  terms 
of  any  two  languages.  The  underlying  metaphor,  or  the 
angle  of  view,  differs.  The  associations  also  differ.  Hence 
a  word,  in  addition  to  its  logical  meaning,  acquires  a  com- 
plex suggestiveness.  Dire  disaster  indeed  would  overtake 
one  who  should  attempt  to  use  words  with  regard  only  to 
their  logical  connotation  and  without  considering  the  com- 
pany they  have  kept.  This  is  permissible  only  with  the 
colorless  and  objective  language  of  science.  The  associa- 
tions of  words  are  the  overtones  of  speech,  and  they  have 
the  same  function  as  overtones  in  music.  They  constitute 
a  literary  language  in  distinction  from  a  purely  logical  one, 
and  form  the  insuperable  barrier  to  perfect  literary  trans- 
lation. 

Language  is  never  thought,  but  only  a  symbol  of 
thought,  or  a  stimulus  to  think  the  thought.  When  our 
terras  denote  sense  objects,  or  simple  and  elementary  con- 
ceptions of  the  intellect,  we  may  be  fairly  sure  of  mutual 
understanding ;  but  when  we  get  beyond  these  there  is  no 
security  for  agreement.  The  language  itself  is  figurative 
and  admits  of  misunderstanding.     The  liope  that  the  meta- 


THE    NOTION  149 

phor  will  be  rightly  understood,  and  neither  over  nor  under 
estimated  is  by  no  means  always  realized.  In  such  cases  we 
can  only  vary  the  expression,  often  availing  ourselves  even 
of  contradictory  expressions,  with  the  aim  of  shutting  up 
the  recipient  mind  to  a  form  of  mental  activity  which  shall 
put  before  it  the  meaning  we  seek  to  impart.  In  this  aim 
Ave  are  often  defeated  by  the  dulness  and  irresponsiveness 
of  the  party  of  the  second  part,  and  our  discomfiture  is 
completed  by  the  discovery  that  said  party  generally  regards 
his  own  failure  to  understand  as  a  disproof  of  the  matter 
in  question. 

Sometimes,  also,  the  subject-matter  eludes  any  articulate 
thought  and  expression.  This  is  particularly  the  case  with 
the  emotional  life.  In  setting  forth  this  deeper  life  of  feel- 
ing and  aspiration  we  fall  back  on  music,  art,  worship,  and 
various  symbolic  activities  which  alone  serve  to  give  voice 
to  the  dumb  souls  of  men. 

And  now,  by  combining  the  indefiniteness  or  equally 
dangerous  overdefiniteness  of  language  with  the  indefinite- 
ness of  thought  itself,  we  see  that  we  have  to  deal  with  an 
indefiniteness  of  the  second  order.  We  have  to  struggle 
with  the  difficulties  of  the  subject  itself,  and  also  to  guard 
ourselves  against  the  omnipresent  imposture  and  deceit  of 
language. 

The  concept  is  the  first  and  the  last  in  thought.  It  is 
the  first  in  form  and  the  last  in  completion.  Meanwhile  it 
repreeents  an  ideal  which  we  must  follow,  however  far  oil. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE    JUDGMENT 

Definitions  of  the  judgment  are  tautologous,  and  de- 
scriptions serve  only  for  identification.  The  understanding 
of  the  matter  must  be  sought  in  our  immediate  experience. 
Our  aim,  then,  must  be  not  so  much  to  tell  what  the  judg- 
ment is  as,  rather,  to  tell  what  we  do  when  we  judge. 

The  judgment  is  a  mental  act  in  which  an  aiRrmation  or 
negation  is  made  with  the  conviction  of  its  validity  for  the 
world  of  fact  or  the  world  of  reason.  It  is  this  conviction 
of  validity  and  this  reference  to  an  independent  order  which 
distinguish  the  judgment  in  its  intention  and  subjective  nat- 
ure from  the  groupings  of  association,  and  which  make 
it  possible  to  consider  judgments  as  true  or  false.  This  fact 
has  been  sufficiently  dwelt  upon  in  treating  of  the  objectiv- 
ity of  thought.  Judgments  as  associations  of  ideas  in  a 
particular  consciousness  are  neither  true  nor  false,  but  only 
mental  events.  They  become  true  or  false  only  when  re- 
lated to  an  abiding  order  beyond  them.  When  expressed 
in  language  the  judgment  becomes  the  proposition. 

With  this  conception  of  the  judgment  it  is  plain  that 
judging  enters  even  into  our  most  elementary  consciousness. 
Any  consciousness  which  has  passed  beyond  the  stage  of 
unqualified,  unrelated  feeling  and  become  a  consciousness  of 
something  has  already  reached  the  stage  of  judging.  This 
fact  has  already  appeared  in  the  discussion  of  the  mind's 
activity  in  getting  objects. 


THE    JUDGMENT  151 

The  uncertainty  in  the  traditional  treatment  of  the  judg- 
ment has  a  double  root.  In  the  first  place,  the  sensational- 
ists, owing  to  their  congenital  mental  myopia,  have  always 
overlooked  both  the  constitutive  rational  activitv  underlying 
all  articulate  consciousness,  and  also  the  objective  reference 
implicit  in  thought.  Aided  and  abetted  by  these  two  over- 
sights, they  have  found  it  easy  to  assume  particular  units  of 
consciousness  as  undeniably  given,  and  then  to  unite  these 
by  association  into  groups  and  series.  When  finally  we  are 
assured  that  this  is  all  there  is  to  the  judgment,  all  those 
who  remain  on  the  sense  plane  are  fairly  sure  to  be  con- 
vinced. The  hopeless  superficiality  of  this  view  is  already 
familiar. 

In  the  next  place,  and  on  the  other  hand,  those  whose 
studies  in  psychology  and  epistemology  have  revealed  the 
logical  activity  in  consciousness  itself,  w^hen  they  come  to 
study  logic  are  apt  to  forget  the  results  of  their  previous 
study  and  accept  uncritically  the  old  tradition.  Thus  Sir 
William  Hamilton  repeats  his  uncertainty  respecting  the 
concept  in  his  treatment  of  the  judgment.  In  discussing 
the  conditions  of  consciousness,  he  shows  very  clearly  that 
there  can  be  no  consciousness  without  judgment ;  but  when 
we  come  to  his  doctrine  of  the  judgment,  we  find  the  famil- 
iar subordination  of  the  judgment  to  the  concept  without 
a  trace  of  insight  into  their  true  and  essential  relations. 
Such  vacillation  necessarily  results  from  trying  to  separate 
logic,  as  the  science  of  thought,  from  that  living  activity 
which  underlies  the  whole  mental  life,  from  elementary  con- 
sciousness  on  to  its  most  abstract  speculative  constructions. 

Mr.  Mansel,  in  his  Prolegomena  Logica,  has  shown  a  per- 
ception of  this  inconsistency,  and  has  thought,  or  at  least 
sought,  to  mend  matters  by  distinguishing  logical  from 
psychological  judgments.  Those  judgments  on  which  con- 
sciousness depends  are  psychological ;  properly  logical  judg- 


153  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE 

ments  are  those  in  which  the  full-fledged  concept  plays  its 
well-known  part. 

This  distinction  was  manifestly  made  for  the  sake  of 
saving  the  conceptualistic  logic  and  keeping  the  form  of 
thought  clear  of  any  compromising  alliance  with  the  matter. 
Beyond  this  adventitious  teleological  function,  it  has  no 
warrant  in  the  nature  of  the  case.  The  utmost  that  can 
be  allowed  is  this  :  The  activity  of  judging  is  by  no  means 
always  attended  by  a  reflective  consciousness  of  the  activ- 
ity itself.  In  such  cases  reason  has  us  rather  than  w^e  have 
reason.  In  other  cases  we  may  judge  with  full  conscious- 
ness of  our  material  and  our  aims.  But  any  distinction 
which  may  be  made  here  must  rest  upon  the  measure  of 
reflective  consciousness,  and  not  upon  any  difl'erence  of  the 
logical  elements  in  the  two  cases. 

The  question  whether  the  concept  precedes  the  judg- 
ment, or  the  judgment  the  concept,  may  be  variously  an- 
swered according  to  our  standpoint.  Some  concepts  pre- 
cede some  judgments,  and  some  concepts  succeed  some 
judgments.  The  concept  is  quite  as  often  the  product  of 
the  judgment  as  its  antecedent.  Here  there  is  large  room 
for  one  of  those  sterile  debates  with  which  the  history  of 
logic  has  so  abounded.  On  the  one  hand,  it  might  be  con- 
tended that  an  analysis  of  the  judgment  shows  that  the 
concepts  which  appear  in  the  subject  and  predicate  are 
presupposed.  On  the  other  hand,  we  might  be  challenged 
to  show  any  concept  whatever  which  does  not  imply  some 
precedent  judgment. 

The  wa}'  out  of  this  deadlock  lies  in  the  insight  that 
neither  the  judgment  nor  the  concept  is  anything  by  itself 
or  in  abstraction  from  each  other.  The  judging  act  has  a 
double  aspect.  It  involves  a  matter  and  a  reduction  of  that 
matter  to  rational  form.  But  while  the  act,  upon  analysis, 
falls  asunder  into  these  two  factors,  there  is  no  proper  pre- 


THE    JUDGMKNT  153 

cedence  or  sequence;  for  neither  is  anytliing  lor  thought 
except  through  the  other.  Of  course  this  mutual  inter- 
penetration  of  the  two  elements  linds  no  proper  expression 
in  the  conventional  symbol  for  the  judgment,  A  is  B.  While, 
then,  we  must  retain  such  symbols  for  the  sake  of  ex})osi- 
tion,  we  must  be  careful  to  remember  that  they  are  only 
symbols  which  stand  for  the  judgment  rather  than  repre- 
sent it. 

The  difficulty  in  finding  a  single  satisfactory  formula 
for  the  judgment  is  due  to  the  fact  that  judgments  are  of 
all  degrees  of  complexity,  and  occur  under  all  the  cate- 
gories. Judgments  of  likeness,  of  space,  of  time,  of  num- 
ber, of  quantity,  of  identity,  of  causality,  of  inherence,  of 
subsumption,  of  existence,  are  incommensurable  as  the  re- 
spective categories  themselves ;  and  when  we  seek  to  force 
them  into  a  common  expression  we  are  in  danger  either  of 
ignoring  the  peculiarities  of  some  of  the  judgments,  or  of 
making  a  formula  so  general  as  to  have  no  valuable  mean- 
ing. Attributive  judgments,  subsumptive  judgments,  quan- 
titative judgments,  existential  judgments,  judgments  of 
identification  and  equivalence,  are  hard  to  describe  by  any 
common  formula  other  than  that  given — namely,  a  judg- 
ment is  a  mental  act,  or  the  result  of  a  mental  act,  in  which 
an  affirmation  or  negation  is  made  with  the  conviction  of 
its  validity  for  the  world  of  fact  or  the  world  of  reason. 
Most  of  what  is  said  in  logical  treatises  about  the  judgment 
is  false  to  its  logical  and  psychological  nature.  The  ex- 
position is  commonly  constructed  with  reference  to  S3dlo- 
gistic  necessities  rather  than  logical  truth.  Sometimes, 
also,  the  exposition  is  determined  by  the  exigencies  of  a 
partisan  doctrine ;  in  which  case,  of  course,  truth  is  a  sec- 
ondary consideration.  Both  forms  of  aberration  deserve 
illustration. 

For  entering  into  and  illustrating  syllogistic  forms  the 


154  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

subsumptive  judgment  is  best  adapted.  The  judgment  A 
is  B,  then,  means  that  the  subject  or  the  class  A  is  con- 
tained in  tlie  class  B.  Oaks  are  trees  means  that  the  class 
oak  is  contained  in  the  class  tree.  Maples  are  not  hickories 
means  that  the  class  maple  lies  outside  of  the  class  hickory. 
Some  trees  are  chestnuts  means  that  the  class  tree  lies 
partly  within  the  class  chestnut.  And  this  relation  is  ea- 
sily demonstrated  to  sense  b}^  the  familiar  illustration  of 
circles  which  include  or  exclude  each  other,  wholly  or  par- 
tially. Besides,  this  conception  of  the  judgment  has  the 
advantage  of  evading,  at  least  apparently,  all  metaphysical 
questions  concerning  inherence  and  connection ;  and  thus 
the  judgment  is  kept  clear  of  all  vexatious  and  irrelevant 
consideration  of  the  matter  of  thought,  and  confined  to  its 
own  proper  subject  of  the  form.  On  all  these  accounts 
there  has  been  a  very  general  tendency  among  formal  logi- 
cians to  recognize  only  judgments  of  the  subsumptive  type. 
How  foreign  this  is  to  logical  and  psychological  truth  is 
plain  upon  inspection.  In  comparatively  few  judgments  is 
the  thought  that  of  subsumption.  Quantitative  judgments 
are  commonly  not  subsumptive  at  all.  In  attributive  judg- 
ments the  aim  is  to  affirm  a  predicate,  not  to  subsume  one 
class  under  another.  And  subsumption  itself  commonly  de- 
pends on  connection.  This  is  the  case  even  when  classes  are 
affirmed  of  classes.  Here  the  essential  thought  is  not  the 
inclusion  of  one  class  in  another  class,  but  rather  the  attri- 
bution to  the  objects  denoted  by  one  class  term  of  the  prop- 
erties connoted  by  the  other  class  term.  Thus  pigeons  are 
birds  does  not  mean  that  pigeons  are  included  in  the  class 
birds,  but  that  pigeons  have  the  properties  connoted  by  the 
term  birds.  The  belonffing  together  of  two  or  more  marks 
is  the  essential  conception.  While,  then,  the  subsumptive 
rendering  may  be  allowed  where  any  practical  convenience 
results,  as  in  syllogistic  exposition,  we  must  be  on  our  guard 


THE   JUDGMENT  155 

against  taking  it  as  other  than  a  superficial  or  artificial  con- 
ception of  the  judgment. 

This  illustrates  what  is  meant  by  saying  that  a  large  part 
of  the  current  exposition  of  the  judgment  is  constructed 
with  reference  to  the  needs  of  the  syllogism,  and  not  with 
reference  to  the  logical  fact.  A  traditional  definition  of  the 
judgment  illustrates  the  second  form  of  aberration  men- 
tioned, that  which  results  from  defining  the  judgment  to  fit 
a  theory. 

According  to  this  definition  the  judgment  is  a  declara- 
tion of  the  agreement,  or  disagreement,  of  two  notions. 
This  view  has  attractions  for  philosophers  of  very  different 
schools.  The  empiricist  is  naturally  drawn  to  it,  as  it  seems 
to  reduce  thought  to  such  low  terms  that  association  by 
similarity,  or  dissociation  by  unlikeness,  might  well  be  able 
to  manage  the  matter.  Certain  types  of  idealism,  too,  find 
their  account  in  it,  as  it  says  nothing  of  things,  and  keeps 
the  mind  within  the  realm  of  ideas.  The  conceptualist  and 
the  logical  formalist  also  are  fond  of  this  definition,  and  for 
obvious  reasons.  It  carefully  excludes  all  reference  to  mat- 
ter-of-fact, and  leaves  the  mind  free  to  contemplate  the  un- 
stained purity  of  the  thought  form. 

Whether  we  are  to  accept  this  definition  must  depend 
on  its  meaning,  which,  unfortunately,  is  not  immediately 
clear.  It  may  mean  that  judgment  is  a  declaration  of  the 
agreement  or  disagreement  of  the  ideas  as  mental  states ; 
or  it  is  such  a  declaration  concerning  the  contents  of  the 
ideas ;  or  it  is  a  declaration  concerning  the  things  which  the 
ideas  represent.  The  first  sense  is  manifestly  absurd.  Ideas 
have  none  of  the  properties  of  their  contents.  The  thought 
of  ice  is  not  cold,  and  the  thought  of  fire  is  not  hot.  The 
qualities  are  in  the  objects,  and  not  in  the  ideas.  And  hence 
it  is  said,  with  correct  meaning  but  doubtful  expression,  not 
ideas  but  things  are  joined  in  the  judgment. 


156  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

But,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  plain  that  very  many  judg- 
ments do  not  concern  things  at  all,  as  in  the  subjective  sci- 
ences. Besides,  when  they  do  concern  things,  things  them- 
selves are  never  in  thought,  but  only  ideas.  Hence  it  would 
seem  that  we  must  say  that  the  judgment  deals  neither  with 
ideas  as  mental  states,  nor  with  things  as  extraraental  ex- 
istences, but  only  with  the  logical  contents  of  ideas.  This 
we  must  allow  to  a  certain  extent.  Thouo^ht  has  no  wav  of 
dealing  with  things  except  through  ideas,  and  hence  the 
contents  of  our  ideas  must  necessarily  make  up  the  whole 
sphere  of  consciousness.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  we  must 
equally  allow  that  the  judgment  is  never  complete  until 
these  contents  are  related  to  a  world  of  fact  or  reason  which 
these  contents  apprehend  or  reproduce.  Even  in  the  case 
of  purely  fictitious  objects,  as  we  have  seen,  there  is  the 
same  objective  reference,  not  indeed  to  the  world  of  cosmic 
fact,  or  historic  event,  or  pure  reason,  but  to  the  world  of 
convention.  An  artist  who  would  paint  a  griffin  must  re- 
gard the  nature  of  the  beast  as  certainly  as  in  painting  a 
camel.  To  be  sure,  the  griffin  exists  only  in  the  world  of 
mythological  and  poetic  convention,  but  as  an  inhabitant  of 
that  world  it  has  a  fixed  character  Avhich  must  be  regarded 
in  all  our  dealings  with  it. 

While,  then,  the  judgment  does  not  connect  or  disjoin 
tilings,  it  certainly  aims  to  declare  the  connections  or  dis- 
junctions of  things  ;  or,  while  the  judgment  does  nothing  to 
thinos,  it  nevertheless  busies  itself  with  the  relations  and 
truth  of  things.  Understanding  by  things  the  objective  im- 
plication of  thought,  we  may  say  that  all  judgments  have 
an  existential  reference  in  them ;  not  always  to  substantive 
existence  of  course,  but  to  an  order  of  some  sort  to  which 
the  judgment  is  related  as  true  or  false.  Without  this  ref- 
erence the  judgment  loses  all  meaning  and  sinks  to  the  level 
of  children's  formulas  of  incantation. 


THE   JUDGMENT  157 

Many  schemes  for  classifying  judgments  have  been  in- 
vented, all  of  which  are  rejected  by  somebody.  These  often 
have  their  source  in  psychological  or  epistemological  theo- 
ries, and  vary  with  the  sect.  Judgments  may  also  be  clas- 
sified by  the  categories  under  which  they  occur,  and  in 
many  respects  this  classification  is  valuable.  Judgments  in 
space,  or  time,  or  quantity,  cannot  be  understood  except 
from  their  own  standpoint.  In  the  Kantian  sense  they 
are  intuitions;  that  is,  no  analysis  of  the  subject  reveals 
the  predicate,  but  by  constructing  the  problem  we  see  the 
truth. 

There  is,  then,  an  element  of  arbitrariness,  or  at  least  of 
relativity,  in  the  classification  of  judgments.  Fortunately, 
this  fact  in  no  way  affects  the  aim  of  the  judgment,  or 
obscures  our  insight  into  its  truth.  But  the  fact  itself  and 
this  saving  clause  are  often  overlooked  ;  and  strenuous  at- 
tempts are  made,  agonistic  in  the  inverse  ratio  of  their  im- 
portance, to  secure  an  absolute  classification.  Abandoning 
such  high  aims,  we  point  out  that  the  classification  which 
has  most  logical  merit  is  that  which  divides  judgments  into 
categorical,  conditional,  and  disjunctive  ;  and  it  has  this 
merit  because  it  is  the  only  one  which  adequately  represents 
the  form  of  living  experience.  In  the  first  the  predicate  is 
unconditionally  affirmed  or  denied ;  in  the  second,  condition- 
ally ;  in  the  third  no  predicate  is  afiirraed,  but  a  necessary 
choice  between  two  or  more. 

Of  course  much  effort  has  been  made  to  reduce  the  two 
latter  forms  to  the  first,  but  with  very  imperfect  success. 
After  a  fashion,  indeed,  any  conditional  or  disjunctive  mat- 
ter may  be  put  into  a  categorical  form.  Thus,  If  A  is  B,  A 
is  C\  may  be  read,  All  A  B''s  are  Cs.  If  A\^  B,C  is  i>,  may 
be  read,  A  B  and  C  D  come  together.  In  like  manner  the 
disjunctive  judgment  may  be  thrown  into  both  conditional 
and  categorical  form.     Thus,  .4   is  either   B  or  C  may  be 


158  THEORY   OF   THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

read,  If  A  is  B,  it  is  not  C.     Or  B  and  C  are  the  divisions 
of  A. 

At  best,  however,  this  only  shows  that  a  conditional  or 
disjunctive  matter  may  be  put  into  an  equivalent  categori- 
cal form  ;  it  is  very  far  from  dispensing  with  the  conditional 
and  disjunctive  ideas.  These  ideas  remain  under  the  alleged 
identification  of  form,  and  modify  the  predication.  The 
common  form  does  not  remove  the  fact  that  in  some  judg- 
ments the  predicate  is  unconditionally  affirmed ;  in  others 
it  is  not  so  affirmed.  It  remains  to  point  out  that  all 
three  forms  are  alike  necessary  for  the  expression  of  real 
thought. 

Of  the  categorical  judgment  nothing  need  be  said.  The 
conditional  judgment  is  necessary  for  expressing  the  condi- 
tional laAvs  and  forces  of  reality.  The  categorical  form  is 
needed  to  express  simple  connection,  A  is  B.  The  condi- 
tional form  is  needed  to  express  conditional  connection,  A 
is  ^  if  J.  is  C ;  that  is,  A  is  B  under  the  condition  C.  In 
the  earlier  logic,  beginning  with  Plato,  we  have  an  attempt 
to  gather  all  reality  under  a  rigid  and  resting  classification  of 
ideas,  and  formal  logic  has  largely  held  the  same  view.  For 
this  the  law  of  identity  and  the  categorical  judgment  suf- 
fice, but  the  view  reduces  thought  to  the  rigid  monotony 
of  the  Eleatics.  In  fact,  reality  is  in  motion.  Nothing  has 
its  properties  absolutely,  but  only  in  relations  and  under 
conditions.  In  place  of  rigid  monotony  we  have  movement 
and  combination  according  to  law.  To  recognize  and  ex- 
press this  fact  we  need  the  form  of  the  conditional  judgment. 
To  be  sure,  there  are  metaphysical  depths  underlying  the 
conditional  judgment,  the  consideration  of  which  logic  hands 
over  to  metaphysics  ;  but  the  judgment  itself  is  necessary 
to  the  expression  of  experience.  Indeed,  if  our  thought 
were  fully  expressed,  it  would  appear  that  most  of  our  cat- 
egorical   judgments    are   really   conditional.     Things   have 


THE   JUDGMENT  159 

color,  but  only  in  the  light.  Water  is  fluid,  but  only  within 
certain  limits  of  temperature.  Water  boils  at  100°  C,  but 
only  under  a  certain  atmospheric  pressure. 

The  disjunctive  judgment  is  likewise  necessary  to  express 
the  movement  of  living  and  concrete  thought.  Notions,  we 
have  seen,  may  be  read  in  intension  or  extension.  A  purely 
intensive  reading  would  leave  thought  with  a  rule,  but  with- 
out objects  to  which  it  might  be  applied.  Thus  the  judg- 
ment, Man  is  mortal,  read  in  intension,  says  only  that  the 
conception  humanity  involves  the  conception  mortality ; 
that  is,  it  is  a  rule  for  dealing  with  men,  if  there  be  any  such. 
The  judgment,  then,  becomes  operative  only  as  Ave  pass 
from  the  intension  to  the  extension.  But  when  we  read  a 
notion  in  extension,  at  once  it  falls  into  its  various  divisions 
or  disjunctions.  Thus  the  notion  man  read  in  extension 
breaks  up  into  male  and  female,  or  men,  women,  and  children, 
or  Americans,  Europeans,  Asiatics,  etc.,  or  other  divisions 
according  to  nationality,  race,  occupation.  In  such  cases 
the  disjunctive  judgment  is  necessary.  It  is  primarily  the 
declaration  that  a  notion  taken  in  extension  falls  into  such 
and  such  divisions,  and  that  any  particular  case  of  this  no- 
tion must  be  found  in  some  one  of  these  divisions  to  the  ex- 
clusion of  the  rest.  Thus  the  disjunctive  judgment  arises 
necessarily  whenever  the  notion  is  read  in  extension. 

We  conclude,  then,  that  actual  thought  cannot  dispense 
with  the  conditional  and  disjunctive  forms.  They  neces- 
sarily emerge  in  concrete  thinking.  To  the  objection  that 
this  is  to  take  account  of  the  matter  of  thought,  while  logic 
confines  itself  to  the  pure  form,  the  answer  must  be  that  a 
form  so  pure  that  it  omits  the  living  principles  by  which 
thought  proceeds  cannot  be  of  much  practical  importance. 
Of  course,  if  any  one  chooses  to  retreat  into  a  mental  vacuum 
and  manipulate  meaningless  symbols,  and  call  the  perform- 
ance the  science  of  the  pure  forms  of  thought,  there  is  no 


160  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

law  against  it.     Such  a  procedure  could  hardly  fail  to  be 
its  own  exceeding  great  reward. 

We  return  now  to  the  categorical  judgment  in  its  affirm- 
ative form.  The  traditional  formula  is  A  is  B.  This 
formula  tits  well  into  the  claim  that  the  judgment  is  a 
declaration  of  the  agreement  of  two  notions;  but  it  is  a 
sorry  expression  for  a  large  body  of  judgments.  In  all 
cases  where  we  posit  the  subject  as  real,  whether  as  sub- 
stantive fact  or  as  historic  event,  it  is  not  easy  to  find  the 
B  with  which  A  agrees.  The  distortions  of  thought  and 
lano^uao-e  which  have  arisen  from  the  determination  to 
crowd  the  historic  tenses  and  all  judgments  of  existence 
into  the  one  form  of  subject,  copula,  and  predicate  are  in- 
structive illustrations  of  what  steep  places  of  nonsense  one 
mav  rush  down  when  possessed  by  the  demon  of  system. 
The  meaning  of  such  judgments  is  obvious.  The  subject 
is  posited  as  belonging  to  the  world  of  real  things  or  events, 
and  nothing  is  gained  by  confusing  this  transparent  clear- 
ness for  the  sake  of  a  barren  form. 

But  a  great  many  categorical  judgments  are  of  the  form 
A  is  B,  and  these  deserve  special  consideration.  Here  the 
fundamental  thought  is  that  of  connection.  The  subject 
A  has  or  implies  the  predicate  B,  or  A  and  B  belong 
together  in  the  nature  of  fact  or  reason.  We  have  already 
seen  that  subsumptive  judgments  are  secondary,  and  de- 
pend upon  this  basal  judgment  of  connection. 

Thus  far  all  is  plain  sailing;  but  there  are  unsuspected 
complexities  in  the  matter  which  must  be  brought  to  light. 
At  first  we  might  think  that  the  judgment  might  be  pos- 
sible with  two  entirely  singular  conceptions,  as.  This  A  is 
this  B ;  but  plainly  this  will  not  do.  This  A  and  this  B 
presuppose  A  and  B  limited  to  a  special  case ;  and  if  we 
drop  out  the  universal  element,  the  judgment  reduces  to, 


THE    JUDGMENT  161 

This  is  this.  The  utmost  that  can  be  allowed  in  this  direc- 
tion is  that  the  subject  may  be  singular;  the  predicate  must 
be  a  class  term. 

But  whatever  the  subject  and  whatever  the  predicate,  a 
little  nominalistic  reflection  must  convince  us  that,  in  any 
concrete  case,  neither  subject  nor  predicate  appears  in  its 
generality,  but  each  is  limited  to  special  values,  and  each  is 
modi  tied  by  the  other.  This  results  necessarily  from  the 
mutual  relations  of  the  universal  and  the  singular.  The 
singular  can  be  thought  only  in  a  universal  form,  and  the 
universal  can  be  realized  only  in  particular  cases.  It  is  not 
the  concept  A  which  is  B,  but  the  individuals  included  in 
the  class  A.  Not  the  king  or  the  oldest  inhabitant  dies,  but 
kings  and  oldest  inhabitants  die.  Again,  in  concrete  cases 
B  is  not  aflirmed  in  its  generalit\\  but  only  in  some  special 
modification,  for  only  thus  can  it  be  realized.  Thus  ^  and 
B  are  both  specialized  in  practice,  and  they  are  also  limited 
by  each  other.  The  predicate  defines  the  subject,  and  the 
subject  limits  the  predicate. 

To  illustrate  the  matter.  In  the  judgment,  Man  is  wise, 
it  is  plain  that  the  subject  is  not  man  the  concept,  but  men, 
the  living  realities.  It  is  further  plain  that  all  men  cannot 
be  the  subject,  for  a  great  many  men  are  not  wise.  Only 
the  wise  men  are  the  real  subjects  when  we  think  the  matter 
out.  Again,  the  wisdom  is  not  to  be  taken  absolutely,  but 
only  in  relation  to  the  human  subjects.  It  is  not,  then,  an- 
gelic or  superhuman  wisdom  of  any  kind  that  can  be  af- 
firmed, but  only  human  wisdom ;  and,  indeed,  in  any  special 
case,  only  the  wisdom  of  the  particular  subject.  Newton's 
wisdom  could  not  be  affirmed  of  one  learning  the  multipli- 
cation table.  When  these  considerations  are  duly  reflected 
upon,  it  would  seem  as  if  the  judgment  A  is  B  must  become 
^  ^  is  ^  ^,  and  thus  vanish  into  an  identical  judgment. 

And  now  it  would  seem  that,  as  is  most  meet,  we  have 
11 


162  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

fallen  a  prey  to  overdone  acuteness,  and  have  landed  our- 
selves in  a  blind  alley,  where  we  can  neither  go  on  nor  back 
out.  For  an  empirical  theory  of  thought  this  is  probably 
the  end.  It  can  find  no  subjects  which  last  long  enough  to 
be  subjects,  and  no  connection  to  serve  as  a  basis  of  predi- 
cation. Its  excessive  nominalism  also  leaves  it  without  any 
law-giving  universal,  and  the  judgment  vanishes  into  tau- 
tology or  contradiction.  And  for  any  theory  of  thought 
the  only  way  out  of  the  puzzle  lies  in  the  general  assump- 
tion of  connection  and  in  the  subordination  of  individuals  to 
the  universal.  The  former  fact  makes  it  possible  to  form 
groups  of  elements,  AB^  CD,  etc.  The  meaning  of  these 
groups  is  that  their  elements  belong  together,  and  this  fact 
we  express  by  saying  A  '\^  B,  C  is  D,  etc.  These  judg- 
ments are  entirely  in  intension,  and  are  simply  rules  of  pro- 
cedure for  dealing  with  particular  cases.  In  this  respect  they 
are  closely  allied  with  the  concept,  which,  w^e  have  seen, 
is  not  a  conception  of  any  particular  thing,  but  a  rule  for 
forming  conceptions  of  any  number  of  particular  things. 
The  intensive  judgment  ^  is  ^  finds  concrete  application 
only  as  we  pass  to  the  extension  of  the  terms  and  consider 
the  individuals  included  under  them,  and  subordinate  those 
individuals  to  the  general  law,  A  is  B ;  that  is,  in  practice, 
if  anything  is  A  it  is  also  B. 

If,  then,  we  ask  for  the  implications  of  the  actual  work- 
ing judgment  we  find  the  following:  It  must  first  be  pos- 
sible to  form  general  groups  of  elements,  as  A  B,  which 
admit  of  being  expressed  in  the  form  A  is  B.  This  possi- 
bility depends  on  the  primal  assumption  that  some  things 
belong  together  in  the  order  of  fact  or  reason.  But  this 
form  remains  only  a  general  rule  without  application,  unless 
A  and  B  become  universals  comprehending  an  indefinite 
number  of  individuals  for  which  they  are  law-giving.  Of 
course  it  is  not  meant  that  these  implications  lie  on  the  sur- 


THE   JUDGMENT  163 

face  of  the  judgment,  so  that  he  that  runs  may  read,  but 
only  that  when  the  judgment  is  criticised  these  implica- 
tions appear  as  the  condition  of  saving  it  from  collapse. 

In  the  fundamental  judgment  of  connection,  A  is  B, 
there  is  no  reference  to  extension;  but  as  the  judgment 
becomes  concrete  and  operative  only  as  we  pass  to  the 
extension  of  the  terms,  the  quantity  of  judgments  has  to 
be  considered.  In  the  fundamental  judgment,  also,  the 
quantity  is  universal.  Ais  £  declares  that  A  and  B  belong 
together,  and  hence  if  anything  is  A  it  is  B,  or  All  A's  are 
B.  It  is  easily  conceivable  that  the  material  of  thought 
should  have  been  of  such  a  kind  that  only  universal  judg- 
ments should  be  possible.  All  A's  are  B,  or  No  A  is  B. 
Particular  judgments  arise  from  the  possibility  of  cross 
classification.  The  same  objects  may  be  classified  according 
to  different  standards,  thus  producing  overlapping  classes. 
This  relation  is  expressed  in  the  particular  judgment,  Some 
A''s  are  B  ;  Some  A'^s  are  not  B. 

From  the  standpoint  of  formal  logic  the  negative  judg- 
ment is  entirely  simple.  It  denies  the  connection  of  A  and 
B,  or  declares  that  they  belong  apart.  Attempts  have  been 
made  to  turn  it  into  an  affirmative  judgment  by  attaching 
the  negative  to  B.  Thus,  A  is  non-^ ;  so  that,  instead  of 
denying  B,  we  affirm  non-^.  But  this  is  mainly  misplaced 
sharpness.  Non-^  is  no  notion  at  all,  but  only  a  chaotic 
heap  of  all  things  and  thoughts  which  are  not  B.  The 
terms  of  this  kind,  which  abound  in  language,  are  negative 
only  in  form,  or  their  negation  is  limited  to  the  class  in 
question ;  for  instance,  immortal,  inhuman,  unjust,  indecent, 
etc. 

The  traditional  logic  gives  us  a  table  of  judgments  as 
follows : 

All  A  is  B,  No  A  is  B, 

Some  A  is  B,  Some  A  is  not  B, 


164  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

or  universal  affirmative  and  negative,  and  particular  affirm- 
ative and  negative.  This  scheme  rests  on  reading  A  in 
extension,  and  says  nothing  of  the  essential  judgment  A 
is  B,  which  alone  brings  out  the  idea  of  law  or  connec- 
tion. Thus  the  most  essential  factor  of  thought  is  missed 
entirely. 

In  this  table  also  no  account  is  taken  of  the  quantity  of 
the  predicate ;  that  is,  it  is  not  stated  whether  All  A  is  All  B, 
or  only  Some  B,  etc.  This  addition  has  been  made  to  logi- 
cal doctrine  under  the  name  of  the  quantification  of  the 
predicate.  It  is  a  mere  formalism  of  no  practical  or  theo- 
retical importance. 

A  final  step  in  this  mechanical  formalism  is  the  equa- 
tional  and  symbolic  logic.  In  this  the  attempt  is  made  to 
express  judgments  in  the  form  of  equations  ;  and  thus,  it  is 
thought,  a  notable  advance  in  logical  theory  is  secured.  But 
of  this  also  it  must  be  said  that  it  has  neither  practical  nor 
theoretical  importance.  It  might  have  some  practical  value 
if  the  solution  of  artificial  verbal  puzzles  were  the  whole 
duty  of  logic.  As  it  is,  it  is  little  more  than  a  study  of  ver- 
bal permutations  and  combinations  without  any  valuable 
result.  Resting,  as  it  does,  on  the  view  that  the  judgment 
expresses  merely  the  mutual  inclusion  or  exclusion  of  classes, 
it  misses  the  nature  of  living  thought  altogether.  As  in  the 
case  of  nostrums  in  general,  the  testimonials  to  its  value  are 
to  be  found  chiefly  in  the  advertisement.  To  be  sure,  it  will 
be  said  that  logic  is  under  obligation  to  exhibit  all  possible 
forms  of  judgment  for  the  sake  of  systematic  completeness, 
and  if  one  has  time  and  taste  for  that  sort  of  thing  there  is 
no  objection.  But  it  has  as  little  significance  for  the  knowl- 
edge or  progress  of  real  thought  as  a  study  of  the  possible 
permutations  and  combinations  of  the  words  in  the  diction- 
ary would  have  for  literature. 

Thus  we  have  sought  to  show  the  leading  forms  of  the 


THE    JUDGMENT  165 

judgment,  and  the  thought  principles  on  which  they  rest. 
The  modifications  of  these  forms  as  expressed  in  language 
are  inexhaustible,  and  must  be  dealt  with  as  they  arise.  An 
insight  into  the  principles  involved  is  all  that  is  needed  or 
even  desirable. 


CHAPTER  VII 

INFERENCE 

By  far  the  larger  part  of  our  judgments  are  not  given 
as  true  in  immediate  experience  or  in  direct  insight.  We 
reach  them  by  analyzing  or  combining  other  judgments 
which  are  given  or  assumed.  This  process  is  called  infer- 
ence. It  is  another  phase  of  the  complex  movement  by 
which  we  attain  knowledge.  From  the  nature  of  the  case, 
inference  implies  imperfect  knowledge,  and  must  be  limited 
to  beings  of  finite  range.  This  fact  is  often  overlooked  in 
the  criticisms  passed  upon  the  forms  of  inference. 

Inference  consists  in  drawing  from  one  or  more  judg- 
ments, called  premises,  some  others,  called  conclusions,  which 
shall  always  be  true  if  the  premises  are  true.  The  validity 
of  the  inference  does  not  depend  on  the  truth  either  of  the 
premises  or  of  the  conclusion,  but  upon  their  mutual  rela- 
tions. From  untrue  or  purely  fictitious  premises  conclu- 
sions may  be  logically  drawn.  They  do  not,  of  course,  be- 
come true  thereby,  but  their  necessary  connection  with  the 
premises  is  shown ;  and  this  connection,  as  in  the  reduction 
to  absurdity,  may  be  used  for  overthrowing  the  premises 
themselves. 

The  falsehood  of  both  premises  and  conclusion,  then,  is 
quite  compatible  with  the  validity  of  the  inference.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  truth  of  both  is  no  security  for  the  validity 
of  the  inference.  A  conclusion,  true  as  to  its  matter,  may 
be  drawn  in  connection  with  either  true  or  false  premises 


INFERENCE  167 

without  being  implied  in  them.  Finally,  a  true  conclusion 
may  be  validly  drawn  from  fictitious  and  even  from  meaning- 
less premises,  provided  we  are  allowed  arbitrarily  to  con- 
struct the  premises  with  reference  to  the  conclusion.  The  doc- 
trine of  inference,  however,  does  not  concern  itself  with  the 
truth  or  falsehood  of  premises  or  conclusion,  but  only  with 
the  conditions  of  valid  inference  from  admitted  or  assumed 
premises.  And  here,  as  elsewhere,  we  confine  our  atten- 
tion to  the  general  principles,  leaving  details  to  technical 
treatises. 

Inferences  are  divided  into  mediate  and  immediate.  In 
the  latter  the  conclusion  is  drawn  from  the  analysis  of  a 
single  judgment ;  in  the  former  from  the  combination  of 
two  or  more.  It  is  by  no  means  easy  to  draw  the  line  be- 
tween these  two  classes  at  their  adjacent  frontiers ;  but  our 
previous  study  has  taught  us  that  few  logical  distinctions 
exist  in  any  such  hard  and  fast  form  as  they  assume  in  the 
text-books.  We  may  allow  this  distinction  also  in  a  general 
way,  without  feeling  any  obligation  to  waste  time  in  map- 
ping out  the  territory  of  the  respective  realms.  It  is  much 
more  important  to  see  that  the  inference  is  valid  than  to 
decide  what  to  call  it.  We  consider  first  the  immediate  in- 
ferences. 

In  conversion  we  interchange  subject  and  predicate,  so 
that  A  B  becomes  B  A;  and  this  second  judgment  is  said 
to  be  an  immediate  inference  from  the  first.  Thus  from 
Squares  are  rectangles  we  conclude  that  Some  rectangles 
are  squares. 

Whether  conversion  involves  any  inference  is  a  point 
which  has  been  very  warmly  debated,  some  contending  that 
there  is  real  inference,  while  others  maintain  that  we  have 
simply  the  old  matter  in  a  changed  verbal  form. 

The  latter  claim  is  certainly  true  for  all  judgments  of 
pure  quantity.     7-^5  =  12  and  12  =  7-f-5  are  not  two  equa- 


168  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

tions,  but  one  ;  that  is,  when  considered  as  derived  from  one 
anotlier.  In  like  manner  x=y  and  y-x  are  the  same  equa- 
tion ;  there  is  no  inference  or  progress  in  passing  from  one 
to  the  other.  The  same  is  true  for  all  equipollent  judg- 
ments, as  in  definitions.  There  is  no  inference  or  change  of 
thousht  in  conversion  in  such  cases. 

With  attributive  judgments  no  conversion  is  possible  until 
the  judgment  is  given  an  artificial  form.  Thus,  The  rose 
is  red  remains  unconvertible  until  we  take  it  to  mean  that 
the  rose  is  a  red  thing,  or  is  contained  in  the  class  of  red 
things :  and  then  we  may  convert  it  into  Some  red  things 
are  roses.  But  here  again  there  is  no  proper  inference ;  for 
when  we  say  that  roses  are  red  things  we  do  not  mean  that 
they  are  all  sorts  of  red  things,  as  strawberries  or  flamingoes, 
but  only  rose-red  things ;  and  when  we  say  that  some  red 
things  are  roses,  again  we  do  not  mean  any  red  things  indif- 
ferently, but  only  the  red  things  which  are  roses.  Which- 
ever way  we  work  the  matter,  therefore,  if  we  know  what 
we  mean  in  the  primal  judgment  we  have  no  new  matter  in 
the  converted  one.  Similar  considerations  apply  to  the  con- 
version of  negative  judgments. 

The  importance  of  the  doctrine  of  conversion,  then,  is  not 
positive,  but  negative.  It  secures  no  new  knowledge,  but 
wards  off  a  familiar  fallacy,  and  even  this  function  is  limited 
to  the  universal  affirmative  judgment.  From  the  fact  that 
All  J.  is  ^  it  is  easy  to  conclude  that  All  B\^A;  and  hence 
it  is  pedagogically  important  to  remind  the  unwary  that  A 
may  be  included  in  the  class  B  without  exhausting  B.  That 
all  men  are  animals  does  not  imply  that  all  animals  are 
men. 

Other  forms  of  immediate  inference  arise  from  what  is 
called  the  opposition  of  judgments.  This  involves  no  new 
principle  beyond  that  of  consistency  in  aflBrmation,  and  leads 
to  nothing  positive.     It  merely  states  the  relation  of  affirm- 


INFERENCE  189 

ative  and  negative  judgments  of  different  quantity  and  qual- 
ity wiien  the  subjects  and  predicates  are  the  same. 

Immediate  inference  by  added  determinants  is  more  sig- 
nificant. This  finds  its  chief  field  in  quantitative  reasoning. 
Its  typical  form  would  be 

A  =  B. 
Hence  F{A)^F{B). 

That  is,  if  any  two  quantities  are  equal,  then  equivalent 
operations  performed  on  both  will  give  equivalent  results. 
In  dealing  with  class  terras  the  same  principle  applies  so 
long  as  we  do  not  change  the  quality  of  the  judgment  by 
our  added  determinants. 

In  this  class  of  immediate  inferences,  and  also  in  those 
which  may  be  obtained  by  analyzing  the  implications  of  the 
predicate,  a  little  ingenuity  might  find  some  ground  for 
claiming  that  they  are  really  mediate,  as  depending  on  some 
back-lying  principle  which  is  the  major  premise  of  the  infer- 
ence. Thus,  it  might  be  contended  that  if  A  is  B,  NA  is 
NB,  is  really  a  mediate  inference  depending  on  the  principle 
that  equal  operations  on  equal  quantities  give  equal  i-esults  f 
but  it  would  hardly  pay  expenses.  Without  doubt  the  in- 
ference would  not  be  true  if  the  principle  were  not  true; 
and  equally  without  doubt  the  principle  would  not  be  true 
if  the  inference  were  not  true.  No  rational  principle  is  in 
dispute  at  all,  but  only  the  barren  psychological  question 
whether  we  can  see  rational  necessity  in  particular  cases 
without  having  first  consciously  generalized  the  problem. 

In  any  case,  the  great  bulk  of  inference  is  mediate.  Its 
principles  we  now  pass  to  consider. 

There  are  two  general  forms  of  deductive  reasoning, 
Bubsumptive  and  substitutive;  and  corresponding  to  these 
there  are  two  general  principles  of  inference.  In  subsump- 
tive  reasoning  we  deal  with  class  notions,  or  the  relation 
of  individuals  to  the  universal.     The  law  for  this  type  of 


170  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

reasoning  is  found  in  Aristotle's  dictum  de  omni  et  nullo. 
If  I  am  able  to  affirm  a  class  mark  or  law,  then  I  may  affirm 
that  mark  or  law  of  any  or  all  of  the  individuals  subsumed 
under  the  class.  Negatively,  when  I  am  able  to  deny  any 
mark  or  law  of  a  class,  I  may  deny  it  of  the  individuals 
which  compose  the  class.  The  gist  of  this  reasoning  is  the 
subordination  of  individuals  to  the  universal,  and  a  deter- 
mination of  them  in  accordance  with  the  law  of  the  uni- 
versal. 

In  substitutional  reasoning  we  do  not  proceed  by  the 
subsumption  of  individuals  under  a  class,  but  rather  by  the 
substitution  of  equivalents.  In  any  judgment  whatever  as- 
sumed to  be  true  I  may  substitute  equivalent  values  for 
either  subject  or  predicate,  and  the  resulting  judgment  will 
be  equally  true.  This  law  appears  especially  in  the  quanti- 
tative reasoning  of  mathematics. 

All  deductive  reasoning  proceeds  by  one  or  the  other  of 
these  principles,  or  by  both  together,  and  there  can  be  no 
reasoning  without  them.  Subsumptive  reasoning  disap- 
pears unless  we  can  subordinate  the  individual  to  the  uni- 
versal. Quantitative  reasoning  disappears  unless  we  are 
allowed  to  substitute  equivalent  values.  Inference  consists 
essentially  in  such  subsumptions  and  substitutions,  and  in 
drawing  the  appropriate  conclusions.  In  affirmative  reason- 
ing either  we  subsume  a  thing  under  a  class,  and  then  af- 
firm the  class  mark  or  law  of  the  thing,  or  we  identify  or 
equate  a  given  thing  with  some  other  thing,  and  infer  that 
what  is  true  of  one  is  true  of  the  other.  False  inference  in 
such  cases  is  due  to  a  false  subsumption,  or  to  a  false  identi- 
fication and  substitution.  The  negative  application  of  the 
laws  suggests  itself. 

The  earlier  traditional  logic  recognized  only  subsumptive 
reasoning,  and  of  course  was  much  puzzled  what  to  do  with 
the  quantitative  reasoning  of  mathematics.     In  much  of 


INFERENCE  171 

the  latter  there  is  no  subsumption,  and  it  pays  little,  and 
often  no,  attention  to  syllogistic  form.  On  this  account 
some  logical  rigorists  were  inclined  to  deny  that  logic  has 
anything  to  do  with  mathematics.  This  ancient  one-sided- 
ness  has  been  paralleled  by  a  modern  one-sidedness  which 
seeks  to  reduce  subsumption  to  substitution.  Such  attempts 
do  not  tend  to  edification.  They  have  interest  only  for 
those  ill-starred  beings  who  see  in  verbal  unifications  the 
ideal  goal  of  thought  and  knowledge.  Living  thought  is 
content  to  see  the  reality  and  importance  of  both  types 
of  inference. 

The  simplest  form  of  mediate  reasoning  involves  (1)  a 
statement  of  the  mark  or  law,  positive  or  negative,  of  a 
class ;  (2)  a  ranging  of  some  individual  or  individuals  under 
that  class ;  and  (3)  the  affirmation  of  the  class  mark  or  law 
of  the  subsumed  individuals.  Or  we  affirm  or  deny  some- 
thing of  something,  substitute  some  equivalent  for  that 
something,  and  affirm  or  deny  the  original  something  of 
the  substituted  equivalent.  Such  an  argument  is  the  sim- 
plest unit  of  mediate  reasoning,  and  into  such  units  any 
complex  argument  may  be  broken  up.  This  unit  we  call 
a  syllogism,  and  its  sufficient  law  is  given  in  the  general 
rules  of  inference  already  laid  down.  Wherever  these  are 
regarded  the  inference  is  valid. 

The  traditional  doctrine  of  the  syllogism  is  somewhat 
artificial.  The  truth  therein  lies  in  the  rules  just  men- 
tioned ;  the  artificiality  is  due  to  a  mechanical  interpreta- 
tion of  the  rules.  An  instance  is  found  in  the  doctrine  of 
three  terms.  Commonly,  where  there  are  more  than  three 
terms  there  is  no  proper  subsumption  or  substitution,  and 
hence  the  doctrine  of  three  terms  is  laid  down  as  funda- 
mental. But  this  inverts  the  true  order.  The  subsump- 
tion or  substitution  is  the  thing,  and  if  we  have  this  the 
inference  will  be  valid  with  three  terms  or  thirty.     It  is 


172  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

well  known  what  distortions  of  thought  and  language  the 
defenders  of  the  doctrine  of  three  terms  have  had  to  resort 
to  in  order  to  save  it.  This  results  necessarily  from  a  me- 
chanical externalism  which  misses  the  living  movement  of 
thought.  Because  of  the  complexity  of  human  speech  we 
often  come  upon  forms  of  argument  which  are  perfectly 
clear  and  valid  from  the  side  of  the  fundamental  rules  of 
inference,  but  which  only  violence  can  bring  under  the  arti- 
ficial rules  of  the  syllogism.  Hence  we  regard  the  special 
rules  of  the  syllogism  as  given  in  the  traditional  logic  as 
secondary,  and  by  no  means  always  valid.  And  when  an 
argument  is  invalid,  it  is  not  because  the  artificial  rules  of 
the  syllogism  have  been  violated,  but  because  there  has 
been  a  false  subsumption  or  exclusion,  or  a  false  substitu- 
tion. Even  the  fallacies  of  the  undistributed  middle  and 
the  illicit  process  of  the  terms  fall  under  this  condemna- 
tion. And  our  criticism  of  an  argument  must  always  di- 
rect itself  to  considering  the  validity  of  our  subsumption 
or  substitution,  and  not  to  a  mechanical  counting  of  terms 
or  other  unprofitable  externalisms.  In  this  way  we  shall 
relieve  the  syllogism  from  the  artificialities  which  have 
brought  upon  it  just  reproach. 

Aristotle's  dictum  has  been  subjected  to  a  deal  of  criti- 
cism, much  of  it  irrelevant  and  much  of  it  directed  against 
loose  or  careless  formulations  of  it.  Illustrations  of  the 
latter  are  found  in  such  statements  as  that  what  is  true  of 
all  is  true  of  each,  or  what  is  true  of  the  class  is  true  of  the 
members.  Of  course  it  is  easy  to  point  out  that  what  is  true 
of  all  is  not  true  of  each,  unless  the  all  be  taken  distribu- 
tively,  and  then  it  is  a  tautology— what  is  true  of  each  is 
true  of  each.  In  like  manner,  what  is  true  of  the  class  is 
true  of  the  members  only  when  by  the  class  we  mean  the 
members ;  and  thus  we  fall  into  tautology  again. 

Other  criticism  is  directed  against  the  dictum  as  resting 


INFERENCE  173 

upon  a  realistic  conception  of  the  class  as  a  metaphysical 
essence.  Mr.  Mill  visits  some  condign  chastisement  upon  the 
doctrine  for  having  formerly  kept  company  witli  scholastic 
realists,  and  insists  that  it  must  go,  along  with  the  meta- 
physics from  which  it  sprang. 

On  all  of  these  accounts  the  dictum  is  often  represented 
as  something  which  progressive  logicians  have  outgrown. 
Reflection,  however,  upon  the  manifest  fact  that  the  real 
principle  of  reasoning,  whatever  it  may  be,  must  be  the 
same,  yesterday,  to-day,  and  forever,  leads  to  the  surmise 
that  this  criticism  does  not  get  to  the  root  of  the  matter. 
In  fact,  the  real  meaning  of  the  dictum  has  always  been  the 
subordination  of  the  individual  to  the  universal,  and  the 
judgment  of  the  individual  in  accordance  with  the  law  of 
tiie  universal  to  which  it  is  sul)ordinated.  Hence  the  law 
of  the  class— that  is,  the  universal— applies  to  the  members 
of  the  class.  Tiiis  is  the  affirmative  meaning  of  the  dictum. 
Conversely,  nothing  may  be  affirmed  of  the  members  which 
conflicts  with  the  law  of  the  class.  This  is  the  negative  side 
of  the  dictum. 

How  this  subordination  of  the  individual  to  the  universal 
is  secured  has  no  doubt  been  variously  conceived,  and  the 
metaphysicians  are  by  no  means  yet  agreed  about  it ;  but 
the  subordination  itself  cannot  be  questioned  as  the  principle 
of  all  subsumptive  reasoning.  Whenever  any  substitute  is 
proposed,  if  valid  at  all,  it  always  turns  out  to  be  a  new,  if 
not  an  inferior,  formulation  of  the  old  principle.  This  is 
manifestly  the  case  with  Mr.  Mill's  supposed  improvement. 
According  to  him  the  true  principle  of  reasoning  is  this  :  At- 
tribute ^  is  a  mark  of  attribute  B,  and  hence  wherever  we 
find  A  we  may  afiirm  B.  This  is  identical  in  meaning  with 
the  dictum,  and  inferior  in  expression  ;  for  it  is  by  no  means 
clear  that  attributes  may  be  affirmed  of  attributes.  Up  to 
date,  human  speech  declines  to  say  yellow  is  sour,  or  white 


174  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

is  cold,  as  an  equivalent  for  lemons  are  sour,  or  snow  is  cold. 
It  would  seem,  then,  that  logicians  would  do  well  to  distin- 
guish between  the  metaphysical  question  of  how  the  subordi- 
nation of  the  individual  to  the  universal  is  secured,  and  the 
logical  doctrine  w^hich  affirms  such  subordination  as  the 
principle  of  reasoning. 

The  division  of  syllogisms  into  moods  and  figures  is  some- 
thing of  neither  theoretical  nor  practical  value.  In  its  best 
estate  the  doctrine  of  figure  is  rather  an  accident  of  language 
than  a  peculiarity  of  thought.  Language  admits  of  the 
varying  position  of  the  middle  term  and  of  the  resulting 
permutations.  The  end  of  the  cumbrous  special  rules  is 
better  attained  by  remembering  the  meaning  and  extension 
of  our  terms.  When  this  is  done  the  reasoning  will  take 
care  of  itself ;  and  when  this  is  done  we  can  draw  valid  con- 
clusions in  every  figure,  though  violating  aU  the  special  rules 
of  the  syllogism. 

The  first  figure  admits  of  universal  and  particular,  posi- 
tive and  negative  conclusions,  and  thus  embraces  the  whole 
table  of  judgments.  Hence  it  has  been  called  the  perfect 
figure.  A  better  reason  for  calling  it  perfect  lies  in  the  fact 
that  the  subordination  of  the  individual  to  the  universal 
appears  more  clearly  in  this  figure  than  in  the  others.  And 
as,  by  implication,  the  other  figures  were  imperfect,  a  de- 
sire arose  for  translating  them  into  equivalent  values  in  the 
first  figure.  The  mechanism  for  reduction  thus  resulting 
belongs  entirely  to  the  barren  and  artificial  formalism  which 
has  been  such  a  reproach  to  logic.  It  is  a  monumental  il- 
lustration of  misdirected  and  fruitless  ingenuity. 

Mathematical  reasoning  shows  some  peculiarities  beyond 
those  mentioned  above.  In  geometry  both  subsumption 
and  substitution  enter  to  some  extent ;  but,  in  addition,  the 
argument  generally  depends  not  upon  an  analysis  of  notions, 
but  upon  a  construction  of  the  problem  and  of  the  relations 


INFERENCE  175 

expressed.  No  analysis  of  the  notion  of  the  triangle  as  a 
three-sided  plane  figure  reveals  the  equality  of  its  angles  to 
two  right  angles.  This  is  found  not  by  reflecting  on  a 
definition,  but  by  auxiliary  constructions.  That  a  straight 
line  is  shorter  than  any  curved  or  broken  line  between  the 
same  points  is  not  known  by  analyzing  the  notions,  but  by 
constructing  the  problem.  Then  the  proposition  is  not  de- 
duced, but  seen. 

The  same  fact  appears  also  in  numerical  reasoning.  Here, 
too,  thought  proceeds  not  merely  by  substitution  and  analy- 
sis, but  also  and  more  essentially  by  synthetic  processes 
based  on  an  insight  into  the  nature  of  number.  Further- 
more, in  most  mathematical  reasoning  no  attention  is  paid 
to  syllogistic  form.  The  manipulation  of  equations,  the  con- 
struction of  proportions,  the  formation  and  summation  of 
series,  and  all  the  complex  reasonings  which  attend  this 
work  go  on  in  supreme  indifference  to  syllogistic  forms, 
but  also  in  entire  certainty,  so  far  as  the  reasoning  goes,  if 
due  care  be  paid  to  the  subsumptions  and  substitutions. 
Syllogistic  form  would  add  nothing  to  the  cogency  of  the 
reasoning,  and  would  be  almost  fatal  to  its  facility. 

Conditional  and  disjunctive  syllogisms  contain  nothing 
which  calls  for  special  criticism. 

The  formal  logician  should  look  more  to  the  living  prin- 
ciples of  inference  and  less  to  its  mechanical  forms.  The 
latter  should  be  seen  in  their  secondary  character  in  their 
best  estate,  and  in  their  artificiality  and  even  invalidity  in 
many  cases.  But  the  syllogism  in  any  form  has  long  been 
rejected  as  worthless  or  as  begging  the  question,  and  hence 
as  useless  in  real  reasoning.  These  objections  have  become 
traditional,  and  a  word  must  be  devoted  to  them. 

And  first,  it  is  said,  the  syllogism  begs  the  question.  If 
M  is  P  and  S  is  M,  of  course  S  is  P ;  but  the  M  is  P  al- 


176  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

ready  contains  the  S  is  P,  and  thus  begs  the  question. 
Here  the  ditficulty  is  with  the  major  premise.  It  contains 
the  conclusion,  and  there  is  no  valid  argument. 

This  objection  rests  on  taking  some  natural-history  no- 
tion, as  man.  Thus,  All  men  are  rational ;  Caesar  is  a  man, 
and  hence  Caesar  is  rational.  Now  it  is  said  the  major 
premise  contains  the  conclusion,  for  we  could  not  know  it  to 
be  true  unless  we  had  already  examined  Caesar's  case.  But 
even  then  the  objection  is  badly  put,  for  the  major  premise 
does  not  beg  the  conclusion  in  any  case.  From  the  fact 
that  all  men  are  rational,  nothing  follows  as  to  Caesar  until 
the  minor  premise  declares  him  to  be  a  man.  If  Caesar 
were  a  horse,  or  the  house-dog,  the  major  premise  could 
never  beg  him  into  rationality.  The  correct  objection,  if 
there  be  any,  should  be,  not  that  the  syllogism  begs  the 
question,  but  that  it  is  barren  and  leads  to  no  new  knowl- 
edge. 

But  this  objection  also  would  be  short-sighted.  It  has 
significance  only  for  one  who  looks  away  from  the  living 
movement  of  concrete  thought.  Such  force  as  it  has  rests 
on  the  assumption  that  we  get  our  major  premises  only  by 
summing  up  individual  cases,  and  that  whoever  thinks  the 
universal  thinks  also  the  individuals  subsumed  under  it. 
If  the  former  part  of  the  assumption  were  correct,  of 
course  the  statement  of  a  universal  would  presuppose  an 
examination  of  all  the  particular  cases.  Any  deduction  of 
particulars  from  the  universal  would  then  be  simpl}'-  re- 
tracing our  steps,  and  there  would  be  no  progress.  The 
second  part  of  the  assumption  would  make  the  syllogism 
equally  futile,  for  in  thinking  the  major  premise  we  should 
think  the  conclusion  without  any  deduction. 

In  fact,  however,  logical  universals  are  not  reached  in 
that  way.  A  universal  reached  by  simple  summation  would 
not  be  any  rule  for  thought,  but  merely  a  dead  register  of 


LNFEKKNUE  177 

experience.  Even  in  the  physical  sciences  general  propo- 
sitions are  not  won  by  merely  summing  up  particular  cases, 
but  certain  cases  are  taken  as  specimens,  and  from  them  a 
law  is  inferred  for  the  whole  class.  For  a  general  propo- 
sition about  hydrogen  it  is  not  necessary  to  examine  all 
cases  of  hydrogen,  and  it  is  also  possible  to  infer  much 
about  a  given  element  when  we  are  able  to  identify  it  as 
hvdroo:en.  Neither  is  it  true  that  whoever  thinks  the  uni- 
versal  thinks  all  the  particulars  under  it.  In  general  the 
universal  is  a  rule  for  dealing  with  particular  cases  as  they 
arise,  and  can  be  very  conveniently  thought  without  refer- 
ence to  individuals. 

In  the  rational  sciences  our  universal  propositions  are 
the  expression  of  immediate  insight  or  are  reached  by  gen- 
eral reasoning,  which  takes  no  account  of  particular  cases. 
In  such  cases  the  syllogism  contains  advance.  Thus,  if  I 
know  that  6'  =  ^  gf  and  v=gt,  I  have  the  whole  science  of 
uniformly  accelerated  motion,  and  a  law  for  all  possible 
cases.  And  in  any  particular  application  of  this  law  it 
would  be  about  equally  absurd  to  claim  either  that  the 
question  is  begged  or  that  no  new  knowledge  is  gained. 
The  same  is  true  for  mathematics  in  general.  We  reach 
and  comprehend  the  general  propositions  without  the  slight- 
est consideration  of  particular  cases,  and  we  combine  and 
appl}'^  these  propositions  in  a  way  which  leads  to  real  and 
important  advances  in  knowledge.  The  higher  mathemat- 
ics may  be  latent  in  the  elementary  intuitions  and  prin- 
ciples, and  yet  there  is  real  progress  in  making  the  latent 
patent.  It  w^ould  be  highly  humorous  to  claim  that  every 
one  is  a  master  of  mathematics  because  he  has  all  the  ele- 
mentary intuitions  from  which  mathematics  is  developed. 

But  the  charge  of  begging  the  question  may  be  directed 
against  the  minor  premise  as  well  as  the  major.  For  if  we 
say,  All  men  are  rational ;  Caesar  is  man,  hence  Caesar  is  ra- 

12 


178  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT   AND   KNOWLEDGE 

tional,  it  is  plain  that  we  cannot  call  Caesar  a  man  unless  we 
know  him  to  be  rational,  and  thus  again  we  beg  the  question. 
If  we  say  he  might  be  a  man  without  being  rational,  that 
might  well  be  true  as  a  matter  of  fact,  but  it  would  not  be 
true  in  the  sense  demanded  by  the  argument.  For  if  Csesar 
is  a  man  in  some  sense  which  does  not  imply  rationality  we 
make  no  connection  with  the  major  premise,  and  the  argu- 
ment fails  entirely.     So,  then,  the  minor  begs  the  question. 

The  truth  of  this  claim  depends  on  what  is  necessary  to 
classification.  If  in  order  to  classify  an  object  we  must 
consider  all  its  attributes  there  would  certainly  be  no  gain 
in  reasoning.  In  the  previous  case  the  objection  was  that 
the  knowledge  of  the  universal  involves  a  knowledge  of  all 
the  individuals ;  here  the  objection  is  that  the  classification 
of  the  individual  involves  a  complete  comparison  of  the  in- 
dividual with  the  connotation  of  the  universal.  Before, 
then,  we  can  say  that  a  given  being  is  a  man  we  must  know 
him  thoroughly,  and  of  course  reasoning  is  fruitless. 

But  this  is  a  formal  rather  than  a  real  objection,  and  has 
onlv  an  academic  sio:nificance.  It  is  not  valid  at  all  in  the 
rational  sciences.  We  might  argue,  The  area  of  the  triangle 
is  equal  to  one-half  its  base  by  its  altitude.  This  is  a  tri- 
angle, and  therefore  its  area  is  equal  to  one-half  its  base  by 
its  altitude.  No  one  would  think  of  saying  that  the  minor 
premise  begs  the  question,  because  we  cannot  tell  whether 
the  figure  reallv  is  a  triangle  until  we  have  discovered  that 
its  area  is  equal  to  one-half  its  base  by  its  altitude.  The 
practical  absurdit}'^  would  be  manifest.  We  can  indeed 
feign  a  world  of  objects  where  classification  should  be  thus 
difiicult  and  uncertain,  and  in  such  a  world  reasoning  would 
not  be  of  any  value.  But  in  the  real  world  the  order  of 
things  is  more  manageable,  and  we  do  contrive  to  add  to 
knowledge  in  spite  of  the  shortcomings  of  both  the  major 
and  the  minor  premise. 


INFERENCE  179 

As  was  said  at  the  beginning  of  this  chapter,  reasoning 
is  a  device  for  helping  beings  of  imperfect  insight  to  knowl- 
edge. Seasoning  might  be  vacated  or  made  valueless  by 
either  of  two  facts.  Perfect  insight  would  make  reasoning 
needless.  Or  reasoning  might  be  made  impossible  by  the 
intractijbility  of  our  objects,  such  that  they  could  not  be 
subordinated  to  any  law-giving  universal.  But  we  can  de- 
cide whether  reasoning  is  possible  or  valuable  for  us  only 
by  consulting  experience.  When  we  adopt  this  method 
these  academic  spectres  will  cease  to  haunt  us. 

Thus  far  of  inference  as  if  its  premises  could  always  be 
adequately  expressed.  This,  however,  is  rarely  possible,  ex- 
cept in  the  formal  sciences.  But  a  great  deal  of  valid  reason- 
ing may  be  done  which  does  not  admit  of  adequate  formal 
statement.  The  grounds  of  the  inference  are  too  subtle, 
delicate,  complex  for  verbal  expression.  For  instance,  how 
do  we  recognize  a  face  or  discern  the  trustworthiness  of  a 
friend  ?  There  is  here  an  action  of  the  whole  mind,  with  its 
furniture  of  experience  and  tendency,  which  would  only  be 
caricatured  by  syllogistic  formulation.  Much  of  our  practi- 
cal reasoning  is  of  this  sort.  It  may  be  perfectly  valid,  but 
it  cannot  be  formulated.  Hence  the  wisdom  of  the  rule,  in 
such  cases,  to  give  our  decision,  but  never  to  give  our  reasons. 
The  real  reasons  cannot  be  given,  and  the  reasons  we  do 
give  only  expose  us  to  further  quibble  or  objection. 

When  definite  concepts  are  given  and  can  be  united  into 
definite  premises  the  reasoning  may  go  on  in  perfect  cer- 
tainty. But  in  concrete  matter  this  is  by  no  means  always 
the  case.  As  the  definite  concept  is  an  ideal  which  is  only 
rarely  reached,  so  the  demonstrative  inference  is  an  ideal 
which  is  only  rarely  reached.  Hence  some  provision  must 
be  made  for  the  recognition  of  probability,  which  is  pro- 
verbially the  guide  of  life.      In  mathematics  our  objects 


180  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

are  our  own  creation,  and  there  is  no  question  of  a  par- 
allax between  the  thoug-ht  and  the  thine;:  but  as  soon  as 
we  come  to  concrete  matter  this  possibility  has  to  be  reck- 
oned with.  Here,  of  course,  we  can  shuffle  our  symbols  at 
will,  and  say  M  is  P,  S  is  M,  and  hence  S  is  P;  but  it  is 
not  easy  in  reality  to  be  sure  that  JI  is  so  certainly  P  and 
S  so  certainly  M  that  S  is  necessarily  P.  The  trouble  is 
that  real  individuals  are  often  not  exhausted  in  the  universal, 
or  that  they  come  under  many  universals,  and  finally  have 
their  own  incommunicable  difl'erence  besides.  For  instance, 
I  wish  to  get  some  idea  of  a  given  person's  character,  and  I 
enumerate  a  list  of  universals.  Thus  :  Man  has  a  conscience ; 
man  is  rational ;  man  is  religious ;  man  is  sympathetic  and 
sociable ;  but  all  of  this  is  no  surety  for  my  man.  In  spite 
of  these  universals  he  may  be  a  knave,  an  imbecile,  an  infi- 
del, a  hard-hearted  law-breaker.  To  know  him  I  must  know 
his  own  equation,  and  this  I  shall  never  get  from  formal 
universals. 

To  all  of  this  the  professional  logician  will  reply  that 
logic  has  nothing  to  do  with  such  cases,  and  will  betake 
himself  to  his  symbols  again,  and  with  much  emotion  will 
recite  M  is  P,  S  is  M,  S  is  P.  But  the  answer  must  be 
that,  while  logic  may  have  nothing  to  do  with  such  cases, 
living  thought  has  a  great  deal  to  do  with  them.  It  is 
indeed  desirable,  from  a  logical  standpoint,  that  all  our 
conceptions  could  be  reduced  to  definite  3Ps,  P's,  and  S's  ; 
but  where  it  is  not  possible  we  are  still  allowed  to  do  the 
best  we  can,  even  if  we  do  not  always  observe  strict  logical 
form. 

In  the  physical  and  chemical  laboratory,  and  in  dealing 
with  some  natural  species,  we  are  generally  sure  enough 
that  our  A''s  are  really  A.  We  have  here  the  whole  accu- 
mulated tradition  of  experience  and  scientific  work  ;  but  as 
soon  as  we  come  to  life  and  man,  and  to  truths  which  take 


INFERENCE  181 

hold  on  life,  the  matter  is  very  different.  Thus,  take  any 
case  of  circumstantial  evidence.  How  shall  we  estimate  the 
bearing  of  the  testimony,  the  character  of  the  witnesses,  the 
previous  character  of  the  accused,  the  facts  themselves,  sup- 
posing them  true?  There  is  here  a  complex  action  of  the 
living  mind  with  its  stores  of  experience  which  the  syllogism 
could  never  reproduce.  The  reasoning  is  not  indeed  demon- 
strative, but  it  is  of  the  kind  on  which  life  mainly  depends. 

Reasoning  gets  still  further  away  from  the  possibility  of 
formulation  and  becomes  more  questionable  when  it  deals 
with  subjects  which  admit  only  of  subjective  estimate,  or 
Avhen  the  possible  premises  are  many.  The  personal  equa- 
tion of  the  investigator  is  apt  to  color  the  estimate  or  to 
affect  the  choice  of  the  premises.  No  logic  could  compel 
an  Irish  Catholic  and  an  Irish  Protestant  to  draw  the  same 
conclusion  from  the  facts  of  Oliver  Cromwell's  life.  In 
the  inferences  we  draw  from  life  and  history  the  personal 
factor  gives  direction  to  the  logic.  In  such  cases  formal 
reasoning  only  gives  an  air  of  reason.  We  anal3'ze  and 
express  our  feelings  and  desires,  and  if  we  succeed  in  im- 
pressing them  upon  others  the  reasoning  is  held  to  be  good  ; 
if  not,  it  is  bad.  The  real  conflict  is  between  different  ideas 
and  ideals,  and  these  have  to  fight  it  out  on  the  field  of 
personal  experience  and  the  larger  field  of  history.  In  the 
meantime  we  make  the  motions  of  reasoning,  but  the  real 
argument  goes  on  in  the  hidden  depths  of  the  spirit. 

It  is  important  to  bear  this  general  line  of  thought  in 
mind,  as  some  uninstructed  people  often  fancy  that  veri- 
table sjdlogistic  argument  must  be  given  for  all  that  is  to 
be  believed ;  whereas  the  fact  is  that  such  argument  is  but 
a  small  factor  in  living  experience.  Commonly  no  one  shows 
such  inability  to  appreciate  the  living  movement  of  thought 
as  the  formal  logician  in  his  pathetic  devotion  to  the  formal 
syllogism. 


CHAPTER  Vm 
PROOF 

A  PROPOSITION  may  be  given  of  whose  truth  we  are  not 
sure ;  then  we  seek  for  proof  or  disproof.  In  general  this 
consists  in  bringing  the  proposition  into  relation  to  some- 
thing known,  so  that  we  may  see  the  proposition  to  be  a 
necessary  implication  or  incompatibility.  This  process  is 
proof  or  disproof.  Logic  can  give  no  rule  for  the  process ; 
it  can  only  criticise  it  and  determine  its  validity.  The  dis- 
covery of  the  argument  itself  is  left  to  individual  sagacity 
and  invention. 

Thus,  proof  appears  to  be  a  kind  of  reversion  of  the  proc- 
ess of  inference.  There  we  had  the  premises  to  draw  the 
conclusion ;  here  we  have  the  conclusion  to  find  the  prem- 
ises. 

Proof  may  be  direct  or  indirect.  In  the  former  case  we 
directly  deduce  the  proposition  as  a  consequence  of  other 
propositions ;  in  the  latter  case  we  disprove  its  contradic- 
tory and  then  infer  the  truth.  The  reduction  to  absurdity 
is  the  leading  form  of  indirect  proof.  Some  have  affected 
to  find  direct  proof  more  cogent  than  indirect,  but  this  is 
mere  pedantry,  or  an  undue  estimate  of  logical  form. 

From  the  nature  of  the  case,  proof  is  limited.  It  presup- 
poses some  propositions  back  of  itself  as  its  own  condition. 
If  these  also  are  to  be  proved,  proof  will  never  come  to  an 
end,  and  thus  nothing  will  be  proved.  We  must,  then,  have 
certain  propositions  indisputably  given,  or  standing  secure 


PROOF  183 

in  their  own  right,  if  proof  is  ever  to  begin  or  end.  Not 
everything  can  be  proved. 

Here  again  some  pedants  have  confused  themselves  into 
thinking  that  this  is  a  dire  disaster  for  knowledge,  but  this 
is  due  to  overlooking  the  true  nature  of  proof.  For  the  es- 
sence of  proof  is  insight  into  the  necessity  of  admitting  the 
proposition  in  question,  and  this  is  reached  by  so  combining 
the  insights  we  have  as  to  reach  the  new  insight.  But  the 
insight  is  the  gist  of  the  matter,  and  if  we  have  this  at  the 
start  it  is  a  waste  of  time  to  ask  for  more.  By  a  certain 
operation  in  the  calculus  of  maxima  and  minima  a  straight 
line  may  be  shown  to  be  the  shortest  distance  between  two 
points,  but  it  is  no  clearer  or  surer  than  when  directly 
seen. 

Further,  proof  does  not  make  a  proposition  true,  but  only 
enables  us  to  see  it.  It  is  the  ground  of  our  knowing  the 
truth,  not  the  ground  of  its  being  true.  Oversight  here  has 
led  to  various  absurdities  in  philosophy.  Thus  the  argu- 
ment for  the  First  Cause  has  been  rejected  on  the  ground  that 
anything  deduced  must  be  inferred  from  premises  superior 
to  it,  and  hence  must  be  second  and  not  first.  This  conclu- 
sion might  be  valid,  if  our  premises  were  the  ground  of  be- 
ing, instead  of  the  ground  of  our  knowing.  Otherwise  it 
hardly  rises  to  the  dignity  of  a  sophism. 

In  general  it  is  very  common  with  beginners  to  think 
that  their  arguments  make  the  thing  true,  and  to  mistake 
the  order  of  their  learning  for  the  true  order  of  existence. 
The  distinction,  however,  is  palpable.  The  grounds  of  our 
knowing  or  believing  are  commonly  incommensurable  with 
the  grounds  of  existence.  The  grounds  of  knowing  are  rel- 
ative to  our  standpoint  and  grade  of  development.  Hence 
many  valid  arguments  are  possible  for  the  same  thing.  Our 
geometry  is  made  up  of  propositions  and  arguments.  In 
different  works  the  arguments  are  often  different.    The  doc- 


184  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE 

trine  of  the  ellipse  may  be  developed  from  different  stand- 
points. The  ellipse  may  be  considered  as  a  conic  section  or 
as  a  curve  of  the  second  degree,  or  it  may  be  defined  with 
reference  to  two  fixed  points.  Yet  the  same  properties  of 
the  curve  may  be  reached  by  these  very  different  roads. 
Truth  is  known  to  be  true  only  when  it  is  proved  ;  but  truth 
is  true,  whether  w^e  can  prove  it  or  not. 

Proof,  too,  is  limited  bv  the  nature  of  the  knowino^  mind. 
It  is  only  a  stimulus  to  see,  and  a  stupid  mind  cannot  see. 
There  is  no  such  thing  as  an  objective  proof  which  proves  in 
the  absence  of  intelligence,  something  as  a  Buddhist  prayer- 
mill  prays  in  the  absence  of  the  suppliant.  It  is  very  com- 
mon with  the  dull  to  mistake  their  own  dulness  for  a  lack 
of  proof.  But  since  proof  is  really  only  a  stimulus  to  think 
in  a  certain  way  it  is  necessarily  conditioned  by  the  nature 
of  the  mind  addressed.  Hence,  when  the  subject  lies  beyond 
our  ordinary  range,  especially  when  it  rises  into  the  realm 
of  abstract  thought,  we  are  apt  to  view  our  own  limitation 
as  a  shortcoming  of  the  argument.  In  such  cases  the  swag- 
gering announcement,  I  don't  see  that,  is  properly  met  by 
the  question.  Well,  what  of  it  ? 

In  general  the  need  of  proof  is  a  mark  of  limitation. 
The  self-evident  is  what  we  see  without  a  process,  and  its 
limit  depends  on  the  degree  of  mental  insight.  For  perfect 
knowledge  everything  in  the  system  of  reason  would  be 
equally  self-evident.  We,  however,  not  having  such  in- 
sight, have  to  find  our  way  by  combining  the  little  we 
know  so  as  to  advance  into  the  unknown.  Reasoning  in 
general  would  be  needless  for  a  perfect  mind.  It  is  only 
the  device  of  a  limited  intelligence  for  extending  its  realm 
when  direct  insight  fails. 

What  has  been  said  thus  far  applies  to  proof  in  the  strict 
sense  of  rational  demonstration.  But  the  word  is  often  used 
with  less  stringency,  and  then  proof  consists  in  giving  rea- 


PROOF  185 

sons  which,  while  not  compelling  assent,  produce  conviction. 
A  word  must  now  be  said  on  the  general  subject  of  probability. 

Prohabilitij 

In  strictness  only  that  is  knowledge  which  is  indisputably 
given,  rationally  self-evident,  or  cogently  deduced  from  un- 
questionable facts.  Hence,  strict  knowledge  is  limited  to 
the  immediate  data  of  consciousness  or  to  the  contents  of 
the  rational  sciences.  All  other  so-called  knowledge  is 
properly  belief.  It  could  be  denied  without  contradicting 
any  law  of  thought,  though  perhaps  not  without  practical 
absurdity.  Belief  varies  all  the  way  from  complete  con- 
viction to  the  lowest  probability.  The  psychology  of  be- 
lief has  many  peculiarities,  owing  to  the  fact  that  an  ele- 
ment of  volition  enters  into  it.  We  have,  then,  an  island 
of  knowledge,  a  border  of  belief,  and,  poured  round  all,  the 
ocean  of  the  unknown. 

The  distinction  of  knowledge  and  belief  is  a  purely  sub- 
jective one.  Both  alike  presuppose  objective  connection ; 
the  difference  lies  only  in  the  subjective  certainty  with  which 
it  is  grasped,  or  in  the  reasons  on  which  that  certainty  is 
founded. 

Probability,  then,  is  the  guide  of  life.  The  degree  of  this 
probability  admits  of  no  exact  determination.  In  most 
events  we  have  to  judge  by  practical  sagacity  rather  than 
any  formal  rule.  He  who  can  successfully  discern  the  signs 
of  the  times  is  the  person  of  good  sense.  If  he  should  re- 
port his  reasons  they  would  make  a  sorry  show  tested  by 
logical  rule,  and  probably  he  would  hardly  know  the  real 
reasons  himself.  In  such  cases  we  proceed  by  instinct  or  a 
kind  of  knack  rather  than  by  formal  rules.  The  probability 
here  admits  of  no  exact  determination  ;  first,  because  we 
know  little  about  the  factors  at  work,  and,  secondly,  because 
the  factors  themselves  often  admit  of  no  numerical  statement. 


186  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

Trust  in  evidence  and  in  one  another,  forecasts  of  social 
and  political  movements,  are  cases  of  this  kind.  These  sub- 
jects, especially  the  credibility  of  testimony,  have  often  been 
elaborately  treated,  and  with  the  most  astonishing  mathe- 
matical skill ;  but  it  is  only  wasted  time.  In  estimating,  say, 
the  credibility  of  a  witness  we  should  have  to  take  many 
things  into  account,  as  the  character  of  the  witness,  the  nat- 
ure of  the  story,  his  interest  in  the  truth,  and  a  variety  of 
complex  circumstances  besides ;  and  these  defy  numerical  cal- 
culation. If  we  nevertheless  insist  on  figuring  we  merely 
delude  ourselves  with  a  false  show  of  accuracy,  while  the 
facts  remain  as  vague  as  ever.  Sometimes,  however,  nu- 
merical determination  is  possible,  and  then  the  calculus  of 
probabilities  comes  in. 

The  calculus  of  probabilities  began  in  a  study  of  games 
of  chance,  and  from  this  unpromising  origin  it  has  become 
a  matter  of  great  practical  importance.  Still,  there  has  been 
little  agreement  as  to  its  foundation,  or  even  as  to  its  mean- 
ing. Some  seek  to  found  it  on  apriori  considerations,  and 
others  found  it  on  experience.  As  to  the  meaning  of  prob- 
ability, some  make  it  subjective  only,  and  declare  the  aim 
of  the  calculus  to  be  to  find  the  quantity  of  belief.  Others 
insist  that  this  is  meaningless,  that  quantity  of  belief  admits 
of  no  intelligible  interpretation,  and  that  when  we  say  that 
our  belief  is  three-fourths  in  one  case  and  four-fifths  in 
another,  we  do  not  find  any  corresponding  subjective  differ- 
ence, but  mean  that  we  expect  the  event  to  happen  three 
times  out  of  four  in  one  case,  and  four  times  out  of  five  in 
the  other.     The  truth  seems  to  be  as  follows : 

1.  Ultimately  the  probability  expresses  a  ratio,  the  ratio 

of  the  favorable  possibilities  to  the  whole  number.    If,  then, 

m  equals  the  whole  number  of  possibilities,  and  n  equals  the 

n 
favorable  ones,  then  —  equals  the  probability  of  the  event 


PROOF  187 

in  question.  Thus,  in  throwing  a  cube,  as  in  the  playing  of 
dice,  any  one  of  the  six  sides  may  turn  up.  The  probability 
that  any  one  side  will  turn  up  is  one-sixth. 

2.  This  ratio  may  be  found  in  many  cases  by  mathemat- 
ical analysis  of  the  possibilities,  as  in  games  of  chance — cards, 
dice,  lotteries,  etc.  In  such  cases  we  have  primarily  only  a 
study  of  permutations  and  combinations  and  a  finding  of 
certain  ratios.  Such  study  is  quite  independent  of  experi- 
ence, as  much  so  as  the  calculus  of  variations ;  and  the  re- 
sults reached  are  logically  valid,  even  if  they  are  practically 
worthless.  But  that  these  results  have  any  application  to 
experience  can  be  learned  onh^  from  experience.  In  practice 
the  important  averages  are  obtained  entirely  from  experi- 
ence, especially  from  statistics.  This  is  the  case  with  all 
the  averages  on  which  the  various  forms  of  insurance  de- 
pond,  and  with  social  averages  in  general.  We  find,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  that  certain  averages  hold  in  experience,  and 
from  these  we  calculate  what  we  may  expect. 

3.  The  probability  reached  determines  only  our  expecta- 
tion beforehand,  and  is  no  objective  quality  of  the  thing. 
Hence,  after  the  event  has  declared  itself,  the  previous  im- 
probability is  no  argument  against  it,  and  for  two  reasons: 
First,  the  event  which  was  antecedently  improbable  may  be 
attested  by  evidence  which  removes  all  doubt.  The  ante- 
cedent improbability,  according  to  the  life-tables,  that  a 
healthy  youth  will  die  during  the  year  is  not  the  slightest 
reason  for  denying  his  death  when  it  occurs.  Secondly, 
while  any  one  event  is  improbable  as  against  some  one  of 
all  the  rest,  it  may  be  no  more  improbable  than  any  other 
of  the  same  class.  If  one  were  about  to  throw  a  handful 
of  type  on  the  jloor,  any  definite  preannounced  order  of  fall- 
ing would  be  very  improbable,  but  no  more  so  than  any 
other  of  the  same  complexity.  Their  falling  so  as  to  form 
an  intelligible  sentence  would  be  no  more  improbable  than 


188  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

any  other  equally  complex  order  agreed  on  in  advance.  In 
general  the  intelligible  order  would  be  vastly  more  im- 
probable than  an  unintelligible  one,  as  anything  would  suf- 
fice for  unintelligence,  while  only  a  complete  determination 
of  all  the  letters  to  only  one  position  would  produce  the 
intelligible  order.  Delusion  at  this  point  is  common.  When 
all  the  other  possibilities  are  many  we  lump  them  all  into 
one  case,  and  then  feel  great  surprise  that  the  single  event, 
with  so  many  chances  against  it,  should  nevertheless  have 
succeeded  in  occurring.  In  all  such  cases  our  surprise  is  not 
logical  but  psychological. 

4.  The  probability  is  not  a  thing.  In  itself  the  thing  is 
fixed,  and  our  expectation  has  nothing  to  do  with  it.  In 
itself  the  probability  is  only  a  ratio,  or  the  fact  that  the 
average  of  events  is  such  or  such.  We  are  not,  then,  to 
view  the  probability  as  a  secret  something  which  deter- 
mines events.  This  blunder  is  often  made  in  moral  sta- 
tistics. After  finding  a  certain  average  in  human  affairs 
we  conclude  that  some  secret  fate  is  at  work.  Bv  the  aid 
of  a  little  rhetoric  we  easily  persuade  ourselves  that  an 
event  is  fully  accounted  for  when  the  law  of  averages  de- 
mands it.  There  may  be  an  average  in  birth  and  death  and 
crime,  but,  after  all,  the  average  is  not  responsible  for  any 
of  them.  It  takes  something  more  potent  than  an  average 
to  produce  typhoid  fever  or  to  crack  a  safe. 

5.  In  a  series  of  mutually  exclusive  events  conceived  as 
equally  possible  we  have  no  reason  for  expecting  one  rather 
than  any  other.  Conversely,  in  a  series  of  actual  events,  if 
we  find  one  form  recurring  much  oftener  than  calculation 
would  lead  us  to  expect,  we  conclude  that  something  favors 
that  form,  so  that  the  assumed  equal  possibility  is  not  true. 
Continued  runs  of  luck  in  games  of  chance  are  apt  to  awaken 
suspicion.  It  is  this  principle  which  underlies  inductive 
logic. 


PROOF  189 

6.  The  doctrine  of  probabilities  in  no  way  applies  to  first 
facts.  It  assumes  a  definite  set  of  facts  and  principles  as 
its  starting-point,  and  is  otherwise  meaningless.  It  would 
be  absurd  to  ask  what  would  be  probable  if  nothing  existed. 
Of  course  in  its  application  to  a  mechanical  system  it  is 
simply  an  expression  of  our  ignorance.  In  such  a  system 
everything  is  fixed.  The  actual  is  the  only  possible,  and  the 
non-actual  is  the  impossible. 

The  doctrine  is  often  misused  in  theistic  discussion.  If 
the  question  were  as  follows,  it  would  apply  :  Is  it  probable 
that  mechanical  elements  without  law  or  essential  relation 
to  intelligible  forms  would  ever  attain  to  them?  The 
answer  must  be,  No ;  but  to  make  the  conclusion  applica- 
ble it  must  be  shown  that  such  elements  ever  existed.  Why 
not  view  law  and  order  as  eternal,  which  we  no  more  ex- 
plain than  theism  explains  God  himself?  Atheism,  on  the 
other  hand,  often  misuses  the  doctrine  by  supposing  that  in 
infinite  time  all  conceivable  combinations  must  be  hit  upon. 
This  confounds  conceptual  with  actual  possibility,  and  breaks 
with  the  notion  of  law  upon  which  all  thinking  depends. 

So  much  for  the  theory.  Its  application  is  notoriously 
difficult.  The  very  greatest  mathematicians,  as  Pascal, 
D'Alembert,  and  Leibnitz,  have  stumbled  over  the  simplest 
principles.  Many  of  the  results  are  questionable  in  their 
best  estate,  not,  indeed,  in  the  mathematical  analysis,  but  in 
the  concrete  application.  Thus  the  rule  of  succession  given 
by  most  writers  without  suspicion  is  extremely  treacherous. 
This  rule  seeks  to  conclude  from  the  past  to  the  future,  or 

from  the  known  to  the  unknown.     Its  form  is  -,  where 

m  -f  2 

m  stands  for  the  total  number  of  occurrences  or  known  facts. 

Of  course  if  m  is  large  the  fraction  closely  approaches  unity 

or  certainty.     Suppose  the  question  to  be  the  probability  of 

the  sun's  rising  to-morrow  ;  m  is  the  number  of  past  risings, 


190  THEOKY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

and  the  probability  is  high.  But  the  reasoning  here  is  illu 
sory.  In  the  apphcation  of  this  law  we  only  give  the  ap 
pearance  of  logic  to  a  conclusion  we  have  otherwise  gained. 
Without  consulting  experience  as  to  the  application  of  the 
law,  and  thus  making  it  superfluous,  we  should  be  met  by 
Venn's  objection.  It  has  rained  for  three  days ;  I  have 
given  three  false  alarms  of  fire ;  and  I  have  fed  ray  chickens 
three  times  with  strychnine.  What  is  the  probability  for 
the  fourth  case  ?  By  the  rule  it  is  four-fifths  that  it  will  rain 
the  fourth  day,  that  the  neighbors  will  respond  to  the  next 
alarm,  and  that  my  chickens  will  die  the  next  time. 

Finally,  we  must  remember  that  the  most  remarkable 
coincidences  are  possible.  The  calculus  does  not  say  what 
must  be,  but  what  we  are  to  expect  in  advance.  In  fact, 
the  most  improbable  things  occur  every  day  without  sur- 
prising us ;  but  when  they  are  at  a  distance,  especially  in 
time,  it  is  possible  to  show  a  deal  of  acumen  in  contesting 
their  occurrence.  It  would  be  easy  to  gather  out  of  the 
recent  history  and  diplomacy  of  the  most  civilized  nations 
a  collection  of  things  so  strange  that,  when  tested  by  their 
antecedent  probability,  every  one  would  pronounce  them 
incredible.  No  more  treacherous  pitfall  besets  the  steps 
of  the  historian  than  the  temptation  to  construe  history 
on  the  basis  of  apriori  probability. 

Even  in  matters  of  pure  chance  runs  of  luck  occur,  and 
some  have  even  held  that  in  the  long-run  every  bank  and 
insurance  company  will  fail.  This  is,  of  course,  mistaken, 
as  it  rests  on  the  assumption  that  every  conceivable  possi- 
bility must  become  actual;  but  the  probability  alone  will 
not  save  a  bank  from  failure.  Jevons,  in  his  Principles 
of  Science,  mentions  a  case  in  which  three  computers  were 
set  to  calculate  the  place  of  a  star.  All  blundered,  and 
in  precisely  the  same  way,  yet  for  no  apparent  reason.  In 
history,  also,  remarkable  coincidences  abound  which  are  the 


PROOF  191 

chief  stock  in  trade  of  a  species  of  prophet.  By  a  little 
manipulation  any  name  or  series  of  names,  or  numbers, 
may  be  made  to  show  the  most  extraordinary  coincidence 
with  the  number  of  the  beast,  or  with  any  prominent  date 
or  striking  historical  event.  Professor  Benjamin  Pierce 
claimed  that  the  Neptune  disccwered  by  Leverrier  and 
Adams  was  not  the  planet  they  had  calculated  ;  that  the 
problem  admitted  of  a  double  solution,  but  that  at  the 
time  of  the  discovery  the  two  solutions  gave  a  common 
position  for  the  disturbing  planet,  and  thus  by  chance  the 
mistake  was  rectified.  The  previous  improbability  of  such 
an  event  vvas  indefinitely  great,  but  it  would  count  for 
nothing  against  direct  evidence  of  its  occurrence. 

The  conclusion  is  that  demonstration  is  an  ideal  which 
is  only  rarely  attained.  For  the  most  part  we  have  to  con- 
tent ourselves  with  probabilit}'^,  and  this  can  seldom  be  ac- 
curately determined.  The  calculus  of  probabilities,  while 
beyond  question  as  a  specimen  of  mathematical  analysis, 
has  only  a  limited  application  in  experience.  Doubt  here 
attaches  not  to  the  mathematics,  but  to  the  assumption  that 
the  mathematics  accurately  represents  the  facts.  "Without 
such  accuracy  the  longer  we  figure  the  further  we  go  astray. 


CHAPTER   IX 

DEDUCTION    AND    INDUCTION 

Sometimes  we  are  able  to  give  an  exact  definition  of  our 
objects,  and  have  such  an  insight  into  their  nature  that  we 
are  able,  on  the  mind's  own  warrant,  to  make  universal 
statements  about  them.  By  combining  the  definitions  and 
these  judgments  we  may  advance  to  still  other  judgments 
indefinitely.  In  such  cases  we  are  said  to  reason  deduc- 
tively, or  to  follow  the  deductive  method.  This  term  is  not 
the  happiest,  as  all  inference  is  a  deduction  of  consequences 
from  premises,  universal  or  particular,  but  the  usage  is 
fixed. 

The  most  striking  example  of  this  method  is  found  in 
the  mathematical  sciences — geometry,  algebra,  trigonometry, 
analytics,  calculus,  mechanics,  etc.  Here  we  have  certain 
ideas  of  space,  time,  motion,  number,  etc.,  which  are  per- 
fectly clear  in  the  sense  in  which  we  use  them,  and  concern- 
ing which  we  are  able  to  affirm  some  universal  principles 
on  our  own  warrant.  Setting  out  from  these  principles, 
perceived  by  intuition,  we  travel  far  and  wide,  and  build 
up  a  great  and  important  system  of  truth. 

If  it  were  possible  to  apply  the  same  method  to  the 
study  of  nature  we  should  in  like  manner  be  able  to  build 
up  an  apriori  science  of  nature.  Misled  by  the  analogy  of 
mathematics,  and  also  by  the  native  dogmatism  of  the  hu- 
man mind,  the  early  ages  followed  this  method  very  largely, 
with  vanity  and  vexation  of  spirit  for  the  main  result.    Yer- 


DEDUCTION    AND    INDUCTION  193 

bal  definitions  were  constructed  and  verbal  judgments  were 
formed,  and  tliese  were  united  into  fantastic  or  barren  sys- 
tems. This  sterility,  together  with  the  growth  of  critical 
reflection,  led  men  to  see  that  an  apriori  science  of  nature 
IS  impossible,  except  to  a  very  slight  extent. 

In  mathematics  we  have  a  knowledge  of  our  objects;  in 
physics  we  have  only  a  knowledge  about  our  objects.  In 
the  former  we  begin  with  a  constructive  definition ;  in  the 
latter  we  beg^in  with  a  denotative  name.  In  the  former  we 
define  our  objects  from  within;  in  the  latter  we  describe 
them  from  without.  In  the  outer  world,  then,  we  are  kept 
on  the  surface  of  things.  We  name  our  objects  and  recog- 
nize them,  but  we  are  not  able  to  penetrate  into  their  hid- 
den nature  so  as  to  say  what  it  implies.  Hence,  instead  of 
the  deductive  procedure  which  seeks  to  learn  particulars 
from  the  universal,  we  invert  the  process  and  seek  to  gather 
universals  from  the  particulars.  This  procedure  is  called 
induction. 

The  same  thought  may  be  set  forth  in  a  somewhat  differ- 
ent manner.  The  categories  of  our  thought  apply  to  all 
contingent  objects,  but  they  completely  express  none.  In 
so  far  as  the  categories  express  the  objects  an  apriori  sci- 
ence is  possible,  and  only  in  so  far.  Thus,  in  so  far  as  ob- 
jects have  regular  form,  outline,  area,  etc.,  we  can  determine 
their  properties  by  means  of  geometry.  In  so  far  as  they  are 
countable  the  category  of  number  applies  to  them,  and  they 
become  amenable  to  the  science  of  arithmetic.  In  so  far  as 
they  are  events  the  categories  of  time  and  causation  apply 
to  them ;  and  whatever  these  categories  imply  may  be  af- 
firmed apriori  of  events.  But  these  formal  relations  are  far 
from  exhausting  the  objects.  They  only  tell  the  general 
relations  which  must  obtain  among  objects,  without  re- 
vealing their  specific  nature.  Thus  space  applies  to  all  ex- 
ternal objects,  but  it  does  not  decide  what  objects  shall  be 

13 


194  THEOKY    OF   THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

external.  Time  and  causation  apply  to  all  events,  but  thej 
do  not  decide  what  the  events  shall  be.  Number  likewise 
applies  to  all  objects,  but  it  does  not  prescribe  the  nature 
of  the  things  numbered.  Hence  the  categories  which  give 
the  general  form  of  experience,  or  the  outlines  within  which 
alone  experience  is  possible,  are  entirely  compatible  with  a 
great  many  other  systems  of  specific  contents.  So  far  as 
the  abstract  categories  go,  any  number  of  other  worlds  are 
as  possible  as  the  actual  one.  Hence,  in  the  mastery  of  ex- 
perience, we  may  proceed  deductively  for  a  little  way,  but 
for  the  most  part  we  must  fall  back  on  induction. 

If  induction  is  to  mean  anything  more  than  simple  ex- 
perience, its  practical  problem  must  be  to  infer  general 
principles  from  particular  facts.  At  least  that  is  the  sense 
in  which  it  will  be  used  here.  The  tedious  and  sterile  dis- 
putes over  perfect  and  imperfect  induction  must  be  left  to 
those  who  deal  in  that  sort  of  thing. 

The  starting-point  of  induction  in  this  sense  is  the  world 
of  particular  facts,  which,  however,  are  already  qualified  and 
constituted  by  the  categories;  that  is,  it  is  the  world  of 
experience  as  it  exists  for  spontaneous  and  unreflective 
thought.  Objects  are  already  given  as  abiding  things  with 
fixed  meanings  and  in  fixed  relations,  and  the  work  of  in- 
ductive inquiry  can  never  be  to  discover  and  establish  these 
relations,  but  only  to  specify  them  and  render  them  more 
exact.  When  a  disciple  of  induction  fancies  it  possible  to 
begin  with  pure  experience  unqualified  by  any  work  of 
thought,  he  forgets,  if  he  ever  knew,  that  Hume  and  Kant 
have  lived.  The  constancy  and  continuity  of  objects  which 
first  produce  fixity  in  the  weltering  chaos  of  impressions, 
and  which  are  the  foundation  of  all  articulate  experience, 
are  no  such  matter-of-course  as  the  empiricist  thinks,  but 
are  a  notable  contribution  of  thought. 

And  even  assuming  the  world  of  abiding  things,  the 


DEDUCTION    AND   INDUCTION  195 

foundation  of  inductive  inference  is  commonly  misunder- 
stood. It  is  said  to  be  the  uniformity  of  nature,  or  that  like 
is  true  of  like,  or  some  such  general  formula.  Much  doubt 
might  be  raised  as  to  the  meaning  of  these  expressions.  If 
we  speak  of  the  uniformity  of  nature  as  a  whole,  we  exclude 
change  altogether ;  and  when  we  admit  non-uniformity  at 
all,  it  is  not  clear  what  it  is  that  is  uniform.  If  we  say  the 
true  principle  is  that  like  is  true  of  like,  it  would  be  easy  to 
define  like  in  such  a  way  as  to  turn  the  statement  into  tau- 
tology ;  and  if  we  allow  any  difference  in  the  likes,  who  can 
tell  what  effect  this  difference  will  have  on  the  outcome? 
If,  finally,  we  decide  that  the  principle  should  run  that  like 
antecedents  have  like  consequents,  or  like  causes  like  effects, 
we  are  by  no  means  out  of  the  woods  yet.  For  it  would 
seem  that  the  entire  universe  is  the  antecedent  of  every 
event ;  and  if  the  universe  be  the  same  the  event  should  be 
the  same;  but  if  the  universe  be  different  the  principle 
would  demand  a  different  effect.  We  can  get  nothing  out 
of  any  of  these  formulas  unless  we  assume  that  real  like- 
ness exists  among  things,  thus  constituting  real  kinds,  and 
that  the  cosmic  causality  proceeds  along  multitudinous 
lines,  each  of  which  may  be  traced  by  itself.  Without  the 
latter  assumption  we  inevitably  fall  into  the  above  dilem- 
ma. The  entire  universe,  as  antecedent,  is  either  the  same 
or  different;  and  in  either  case  we  are  grievously  tor- 
mented. 

But  whatever  the  principle  of  uniformity  may  mean,  it 
is  fruitless  in  actual  research  in  any  case.  It  is,  in  a  way, 
a  postulate  of  induction,  as  the  universality  of  law  and 
connection  is  a  postulate,  but  it  is  a  presupposition  of  all 
research  rather  than  a  guide  in  any.  The  actual  aim  in 
concrete  investigation  is  not  to  prove  that  nature  is  uni- 
form, but  to  find  what  the  uniformities  are.  In  deciding 
between  competing  theories,  the  uniformity  of  nature   is 


196  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

impartial,  and  for  the  manifest  reason  that  we  are  trying 
to  find  which  of  the  theories  expresses  the  uniformity. 
Again,  that  hke  is  true  of  like  is  equally  barren,  however 
true  it  may  be ;  for  the  real  question  is :  Are  there  any 
real  likes  or  kinds  as  distinct  from  superficial  resemblance, 
so  that  we  may  affirm  of  each  and  all ;  and  supposing  such 
kinds  to  exist,  what  are  they  ? 

The  actual  movement  of  thought  is  this :  We  tacitly 
assume  a  system  of  reality  with  fixed  laws  of  existence  and 
sequence  among  its  elements.  These  are  fixed  connections 
and  not  chance  conjunctions.  Without  this  assumption, 
there  is  no  order  for  thought  to  grasp,  and  the  conditions 
of  truth  do  not  exist.  With  this  assumption,  the  problem 
becomes  to  find  what  these  fixities  are,  or  how  we  are  to 
distinguish  between  the  chance  conjunctions  of  experience 
and  the  essential  connections  of  reality.  The  notion  of 
connection  is  contributed  by  reason.  The  nature  of  con- 
nection is  a  metaphysical  problem  which  only  reason  can 
solve.  The  actual  connections  are  mainly  to  be  discovered 
by  experience. 

And  here  the  mind  proceeds  on  the  principle  that  uni- 
formity or  frequency  of  coincidence  cannot  be  the  efi'ect  of 
chance,  but  must  itself  have  a  reason.  Such  coincidence 
becomes  a  problem  which  finds  a  solution  only  in  the  as- 
sumption that  it  rests  upon  one  of  the  uniformities  of  real- 
ity. This  is  the  fruitful  principle  of  inductive  reasoning. 
We  observe  coincidence,  and  explain  it  as  the  expression  of 
a  law.  Then  we  assume  that  the  cases  observed  are  speci- 
men ones,  and  extend  the  law  to  all  similar  cases.  This  is, 
in  brief,  the  logic  of  induction. 

This  result  ma}'  become  clearer  by  some  further  expo- 
sition. It  is,  first,  plain  that  inductive  inference  can  never 
get  clear  of  metaphysical  assumptions.  The  objective  or- 
der of  law  is  assumed,  not  proved.     Particular  laws  may 


DEDUCTION    AND    INDUCTION  197 

be  discovered,  but  the  general  assumption  of  law  and  order 
is  essential  to  any  inference  whatever. 

In  the  next  place,  it  is  plain  that  this  general  assump- 
tion is  only  a  presupposition  of  all  investigation,  and  is  no 
guide  in  any  actual  study.  Inductive  science  which  under- 
stands itself  confines  itself  to  discovering  the  uniformities 
of  things  and  events.  These  cannot  be  discovered  by  meta- 
physical speculation  of  any  sort,  and  the  nature  and  place 
of  the  ground  of  these  uniformities  can  never  be  deter- 
mined by  inductive  methods. 

Finally,  the  statement  concerning  chance  and  coincidence 
needs  some  further  explanation.  By  chance  is  not  meant 
lack  of  causation,  but  the  coincidence  in  an  event  of  mutu- 
ally independent  series  of  causation.  Thus  the  unpurposed 
meeting  of  two  persons  is  spoken  of  as  a  chance  one  when 
the  movement  of  neither  implies  that  of  the  other.  Here 
the  antithesis  of  chance  is  purpose.  Effects  in  nature  are 
ascribed  to  chance  when  the  elements  that  co-operate  in 
their  production  are  mutually  independent,  and  when  the 
effects  appear  simply  as  resultants  of  forces  which  have  no 
essential  relation  to  them.  With  reference  to  the  forces 
such  effects  are  by-products.  Thus  the  existence  of  water 
in  the  Atlantic  basin  might  be  referred  to  chance,  but  the 
union  of  oxygen  and  hydrogen  to  form  water  could  not  be 
so  referred.  The  former  might  seem  to  be  an  accidental 
resultant  of  mutually  independent  agencies,  but  the  latter 
is  founded  in  the  essential  nature  of  the  elements.  Here 
the  antithesis  of  chance  is  law.  Possibly  the  two  antitheses 
of  chance  are  really  one,  and  purpose  is  that  one. 

When  we  are  dealing  with  single  or  simple  facts  it  is  easy 
to  rest  in  the  reference  to  chance.  That  boulder  in  yonder 
field,  or  that  ledge  of  rocks,  expresses  no  purpose  and  no  law. 
It  is  the  outcome  of  laws,  to  be  sure,  but  the  laws  contain 
no  reference  to  the  boulder  in  them.    The  laws  would  be  all 


198  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT   AND   KNOWLEDGE 

that  they  are  if  there  were  no  boulder  in  existence.  For 
such  things  the  reference  to  chance  seems  to  suffice.  But 
when  the  facts  constantly  recur,  or  when  they  are  complex 
and  many  elements  converge  to  a  single  end,  we  are  no 
longer  able  to  rest  in  the  notion  of  chance.  As  soon  as  an 
event  which,  considered  in  itself,  might  seem  to  be  purely 
accidental,  recurs  frequently,  we  begin  to  demand  a  ground 
for  the  recurrence.  Even  runs  of  luck  in  games  of  chance 
cannot  become  continuous,  or  even  frequent,  without  excit- 
ing inquiry.  Regularity  or  frequency  of  coincidence  con- 
stitutes a  problem  and  demands  explanation.  It  is  this  prin- 
ciple which  underlies  the  logic  of  induction  and  gives  it  aU 
its  cogency. 

When,  then,  we  find  groups  of  marks  constantly  recur- 
ring in  nature,  we  assume  that  they  not  merely  occur  to- 
gether, but  that  they  belong  together,  so  that  where  one 
member  of  the  group  is  found  the  others  may  be  inferred. 
Or  when  we  see  a  given  kind  of  event  always  following  or 
accompanying  another,  we  conclude  that  we  have  a  fixed 
order  of  causal  sequence,  or  a  law  of  nature.  Only  thus  can 
we  explain  the  coincidence  so  as  to  find  rest  unto  our  souls. 

It  is  this  fact,  that  repeated  coincidence  becomes  a  prob- 
lem and  demands  explanation,  which  gives  meaning  to  the 
repetition  of  experiment,  or  the  extension  of  observation,  in 
induction.  Why  should  many  cases  prove  more  than  one  ? 
The  answer  lies  in  the  theory  of  probabilities,  which  is  only 
an  exposition  of  our  principle.  The  probability  that  we 
have  a  fixed  law  grows  with  the  number  of  cases  in  which 
it  is  found  to  hold.  This  is  the  fruitful  principle  of  induc- 
tive reasoning,  and  it  underlies  aU  the  inductive  methods. 

The  logic  of  induction  has  been  much  confused  by  the  not 
over-intelligent  strife  of  the  empirical  and  apriori  schools 
of  philosophy.  This  has  led  to  a  failure  properly  to  ana- 
lyze the  problem.     The  empiricist  has  claimed  that  indue- 


DEDUCTION    AND   INDUCTION  199 

tion  may  proceed  on  a  purely  empirical  basis,  without  any 
metaphysical  assumptions  whatever.  In  so  doing  he  has 
overlooked  the  metaphysics  immanent  in  experience,  and 
the  objectivity  of  thought.  The  apriorist,  on  the  other 
hand,  has  insisted  on  the  metaphysics,  but  has  failed  to  see 
that  the  practical  problem  of  discovering  the  actual  uni- 
formities of  coexistence  and  sequence  is  in  no  way  solved 
thereby.  The  debate  between  the  two  schools  must  be 
carried  on  at  another  point — the  possibility  of  experience  in 
general.  The  discovery  of  uniformity  ought  not  to  be  com- 
plicated with  metaphysical  questions  concerning  its  nature 
and  ground. 

The  inductive  problem  is  manifold,  but  has  three  leading 
directions.  First,  since  our  conceptions  of  concrete  things 
cannot  be  built  up  by  apriori  definition,  we  have  to  learn 
from  experience  what  marks  belong  together.  Finding  in 
many  cases  a  coincidence  of  marks  «,  h,  c,  we  conclude  that 
they  form  a  fixed  group  in  the  subject  8.  Of  course  all  we 
can  observe  is  that  they  come  together;  the  affirmation 
that  they  belong  together  is  a  surplus  by  which  the  mind 
seeks  to  transform  the  mere  conjunctions  of  experience  into 
a  rational  connection.  This  phase  of  induction  consists  in 
forming  the  notion. 

Or,  in  the  next  place,  we  may  assume  a  subject,  and  seek 
to  determine  its  properties  and  law.  In  rational  science 
we  are  able  to  infer  the  properties  of  a  subject  by  reflection 
upon  its  definition.  In  the  world  of  things  this  is  not  pos- 
sible. Thus,  oxygen,  magnetism,  electricity  are  not  concep- 
tions from  which  we  can  deduce  properties,  but  only  names 
for  the  subject  of  certain  properties  or  for  groups  of  phe- 
nomena. 

The  third  leading  inductive  problem  is  the  search  for 
causal  connection,  as  it  is  called.     This  is  so  important  that 


200  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

many,  following  Mill,  have  made  it  the  whole  of  induction. 
The  truth  is  that  the  real  practical  question  here  does  not 
concern  itself  at  all  with  the  idea  of  causation,  but  only  with 
the  uniformities  of  sequence.  The  mind  brings  the  idea  of 
causation  into  temporal  sequences  for  its  speculative  satis- 
faction, but  is  practically  no  wiser  on  that  account. 

If  all  phenomena  were  perfectly  simple  and  easily  dis- 
tinguishable it  would  be  easy  to  trace  the  order  of  connec- 
tion. Putting  6' and  ^for  the  factors  whose  connection  it 
is  proposed  to  establish,  experience  might  show  us  the  fol- 
lowing cases : 

First,  C  and  E  are  found  together  or  come  together,  and 
they  are  not  found  apart.  When  C  is  given  E  is  given,  and 
when  C  is  lacking  E  is  lacking.  We  conclude  that  they  be- 
long together. 

Secondly,  C  and  E  are  found  to  vary  together.  It  is  in- 
ferred that  they  belong  together. 

These  two  cases  involve  the  gist  of  experience  and  the 
sum  of  inductive  loo^ic.  All  else  is  device  for  discoverinof 
whether  (7  and  ^'do  really  thus  come  together  or  not.  The 
conclusion  from  coming  together  to  belonging  together  rests 
on  the  mental  necessity  of  seeking  a  ground  for  regularity 
or  frequency  of  coincidence. 

Mr.  Mill  has  expanded  the  matter  into  his  five  inductive 
methods  of  agreement,  difference,  agreement  and  difference, 
concomitant  variations,  and  residues ;  but  these  contain  no 
new  principle.  So  far  as  they  transcend  the  general  cases 
mentioned,  they  are  only  practical  devices  for  making  the 
subject-matter  amenable  to  logic.  The  result  of  all  tiie 
methods  is  only  to  show  that  C  and  E  are  found  together, 
or  come  together,  or  vary  together. 

All  of  this  is  very  simple  and  very  conclusive  when  ab- 
stractly considered.  We  have  only  to  regard  attentively 
our  symbols  to  see  how  clear  the  matter  is.      In  practice. 


DEDUCTION    AMD    INDUCFION  201 

however,  it  is  not  such  plain  sailing.  Phenomena  are  not 
simple  or  easily  distinguishable,  and  thus  it  is  difficult  to 
reduce  them  to  the  simplicity  demanded  by  our  logical  for- 
mulas. In  the  case  of  causal  connection  we  may  have  the 
following  cases : 

1.  C  is  followed  by  E ;  but  C  may  admit  of  analysis 
into  a  +  h  +  d ;  and  possibly  not  C  a&  a  whole,  but  some  one 
of  its  factors,  as  h,  is  the  real  cause.  Thus,  the  cause  of  the 
coagulation  of  the  blood  can  be  easily  named  in  a  general 
way,  but  when  we  seek  to  trace  the  exact  order  it  turns 
out  to  be  a  highly  involved  affair.  Then  we  hear  of  para- 
globulin  and  fibrinogen  and  fibrin  ferment,  with  a  sugges- 
tion of  one  or  two  outstanding  mysteries.  It  is  also  pos- 
sible that  (7  and  ^are  effects  of  a  common  cause,  and  have 
only  a  temporal  relation,  like  day  and  night. 

2.  E  may  be  lacking  when  6' is  given.  "We  cannot  con- 
clude that  C  is  not  the  cause,  for  there  may  have  been  a 
hinderance  which  prevented  C  from  having  its  appropriate 
effect. 

3.  E  may  be  given  without  C,  but  we  may  not  conclude 
that  C  is  not  a  cause  of  E,  but  that  it  is  not  the  only  cause. 

4.  Remove  (7,  and  E  remains.  Here  we  can  onlv  con- 
elude  that  C  is  not  the  preserving  cause.  Bad  air  may 
cause  disease  which  will  not  vanish  with  the  bad  air. 

In  practice,  then,  the  plurality  of  causes  and  the  com- 
plexity of  phenomena  make  it  difficult  to  reach  certain 
conclusions.  E  ma}'^  be  due  not  only  to  6\  but  to  C,  or  C\ 
or  Cy  And  C  itself  may  be  complex  and  contain  unsus- 
pected elements,  or  may  work  under  unnoticed  conditions, 
which  determine  the  effect.  Hence  we  need  to  reduce  our 
problem  to  simplicity  so  as  to  know  all  the  factors  at  work 
if  we  would  reach  any  valid  conclusion. 

This  is  far  from  easy  even  with  simple  physical  experi- 
ments.    In  the  laboratory,  defective  instruments,  personal 


202  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

equations,  impure  materials,  and  unsuspected  conditions,  as 
well  as  the  imperfect  analysis  of  the  problem  itself,  are  to 
be  guarded  against.  The  alchemists  doubtless  were  led  on 
and  led  astray  by  finding  traces  of  silver  in  the  lead  with 
which  they  worked.  In  the  complex  questions  of  physiol- 
ogy, hygiene,  and  society  we  cannot  be  too  circumspect. 
Here  the  facts  are  always  more  complicated  than  we  sus- 
pect, and  the  causes  are  many.  The  facts  take  on  an  un- 
real and  misleading  simplicity  in  our  statements,  and  only 
the  practised  thinker  discerns  the  illusion. 

For  instance :  There  are  more  arrests  at  one  time  than 
another,  and  the  conclusion  is  drawn  that  there  is  an  in- 
crease of  crime.  But  before  assenting  we  should  need  to 
inquire  whether  there  has  been  any  change  in  the  laws ; 
whether  crime  has  the  same  meaning;  whether  there  has 
been  any  change  in  the  vigilance  of  the  police;  what  the 
nature  of  the  crimes  is,  etc.  Or  it  is  said  that  there  are 
more  divorces  in  the  United  States  than  in  Europe  ;  and  the 
conclusion  is  drawn  that  the  relation  of  the  sexes  is  looser, 
or  that  the  marriage  vow  is  held  as  less  sacred.  But  here 
again  we  should  first  need  to  look  at  the  nature  of  the  di- 
vorce laws  in  the  two  countries ;  and  then  it  might  appear 
that  the  difference  in  the  laws  fully  explains  the  difference 
in  question,  and  it  might  also  appear  that  there  are  worse 
things  than  easy  divorce.  Except  when  critically  collected, 
so  as  to  reproduce  the  significant  facts,  and  critically  inter- 
preted, statistics  are  so  treacherous  that  it  is  not  without 
ground  that  the  proposition  has  been  made  to  view  statistics 
as  the  superlative  of  lies. 

In  this  whole  matter  of  induction  logic  has  an  important 
critical  function,  in  the  way  of  restraining  the  hasty  dog- 
matism of  the  human  mind.  From  a  few  cases  we  conclude 
to  all.  Negative  cases  are  overlooked  ;  positive  ones  strike 
the  imagination.     The  relation  of  positive  to  negative  is 


DEDUCTION    AND    INDUCTION  203 

ignored.  In  this  way  nostrums,  amulets,  charms,  unlucky 
days,  spells,  mind-cures,  etc.,  get  credit.  In  such  cases  we 
must  resort  to  statistics,  experiment,  accurate  observation, 
and  a  careful  analysis  of  the  problem.  With  minds  amena- 
ble to  reason  this  treatment  will  commonly  prove  effectual 
if  continued. 

In  matters  less  suggestive  of  superstition  and  mental 
pathology  it  is  common  to  overlook  the  complexity  of  the 
case  and  pick  out  that  antecedent  which  falls  in  with  our 
fancy,  or  interest,  as  the  sole  cause.  This  is  common  in 
politics  and  jeremiads.  The  perennial  discovery  that  the 
church  or  the  state  is  in  danger  is  of  this  sort.  The  enor- 
mous complexity  of  the  social  order  and  the  multitudinous 
factors  which  work  together  in  society  always  make  this 
sort  of  thing  possible.  The  partisan  politician  can  see  no 
other  source  of  public  weal  or  woe  than  the  political  admin- 
istration. If  any  one  chooses  he  can  find  the  great  cause 
of  our  social  ills  in  the  higher  education  of  women,  or  in 
the  failure  to  keep  the  seventh  day  instead  of  Sunday,  or 
in  the  refusal  to  put  the  name  of  God  into  the  Constitution, 
or  in  the  distrust  of  Providence  involved  in  lio^htnin^-rods 
and  life-insurance.  Such  barren  mockery  and  pretence  of 
reasoning  are  too  familiar  to  need  illustration.  The  only 
remedy  lies  in  improving  the  mental  type  by  forming  the 
logical  habit,  and  broadening  the  outlook  upon  the  facts  of 
nature,  life,  and  history. 

The  all-sufficient  logical  rule  for  induction  is  to  analyze 
our  fact  or  experiment  into  all  its  factors  if  possible,  and 
note  what  each  contributes  to  the  result.  When  many 
things  are  in  play  which  forbid  such  analysis  only  the  most 
general  conclusions  can  be  reached,  and  they  should  be 
loosely  held.  In  a  great  many  things  it  is  a  mark  of  wis- 
dom, and  often  also  a  mark  of  conscience,  not  to  have  an 
opinion. 


204  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

General  logic  can  lay  down  only  this  general  rule.  The 
practical  methods  of  dealing  with  various  classes  of  facts  so 
as  to  bring  them  under  the  rule  must  be  learned  from  the 
special  sciences.  In  this  sense  every  science  may  be  said  to 
have  its  own  method  and  its  own  logic.  The  value  of  the 
general  study  consists  in  getting  some  idea  of  what  proof 
means,  and  some  conception  of  the  general  rational  princi- 
ples involved. 

Some  traditional  quibbles  concerning  inductive  logic  re- 
main to  be  considered.  The  pure  formalist  objects  that  the 
inductive  conclusion  is  from  the  particular  to  the  universal, 
and  is  therefore  illogical.  If  nothing  but  logical  form  is  re- 
garded, or  if  absolute  demonstration  be  demanded,  this  is 
correct.  Some  does  not  prove  all,  and  inductive  conclusions 
are  never  demonstrated.  But  the  objection  is  more  sweep- 
ing than  the  objector  imagines,  for  it  denies  the  possibility 
of  any  reasoning  on  objective  reality  at  all.  Our  experience 
of  most  classes  of  things  is  limited  to  a  comparatively  few 
specimens ;  indeed,  we  have  not  experienced  the  class  at  all. 
Certain  things  with  a  measure  of  similarity  have  been  found 
in  experience;  the  passage  to  the  notion  of  a  class  which  is 
law-o'ivinfi:  for  all  is  a  venture  of  our  own.  And  even  of  the 
few  things  we  have  found  we  have  had  only  particular  ex- 
periences in  time ;  the  passage  from  these  particular  experi- 
ences to  the  conception  of  an  abiding  and  continuous  law  for 
the  things  is  a  very  special  venture  of  our  own.  Hence,  if 
the  objection  is  valid  we  are  shut  up  to  recital  of  our  sub- 
jective experiences,  and  thought  vanishes.  This  puzzle  is 
solved  by  the  facts  before  mentioned.  First,  the  mind  consti- 
tutes its  objects,  and  assumes  that  fixities  of  coexistence  and 
sequence  exist  in  reality.  Secondly,  the  mind  assumes  that 
a  continued  coincidence  of  certain  marks  in  many  cases 
proves  that  they  are  the  sign  of  a  class  or  law  and  belong 


DEDUCTION    AND    INDUCTION  205 

together.  It  is  this  notion  of  a  class  or  law  which  enables 
the  mind  to  pass  from  some  to  all ;  and  it  is  the  doctrine  of 
probabilities  which  allows  us  to  infer  that  a  given  group  of 
marks,  or  a  given  order  of  sequence,  is  a  true  universal. 
Hence  the  inductive  argument  unfolded  runs  as  follows  :  A 
is  P,  B  \s  P,  C  is  P,  D  is  P.  These  are  particular  obser- 
vations. But  A^  B,  C,  D  are  specimens  of  a  class  S ;  hence 
S  \s  P  and  all  S's  are  P. 

It  is  idle  to  quibble  over  this  logic.  The  necessary  par- 
ticularity of  experience  is  manifest.  The  impossibility  of 
resting  in  a  recital  of  particular  experiences  is  equally  man- 
ifest. Not  merely  our  theoretical  but  our  practical  life 
would  be  impossible  without  generalizing  particular  experi- 
ence into  universal  rules.  There  could  be  no  dependence 
on  anything,  and  nothing  would  teach  anything.  It  is 
hardly  worth  while  to  secure  formal  accuracy  at  this  cost. 
The  regret  which  the  living  thinker,  in  distinction  from  the 
closet  logician,  feels  at  this  point  is,  that  logic  has  no  rule 
for  deciding  when  coincidence  becomes  frequent  enough  to 
warrant  the  conclusion  to  a  law.  Some  coincidences  mean 
more  than  others.  Some  facts  lie  nearer  the  constants  of 
the  system  than  others.  Such  differences,  however,  must  be 
learned  from  the  subject-matter  and  the  general  drift  of  ex- 
perience. 

A  second  objection  proceeds  from  the  empiricists,  especial- 
ly Mr.  Mill.  He  insists  that  induction  proceeds  from  particu- 
lars to  particulars  directly,  and  not  through  the  notion  of  a 
class  or  law.  For  if  the  fact  that  some  die  proves  that  all 
will  die,  it  certainly  proves  that  J.  or  ^  or  C  will  die.  This 
plea  is  short-sighted.  It  may  be  true  psychologically,  but  it 
is  not  true  logically.  The  only  thing  that  warrants  us  in 
passing  from  one  case  to  another  is  the  assumption  that  both 
are  under  a  common  law,  or  are  cases  of  a  common  kind. 
Without  this,  thought  cannot  logically  move  at  all;  and  we 


206  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE 

can  draw  no  inference,  whether  from  some  to  all,  or  from 
some  to  some. 

A  third  scruple  concerning  the  logic  of  induction  con- 
cerns the  plurality  of  causes.  A  given  event,  it  is  said,  can 
have  only  one  cause;  and  hence  there  is  no  plurality  of 
causes.  This  scruple  arises  from  confounding  the  metaphys- 
ical and  the  inductive  problem.  A  pure  empiricism  is  in- 
deed open  to  this  objection,  but  it  does  not  lie  against  induc- 
tion as  we  have  defined  it. 

It  was  stoutly  contended  by  the  earlier  disciples  of  in- 
duction that  deduction  is  useless  in  research.  This  was  due 
to  the  historical  barrenness  of  the  purely  deductive  method. 
But  in  time  it  became  apparent  that  induction  alone  is 
helpless,  or  at  best  can  only  crawl.  Induction  may  help 
us  to  premises,  but  deduction  must  draw  the  conclusions. 
The  great  method  of  research  is  this  :  First,  we  observe  the 
facts  and  form  a  provisional  theory  or  hypothesis.  Sec- 
ondly, we  deduce  the  conclusions  from  the  hypothesis ;  and, 
thirdly,  we  compare  the  inferred  facts  with  the  observed 
ones.  Disagreement  disproves  the  theory.  Agreement 
strengthens  our  faith,  and,  when  extended,  confirms  it. 
Thus,  in  the  case  of  gravitation,  Newton  formed  the  hy- 
pothesis that  the  earth  draws  the  moon  according  to  the 
law  of  the  inverse  square.  He  then  calculated  the  moon's 
motion  on  that  supposition ;  and  this,  after  much  mistake 
and  uncertainty,  was  found  to  agree  with  the  observed  mo- 
tion. Of  course  in  all  such  work  our  experiments  and  cal- 
culations only  reveal  coincidence,  and  this  the  mind,  on  its 
own  warrant,  transforms  into  law. 

After  our  faith  in  a  theory  has  once  been  established, 
then  by  deduction  we  may  often  advance  beyond  any  pos- 
sible induction.  Thus,  in  astronomy  we  reach  results  de- 
ductively which  no  direct  observation  could  ever  discover. 


DEDUCTION    AND    INDUCTION  207 

In  ph3^sics,  too,  we  get  formulas  from  which  we  draw  con- 
clusions impossible  to  induction.  In  this  way  we  get  a 
hint  of  how  long  the  sun  can  emit  heat,  or  a  limit  beyond 
which  the  fluidity  of  the  earth  cannot  be  placed.  Or  we 
get  an  insight  into  molecular  phenomena  which  lie  beyond 
inspection,  or  we  conclude  to  the  future  of  the  physical 
system. 

What  has  been  said  of  inductive  inference  applies  equally 
to  the  formation  and  verification  of  hypotheses,  which,  in- 
deed, is  only  one  phase  of  induction,  and  cannot  be  sharply 
marked  off  from  induction  in  general.  There  is  no  accu- 
rate definition  or  consistent  use  of  the  term  h^^pothesis; 
but,  in  general,  we  may  define  an  hypothesis  as  an  ideal 
conception  whereby  the  mind  seeks  to  reduce  a  set  of  facts 
to  rational  order  and  make  them  intelligible  to  itself. 
Such  are  the  atomic,  the  nebular,  the  evolution  hypotheses. 
In  this  sense  hypothesis  is  synonymous  with  theory.  Hy- 
potheses vary  all  the  way  from  well-established  theories  to 
random  guesses.  There  is  enough  of  the  latter  element 
still  in  the  notion  to  make  it  possible  to  use  the  term  some- 
what disparagingly. 

As  in  the  case  of  proof,  logic  cannot  teach  invention. 
This  must  be  left  to  individual  insight.  Success  in  form- 
ing hypotheses  demands  a  familiarity  with  the  laws  of  the 
facts  in  question  ;  but  given  this  knowledge,  there  is  needed 
an  act  of  intuition  for  which  no  rule  can  be  given.  Never- 
theless, logic  can  give  advice  which  is  negatively  valuable. 
If  it  does  not  lead  to  the  true  theory  it  will  at  least  tend 
to  exclude  the  false  ones,  and  that  is  no  small  gain.  The 
demands  which  logic  makes  are  as  follows : 

1.  The  primal  duty  of  an  hypothesis  is  to  be  intelligible. 
Many  speculative  theories  sin  against  this  law. 

2.  The  hypothesis  must  be  deduced  from  the  facts,  and 
must  in  turn  explain  the  facts.     An  hypothesis  which  when 


208  THEOKY    OF   THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

gi-anted  throws  no  light  on  the  facts,  or  which  leaves  us  as 
badly  off  as  before,  is  a  waste  of  time — an  elephant  or  tor- 
toise under  the  earth, 

3.  Hypotheses  must  admit  of  something  like  proof  or 
disproof,  otherwise  there  is  no  limit  to  the  vagaries  of  the 
imagination. 

4.  An  hypothesis  must  fit  into  others  so  as  to  be  har- 
monious with  our  total  system  of  knowledge.  The  warrant 
for  this  demand  lies  in  the  assumption  that  things  constitute 
a  harmonious  system.  An  hypothesis  constructed  purely 
ad  hoc  without  harmony  with  known  laws  would  be  purely 
arbitrary,  a  fiction  rather  than  an  hypothesis. 

Hypotheses  are  of  two  kinds.  Some  are  simply  offered 
as  explanations  of  the  facts,  and  give  us  no  new  control  over 
the  facts.  They  are  necessary  to  satisfy  the  demand  for  a 
sufficient  reason  ;  and  when  no  competing  hypothesis  satis- 
fies the  mind  as  well,  we  hold  it  for  the  mental  peace  it 
brings,  although  we  cannot  use  it  to  advance  knowledge. 
Such  are  the  atomic  theory,  most  of  the  doctrines  of  ge- 
ology, many  of  the  theories  of  physics,  the  theistic  view  of 
the  world,  etc.  None  of  these  are  fruitful  in  practical  re- 
search ;  they  are  simply  theories  which  are  necessary  to 
explain  the  actual  order  of  facts.  Their  proof  or  verifica- 
tion consists  in  showing  that  the  facts  shut  us  up  to  such  a 
view. 

The  other  order  of  hypotheses  admits  of  deduction,  and 
puts  us  in  control  of  phenomena.  The  proof  of  these  con- 
sists not  merely  in  their  adequacy  to  the  observed  facts,  but 
in  the  agreement  of  their  implications  with  other  facts  not 
originally  contemplated  or  observed.  The  law  of  gravita- 
tion, the  ether  theory  of  light,  are  examples.  These  can  be 
used  to  advance  knowledge,  and  are  generally  mathemati- 
cal. Once  in  a  while  a  speculator  of  positivist  leanings  de- 
cides that  only  the  latter  class  of  hypotheses  is  to  be  allowed. 


DEDUCTION    AND    INDUCTION  309 

The  former  he  rejects  as  un verifiable  figments  of  fancy. 
Unfortunately,  he  does  not  always  have  the  clearest  notion 
as  to  what  verification  means ;  and,  besides,  he  has  the  hu- 
man mind  agamst  him. 

"When  the  facts  are  such  that  we  are  not  shut  up  to  one 
hypothesis,  but  any  one  of  many  is  possible,  then  it  is  our 
duty  to  hold  to  the  facts  and  leave  the  hypotheses  to  those 
unhappy  beings  who  must  have  an  opinion,  whether  they 
have  anv  right  to  one  or  not. 

With  regard  to  these  uniformities  which  thought  postu- 
lates and  induction  aims  to  discover,  a  word  of  caution  must 
be  uttered.  They  are  commonlv  called  laws,  a  term  in  the 
use  of  which  there  is  very  great  looseness.  The  laws  of 
motion,  of  force,  of  heredity,  of  variation,  of  wages,  of  prob- 
ability, etc.,  are  all  huddled  together  under  one  class,  and 
the  force  of  the  terra  serves  to  sanctify  the  mere  rough 
averages  of  statistics  and  vague  generalizations  from  ex- 
perience, as  well  as  the  laws  of  gravitation  and  chemical 
combination.  In  this  way  it  often  happens  that  the  prob- 
lem itself  is  put  forward  as  its  own  solution.  This  misuse 
of  the  term  law  is  a  large  part  of  the  stock  in  trade  of  the 
hearsay  scientist  and  philosopher.  It  is  important  to  recog- 
nize that  there  are  laws  and  laws,  and  that  some  laws  are 
only  consequences  of  others.  The  laws  of  phenomena  in 
general  are  of  this  sort.  The  motions  of  the  planets  might 
be  called  laws,  but  in  truth  they  are  only  facts  resulting 
from  some  back-lying  laws.  They  are  not,  therefore,  original 
constants  of  the  system,  but  secondary  results,  and  they 
might  be  indefinitely  modified  without  changing  the  sys- 
tem of  constants.  The  freezing  of  water  in  a  flame  is  a  de- 
parture from  the  phenomenal  order,  but  the  deeper  laws  of 
physics  find  illustration  in  such  a  fact.  For  the  fixity  of  the 
phenomennl  order,  which  is  practically  the  most  important 

of  all  fixities,  we  have  no  theoretical  security  whatever, 
u 


210  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE 

It  is  also  important  to  form  some  idea  of  what  law  is  to 
mean  in  any  case.  In  this  matter  the  connections  of  reason 
are  the  only  laws  perfectly  clear  to  us.  Where  these  can  be 
discovered  there  can  be  no  doubt.  But  most  of  the  con- 
junctions of  nature  are  no  implications  of  reason,  and  as  such 
are  contingent.     Of  them  we  may  hold  three  views  : 

1.  They  are  mere  coincidences  in  our  experience  and  ex- 
press no  order  of  reality.  They  are  not  laws  of  nature,  but 
accidents  of  our  experience. 

2.  They  are  laws  founded  in  some  opaque  necessity  in 
things  of  which  no  more  can  be  said. 

3.  They  are  uniformities  of  phenomena  which  represent 
no  necessity  but  the  orderly  forms  of  procedure  on  the  part 
of  some  being  back  of  them. 

It  is  impossible  to  rest  in  the  first  view,  and  between  the 
second  and  third  metaphysics  must  decide.  It  is  important 
to  note,  however,  that  the  necessity  posited  in  nature  is  not 
found  but  assumed,  and  many  considerations  make  it  prob- 
able that  it  is  not  there.  The  choice,  we  have  seen,  is  not 
between  chance  and  necessity,  but  between  necessity  and 
purpose.  But  it  is  well  to  keep  the  inductive  question  con- 
cerning the  actual  order  of  things  distinct  from  the  meta- 
physical question  concerning  the  nature  and  ground  of  that 
order.  Only  through  this  division  of  labor,  or  partition  of 
territory,  can  there  be  any  progress  towards  the  solution  of 
either  the  inductive  or  the  metaphysical  problem. 


CHAPTER  X 

EXPLANATION 

The  things  and  events  of  experience  are  such  that  the 
mind  is  unable  to  rest  in  them,  but  seeks  to  unite  them  in 
ways  which  shall  satisfy  its  own  nature  by  accounting  for 
them.     This  is  explanation. 

Explanation,  then,  is  only  a  special  phase  of  the  general 
mental  demand  for  systematic  connection.  The  driving 
force  in  it  is  the  desire  for  connection  and  totality,  or  the 
desire  for  a  rounded  and  finished  system.  It  has,  however, 
special  forms  which  make  it  desirable  to  devote  special  at- 
tention to  it.  Some  of  the  chief  interests  of  thought  centre 
in  this  subject,  and  some  of  our  worst  aberrations  have 
their  source  in  misunderstandings  of  the  same.  And  here 
too  logic  has  an  important  function  in  analyzing  this  notion, 
so  as  to  understand  its  implications  and  prevent  the  mind 
from  losing  its  way.  We  approach  the  subject  in  a  round- 
about manner. 

Our  so-called  knowledge  is  often  said  to  be  made  up  of 
facts  and  theories.  Whether  we  shall  allow  this  statement 
depends  on  what  we  mean  by  a  fact.  Many  a  notion  might 
represent  either  a  fact  or  a  theory,  according  to  our  stand- 
point. For  instance,  is  the  Copernican  doctrine  a  fact  or  a 
theory  ?  Is  the  law  of  gravitation  a  fact  or  a  theory  ?  Is 
not  any  proved  hypothesis  a  fact  rather  than  a  theory  ? 
A  better  statement  would  be  that  knowledge  is  made  up 
of  the   data  of  experience  and   their  interpretation.     Of 


212  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

course  a  scruple  might  be  raised  concerning  ttie  data  them- 
selves, on  the  ground  that  they  are  not  free  from  subjec- 
tive modification,  but  it  would  be  a  fruitless  refinement  at 
this  point.  It  is  sufficiently  accurate  to  say  that  knowl- 
edge is  made  up  of  the  data  of  articulate  experience,  and 
in  this  sense  of  facts  and  their  interpretation.  That  the 
distinction  is  purely  subjective  is  manifest. 

In  estimating  the  value  of  any  system  of  knowledge — say, 
of  physical  science — we  need  to  keep  this  fact  in  mind,  and 
distinguish  between  science  as  fact  and  science  as  interpre- 
tation. The  former  alone  abides.  The  phenomena  and 
their  known  laws  are  the  abiding  and  valuable  part  of 
science.  They  aie  the  valuable  part ;  for  when  we  have  the 
laws  of  phenomena  we  can  read  the  past,  previse  the  fut- 
ure, and,  by  arranging  the  antecedents,  we  can  determine 
the  consequents.  Given  a  knowledge  of  the  laws  of  chemi- 
cal change  and  combination,  we  have  all  that  is  practically 
valuable  in  chemistry.  The  atomic  theory  as  a  metaphysi- 
cal fact  has  no  practical  value.  Given  the  laws  of  heat  or 
electricity,  it  is  practically  indifferent  what  theory  we  adopt. 
Even  in  gravitation  the  law  is  everything,  the  theory  is 
nothing.  The  practical  astronomer  applies  the  law,  and 
his  calculations  are  valid  so  long  as  the  law  holds,  no  mat- 
ter how  the  planetary  motions  are  produced. 

The  fact  side  too  contains  the  abiding  element  of  sci- 
ence. There  have  been  rival  theories  of  light,  but  optical 
phenomena  are  ever  the  same.  Chemical  theory  has  changed 
again  and  again,  and  can  hardly  be  said  to  have  reached  a 
final  form  even  yet.  The  text-books  do  indeed  give  us  the 
most  elaborate  representations  of  the  inner  structure  of  the 
molecules,  but  except  as  convenient  practical  fictions  only 
the  uncritical  dogmatist  believes  in  them.  Meanwhile  the 
laws  and  facts  of  chemical  change  remain  w^hat  they  always 
have  been ;  no  fact  has  been  overturned  or  in  any  way  set 


EXPLANATION  213 

aside.  Geolog}''  has  abounded  and  still  abounds  in  differ- 
ing opinions :  but  the  strata  and  their  contents  are  still 
there,  and  they  would  remain  there  if  we  repudiated  every 
dogma  of  theoretical  geology.  The  estimates  of  time  re- 
quired for  certain  geological  changes  vary  all  the  way  from 
a  few  million  years  to  something  like  eternity,  but  the 
changes  tliemselves  are  undoubted.  No  more  are  the  gen- 
eral theories  of  light,  heat,  magnetism,  and  electricity  res- 
cued from  all  doubt  and  obscurity.  In  all  these  fields  many 
useful  facts  and  phenomenal  laws  are  known,  but  the  ex- 
planation, the  rational  comprehension,  is  lacking.  Phenom- 
ena occur  in  certain  ways  or  under  certain  conditions,  but 
we  know  not  how  nor  why.  The  present  state  of  scien- 
tific theory,  even  in  the  inorganic  sciences,  is  one  of  fer- 
mentation with  no  signs  of  a  speedy  settling. 

Of  all  this,  however,  the  quack  and  the  hearsay  scientist 
have  no  suspicion.  With  them  facts,  theories,  and  surmises 
mingle  in  one  inextricable  chaos,  and  all  alike  appear  as  in- 
vincible science.  This  pathetic  devotion,  born  of  ignorance, 
has  made  science  and  scientific  the  great  question-begging 
epithets  of  our  time.  In  truth,  however,  a  large  part  of 
what  is  called  science  is  not  a  fact,  but  a  theor}'  about 
facts — a  set  of  theoretical  conceptions  whereby  the  mind 
seeks  to  make  the  facts  intelligible  to  itself,  and  to  meet  its 
demand  for  a  sufficient  reason.  But  these  theories  have 
changed  again  and  again.  Very  little  scientific  theory  is 
now  what  it  was  a  generation  ago,  but  for  the  ignorant 
and  the  dogmatic  the  current  theory  is  science  now  as  the 
current  theory  was  science  then. 

If  now  we  ask  for  a  theory  which  shall  be  final  we  must 
admit  that  we  have  very  little  that  is  secure  from  over- 
throw. Of  course  all  such  theorizing  rests  on  the  assump- 
tion that  the  normal  processes  of  our  thinking  are  valid  for 
reality,  so  that  what  the  mind  infers  from  facts  must  also 


214  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE 

be  a  fact,  and  what  we  need  to  explain  the  facts  is  neces- 
sary to  their  existence.  This  in  itself  is  an  enormous  as- 
sumption, but  even  on  the  basis  of  this  assumption  it  is 
hard  to  reach  finality.  The  trouble  is  that  the  facts  are 
rarely  so  unambiguous  as  to  exclude  competing  interpreta- 
tions. In  reading  the  past  we  can  only  say,  If  we  know  all 
the  significant  facts,  and  if  there  has  been  no  change  in  the 
ways  of  working,  such  or  such  was  the  case.  But  in  truth 
all  such  reading  is  simply  a  declaration  of  what  we  should 
expect  to  find  in  the  past  on  the  basis  of  our  present  knowl- 
edge. "Whether  the  fact  was  really  so  is  quite  another 
affair.  If  we  should  discover  new  facts,  or  should  get 
positive  testimony  in  place  of  the  present  circumstantial 
evidence,  we  might  change  our  thought  of  the  past  very 
profoundly.  In  that  case,  again,  no  scientific  fact  would 
be  disturbed,  but  an  inference  would  be  rectified  which  was 
based  on  imperfect  knowledge.  The  old  conclusion  would 
still  be  valid  from  the  old  standpoint,  but  it  would  be  modi- 
fied, or  set  aside,  by  the  larger  knowledge.  To  take  an  ex- 
treme illustration,  if  any  one  should  persuade  himself  that 
a  divine  record  sets  forth  that  the  earth  was  really  fitted  up 
in  six  ordinary  days  there  would  be  nothing  in  that  to  modi- 
fy any  geologic  fact,  however  much  it  might  affect  geologic 
theories.  We  should  never  reach  such  a  view,  indeed,  from 
a  study  of  the  rocks ;  but  this  study  does  not  tell  us  what 
was,  but  only  what  we  should  judge  to  have  been  on  the 
basis  of  geologic  appearance. 

This  matter  of  reading  the  past  is  further  complicated 
by  a  doubt  whether  any  system  of  law  can  give  any  ac- 
count of  its  origin  and  history.  An  order  of  law  in  a  mov- 
ing world  would  necessarily  have  a  virtual  past.  Thus,  if 
we  should  suppose  the  solar  system  created  outright,  the 
equations  which  expressed  the  positions  and  motions  of  the 
phmets  at  the  moment  of  creation  could  be  read  backward 


EXPLANATION  215 

as  well  as  forward ;  but  the  backward  reading  would  refer 
to  a  virtual  past,  not  a  real  one.  The  same  is  true  for  any 
order  of  law  in  a  changing  world.  It  admits  of  being  read 
backward,  and  there  is  no  sure  test  whereby  we  can  dis- 
tinguish the  virtual  from  the  real  past.  Our  analytic  thought 
naturally  thinks  that  the  simple  elements  preceded  com- 
pounds, but  this  is  only  a  logical  precedence.  We  find  no 
warrant  for  turning  it  into  a  temporal  relation.  If  there 
have  always  been  chemical  elements,  for  all  we  can  say 
they  may  always  have  been  chemically  active  and  chemi- 
cally united  in  any  order  of  complexity. 

If  we  occupy  a  religious  standpoint,  and  think  of  the 
world  as  created,  we  are  no  more  successful  in  demonstrat- 
ing what  the  beginning  must  have  been.  That  everything 
must  have  looked  brand-new  is  a  thesis  for  which  astonish- 
ingly little  proof  can  be  advanced.  If,  finally,  we  call  in  the 
divine  veracity  we  soon  find  that  veracity  is  a  very  slippery 
notion  when  we  get  away  from  the  familiar  relations  of  daily 
life ;  and,  besides,  it  is  very  doubtful  if  that  veracity  is  under 
bonds  to  save  us  from  the  necessity  of  looking  well  to  our 
logical  goings.  Dogmatizing  on  origins  is  logically  a  very 
perilous  business.  It  generally  ends  in  mistaking  the  sim- 
plifications of  analysis  for  the  original  forms  of  existence. 

If  we  are  in  such  a  plight  in  the  physical  field,  where  the 
facts  are  relatively  simple,  and  where  we  seem  to  be  near  to 
the  constants  of  the  system,  matters  are  far  worse  when  we 
reach  the  human  field  of  history.  Here  the  range  of  possi- 
bility is  so  great,  and  the  facts  are  so  ambiguous,  or  so  im- 
perfectly known,  that  little  trust  may  be  placed  in  any  the- 
ory which  does  not  rest  on  positive  evidence.  Plausible 
suggestions  are  possible  in  explanation  of  any  historical  fact. 
Plausible  constructions  of  human  origins  are  always  possi- 
ble in  terms  of  the  reigning  speculation.  Showy  philoso- 
phies of  history  are  easily  constructed  by  the  aid  of  a  little 


216  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT   AND   KNOWLEDGE 

judicious  selecting  and  ignoring.  Improvising  ancient  his- 
tory is  an  easy  and  pleasing  task.  But  in  all  these  matters 
the  trained  thinker  remains  a  doubting  Thomas  until  some 
positive  evidence  is  adduced. 

Historical  explanations  are  uncertain  enough  when  deal- 
ing with  objective  facts.  When  it  comes  to  psychological 
motives  and  intentions  the  difficulty  is  indefinitely  increased. 
This  is  a  great  boon  to  literary  commentators,  who  find  in 
this  fact  a  chance  to  market  their  imaginary  wares.  The 
same  fact  makes  possible  the  whitewashing  of  almost  any 
historical  infamy  which  lies  at  a  distance.  Some  facts  are 
so  purely  objective  as  to  call  for  no  deep  scrutiny  of  mo- 
tives. That  A  bought  a  piece  of  land  from  j5  is  a  transac- 
tion which  is  easily  comprehended ;  but  that  Henry  VIII. 
divorced  his  wives  is  a  fact  of  another  sort,  and  one  which 
admits  of  much  explaining. 

It  is  this  uncertainty  and  unfruitfulness  of  most  theories 
which  leads  both  to  the  positivist  restriction  of  thought  and 
knowledge  to  the  observation  and  registration  of  phenom- 
ena, and  also  to  the  periodical  outbreaks  of  scepticism.  The 
mind,  finding  itself  foiled,  or  losing  itself  in  inconsistency, 
for  a  time  despairs  until  nature  reasserts  itself,  and  once 
more  Sisyphus  upheaves  his  stone. 

These  rather  general  remarks  illustrate  the  mental  desire 
for  explanation,  and  also  suggest  the  need  of  caution  in  its 
gratification.  We  must  beware  of  getting  through  too  soon, 
and  of  resting  in  plausible  but  fictitious  theories.  We  have 
now  to  treat  the  matter  more  in  detail. 

First  of  all,  a  purel}^  formal  type  of  explanation  must  be 
noticed  in  w^hich  the  mind  makes  motions  but  no  progress. 
It  merely  gives  the  form  of  ground  or  reason  to  the  fact 
itself.  The  qualities  and  activities  of  a  thing  are  referred 
to  its  nature,  which  is  posited  as  their  hidden  ground.    This 


EXPLANATION  217 

is  often  derided  by  amateur  critics,  who  are  not  too  dull  to 
see  its  unprogressive  nature,  but  are  too  dull  to  see  its  ra- 
tional necessity.  There  is  certainly  no  progress  in  explain- 
ing chemical  action  by  affinity  or  gravitation  by  gravity, 
but  there  is  a  formal  satisfaction  of  the  mental  demand  for 
a  reason.  Without  it  the  idea  of  connection  vanishes,  and 
the  events  float  loose  and  groundless. 

Explanation  which  deals  with  real  existence,  in  distinc- 
tion from  pedagogical  explanation,  has  several  stages  which 
deserve  to  be  distinguished.  The  lowest  consists  in  refer- 
ring the  fact  to  a  class  or  law.  We  explain  the  fall  or 
floating  of  bodies  by  reference  to  gravitation.  Chemical 
changes  are  referred  to  affinity,  magnetic  phenomena  to 
magnetism.  In  this  way  we  gather  our  facts  into  classes 
or  refer  them  to  laws,  and  when  this  is  done  we  count  the 
facts  explained. 

It  is  plain  that  this  explanation  gives  no  insight  into  the 
nature  of  the  fact.  Its  sole  value  is  its  loo^ical  convenience. 
It  rescues  the  facts  from  their  isolation,  so  that  they  are  no 
longer  separate  and  lonel}'^  in  our  mental  system,  but  are 
recognized  as  cases  of  a  kind  or  law.  At  the  same  time 
the  facts  remain  as  separate  and  distinct  as  ever,  for  classifi- 
cation makes  no  identity  and  abolishes  no  difference.  They 
also  remain  as  mysterious  as  ever ;  for  the  nature  of  a  given 
fact  is  in  no  way  revealed  by  the  discovery  that  there  are 
many  other  facts  of  the  same  kind. 

Both  of  these  truths  are  often  overlooked,  and  classifi- 
cation is  supposed  to  reproduce  some  actual  process  in 
reality.  The  plurality  and  difl'erence  of  the  facts  disap- 
pear in  the  unity  and  simplicity  of  the  class  term,  and  hence 
there  often  arises  the  fancy  that  the  universal  or  law  rep- 
resents the  original  from  which  the  pai'ticular  realities  or 
events  proceed.  Still,  it  is  plain  that  classification  in  no 
way  changes  the  facts  or  reveals  their  concrete  source.     If 


218  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

we  unite  all  cows,  sheep,  goats,  etc.,  under  the  common  term 
animal  we  manifestly  do  nothing  to  the  cattle  themselves ; 
least  of  all  do  we  identify  them.  It  is  equally  plain  that 
from  the  general  term  no  actual  case  can  be  deduced.  The 
terra  applies  to  all  cases,  but  implies  none.  The  individuals 
are  subordinated  to  the  class,  but  they  are  not  produced  by 
the  class.  The  relation  is  logical,  not  ontological ;  and  when- 
ever we  wish  to  think  the  facts  as  they  are  we  have  to  re- 
call all  the  quahtative  and  contextual  differences  which 
have  disappeared  from  the  class  term,  but  which  are  neces- 
sary to  constitute  the  individual.  Very  much  of  our  think- 
ing, as  we  have  seen,  is  symbolic,  and  we  have  no  occasion 
to  go  beyond  the  generalities  of  the  class.  Hence  we 
easily  mistake  the  symbol  for  the  thing,  and  logical  rela- 
tions for  real  relations.  When  to  this  fact  we  add  the 
element  of  necessity,  which  for  crude  thought  lurks  in  the 
notion  of  law,  it  is  easy  to  think  that  classification  is  a 
complete  explanation. 

In  fact,  the  mental  value  of  such  explanation  lies  entirely 
in  its  convenience,  and  in  reducing  many  cases  to  one  sym- 
bolic expression.  And  as  the  mind  seldom  has  occasion  to 
go  beyond  the  symbol,  or  to  think  it  out  into  concrete  de- 
tail, such  a  reduction  to  unity  or  simplicity,  or  such  assimi- 
lation to  familiar  matter,  is  commonly  all-sufficient.  When 
we  hear  of  some  unfamiliar  mental  fact  and  are  able  to  see 
it  as  a  modification  of  some  familiar  principle,  it  loses  its 
mystery,  and  we  ask  no  more.  Or  when  the  various  ener- 
gies of  the  physical  system  are  reduced  to  some  form  of 
movement  we  fancy  that  we  have  effected  a  great  simplifi- 
cation of  the  system,  and  have  gone  far  towards  explaining 
it.  In  fact,  we  only  simplify  our  ideas  and  not  the  sys- 
tem. When  we  come  to  deal  with  the  realities  themselves 
we  find  all  the  complexity  coming  back  again,  if  not  in. 
the  idea,  then   in   its   specification   and  application.      The 


EXPLANATION  219 

concrete  problem  cannot  be  reduced  to  lower  terms  by  clas- 
sification. 

Thus,  in  the  case  of  physical  energies  we  say  they  are  all 
modes  of  motion.  But  wh}^  should  these  modes  be  many, 
and  in  what  do  they  consist?  Or  how  does  the  passage 
from  one  form  of  motion  to  another  cause  the  qualitativ'e 
change  involved,  say,  in  passing  from  electricity  to  chemical 
affinity  ?  The  energies  are  all  one  in  the  catalogue,  but  in 
reality  they  remain  as  distinct  as  ever,  except  that  in  certain 
cases  one  energy  may  be  displaced  by  another  qualitatively 
unlike  but  quantitatively  equivalent. 

Or  suppose  we  say  that  all  the  problems  of  physics  are 
cases  of  the  redistribution  of  matter  and  motion.  Here 
we  have  a  generalization  much  admired  but  not  over-fruit- 
ful. Ideas  are  simplified  to  the  last  degree,  but  the  facts  re- 
main as  complex  as  ever.  The  complexity  eliminated  from 
the  ideas  must  be  brought  back  in  the  collocation  of  the  mat- 
ter and  direction  of  the  motion,  and  there  we  are  as  much 
in  the  dark  as  before.  That  collocation  and  direction  now 
become  the  problem.  The  simple  existence  and  mobility  of 
matter  imply  no  specific  grouping  or  movement.  One  seek- 
ing to  invent  a  machine  for  a  specific  purpose  would  not  be 
much  advanced  b}''  learning  that  his  problem  involved  only 
a  redistribution  of  matter  and  motion. 

When  we  are  further  told  that  all  evolution  proceeds  by 
differentiation  and  integration,  from  the  like  to  the  unlike, 
from  the  simple  to  the  complex,  from  the  homogeneous  to 
the  heterogeneous,  we  may  possibly  have  a  valid  description 
of  the  appearance  and  of  the  general  form  of  the  movement ; 
but  we  have  no  explanation  of  the  concrete  process.  We 
should  need  to  know  how  the  simple  can  ever  become  com- 
plex, or  the  homogeneous  heterogeneous,  unless  complex- 
ity or  heterogeneity  were  already  at  least  implicitly  there. 
Moreover,  such  vague  formulas,  when  they  claim  to  be  more 


320  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

than  superficial  descriptions,  just  because  they  apply  to  every- 
thing, account  for  the  peculiarities  of  nothing.  If  everything 
had  been  different  tliey  would  have  applied  equally  well- 
Thev  contain  no  account  of  direction  and  no  g-round  of  mo- 
tion.  As  the  laws  of  motion  are  valid  for  all  motions,  sup- 
posing them  to  arise,  while  they  account  for  none,  so  these 
formulas  may  apply  in  a  general  way  to  many  things ;  but 
the  true  ground  of  things  must  be  sought  elsewhere.  In 
short,  in  a  necessary  system  any  all-explaining  principle 
law  or  cause  really  explains  nothing  unless  all  the  specific 
conditions  are  brought  in,  and  b}'  that  time  the  simplicity 
vanishes.  The  explaining  cause  must  become  as  complex 
as  the  explained  effect,  or  there  can  be  no  explanation. 

If,  finally,  natural  selection  is  offered  as  an  explanation 
of  living  forms  we  have  no  difficulty  in  admitting  the  prin- 
ciple as  soon  as  we  understand  it.  For  when  the  anthro- 
pomorphism is  climated  from  selection  the  principle  re- 
duces to  the  survival  of  the  fittest ;  and  when  the  ambiguity 
is  eliminated  from  the  latter  principle  it  in  turn  reduces  to 
the  statement  that  the  able  to  survive  survive,  and  that  the 
unable  to  survive  do  not  survive;  or  that  things  survive  in 
the  measure  of  their  abilit}^  to  survive.  One  must  be  dull 
indeed  not  to  see  that  this  is  undeniable ;  but  unless  we 
are  able  to  point  out  in  particular  cases  what  the  element 
of  fitness  is  which  leads  to  survival,  or  the  element  of  un- 
fitness which  leads  to  non-survival,  we  make  no  progress. 
We  know  that  a  thing  is  fit  or  unfit  because  it  survives  or 
fails  to  survive,  and  then  we  use  this  hypothetical  fitness 
or  unfitness  to  explain  the  survival  or  non-survival.  Such  a 
deep  draught  at  the  well  of  truth  could  hardly  prevent  a 
fairly  critical  mind  from  speedily  thirsting  again. 

And  if  we  could  point  out  the  specific  fitness  or  unfitness 
in  specific  cases  we  should  still  be  far  from  any  real  insight. 
We  should  not  see  how  the  fitness  or  unfitness  arises,  nor 


EXPLANATION  22l 

how  the  survivals  and  non-survivals  so  fall  out  that  an  or- 
derly system  of  organic  existence  emerges,  nor  why  the  bio- 
loo-ical  movement  should  take  the  actual  direction.  Yet 
this  is  what  we  need  to  know  if  we  are  to  get  any  real  in- 
sight into  the  world  of  organic  forms.  The  arrival  of  the 
fit  is  a  greater  problem  than  its  survival ;  and  the  non-sur- 
vival of  the  unfit  is  a  matter  of  course,  but  is  irrelevant  to 
the  real  issue. 

Explanation  by  classification  is  very  important  as  a  first 
step  in  the  mastery  of  experience,  but  only  as  a  first  step. 
A  second  stage  of  explanation  consists  in  connecting  a  fact 
with  its  antecedents  as  the  result  of  a  law  or  laws.  In  the 
previous  stage  a  fact  is  viewed  as  a  case  of  a  law ;  here  it  is 
exhibited  as  the  outcome  of  a  law.  This,  however,  is  impos- 
sible except  in  cases  where  the  law  can  be  so  definitely  con- 
ceived in  its  meaning  and  the  form  of  its  application  and 
variation  as  to  admit  of  deduction  from  it.  In  other  cases 
we  have  merely  an  example  of  a  law  without  being  able  to 
deduce  it.  But  when  we  can  deduce  an  effect  from  a  given 
condition  according  to  a  known  law,  or  can  trace  the  co-op- 
eration of  several  laws  in  a  given  effect,  we  have  a  sense  of 
insight  peculiarly  satisfying,  as  when  we  trace  the  formation 
of  dew  on  a  clear  cool  night  to  several  laws  concerning  the 
radiation  of  heat,  specific  heat,  the  condensation  of  water- 
vapor,  etc.  When  we  can  thus  trace  a  fact  to  known  laws, 
so  that  it  is  seen  to  be  their  outcome  under  the  circum- 
stances, we  view  the  fact  as  explained. 

This  form  of  explanation  is  an  advance  on  the  preceding 
one.  There  the  event  was  simply  a  case  of  a  kind  of  which 
no  more  could  be  said.  Here  the  event  is  understood,  at 
least  in  its  proximate  origin.  Given  the  antecedents  we 
trace  the  consequences,  or  conversely.  In  the  former  case 
we  ask  what  consequents  must  result  from  the  antecedents 


223  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

according  to  known  laws.  In  the  latter  we  ask  what  the 
antecedents  must  have  been  to  produce  the  actual  conse- 
quents. But  whether  we  trace  the  antecedents  to  their 
consequents,  or  the  consequents  to  their  antecedents,  the 
essence  of  the  explanation  consists  in  connecting  a  fact  or 
state  of  things  with  other  facts  or  states  of  things  according 
to  known  laws.  Then  we  see  how  one  state  of  things  arises 
out  of  another  state  of  things,  and  how  a  present  state  of 
things  at  once  points  to  a  past  state  of  things  and  foretells  a 
future  state  of  things.  Of  course  such  explanation  is  h3^po- 
thetical,  and  supposes  that  we  know  all  the  significant  laws, 
and  that  they  are  valid  for  both  past  and  future. 

This  kind  of  explanation  is  relatively  independent  of 
metaphysics.  It  deals  simply  with  the  world  of  experience. 
Among  the  coexistences  and  sequences  of  this  world  we  find 
an  order  of  law,  and  by  means  of  it  we  seek  to  unite  the 
various  states  and  factors  of  the  system  into  a  connected 
whole.  "Whatever  our  metaphysics,  the  phenomena  and 
their  laws  remain  the  same,  and  so  long  as  these  remain  it 
will  be  desirable  to  trace  the  phenomenal  order  in  both 
space  and  time. 

This  might  be  called  pre-eminently  scientific  explanation. 
It  need  not  concern  itself  about  metaphysics  or  causation, 
except  in  the  sense  of  empirical  conditions.  It  is  possible 
to  use  causation  in  an  empirical  sense ;  that  is,  to  name  the 
empirical  condition  which  under  the  assumed  circumstances 
led  to  the  fact,  and  this  condition  we  may  call  the  cause. 
Thus,  the  cause  of  the  gun's  bursting  was  a  flaw  in  the 
metal  or  an  overcharge  of  powder.  The  cause  of  the  man's 
death  was  a  fever  or  pneumonia.  The  cause  of  the  ship- 
wreck was  a  gale,  or  a  fog,  or  a  snow-storm,  or  an  unsus- 
pected current,  or  a  hidden  reef.  But  in  such  cases  we  are 
not  dealing  with  metaphysical  causes,  but  only  with  em- 
pirical conditions  which  in  the  actual  order  of  experience 


EXPLANATION  223 

are  connected  with  the  event  in  question.  This  is  the  con- 
ception of  causation  which  should  rule  in  inductive  science, 
as  it  is  the  conception  which  is  most  prominent  in  daily  life. 
With  this  conception,  as  we  have  pointed  out,  we  escape 
the  labyrinths  of  the  metaphysical  problem,  and  we  also 
mark  out  a  definite  field  of  practical  inquiry. 

In  this  type  of  explanation,  then,  we  seek  to  connect 
things  and  events  according  to  rule,  so  that  we  see  how  one 
state  of  things  grows  out  of  another  state  of  things,  or  how 
one  state  of  things  is  required  by  other  states  of  things. 
The  rule  of  procedure  would  be  this :  Decompose  the  fact 
into  its  simplest  elements  and  seek  for  the  elementary  laws 
which  govern  their  combination.  Then  the  fact  may  be 
exhibited  as  the  result  of  its  components  if  it  coexist  with 
them,  or  of  its  antecedents  if  it  succeeds  them.  All  wholes 
must  be  understood  from  their  parts,  all  compounds  from 
their  components,  all  complexes  from  the  simple  factors. 
The  atom  explains  the  molecule,  the  molecule  explains  the 
mass.  The  complex  states  of  consciousness  are  to  be  under- 
stood in  their  elementary  components.  The  social  order 
finds  its  explanation  in  the  many  factors  which  enter  into 
it  and  combine  according  to  law. 

That  our  study  of  reality  must  largely  follow  this 
method  is  manifest.  It  is  the  gist  of  what  is  called  scien- 
tific method.  At  the  same  time  it  does  less  than  is  sup- 
posed. The  connections  which  it  discovers  are  phenomenal 
only,  and  are  generally  matters  of  fact  into  which  we  have 
no  further  insight.  For  all  we  can  see,  they  might  be  any- 
thing else  whatever.  Hence  we  connect  one  state  of  things 
with  another  state  of  things  indeed,  but  only  in  a  phenom- 
enal order,  and  not  by  any  insight  into  their  essential  con- 
nection. We  name  and  describe  the  antecedents  in  the 
reproduction  of  living  things,  but  we  gain  thereby  no  in- 
sight into  the  forces  at  work,  and  we  have  no  knowledge 


224  THEOKY    OF   THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE 

of  the  antecedents  which  enables  us  to  see  that  they  can 
have  only  such  consequents.  We  also  trace  the  order  of 
chemical  change,  and  the  resulting  knowledge  is  of  the 
utmost  practical  value ;  but  we  remain  on  the  surface  so  far 
as  any  insight  into  that  order  is  concerned.  It  would  be 
a  very  great  error,  then,  to  suppose  that  the  connections 
of  things,  even  within  the  phenomenal  field,  are  transparent 
to  intelligence.  On  the  contrary,  they  are  for  the  most 
part  pure  opacity.  The  insight  we  think  we  possess  is 
entirely  fictitious,  and  is  mainly  due  to  the  unconscious 
working  of  the  category  of  necessity  which  makes  every- 
thing clear  by  hypothesis. 

Again,  if  the  connections  of  phenomena  were  perfectly 
transparent,  there  are  some  deep-lying  difficulties  in  this 
form  of  explanation  which  must  always  restrict  it  to  sec- 
ondary significance.  First,  in  any  case,  it  reaches  nothing 
final.  It  presupposes  the  system  of  phenomena  and  their 
laws,  and  then  aims  to  show  how  within  the  system  things 
hang  together.  But  it  gives  no  insight  into  the  system 
which  implies  all  these  things.  Given  a  mechanism,  we 
may  trace  connection  among  its  parts  and  movements,  but 
only  because  the  mechanism  is  originally  given,  "We  see 
how  the  parts  are  connected  and  how  the  movements  fol- 
low from  one  another,  but  only  because  the  mechanism 
which  implies  them  is  given  as  a  whole  from  the  start. 
In  such  an  order  it  is  indeed  desirable  to  trace  the  inter- 
connection of  things,  but  we  should  greatly  deceive  our- 
selves if  we  fancied  that  any  ultimate  explanation  can  be 
reached  in  this  way.  The  mechanism  we  assume  implies 
the  parts,  and  all  our  explanation  within  the  mechanism 
runs  back  to  the  mechanism  as  its  presupposition. 

The  application  to  the  system  of  phenomena  is  evident. 
Here,  too,  we  may  trace  connection  among  the  coexistences 
and  sequences  of  the  system,  but  we  remain  on  the  surface 


EXPLANATION  235 

and  within  the  system.  Hence,  finall}'',  when  we  have  ey- 
plained  all  the  particular  facts — that  is,  have  connected  tnem 
with  other  facts  according  to  rule — the  system  itself  which 
implies  them  is  found  to  contain  the  problem  over  again, 
only  in  a  general  form. 

The  study,  then,  of  the  connections  of  phenomena,  while 
practically  of  the  utmost  importance,  leads  to  no  speculative 
insight,  and  reaches  nothing  in  which  thought  may  rest. 
Its  explanations  only  carry  the  problem  one  step  backward 
and  leave  us  as  badly  off  as  ever.  This  is  overlooked  by 
crude  thought  for  two  reasons :  First,  it  is  satisfied  if  the 
motions  of  explanation  are  made,  and  does  not  care  to  in- 
quire if  the  solution  of  the  problem  is  really  advanced. 
Secondly,  it  tacitly  hypostasizes  the  system  into  "  Nature," 
or  the  "  Universe,"  or  the  "  Cosmos,"  which  is  self-sufficient 
and  self- administering,  and  of  which  no  account  need  be 
given. 

Again,  the  attempt  to  explain  a  whole  by  the  interaction 
of  its  parts,  or  as  the  resultant  of  its  parts,  while  a  necessity 
of  scientific  method,  either  fails  or  moves  in  a  circle  when  it 
claims  to  reach  anything  final  or  anything  more  than  a  par- 
tial view.  If  the  parts  are  not  subject  to  the  law  of  the 
whole  there  is  properly  no  whole,  and  what  we  call  such  is 
only  an  accident  or  chance  product — a  fortuitous  coincidence 
of  manifold  activities  without  any  unifying  law.  But  if,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  parts  are  subject  to  the  law  of  the  whole, 
then  the  whole  is  deduced  from  parts  which  presuppose  the 
whole,  and  our  thought  moves  in  a  circle.  It  is  only  when 
we  are  dealing  with  numerical  and  inorganic  wholes  that 
we  get  much  insight  from  our  analysis  and  synthesis.  In 
organic  and  rational  wholes  the  elements  do  not  explain 
the  wholes,  but  are  explained  by  them. 

The  matter  may  be  briefly  summed  up  as  follows  : 

First,  the  analytic  procedure  is  necessary  to  any  compre' 

15 


226  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

tension.  If  a  given  fact  cannot  be  analyzed  we  must  stop 
with  it.  Only  as  we  break  it  up  by  analysis  and  recombine 
it  in  synthesis  is  there  any  motion.  Thus  we  decompose  the 
mass  into  its  chemical  elements.  Thus  we  isolate  the  parts 
of  the  organism  and  study  their  various  functions.  Thus 
we  reduce  the  mental  life  to  its  components  and  look  for  the 
law  of  their  synthesis. 

Secondly,  when  we  allow  our  analysis  to  carry  us  to  parts 
unrelated  to  the  whole  all  hope  of  insight  fails.  Thus,  sup- 
pose we  seek  to  explain  a  molecule  by  atoms  whose  nature 
does  not  imply  that  form  of  combination,  the  molecule  is  a 
matter  of  chance.  Or  if  we  explain  an  organism  by  ele- 
ments unrelated  thereto,  the  combination  is  chance  again. 
It  is  like  explaining  a  page  of  composition  by  plain  type,  or 
like  finding  all  literature  accounted  for  by  the  discovery  of 
a  dictionary. 

Thirdl}'^,  as  soon  as  we  exclude  the  law  of  the  whole  from 
the  components  the  composition  becomes  a  problem,  and 
when  we  carry  the  law  into  the  components  the  data  in- 
clude the  problem. 

Fourthly,  our  analysis  by  no  means  always  gives  us  the 
components  of  the  thing,  but  only  partial  views  and  abstrac- 
tions— aspects  of  the  thing  rather  than  its  components.  These 
have  their  value  in  what  they  help  us  to,  but  they  are  not 
the  truth  of  the  thing.  Our  analysis  and  synthesis  are  often 
relative  to  ourselves,  and  represent  no  real  process.  In  the 
case  of  the  organism  we  may  abstract  parts  and  functions 
and  study  them  separately,  but  they  exist  only  as  phases  of 
the  one  organic  whole.  The  same  is  true  for  most  psycho- 
'  logical  analyses.  It  is  only  a  very  crude  speculator  who 
fancies  that  these  give  the  components  of  mind  instead  of 
its  various  aspects.  Sometimes  our  analysis,  instead  of  giv- 
ing the  components  of  the  thing,  may  only  give  its  possible 
transformations,  as  in  chemistry,  where  the  composition  of 


EXPLANATION  227 

a  substance  means  only  its  possible  chemical  transforma- 
tions. 

These  considerations  serve  to  show  that  scientific  ex- 
planation has  only  a  limited  field  and  application.  As  soon 
as  it  is  made  all-embracing  it  becomes  empt}'  or  self-stulti- 
fying. 

The  previous  type  of  explanation  often  claims  to  confine 
itself  to  phenomena  without  saying  anything  of  their  causes. 
This  claim  is  seldom  literally  correct.  The  formal  renunci- 
ation of  metaphysics  and  all  its  works  by  no  means  always 
secures  their  exorcism.  Hence  the  scientific  explanation 
has  seldom  freed  itself  from  the  attempt  to  give  a  theory 
of  the  causal  realities  which  underlie  phenomena.  Thus, 
the  advanced  psychologist  talks  freely  of  empirical  causa- 
tion as  the  only  one  with  which  science  deals ;  but  when  it 
is  suggested  that  nothing  can  show  a  better  claim  to  be 
regarded  as  causal,  in  the  empirical  sense,  than  states  of 
consciousness,  he  soon  lets  it  appear  that  he  has  not  mas- 
tered his  own  doctrine,  and  has  something  metaph3^sical  in 
mind.  States  of  consciousness  are  undeniably  conditions  of 
certain  forms  of  physical  movement;  yet  he  is  unwilling  to 
speak  of  them  as  causes,  although  causes,  in  the  inductive 
sense,  are  nothing  but  conditions.  This  uncertainty  shows 
a  mastery  of  phrases  rather  than  of  ideas. 

Scientific  explanation,  then,  has  commonly  been  allied 
with  a  theory  of  the  causal  realities  which  underlie  phe- 
nomena. This  leads  us  to  the  third  form  of  explanation. 
Here  the  aim  is  to  infer  from  phenomena,  not  only  their  plie- 
nomenal  antecedents,  but  also  their  ontological  grounds.  We 
infer  the  causes  which  are  supposed  to  produce  the  effects. 
In  this  way  we  build  theories  about  atoms,  molecules,  forces, 
ethers,  etc.  These  are  viewed  as  the  ontological  constants  in 
cosmic  change,  or  as  the  realities  by  whose  interaction  and 


228  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE 

combination  the  phenomenal  world  is  produced  or  explained, 
in  such  views  the  metaphysical  tendencies  of  the  mind  are 
revealed.  Tlie  cateofories  of  bein":  and  causation  are  im- 
ported  into  phenomena,  and  an  air  of  solid  reality  is  im- 
parted to  the  whole. 

Concerning  the  aim  of  this  work  criticism  has  no  objec- 
tion to  offer,  but  doubt  may  be  raised  as  to  its  product. 
This  metaphysical  work  has  generally  been  done  under  the 
influence  of  our  natural  realism,  and  with  imperfect  insight 
into  the  nature  of  thought.  Space  and  matter  are  viewed 
as  the  supreme  realities,  and  our  ontology  is  shaped  by  and 
to  them.  In  this  way  the  atom  and  the  void  become  the 
great  factors  in  physical  metaphysics,  and  nothing  more  is 
needed  except  a  clumsy  addition  of  causation  in  the  form  of 
moving  forces. 

The  fundamental  importance  of  the  categories  of  being 
and  causation  has  been  insisted  upon,  but  whether  they  can 
be  thought  in  the  form  just  mentioned  must  be  left  to  meta- 
physics to  decide.  This  scheme  of  physical  metaphysics, 
however,  is  so  prominent  in  both  popular  and  scientific 
thouo-ht  that  something  must  be  said  about  it,  both  as  to 
the  form  in  which  it  must  be  conceived  and  as  to  its  value 
as  an  explanation. 

With  bare  lumps  we  can  explain  only  heaps.  Unless  we 
assume  a  mover  without,  w^e  must  posit  moving  forces 
within  ;  and  unless  these  forces  are  under  some  structural 
law,  the}'  will  explain  only  amorphous  masses.  Simple  pull- 
ing and  pushing  in  a  straight  line  makes  no  provision  for 
organization.  Assuming,  then,  the  existence  of  such  forces, 
we  have  a  double  order  of  facts,  one  of  spatial  change  and 
combination,  and  one  of  a  metaphysical  nature.  The  former 
is  a  change  among  things ;  the  latter  is  a  change  in  things. 
The  former  depends  upon  the  latter.  All  spatial  changes 
among  things  must  be  viewed  us  translations  into  phenome- 


EXPLANATION  229 

nal  form  of  dynamic  relations  in  things.  And  the  spatial 
system  can  be  understood  only  through  the  metaphysical 
system.  No  spatial  change  explains  itself  or  anything  else 
until  it  is  referred  to  a  hidden  dvnaraism.  If  we  subtract  a 
chemical  element  from  a  given  molecule,  no  one  can  see  the 
slightest  reason  in  that  fact  for  the  resulting  chemical  change, 
unless  we  assume  a  system  of  dynamic  relations  within  the 
elements  themselves  which  determines  the  form  of  their 
3iianifestation  and  interaction ;  and  this  system  must  be  as 
complex  and  various  as  the  phenomena  themselves. 

This  invisible  dynamic  system  is  overlooked  altogether 
by  superficial  thought.  Such  thought  has  only  the  atoms 
and  the  void  as  data,  and  it  can  easily  conceive  the  atoms  as 
variously  grouped  within  this  void.  The  spatial  imagina- 
tion serves  for  this  insight,  and  nothing  more  is  demanded. 
But  when  thought  is  clarified  to  the  point  of  seeing  the  ne- 
cessity of  affirming  an  unpicturable  d3'namism  behind  the 
system  of  spatial  changes,  then  the  dark  impenetrability  of 
our  physical  metaphysics  begins  to  appear.  Spatial  combi- 
nation we  can  picture.  Volitional  causality  we  experience. 
But  what  that  is  which  is  less  than  the  latter  and  more  than 
the  former  is  an  exceedingl}'  difficult  problem.  Accordingly 
it  is  common  to  hear  the  leaders  of  science,  and  indeed  all 
who  have  got  beyond  the  naive  dogmatism  of  the  senses, 
proclaiming  the  deep  mystery,  if  not  the  unknowability,  of 
the  dynamics  of  the  cosmos.  The  following  words  are  at- 
tributed to  Lord  Kelvin  (Sir  William  Thomson),  on  the  occa- 
sion of  the  fiftieth  anniversary  of  his  connection  with  the 
University  of  Glascow : 

"One  word  characterizes  the  most  strenuous  of  the  efforts 
for  the  advancement  of  science  that  T  have  made  perse ver- 
ingly  through  fifty-liveyears^that  word  is  failure.  I  know 
no  more  of  electric  and  magnetic  force,  or  of  the  relations 
between  ether,  electricity,  and   ponderable    matter,  or  of 


330  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

chemical  affinity,  than  I  knew  and  tried  to  teach  my  stu- 
dents of  natural  philosophy  fifty  years  ago,  in  my  first 
session  as  professor." 

The  knowledge  of  causes  in  the  empirical  sense  is  daily 
growing.  The  knowledge  of  causes  in  a  d3'^namic  sense,  at 
least  from  the  physical  standpoint,  is  more  mysterious  than 
ever.  "VVe  next  point  out  some  logical  difficulties  in  any 
explanation  by  inferred  causes. 

In  general  we  infer  the  causes  from  the  effects,  and  then 
we  explain  the  effects  by  the  causes.  This  seems  like  move- 
ment in  a  circle.  There  is  real  progress  in  such  explana- 
tion only  in  the  following  cases  : 

First,  the  mind  may  have  such  insight  into  the  possibili- 
ties of  the  case  as  to  form  an  exhaustive  disjunctive  judg- 
ment. Then  we  may  show  by  analysis  of  the  fact  that  we 
are  shut  up  to  one  conception  of  the  cause. 

Secondly,  the  conclusion  reached  may  admit  of  inde- 
pendent verification,  or  the  theory  may  be  found  to  embrace 
many  new  facts  which  were  not  considered  in  its  forma- 
tion.  But  when  the  inferred  causes  do  not  admit  of  being 
presented  in  experience,  or  lie  beyond  the  analogy  of  ex- 
perience and  cannot  be  used  to  extend  knowledge,  the  whole 
matter  floats  in  the  air.  We  mark  time  only  without  get- 
ting ahead. 

Indeed,  this  unprogressive  character  attaches  to  every 
system  of  explanation  of  a  mechanical  or  necessary  nature. 
We  infer  A  from  £  and  explain  B  by  A.  We  know  that 
A  was  because  B  is,  and  we  know  that  B  must  be  because 
A  was.  Moreover,  the  A  we  infer  is  not  A  in  general,  but 
a  definite  and  specific  A  which  in  principle  includes  B.  If 
we  fail  to  provide  for  ^  in  ^  we  cannot  deduce  B  from 
A,  and  if  we  do  make  such  provision  we  only  draw  out 
what  we  put  in.  In  all  inference  from  effect  to  cause  we 
are  bound  to  determine  the  thought  of  the  cause  by  the 


EXPLANATION  231 

effect,  and  we  can  infer  neither  more  nor  less  than  the  cause 
of  just  that  effect.  If  we  infer  more  we  are  guilt}--  of  illicit 
process ;  if  we  infer  less  the  effect  is  unprovided  for.  The 
explanation  consists  in  making  the  effects  potential  in  their 
causes,  and  the  deduction  consists  in  conceiving  these  po- 
tentialities as  passing  into  realization.  As  thought  goes 
backward  it  potentializes  the  actual ;  as  it  comes  forward 
it  actualizes  the  potential.  We  read  the  present  into  as- 
sumed past  conditions  which  implied  it,  and  we  read  the 
hypothetical  past  conditions  into  their  assumed  implica- 
tions. In  a  necessary  system  we  can  never  escape  this 
barren  oscillation. 

Our  eyes  are  holden  in  this  matter  because  of  certain 
easy  oversights  which  have  alreadj^  been  referred  to  in  treat- 
ing of  the  first  form  of  explanation.  The  leading  one  is  the 
mistaking  of  verbal  simplifications  for  simplifications  of 
things.  The  complexity,  plurality,  and  differences  of  things 
disappear  in  the  simplicity  and  identity  of  the  class  term, 
and  then  we  fancy  that  the  things  themselves  have  been 
simplified  and  unified.  We  increase  the  illusion  by  the 
further  fancy  that  the  class  term  implies  all  to  which  it 
applies,  and  that  the  corresponding  reality  implies  all  its 
subordinated  forms.  Thus  the  last  terms  of  abstraction  are 
mistaken  for  the  first  and  essential  forms  of  real  existence, 
and  logical  subordination  is  mistaken  for  ontological  im- 
plication. The  illusion  is  completed  by  our  failure  to  recog- 
nize the  shorthand  character  of  language  in  general.  AVe 
think  in  symbols,  and  only  fill  out  the  thought  as  far  as 
may  be  necessary.  Hence  the  causes  to  which  we  refer 
effects  are  thought  only  in  a  general  way,  and  thus  we 
overlook  the  fact  that  in  concrete  and  complete  thinking, 
in  distinction  from  shorthand  and  symbolic  thinking,  we 
can  never  escape  from  complexity  into  simplicity,  or  pass 
from  simplicity  to  complexity,  as  long  as  we  remain  on  the 


232  THEOKY    OF    THOUGHT   AND   KNOWLEDGE 

plane  of  mechanism  and  necessity.  The  perennial  attempts 
to  deduce  the  world  from  some  original  state  of  simplicity 
and  insignificance  all  rest  at  bottom  on  these  oversights. 
The  indefinite,  incoherent,  undifferentiated  homogeneity 
with  which  they  begin  is  something  which  can  be  neither 
reached  nor  used  without  bad  logic. 

There  is  a  fundamental  uncertainty,  springing  out  of  this 
same  confusion,  which  runs  through  popular  explanations 
of  the  evolution  type.  By  dint  of  repetition  it  has  come 
to  be  taken  for  granted  that  nothing  is  to  be  accepted  as 
it  is,  but  everything  is  to  be  understood  through  its  history. 
On  this  line  of  thought  we  are  brought  down  to  the  in- 
definite, incoherent  homogeneity  as  the  beginning  of  things. 
Bat  logic  soon  shows  the  emptiness  of  this  notion.  Then 
we  begin  again.  We  assume  some  original  datum  or  data 
with  definite  laws  and  tendencies,  and  forthwith  logic  shows 
that  the  original  assumption  must  imply  and  determine  all 
future  outcomes.  From  one  point  of  view  something  that 
long  ago  was  explains  all  that  is ;  from  the  other,  something 
that  forever  is  is  the  only  explanation  of  all  that  was,  is,  or 
will  be.  Popular  speculation  in  this  field  oscillates  confused- 
ly and  helplessly  between  these  contradictory  opposites. 
The  confusion  is  especially  prominent  in  the  field  of  biology 
and  psychology.  In  the  study  of  origins,  also,  it  sometimes 
appears  in  the  set  determination  to  trace  all  resemblances 
of  thought  and  custom  and  art  and  rite  to  a  common  source, 
without  inquiring  whether  a  common  humanity  in  a  com- 
mon environment  might  not  well  have  a  similar  manifesta- 
tion, apart  from  any  historic  connection.  At  present  the 
historian  of  religions  or  institutions  feels  compelled,  at  any 
price  and  through  all  manner  of  logical  bushes  and  briers, 
to  feign  a  common  source  whether  he  can  find  it  or  not. 

None  of  these  forms  of  explanation,  nor  all  of  them  to- 


EXPLANATION  233 

gether,  give  final  satisfaction  to  the  inind.  Single  facts  may 
be  shown  to  be  implications  of  other  facts,  but  the  system 
of  facts  and  laws  is  left  opaque  and  meaningless.  The  me- 
chanical explanation  with  wliich  we  have  just  been  dealing 
comes  to  no  end.  It  merely  gives  the  form  of  causality  and 
substantiality  to  the  facts  without  leading  to  anything  more 
simple.  To  escape  this  collapse  the  mind  has  recourse  to  a 
fourth  and  final  form  of  explanation — that  of  purpose  or  final 
cause. 

This  is  the  explanation  by  intelligence  which  is  supposed 
to  be  moving  towards  preconceived  ends,  so  that  the  activity 
is  not  merely  driven  from  behind,  but  looks  before  to  some 
end  to  be  reached,  and  with  reference  to  which  the  whole  is 
determined.  And  this  explanation  takes  up  all  lower  forms 
into  itself.  From  the  orderly  nature  of  mind  we  should 
expect  an  order  of  law,  not  as  a  dumb  fact,  but  as  expressing 
at  once  the  orderly  nature  of  intelligence  and  the  wa}"^  in 
which  it  realizes  its  aims.  From  the  mental  demand  for 
unity  and  continuity  we  should  also  expect  to  find  all  things 
and  events  forming  a  system  in  which  everything  conditions 
every  other  thing,  and  in  which  each  new  state  of  things 
grows  out  of  a  past  state  of  things,  and  in  turn  forms  the 
ground  of  a  future  state  of  things.  Explanation  by  intelli- 
gence, too,  is  the  only  one  which  ever  comes  to  an  end.  In 
any  mechanical  system  we  not  only  reach  no  simpler  state 
of  things,  but  are  shut  up  to  an  infinite  regress  in  which 
thought  itself  perishes.  An  ultimate  ground  of  tilings  in 
which  to  rest  can  be  found  only  in  free  intelligence.  This 
is  the  only  simplicity  which  can  orignate  complexity  ;  the 
only  unity  which  can  produce  plurality ;  the  only  universal 
which  can  specify  itself  into  particulars ;  the  only  real  ex- 
planation of  anything. 

To  know  what  things  are  for,  how  they  are  brought 
about,  how  they  are  bound  together,  and  what  the  agent  or 


234  THEOKY    OF   THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

agents  concerned  in  their  production — this  is  the  aim  the 
mind  sets  itself.  Tliis  aim  is  a  mental  ideal  only  imperfectly 
realized.  But  by  keeping  its  several  factors  distinct,  by 
recognizing  their  mutual  compatibility,  or,  rather,  the  neces- 
sity of  all  if  thought  is  to  complete  itself,  and  by  persistent 
labor  and  patient  thought  in  the  service  of  cognition,  we 
may  hope  gradually  to  transform  the  opaque  data  of  expe- 
rience into  the  transparent  order  of  reason. 

And  now  possibly  it  may  occur  to  some  reader  to  ask 
if  the  explanation  by  intelligence  be  not  open  to  all  the 
objections  we  have  urged  against  mechanism.  And  is  not 
intelligence  itself  the  mystery  of  mysteries,  so  that  we  have 
simply  pooled  all  lesser  mysteries  in  this  comprehensive 
one? 

In  reply  we  recall  what  was  said  in  treating  of  volitional 
causality.  We  there  pointed  out  that  any  ultimate  fact 
must  be  mysterious,  in  the  sense  that  it  is  something  to  be 
recognized  and  admitted  rather  than  something  to  be  de- 
duced and  comprehended.  In  this  sense,  no  doubt,  intellect 
is  a  great  mystery.  We  cannot  build  it  out  of  anything 
else.  We  cannot  tell  how  intellect  is,  or  can  be,  a  fact. 
We  can  only  recognize  it  as  something  actually  existent. 

But  we  also  pointed  out  that  there  is  a  choice  in  mys- 
teries. Some  mysteries  make  other  things  clear,  and  some 
leave  things  as  dark  and  impenetrable  as  ever.  The  former 
is  the  case  with  the  mystery  of  intelligence.  It  makes  pos- 
sible the  comprehension  of  everything  but  itself.  In  the 
mechanical  scheme  we  are  compelled  to  use  the  formal 
categories  of  possibility,  potentiality,  necessity,  and  causa- 
tion, of  which  the  concrete  significance  absolutely  eludes 
all  conception.  It  was  to  escape  this  difficulty  that  Kant 
invented  his  schematism  of  the  categories,  an  invention  of 
which  the  aim  was  more  manifest  than  the  success.  In 
truth,  we  can  find  concrete  illustration  of  these  categories 


EXPLANATION  235 

only  in  our  inner  experience.  Tliey  remain  elusive  abstrac- 
tions until  they  are  interpreted  in  forms  of  the  inner  life. 

Again,  in  the  mechanical  scheme,  thought  can  never 
complete  itself  or  satisfy  any  of  its  tendencies.  We  can 
find  no  unity,  and  if  we  could  we  could  never  use  it.  From 
the  many  we  cannot  reach  the  one,  and  from  the  one  we 
cannot  reach  the  many.  We  can  find  no  explanation,  for 
the  problem  ever  retreats  into  the  proposed  solution.  If 
along  the  line  of  a  necessary  movement  we  make  anywhere 
a  cross-section,  logic  compels  iis  to  find  potentially  or  actu- 
ally present  everything  that  wih  ever  emerge.  Thus  we 
toil  along  the  line  of  the  infinite  regress,  seeking  rest  and 
finding  none.  Intelligence  may  be  a  mystery,  but  it  helps 
us  out  of  this  deadlock  by  assimilating  the  cosmic  causa- 
tion to  itself.  And  when  there  is  a  little  critical  enlighten- 
ment it  is  plain  that  the  choice  is  between  this  and  words 
which  end  in  nothing. 

Much  groundless  but  mischievous  misunderstanding  has 
arisen  in  the  history  of  thought  concerning  the  relation  of 
scientific  explanation  and  the  explanation  by  intelligence. 
Gradually  we  are  coming  to  see  that  they  represent  two 
different  points  of  view,  and  can  never  conflict  except 
through  confusion.  However  much  we  may  believe  that 
there  is  a  purpose  in  things,  we  cannot  dispense  with  the 
study  of  the  laws  of  things  and  events,  and  no  study  of  the 
way  in  which  things  are  done  has  any  logical  bearing  on 
the  conviction  that  there  is  purpose  in  the  doing.  The  op- 
position which  has  actually  existed  is  due  to  the  superficial 
metaphysics  of  uncritical  thought,  which  erects  law  into 
necessity  and  makes  nature  into  a  self-running  mechanical 
system.  This  spectre  needs  no  exorcism,  but  vanishes  of 
itself  as  soon  as  thought  attains  to  clear  self-knowledge. 

In  looking  over  these  types  of  explanation  we  see  that 


236  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE 

they  form  a  series,  and  that  we  could  not  rest  fully  satisfied 
until  the  series  and  all  its  members  are  complete.  But  it  is 
plain  that  this  represents  an  ideal  which  is  not  yet  attained 
in  any  type  of  explanation.  The  simple  classification  of 
things  and  events  is  far  from  complete.  To  be  sure,  a  cer- 
tain general  classification  under  the  categories  is  always 
possible,  and  is  indeed  necessary  to  give  us  any  objects 
whatever,  but  this  is  so  general  as  to  give  little  insight. 
The  classification  which  shall  give  the  natural  and  essential 
affinities  of  things  is  still  far  from  completion. 

It  is  equally  impossible  to  trace  the  systematic  connec- 
tion of  all  events,  however  firmly  we  may  believe  in  it.  We 
may  be  sure  that  there  is  a  point  of  view  from  which  we 
could  see  how  the  present  state  of  things  arises  from  a  past 
state  of  things  and  produces  a  future  state  of  things ;  but 
here  too  we  walk  by  faith,  not  by  sight.  We  are  not  even 
sure  how  this  implication  and  production  are  to  be  under- 
stood :  whether  it  be  ontological  and  dynamic,  or  only  logi- 
cal, arising  from  the  plan  of  the  whole.  Likewise  we  are 
sure  that  there  must  be  an  adequate  causal  explanation,  but 
we  are  far  from  being  able  to  trace  it  everywhere,  even  from 
an  empirical  standpoint.  When  we  pass  to  proper  efficiency 
there  is  great  uncertainty  as  to  the  form  under  which  causa- 
tion is  to  be  conceived,  whether  under  a  mechanical  and 
necessary  form,  or  under  a  spiritual  and  volitional  one.  Fi- 
nally, we  may  be  sure  that  all  explanation  at  last  roots  in 
purpose  and  intelligence,  but  we  are  very  far  from  being 
able  to  trace  this  purpose  in  detail.  It  remains,  for  the  most 
part,  inscrutable. 

We  must  be  careful,  therefore,  not  to  confound  the  legiti- 
macy of  the  formal  demand  for  explanation  with  the  proof 
of  any  particular  concrete  explanation.  Reflection  justifies 
the  formal  demand,  but  specific  evidence  must  accompany 
every  particular  case. 


EXPLANATION  237 

Oversight  of  this  fact  is  one  of  the  besetting  sins  of  the 
uncritical  mind.  Because  it  is  making  motions  which  are 
formally  justified,  it  finds  it  easy  to  rest  in  any  alleged  ex- 
planation without  inquiring  whether  it  really  explains  or  is 
demanded  by  the  facts.  This  is  especially  the  case  with  all 
matters  that  lie  at  a  distance,  especially  in  time,  as  in  ancient 
life  and  history.  Here  the  speculator  is  not  confronted  with 
the  immediate  contradiction  of  facts,  and  any  plausible  or 
pompous  theory  is  sure  to  find  acceptance  with  minds  in 
which  the  sense  of  logical  obligation  is  weak. 

The  great  majority  of  the  things  which  pass  for  explana- 
tions in  popular  thought  explain  nothing.  Often  they  have 
only  a  fictitious  connection  with  the  problem;  sometimes 
they  repeat  the  problem  ;  very  frequently  they  float  in  the 
air.  Our  generalizations  are  often  so  vague  as  to  have  no 
valuable  meaning,  as  when  we  explain  things  by  differenti- 
ation and  integration.  Again,  in  our  causal  explanation  we 
often  fail  to  i-educe  the  fact  to  anything  simpler,  and  thus 
produce  elephants  and  tortoises  under  the  earth.  Or  we 
fail  to  remark  the  complexity  of  the  facts,  and  produce  ex- 
planations without  observing  that  many  other  explanations 
are  equally  possible,  or  that  the  facts  are  so  uncertain  that 
any  explanation  is  only  a  dream.  In  all  such  cases  the  crit- 
ical mind  holds  fast  to  the  facts  so  far  as  they  can  be  ascer- 
tained, and  leaves  theorizing  and  system-building  to  those 
unhappy  beings  who  cannot  live  without  a  theory.  The 
development  of  a  critical  habit  of  thought  in  this  matter  is 
apt  to  increase  wisdom  by  diminishing  knowledge. 

In  explanation,  as  in  other  forms  of  logical  activity,  there 
is  needed  a  certain  good  sense  which,  unfortunately,  logic 
cannot  produce  or  furnish.  Everything  has  a  great  many 
antecedents  and  concomitants.  In  a  way  the  whole  uni- 
verse is  antecedent  and  concomitant  of  evervthing.  Ab- 
stractly considered,  the  number  of  possible  combinations  is 


238  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

indefinite,  and  life  is  too  short  to  deal  with  such  a  problem. 
It  becomes  manageable  onl3'  as  the  experience  of  the  com- 
munity and  of  past  investigators  has  determined  the  general 
outlines  within  which  our  thought  must  move.  When  this 
is  disregarded  there  is  no  barrier  against  numberless  whim- 
sies. So  far  as  abstract  logic  goes,  the  direction  of  the 
wind,  the  position  of  the  planets  and  stars,  the  phases  of  the 
moon,  the  lines  of  the  hand,  the  "  criminal  hand,"  and  even 
the  "  criminal  thumb,"  may  have  deep  and  far-reaching  sig- 
nificance for  human  affairs.  A  great  many  professors  from 
the  academy  at  Laputa  are  among  us,  and  all  make  a  great 
show  of  logic.  It  is  only  the  slowly  consolidated  good  sense 
of  the  community  which  keeps  down  this  nonsense  by  per- 
sistently ignoring  it,  and  by  producing  a  mental  soil  on  which 
such  crops  will  not  flourish.  One  must  meet  a  believer  in 
this  sort  of  thing  in  order  to  realize  how  logically  helpless 
we  are  when  there  is  no  common  ground  of  good  sense. 
Then  one  finds  that  in  very  truth  this  kind  goeth  not  readily 
out. 


CHAPTER  XI 

SOME    STRUCTURAL    FALLACIES 

It  is  not  ray  purpose  here  to  deal  with  the  familiar  fal- 
lacies of  logical  treatises.  These  are  self-evident  in  their 
fallacious  character,  and  no  discussion  could  make  it  clearer. 
But  there  are  certain  other  fallacies  which  are  far  more 
subtle,  and  which  are  revealed  only  to  critical  inspection. 
These  fallacies  are  so  inevitable  to  untrained  thought  that 
the}'^  may  be  called  structural,  or  at  least  constitutional. 
But  before  treating  of  them  it  seems  desirable  to  say  a 
word  about  error  in  general. 

Error  itself  is  so  familiar  a  fact  as  commonly  to  excite 
no  surprise  or  even  notice.  Nevertheless,  it  is  theoretically 
a  most  portentous  fact,  being  for  philosophy  something  like 
sin  for  theology  and  ethics.  The  problem  of  error  consti- 
tutes a  kind  of  touchstone  for  philosophical  systems.  Any 
system  which  makes  error  necessary  and  cosmic  destroys 
itself. 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  clear  that  all  investigation  must 
assume  the  essential  truth  of  our  faculties.  If  we  allow 
that  these  in  their  normal  working  may  lead  us  astray, 
there  is  an  end  of  all  faith  in  reason  and  knowledge.  But 
since,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  we  often  do  go  astray,  the  prob- 
lem arises  how  to  combine  the  assumption  of  the  trustwor- 
thiness of  our  faculties  with  the  recognition  of  actual  and 
abundant  error.  Freedom,  we  shall  see,  is  the  only  solu- 
tion of  the  problem  which  does  not  wreck  reason  itself. 


240  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

We  may  get  an  inti'oduction  to  the  problem,  and  also  a 
good  illustration  of  the  ease  with  which  men  overlook  it, 
by  considering  a  passage  from  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer's  First 
Princijjles.  In  the  last  paragraphs  of  Part  I.  of  that  work 
the  question  is  raised  why  an  advanced  and  progressive 
thinker  should  oppose  traditional  and  conventional  beliefs 
after  he  has  outgrown  them,  seeing  that  those  beliefs  may 
well  be  better  adapted  to  those  who  hold  them  than  his 
own  broader  views.     Mr.  Spencer  gives  this  answer  : 

"  He  [that  is,  the  advanced  thinker]  must  remember  that, 
while  he  is  a  descendant  of  the  past,  he  is  a  parent  of  the 
future,  and  that  his  thoughts  are  as  children  born  to  him, 
which  he  may  not  carelessly  let  die.  He,  like  every  other 
man,  may  properly  consider  himself  as  one  of  the  myriad 
agencies  through  whom  works  the  Unknown  Cause;  and 
when  the  Unknown  Cause  produces  in  him  a  certain  be- 
lief he  is  thereby  authorized  to  profess  and  act  out  that 
belief." 

There  is  something  edifying  and  inspiring  in  this  utter- 
ance so  long  as  we  gaze  upon  the  well-behaved  and  enlight- 
ened apostle  of  advanced  thought  who  thus  nobly  represents 
the  future  and  the  Unknown  Cause.  The  rights  of  free 
thought  are  vindicated  once  for  all,  and  are  set  on  high 
above  all  bigoted  cavil.  But  when  we  remember  that  Mr. 
Spencer  expressly  includes  all  other  men  and  all  other  be- 
liefs in  the  same  relation,  and  gives  to  them  all  the  same 
sanction  and  authorization  of  the  Unknown  Cause,  forthwith 
we  begin  to  grope.  For  it  is  not  the  advanced  thinker  only 
who  stands  in  this  august  relation,  and  has  this  supreme 
sanction,  but  "  every  other  man  "  also  "  may  properly  con- 
sider himself  as  one  of  the  myriad  agencies  through  whom 
works  the  Unknown  Cause  "  ;  and  when  the  Unknown  Cause 
produces  in  every  other  man  a  certain  belief  he  too  is 
"  thereby  authorized  to  profess  and  act  out  that  belief." 


SOME    STRUCTURAL    FALLACIES  241 

But  it  is  plain  that  "  every  other  man  "  is  a  somewhat  nu- 
merous personage,  and  his  beliefs  and  acts,  produced  and  au- 
thorized by  the  Unknown  Cause,  are  a  rather  heterogeneous 
and  unsavory  collection,  for  it  includes  all  the  superstitions, 
absurdities,  and  imbecilities  which  have  ever  been  believed, 
and  all  the  horrors  and  atrocities  which  have  ever  been 
perpetrated.  All  of  these  are  the  products  of  the  Unknown 
Cause,  and  the  believers  are,  of  course,  "authorized  to  pro- 
fess and  act  out "  their  beliefs,  for  all  these  ai'e  "  as  children 
born  to  them  which  they  may  not  carelessly  let  die.'' 

But  what  is  truth  in  such  a  system  {  The  Unknown 
Cause  seems  to  have  not  one  opinion  but  many,  and  it  does 
not  abide  in  any  one  for  long.  For  a  disciple  of  this  view  it 
must  be  a  very  grave  circumstance  that  the  Unknown  Cause 
has  produced  a  great  many  false  opinions  for  one  true  one ; 
that,  along  with  a  little  truth,  there  has  been  an  almost  over- 
whelming production  of  error.  The  Unknown  Cause  has 
shown  a  grotesque  tendency  to  revel  in  low  and  unseemly 
views,  fetishisms,  anthropomorphisms,  theologies,  whims,  in- 
fatuations, obstinacies,  instead  of  attaining  to  the  sun-clear 
truths  of  the  synthetic  philosophy.  This  fact  has  so  im- 
pressed many  critics  of  a  pessimistic  turn  that  the}^  have  not 
hesitated  to  think  meanly  of  the  Unknown  Cause  and  all  its 
works.  In  any  case  it  is  clear  that,  up  to  date,  the  Unknown 
Cause  has  not  advanced  beyond  an  indefinite,  incoherent 
heterogeneity  of  opinions,  any  one  of  which  has  the  same 
source  and  sanction  as  any  other. 

This  illustrates  the  position  in  which  every  system  of  ne- 
cessitv  finds  itself  in  dealing  with  the  problem  of  error.  For 
in  such  a  system  every  thought,  belief,  conviction,  whether 
truth  or  superstition,  arises  with  equal  necessity  with  every 
other.  The  belief  in  freedom  is  as  necessary  as  the  belief 
in  necessity.  Theism  and  atheism,  spiritualism  and  materi- 
alism, freedom  and  necessit}^  consistency  and  caprice  are 

16 


242  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

alike  necessary.  Thoughts  and  beliefs  become  effects,  and 
to  speak  of  true  and  false  thoughts  seems  like  speaking  of 
true  and  false  chemical  action.  On  this  plane  of  necessary- 
effect  the  actual  is  all,  and  the  ideal  distinctions  of  true 
and  false  have  as  little  meaning  as  they  would  have  on  the 
plane  of  mechanical  forces. 

But  possibly  we  may  say  that  there  is  nothing  in  the  no- 
tion of  necessity  to  forbid  that  some  thoughts  correspond 
to  reality  while  others  do  not,  and  thus  the  distinction  of 
true  and  false  is  saved.  Allowing  this,  we  are  still  no  better 
off.  For  if  of  these  multitudinous  thoughts  which  are  nec- 
essarily produced  some  are  true  and  some  are  false,  we  need 
to  have  some  standard  for  distinguishing  them  from  one 
another.  And  this  standard  cannot  consist  in  the  necessity 
of  the  true  thoughts  and  the  contingency  of  the  false  ones, 
for  all  are  alike  necessary.  The  belief  in  necessity  is  no 
more  necessary  than  the  belief  in  freedom.  It  would  not 
help  matters  to  declare  that  true  thoughts  are  the  product 
of  normal  thinking,  for  the  same  puzzle  would  arise  in  find- 
ing a  standard  of  normality.  Just  as  little  would  it  avail 
to  take  a  vote  on  the  subject,  for  there  seems  to  be  no 
logical  connection  between  the  notion  of  a  majority  and 
the  notion  of  truth.  The  necessitarian,  moreover,  would  be 
in  a  specially  sorry  plight,  as  the  necessity  which  produces 
beliefs  has  produced  the  belief  in  freedom  much  more  pro- 
fusel}'  than  the  belief  in  necessity.  If  he  should  bethink 
himself  that  there  is  no  one  necessity  which  produces  these 
many  and  contradictory  beliefs,  but  that  there  are  many 
necessities  for  the  many  beliefs,  the  question  of  a  standard 
would  at  once  emerge  amonof  the  necessities  themselves. 

Besides,  if  we  found  a  standard,  how  could  we  use  it? 
The  thought  of  a  standard  implies  a  power  to  control  our 
thoughts,  to  compare  them  with  the  standard,  to  reserve 
our  decision,  to  think  twice,  to  go  over  the  ground  again 


SOME    STRUCTURAL    FALLACIES  243 

and  again,  until  the  transparent  order  of  reason  has  been 
reached.  But  on  this  theory  there  is  no  such  power. 
Thoughts  come  and  thoughts  go.  Some  are  displaced  by 
others,  not  because  of  any  superior  rationality,  but  because 
the  new  conditions  have  produced  new  conceptions. 

Thought  as  thought  counts  for  nothing.  The  under- 
lying dynamic  conditions  determine  the  rational  movement 
without  being  determined  by  it.  When,  in  a  chemical  mole- 
cule, one  element  displaces  another  the  new  combination 
is  not  truer  but  stronger  than  the  old.  So  when  a  mental 
grouping  is  broken  up  and  displaced  by  another  it  is  not 
a  question  of  truth  or  rationality,  but  of  change  in  the  un- 
derlying dynamic  relations.  There  is,  then,  not  only  no 
standard  of  truth,  but  no  power  to  use  it  if  we  had  it. 
Thus  all  beliefs  sink  into  effects,  and  one  is  as  good  as 
another  so  long  as  it  lasts. 

These  considerations  make  it  clear  that  the  question  of 
freedom  enters  intimately  into  the  structure  of  reason  itself. 
It  concerns  not  merely  our  executive  activities  in  the  outer 
world,  but  also  our  inner  rational  activity.  The  only  es- 
cape from  the  overthrow  of  reason  involved  in  the  fact  of 
error  lies  in  the  assumption  of  freedom.  Our  faculties  are 
made  for  truth,  but  this  alone  does  not  secure  truth.  We 
must  use  those  faculties  carefully,  critically,  persistently  if 
any  valuable  knowledge  is  to  be  gained.  Our  faculties  are 
made  for  truth,  but  they  may  be  carelessly  used,  or  wilfully 
misused,  and  thus  error  is  born. 

Of  course  this  freedom  is  not  a  power  to  make  things 
true  or  false  at  will.  The  rational  connection  of  ideas  and 
the  cosmic  uniformities  we  can  neither  make  nor  unmake. 
If  we  have  the  premises  we  cannot  change  the  conclusion. 
The  laws  of  thought  are  secure  from  all  tampering  and 
overthrow.  Yet,  though  thus  imperative,  they  do  not  of 
themselves  secure  obedience.     If  they  did  error  would  be 


244  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE 

impossible.  Hence,  in  addition  to  the  laws  of  thought 
founded  in  the  nature  of  rationality,  there  is  needed  an  act 
of  ratilication  and  self-control  in  accordance  with  those 
laws.  Only  thus  does  reason  become  regnant  in  our  think- 
ing, and  only  thus  do  we  become  properly  rational  beings. 
The  laws  and  relations  of  numbers  are  inviolable,  but  they 
do  not  insure  us  against  blunders  in  calculation.  For  this 
we  need  a  somewhat  intense  attention  and  a  careful  scru- 
tiny of  our  mental  operations.  Again,  the  truths  of  reason 
and  of  physical  science  are  quite  independent  of  our  voli- 
tion ;  but  this  fact  does  not  provide  for  our  knowledge  of 
them.  They  do  not  get  themselves  known,  but  we  come 
to  know  them  only  tlirough  slow,  painful,  and  persistent 
research.  Science  itself  is  one  of  the  great  achievements 
of  human  freedom.  We  do  not  drift  into  it,  neither  is  it 
let  down  ready-made  from  the  skies ;  but  by  the  patient 
toil  and  devotion  of  free  men  the  temple  of  science  and 
knowledge  is  built  up. 

Freedom,  then,  has  great  speculative  significance.  In 
discussing  causation  we  saw  that  this  notion  vanishes  in  the 
infinite  regress  unless  we  elevate  it  to  the  volitional  form. 
In  the  previous  chapter  we  have  seen  that  freedom  is  the 
condition  of  any  real  explanation.  Here  we  find  that  every 
system  of  philosophy  must  invoke  freedom  for  the  solution 
of  the  problem  of  error  or  make  shipwreck  of  reason  itself. 

Returning  now  to  the  fallacies,  the  first  to  be  mentioned 
may  be  called  the  fallacy  of  the  universal.  It  consists  in 
mistaking  class  terms  for  things,  and  in  identifying  the 
processes  of  our  classifying  thought  with  the  processes  of 
reality.  For  its  understanding  we  must  recall  a  few  con- 
siderations from  our  previous  study. 

That  nothing  happens  to  things  when  we  classify  them  is 
familiar  to  us.     Even  if  we  should  succeed  in  reducing  all 


SOME    STRUCTURAL    FALLACIES  245 

objects  to  a  common  class  we  should  only  unify  our  con- 
ceptions without  in  any  way  modifying  the  facts,  and  our 
gain  would  be  not  a  deeper  insight  but  a  more  convenient 
or  extensive  symbolization.  That  many  classes  are  rela- 
tive  to  our  own  purposes  and  have  no  essential  significance 
for  the  objects  is  equally  known.  That  onr  thinking  is 
mainly  symbolic,  dealing  not  with  the  full  conception  of 
the  reality  but  only  with  shorthand  expressions  of  it  is  also 
undoubted.  That  concrete  thinking — that  is,  thinking  which 
is  adequate  to  reality — must  be  as  complex  as  reality  itself  is 
likewise  beyond  question.  Our  class  terms  in  their  gener- 
ality may  represent  reality,  but  they  never  adequately  ex- 
press it.  They  have  value  as  logical  symbols,  but  they  are 
as  little  to  be  mistaken  for  the  reality  as  man  in  general  is 
to  be  mistaken  for  mv  next-door  neighbor. 

No\v  of  all  this,  which  is  clear  enough  when  stated,  our 
spontaneous  dogmatism  never  even  dreams.  The  order  of 
thought  is  identified  with  the  order  of  things  as  a  matter  of 
course.  The  plurality  and  differences  of  the  facts  disap- 
pear in  the  unity  and  sim])licity  of  the  class  term,  and  a 
double  fancy  arises.  The  first  is  that  the  facts  themselves 
have  been  identified,  and  the  second  is  tliat  we  have  come 
upon  the  true  essence  of  the  facts  or  the  original  from 
which  they  proceed.  This  is  the  fallacy  of  the  universal, 
and  this  is  how  it  arises.  We  must  now  proceed  to  illus- 
trate the  ravages  it  has  wrought. 

A  very  large  part  of  popular  speculation,  both  cosmolog- 
ical  and  psychological,  is  but  a  case  of  this  fallacy.  Physi- 
cal objects  are  all  classified  as  material,  and  their  various 
activities  are  said  to  be  manifestations  of  foi'ce.  Thus  we 
reach  a  pair  of  abstractions,  matter  and  force,  from  which  all 
the  peculiarities  and  differences  of  material  things  and  their 
energies  have  disappeared.  This  gives  us  a  species  of  unity 
and  simplicity  of  conception  which  is  forthwith  mistaken  for  a 


246  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

unity  and  simplicity  of  real  existence.  Then  we  are  all  ready 
for  evolution.  As  in  the  system  of  conceptions,  the  species 
may  be  looked  upon  as  modifications  and  specifications  of  the 
genus,  and  as  being  in  that  sense  derived  from  the  genus,  so 
in  the  world  of  things  the  species  may  be  looked  upon  as 
specifications  of  the  supreme  genera,  matter  and  force,  or  as 
derived  from  them.  Matter  and  force,  then,  simple  and  ho- 
mogeneous, are  the  basal  fact,  and  from  their  simplicity  and 
homogeneity  have  proceeded  all  the  complex  forms  of  physi- 
cal existence.  And  as  the  basal  realities  have  no  contents 
beyond  bare  being  and  causality,  there  is  nothing  about 
them  to  start  questions  or  awaken  surprise  ;  and  as  thej'^  are 
also  manifestly  the  source  of  the  higher  forms,  there  is  no 
assignable  limit  to  their  efficiency.  In  this  reasoning  we 
have  the  fallacy  of  the  universal  in  its  most  striking  form — 
the  form  in  which  it  has  been  the  prolific  and  perennial 
source  of  atheistic  and  evolutionary  speculation.  When  set 
forth  in  imposing  terminology,  in  which  homogeneity  and 
heterogeneity,  differentiation  and  integration  play  their  fa- 
milial' parts,  it  rarely  fails  to  pass  for  the  last  profundit3\ 

The  fictitious  and  verbal  nature  of  this  reasoning-  is  man- 
ifest.  As  soon  as  we  think  concretely  and  critically  it  is 
plain  that  this  is  simply  a  shuffling  of  logical  abstractions 
and  relations  which  have  been  mistaken  for  real  existence. 
These  abstractions  have  onlv  a  formal  existence  and  a  logi- 
cal  function.  They  are  indispensable  to  us  in  mastering 
the  manifold  of  experience,  but  when  mistaken  for  reality 
they  become  absurd.  We  have  seen  in  the  preceding  chap- 
ter that  free  thought  is  the  only  real  principle  either  of  sim- 
plification or  differentiation.  Without  it  logic  can  find  its 
way  neither  from  the  many  to  the  one,  nor  from  the  one  to 
the  many ;  and  if  we  seem  to  do  so  we  merely  fall  a  prey  to 
the  fallacy  of  the  universal. 

If  one  should  sa}^  given  a  multitude  of  elements  of  vari- 


SOME    STRUCTURAL    FALLACIES  247 

ous  powers  and  in  complex  relations,  and  in  general  such 
that  they  irapl}^  to  the  minutest  detail  all  that  they  will  ever 
do,  we  can  explain  whatever  they  do,  no  one  would  think  it 
a  very  edifying  or  progressive  performance ;  and  yet  that  is 
the  exact  value  of  all  mechanical  explanation  which  does  not 
appeal  to  mind  But  when  the  complexity  is  hidden  by  the 
simplicity  of  our  terras,  and  the  implicit  implications  of  our 
data  are  overlooked  through  the  deceit  of  the  universal,  we 
advance  with  the  utmost  ease  from  an  indefinite,  incoherent 
homogeneity  to  any  desirable  definite,  coherent  heterogene- 
ity, as  per  contract  or  schedule.  So  great  are  the  impost- 
ure and  deceit  of  the  universal. 

This  fallacy  underlies  the  system  of  Spinoza,  so  far  as  it 
is  reasoned.  It  vitiates  a  large  part  of  Hegel's  work,  and  is 
the  gist  of  Mr  Spencer's  philosophy.  The  bulk  of  panthe- 
istic speculation  roots  in  it,  and  it  is  the  perennial  source  of 
atheistic  reasoning.  In  the  former  case  the  individual  is 
merged  in  the  class  terra,  and  this  soon  passes  for  the  uni- 
versal and  all-erabracing  being.  Thus  a  harmless  logical 
subordination  becomes  a  fatal  ontological  implication.  In 
the  case  of  atheism  the  complexity  and  plurality  of  real 
existence  are  reduced  to  simple  abstractions,  which  are  so 
low  as  apparently  to  demand  no  explanation,  and  thus  the 
world-problem  is  triumphantly  and  most  luminously  solved. 

In  psychology  also  this  fallacy  has  been  rampant,  reduc- 
ing a  good  part  of  psychological  discussion  to  irrelevance 
and  barrenness.  Psychologists  have  been  greatly  exercised 
as  to  what  faculty  is  concerned  in  a  given  experience,  and 
also  as  to  how  many  faculties  are  to  be  assumed  or  allowed. 
There  has  been  a  general  aim  to  reduce  mental  principles  to 
the  fewest  possible,  and  there  has  been  a  very  general  fancy 
on  the  part  of  the  operators  that  they  were  dealing  with  the 
nature  of  the  mind  itself  rather  than  classifying  the  mental 
facts.     Hence  each  new  simplification  has  been  viewed  as  a 


248  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND   KNOWLEDGE 

triumph  of  analysis,  and  as  pointing  to  a  corresponding  sim- 
plicity of  the  mental  nature. 

Here  too  the  illusion  is  patent.  The  classification  of 
mental  states  contains  no  doctrine  of  the  soul  and  no  hint 
of  the  genetic  relations  of  the  facts  as  occurring.  Neither 
does  it  in  an}'  way  identify  or  even  modify  the  facts.  These 
remain  what  they  are,  to  whatever  faculty  or  class  we  may 
refer  them.  If  we  should  reduce  all  the  faculties  to  one  the 
facts  would  remain  as  distinct  as  ever.  Light,  heat,  and 
sound  are  all  sensations,  but  they  are  incommensurable,  nev- 
ertheless. If  we  say,  with  Condillac,  to  think  is  to  feel,  we 
have  to  confess  that  to  think  is  not  to  feel  in  the  same  sense 
that  to  have  a  pain  is  to  feel ;  and  if  the  matter  were  pushed 
it  would  turn  out  that  the  feelino^  which  is  also  thinking:  is 
not  any  and  every  feeling,  but  onl}'  a  thinking  feeling,  and 
indeed  we  should  finally  see  that  even  the  thinking  feelings 
vary  among  themselves.  The  thinking  feeling  which  is 
geometry  would  not  be  the  thinking  feeling  which  is  eco- 
nomics. Thus  the  things  which  we  identify  in  the  noun  or 
verb  we  have  to  distinguish  in  the  adjective  or  adverb,  and 
we  have  our  work  for  nothing.  The  identifications  and 
constructions  are  mainl}'  verbal.  At  this  verbal  mill  the 
associational  psychologists  have  been  grinding  with  sad  pa- 
tience but  dreary  monotony  for  generations.  In  compari- 
son the  blind  leading  the  blind  would  present  a  hopeful  and 
inspiring  spectacle. 

The  general  discussion  of  evolution  in  the  biological 
realm  has  been  greatly  confused  by  this  fallacy  of  the  uni- 
versal. The  very  phrase,  the  transformation  or  transmu- 
tation of  species,  betrays  its  presence.  It  suggests  an  es- 
sence which  is  transformed  and  which  abides.  Because 
it  is  transformed,  the  lower  forms  are  made  over  into  the 
higher;  because  it  abides,  the  higher  are  really  identical 
with  the  lower.     But  when  we  remember  that  a  species  is 


SOME    STRUCTURAL   FALLACIES  249 

really  only  a  group  of  more  or  less  similar  individuals  and 
is  nothing  in  itself  this  notion  vanishes.  The  transforma- 
tion of  a  species  could  only  mean  the  production  of  dissimilar 
individuals  along  lines  of  descent,  thus  forming  a  new  gr(.iip. 
If  in  tracing  the  history  of  organic  forms  along  genealogi- 
cal lines  we  find  a  growing  complexity  and  a  continued 
progress,  the  simple  fact  is  that  the  power  which  produces 
individuals,  instead  of  producing  them  all  on  a  level,  pro- 
duces them  on  a  varied  and  rising  scale,  a  scale  of  greater 
complexity  and  heterogeneity,  and  one  of  growing  adapta- 
tion to  larger  and  fuller  life.  There  is  nothing  whatever 
in  the  fact  of  such  connection  which  identifies  individuals, 
or  which  identifies  higher  and  lower  forms.  We  may  in- 
deed class  them  together  for  logical  convenience,  and  may 
speak  of  later  forms  as  modifications  of  earlier  forms,  but 
both  the  identification  and  the  modification  are  purely  sub- 
jective, and  have  no  significance  for  the  real  things.  Apart 
from  our  subjective  manipulation,  the  fact  is  the  individu- 
als and  the  power  which  produces  individuals  through  the 
processes  of  generation  in  such  a  way  that  they  admit  of 
being  classed  according  to  an  ascending  scale.  All  else  is 
the  shadow  of  our  own  minds.  To  keep  this  steadily  in 
view  would  reduce  the  doctrine  in  question  to  a  subordi- 
nate significance,  and  would  empty  it  entirely  of  those 
fearful  implications  which  it  has  for  popular  thought. 

The  discussion  of  the  relation  of  the  human  mind  to  the 
brute  mind  has  been  largely  vitiated  by  the  same  fallacy. 
Assuming  the  truth  of  evolution,  the  fact  would  be  that 
minds  of  a  lower  grade  preceded  those  of  a  higher  grade ; 
that  these  successive  minds  appeared  in  connection  with 
organisms  genealogically  connected  ;  and,  finally,  that  if  we 
should  classify  these  minds  we  should  find  them  constitut- 
ing an  ascending  order.  This  fact  would  leave  entirely 
untouched  the  question.  What  are  these  individual  minds, 


250  THEORV    OF   THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE 

and  what  is  the  power  or  powers  concerned  in  their  pro- 
duction ?  Our  classifications  decide  nothing  as  to  the  real- 
ity, and  when  we  transcend  our  subjective  manipulation 
we  see  that  the  objective  problem  is  not  to  gather  things 
into  a  common  class,  but  to  produce  a  series  of  existing 
minds,  each  of  which  is  a  distinct  individual,  and  no  one 
of  which,  except  in  a  figurative  sense,  inherits  anything 
from  any  other.  Given  one  or  more  minds  to  produce  new 
minds  of  higher  kind  or  degree,  or  indeed  of  any  kind  or 
degree,  is  the  real  problem.  But  this  fact  is  obscured  by 
constructing  a  pair  of  abstractions,  the  human  mind  and 
the  brute  mind,  and  by  making  the  most  agonistic  and 
even  agonizing  efforts  to  identify  their  contents.  Yet  this 
debate  does  not  touch  reality  at  all,  but  only  the  contents 
of  two  logical  abstractions. 

A  further  illustration  of  this  fallacy  is  found  in  a  current 
doctrine  concerning  the  origin  and  progress  of  religion. 
This  theorv  looks  for  the  earliest  form  of  religious  concep- 
tion and  views  all  later  forms  as  developed  from  it,  so  that 
they  may  be  regarded  as  but  sublimations  of  the  initial 
conception.  But  as  the  earliest  notions  were  crude,  some 
form  of  animism  or  fetishism,  and  as  all  later  notions  are 
but  developments  of  the  earlier,  we  can  only  look  upon  them 
as  being  involved  in  the  condemnation  visited  upon  their 
beginnings.  This  kind  of  thing  has  been  thought  to  be  im- 
mensely significant,  but  in  truth  it  is  only  the  full-blown 
fallacy  of  the  universal.  The  objective  fact  in  the  case  is 
that  men,  in  different  stages  of  development,  have  formed 
varying  and  competing  conceptions  concerning  the  invisible 
world  and  its  hidden  agencies.  Animism,  ghostism,  fetish- 
ism, polytheism,  monotheism,  pantheism,  deism,  Christianity, 
are  illustrations.  These  are  one  in  the  sense  that  astronomy 
and  astrologv,  or  chemistry  and  alchemy,  are  one.  But 
this  fact  of  a  plurality  of  competing  conceptions  is  easily 


SOME    STRUCTURAL    FALLACIES  351 

hidden  by  verbal  thinking.  For  all  of  these  conceptions 
may  be  looked  upon  as  phases  of  religious  belief,  and  thus 
they  are  verbally  identified  or  unified.  Then  we  have  only 
to  look  for  the  earliest  form  of  this  belief  to  find  its  true 
on'oinal  and  abiding  essence,  and  then  we  turn  on  the  ter- 
minology  of  evolution  and  exhibit  the  higher  forms  of 
religious  faith  as  only  sublimations  of  an  earlier  belief  in 
ghosts.  That  all  this  is  only  verbal  manipulation  is  plain 
upon  inspection.  With  equal  cogency  we  might  maintain 
that  astronomy  is  only  sublimated  astrology  and  that  chem- 
istry is  only  sublimated  alchemy,  and  with  equal  relevance 
we  miffht  suo^est  that  no  one  can  have  much  faith  in 
these  sciences  who  duly  considers  their  low  and  unseemly 
origin. 

These  illustrations  give  only  a  faint  hint  of  the  ravages 
of  the  fallacy  of  the  universal.  And,  in  general,  if  we 
should  eliminate  from  speculation  and  discussion  the  va- 
rious forms  of  this  fallacy  their  volume  would  be  surpris- 
ingly diminished. 

This  fallacy  as  applied  to  concepts  I  call  the  fallacy  of 
the  universal.  As  applied  to  principles  it  may  be  called  the 
fallacy  of  abstraction.  It  is  essentially  the  same  fallacy  in 
both  cases,  but  the  manifestation  in  the  two  fields  is  suffi- 
ciently different  to  make  it  permissible  to  have  a  double 
name,  especially  as  thereby  we  secure  a  pretext  for  another 
lot  of  illustrations. 

Thought  cannot  get  on  without  the  universal,  but  it  must 
be  critical  in  its  use.  In  like  manner  thought  cannot  get 
on  without  abstract  principles,  but  it  must  be  equally  crit- 
ical in  their  use.  As  the  concept  may  be  valid  for  things 
w^ithout  being  the  thing,  so  principles  msbj  be  valid  for 
things  without  being  the  thing.  And  as  the  concept  must 
be  specified  into  particular  values  when  applied  to  any  real 


252  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE 

thing,  SO  principles  must  undergo  specification  and  even 
modification  wiaen  applied  to  actual  cases. 

Through  oversight  of  this  fact  men  often  lose  themselves 
in  theories  which  may  be  abstractly  true  and  even  theo- 
retically important,  but  whose  practical  application  is  un- 
certain. In  many  cases,  too,  the  modifications  in  practice 
are  so  great  as  to  leave  the  theory  as  true  as  ever  but 
Avorthless. 

Theoretical  mechanics  illustrates  all  of  these  cases.  The 
science  is  valuable  only  as  it  finds  the  abstract  law,  and  to 
do  this  it  must  abstract  from  all  the  concrete  circumstances. 
It  feigns  a  lot  of  abstractions  as  a  material  point,  a  flexible 
and  frictionless  cord,  a  homogeneous  and  regular  body,  and 
then  formulates  their  law.  But  this  law  is  strictly  true 
only  for  the  abstractions ;  when  applied  to  reality,  allow- 
ance has  to  be  made  for  all  the  actual  circumstances  elimi- 
nated from  the  abstractions.  And  sometimes,  as  in  the 
case  of  the  wedge,  the  theory  is  correct  but  worthless,  for 
in  practice  the  use  of  the  wedge  depends  upon  the  friction 
which  is  omitted  in  the  theory. 

There  can  be  no  science  without  abstract  principles,  but 
there  can  be  no  sane  and  safe  thinking  without  carefully 
inquiring  rnto  the  form  which  they  assume  in  application, 
or  without  inquiring  whether  the  conditions  assumed  in  the 
theory  are  realized  or  realizable  in  practice.  Failure  here 
has  resulted  in  a  vast  amount  of  closet  theory  and  academic 
debate,  productive  of  nothing  but  confusion  and  mischief. 

This  fallac}'  of  abstraction  is  almost  as  pervasive  as  the 
fallacy  of  the  universal.  It  leads  to  a  great  many  unreal 
simplifications  and  illusory  solutions  of  practical  problems. 
Thus  in  ethics  the  theory  of  responsibilit}^  is  very  simple. 
We  form  the  abstraction  of  a  "  moral  agent,"  or  a  "  sinner," 
and  have  no  difficulty  in  laying  down  the  law  for  him. 
And  this  law  may  be  abstractly  correct   and   express  the 


soMK    STKLCTUKAL    !•  AI.I.ACIE.S  253 

essential  judgment  of  our  moral  nature.  But  when  it  comes 
to  applying  this  law  we  begin  to  grope.  For  we  have  not 
a  moral  agent  ready-made  fi-om  the  start,  and  endowed  with 
all  necessary  knowledge  and  sensibility.  The  actual  moral 
agent  has  to  be  developed.  The  knowledge,  the  moral  sen- 
sitiveness, the  volitional  control — all  have  to  be  developed 
or  acquired.  And  the  process  is  a  slow  one,  and  is  never 
completed.  The  morality  of  the  actual  man  is  potential, 
partial,  relative.  This  fact  complicates  the  concrete  prob- 
lem to  an  unknown  extent.  But  the  ethical  and  theological 
theorist  often  overlooks  all  this,  and  contents  himself  with 
theorizing  about  the  ''  moral  agent "  and  the  "  sinner."  The 
result  is  something  either  purely  academic  or  practically 
atrocious. 

Indeed,  even  the  virtues  themselves  depend  to  some  ex- 
tent upon  the  context.  As  abstract  principles  they  may  be 
abstractly  affirnietl,  but  in  application  they  must  be  ad- 
justed to  circumstances.  Thus,  justice  ranks  high  among 
the  eternal  principles,  and  is  of  inalienable  obligation ;  but 
it  is  not  alwavs  easy  to  see  what  justice  demands  in  a  given 
case,  or  how  far  it  is  practically  attainable.  In  fact,  the 
abstract  principle  may  be  insisted  upon  in  a  way  to  make 
society  impossible.  A  fanatical  theorist  may  easily  per- 
suade himself  that  all  social  arrangements  and  all  laws 
are  unjust,  and  a  great  many  facts  might  be  offered  in 
evidence.  Ko  perfectly  just  system  of  taxation  is  possible. 
Every  law  is  unjust  to  some  one.  The  order  of  life  itself 
seems  unjustly  partial.  To  him  that  hath  is  given,  and  from 
him  that  hath  not  is  taken  away  even  that  which  he  hath. 
What  could  be  more  unjust  than  a  world  of  heredity  and 
social  solidarity?  With  such  facts  abounding  it  is  easy  for 
the  ideologist  to  heat  his  own  and  other  weak  heads,  and 
then  we  become  aware  that  there  is  a  certam  truth  in 
Hobbes's  claim  that  right  and  justice  depend  on  the  law ; 


254  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

they  are  what  the  law  allows  or  commands.  It  would  be 
impossible  to  maintain  social  order  if  there  were  not  a  power 
to  end  the  wrangles  which  could  arise  out  of  the  notions 
of  abstract  rights  when  abstractly  interpreted.  There  is 
no  more  potent  and  destructive  solvent  of  civilization  than 
these  same  notions  when  held  without  regard  to  the  con- 
crete conditions  of  human  existence.  The  kind  of  justice 
that  brings  down  the  heavens  is  of  a  piece  with  the  malig- 
nant philanthropy  of  some  historical  reformers. 

The  same  fallacy  runs  through  a  great  deal  of  moral 
teaching  and  moral  reform.  A  set  of  abstract  moral  prin- 
ciples is  set  forth,  but  the  mode  of  application  is  overlooked. 
Then  with  a  few  such  phrases  as  "  loyalt}^  to  principle," 
"loyalty  to  conscience,"  "no  compromise  with  sin,"  it  is 
easy  to  make  a  great  show  of  lofty  purpose.  Such  phrases 
readily  lend  themselves  to  effective  rhetorical  displav.  and 
commonly  aggravate  the  evil  in  question.  For  with  per- 
sons of  this  type  it  is  not  a  question  of  doing  the  best  pos- 
sible when  the  ideally  best  cannot  be  attained,  but  of 
"keeping  their  own  skirts  clear  of  blood,"  or  of  making 
no  "  league  with  death  or  covenant  with  hell."  The  more 
fanatical  had  rather  see  evil  flourish  than  "  compromise 
their  conscience,"  which  is  often  a  most  singular  organ ; 
and  the  weaker  minded  are  afraid  to  do  anything  for  fear 
of  doing  wrong.  This  fallacy  of  the  abstract  has  always 
been  a  ffreat  weakness  of  moral  reform. 

Philanthropy  suffers  in  the  same  way.  It  tends  to  re- 
main abstract  and  academic,  dealing  with  man,  or  the  la- 
borer, or  the  criminal  in  general,  instead  of  studying  the 
concrete  case.  To  be  sure,  the  concrete  case  can  never  be 
effectually  studied  except  in  the  light  of  some  principle,  and 
this  is  the  justification  of  the  abstract  view  ;  but  with  equal 
certainty  the  abstract  principle  leads  to  nothing  until  it  is 
studied  in  its  concrete  application.      Human  equality  is  a 


SOME    STKUOTUKAL    FALLACIES  255 

great  ideal,  but  how  to  secure  it  among  men  wlio  are  pro- 
foundly unequal  is  not  always  evident.  That  we  are  all 
children  of  a  common  Father  should  always  be  borne  in 
mind ;  but  this  does  not  remove  the  fact  that  some  of  the 
children  are  lazy,  or  filthy,  or  turbulent,  or  ignorant,  or  vi- 
cious ;  and  this  fact  must  also  be  taken  into  account. 

When  we  have  the  abstract  principle  the  concrete  prob- 
lem is  only  half  solved.  The  mode  of  application  remains, 
and  this  is  often  the  question  of  chief  difficulty.  Here  is 
where  the  ethical  casuist,  the  religious  disciplinarian,  and 
the  social  refoi*mer  all  come  short.  They  fall  back  on  the 
abstract.  The  amateur  sociologist  falls  back  on  some  glit- 
tering generalities  about  man  and  the  golden  rule,  and  pos- 
sibly even  some  theological  doctrine.  But  these  are  rarely 
in  dispute.  The  practical  question  is.  How  shall  these  gen- 
eralities be  applied  in  the  actual  social  condition  ?  Moses  on 
the  mountain  holding  up  his  hands  is  doubtless  an  impor- 
tant factor,  but  nothing  will  ever  be  done  until  Joshua  goes 
down  into  the  valley  and  brings  things  to  pass. 

We  also  need  to  bear  in  mind  that  a  great  many  practi- 
cal problems  alike  in  ethics  and  sociology,  in  economics  and 
politics,  are  theoretically  indeterminate.  Good  men  may 
dififer,  and  only  life  and  experience  can  finally  point  out  the 
Avay.  In  a  great  many  things  we  must  feel  our  way,  and 
in  such  cases  the  flourishing  of  generalities  at  best  leads  to 
nothing  better  than  fine  writing  or  showy  speeches,  which 
in  no  w^ay  advance  the  matter.  The  high  moral  stand  often 
taken  by  politicians  in  dealing  with  their  opponents,  when 
it  is  not  plain  hypocrisy,  illustrates  this  w^-etched  mockery 
of  reasoning.  The  religious  casuist  especially  needs  to  re- 
member this  indeterminateness  of  practice,  as  he  is  pecul- 
iarly liable  to  mistake  his  own  conviction  or  habit  for  a 
universal  law,  if  not  for  a  divine  command. 

We  find  the  same  devotion  to  the  abstract  in  a  great 


256  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

deal  of  economic  discussion.  The  "  economic  man  "  of  the 
economists  is  an  abstract  fiction  like  the  "  moral  agent "  of 
ethics,  and  is  in  equal  need  of  watching.  For  this  man, 
when  he  appears  in  realit)'^,  is  more  complicated  in  his  nat- 
ure and  relations  than  he  is  in  the  speculation.  But  his 
makers  and  managers  commonly  overlook  this,  and  when 
the}^  have  formulated  some  principle,  which  may  be  ab- 
stractly true,  they  think  that  nothing  more  is  to  be  done.  But 
here  again  it  may  be  that  the  theoretical  postulates  have  a 
parallax  with  reality,  and  that  the  abstract  principle  must 
be  greatly  modified  in  the  application.  Thus,  free  trade 
may  be  an  ideal  both  morally  and  economically  from  the 
academic  standpoint,  but  it  by  no  means  follows  that  it  is 
always  the  best  for  every  people  without  regard  to  their 
economic  conditions.  Such  a  question  cannot  be  academi- 
cally settled.  The  argument  may  still  be  sound  as  an  ab- 
straction, but  it  is  important  to  inquire  whether  the  con- 
ditions assumed  by  the  argument  actually  exist.  That  one 
hundred  men  can  do  one  hundred  times  as  much  as  one 
man  is  self-evident  when  abstractly  taken;  in  practice, 
however,  there  might  be  conditions  such  that  they  could 
not  do  as  much  as  one  man,  and  there  might  be  conditions 
where  they  could  do  many  more  than  a  hundred  times  as 
much  as  one  man.  For  instance,  one  hundred  men  could 
never  dig  up  a  plot  of  ground  six  feet  square  on  the  con- 
dition that  they  all  stand  on  it,  while  one  man  could  manage 
it  very  comfortably.  On  the  other  hand,  a  hundred  men  in 
co-operation  might  do  something  which  singly  they  could 
not  accomplish  at  all.  So  simple  a  case  of  co-operation  as 
pulling  on  a  rope  may  illustrate  the  matter.  Of  course  the 
abstract  hundred  men  must  alwaj's  do  just  one  hundred 
limes  as  much  as  the  abstract  single  man.  The  mathe- 
matics is  perfect,  but  the  concrete  problem  remains  un- 
solved.    The  straight  line  is  always  the  shortest  distance 


80MK    STKUCTL'KAL    FALLACIES  357 

between  two  points  in  pure  space,  and  yet  in  a  world  like 
ours  the  longest  way  round  may  sometimes  be  the  shortest 
way  home.  A  guide  who  had  landed  his  followers  in  a  bog 
would  excuse  himself  in  vain  by  falling  back  on  the  mathe- 
matics of  the  line,  but  he  would  not  be  much  more  absurd 
than  some  of  our  theoretical  economists. 

So  much  for  abstract  free  trade.  That  abstract  protec- 
tion hangs  equally  in  the  air  is  too  evident  to  need  illus- 
tration. 

The  root  of  these  two  fallacies,  or  of  this  one  fallacy 
in  both  of  its  forms,  is  the  failure  to  think  concretely  in 
concrete  matter.  A  great  many  social  disputes  also  are 
confused  if  not  produced  by  this  same  failure.  Thus,  a 
dispute  between  a  debtor  and  a  creditor,  or  an  employer 
and  his  employees,  is  always  something  specific,  and  can  be 
understood  only  in  its  special  circumstances.  If  thus  dealt 
with  there  would  be  some  hope  of  understanding,  and, 
possibly,  of  settling  the  difficulty.  But  the  rule  is  to  gen- 
eralize, and  then  the  abstract  debtor  and  creditor,  labor 
and  capital,  play  their  familiar  part.  The  lurid  rhetoric 
which  is  kept  in  stock  for  such  occasions  is  turned  on. 
Octopi  and  polypi,  boa-constrictors  and  hydra-headed  mon- 
sters crawl  all  over  the  subject.  Vultures  and  cormorants 
flock  in,  and  the  whole  region  swarms  with  anarchists, 
Shylocks,  and  barons.  This  performance,  which,  in  prin- 
ciple, is  the  gist  of  so  much  popular  discussion  in  this  field, 
is  always  exceedingly  humorous,  although  at  times  it  may, 
in  addition,  become  dangerous.  How  to  conduct  a  politi- 
cal campaign  without  it  is  quite  beyond  the  heart  of  the 
natural  man  to  conceive. 

The  fallacy  of  abstraction  is  especially  the  scientific  fal- 
lacy ;  that  is,  science,  by  its  aim  and  form,  is  apt  to  fall 
into  this  fallacy  unless  duly  chastened  by  criticism.  Sci- 
ence as  such  exists  in  abstract  form,  and  we  are  prone  to 

17 


258  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND   KNOWLEDGE 

forget  that  any  science  is  never  the  reality,  but  only  a  par. 
tial  and  abstract  view  of  reality.  The  same  thing,  as  man. 
may  fall  under  a  great  many  sciences.  His  being  has 
physical,  chemical,  physiological,  biological,  psychological, 
economical,  ethical,  and  religious  aspects,  and  he  belongs  to 
all  of  these  sciences.  But  no  one  of  them  alone  can  fully 
express  him.  We  have  to  be  on  our  guard  against  science 
itself ;  for  these  abstractions  are  very  apt  to  set  up  for  the 
true  reality,  and  to  seek  to  exclude  one  another  from  ex- 
istence. The  mind  which  has  produced  them  must  remain 
their  master  by  remembering  their  abstract  and  partial 
character,  and  by  persistently  returning  to  the  reahties 
from  which  they  have  been  abstracted. 

The  science  of  man  himself  furnishes  the  most  striking 
illustration  of  this  usurping  tendency  on  the  part  of  the 
abstract  sciences.  The  physicist  and  chemist,  left  to  them- 
selves, tend  to  regard  man  as  a  physical  and  chemical  com- 
bination. Physical  changes  due  to  human  volition  are  fair- 
ly familiar  facts  of  experience ;  but  as  the}^  lie  in  a  field 
outside  of  ph3'^sics  and  chemistry  the  mere  physicist  or 
chemist  is  perpetually  sliding  into  their  denial.  In  like 
manner  the  biologist,  when  he  has  classilied  man  in  the 
natural-history  series,  tends  to  think  that  he  has  adequately 
grasped  humanity.  The  economist  mistakes  his  partial 
view  for  a  complete  one.  The  mere  physician  does  the 
same,  and,  for  the  sake  of  life,  is  sometimes  ready  to  ignore 
life's  true  significance.  The  moralist  goes  and  does  like- 
wise ;  and,  finally,  the  theologian  tends  to  ignore  all  the 
phases  of  human  life  except  the  abstractly  spiritual.  The 
currier  with  his  high  estimate  of  the  defensive  value  of 
leather  is  a  figure  of  perennial  significance. 

And  now  it  will  doubtless  seem  to  some  readers  that 
this  nominalism  is  a  recantation  of  our  earlier  insistence 
upon  the  necessity  of  the  universal.     But  this  too   is  a 


SOME    STRUCTURAL    FALLACIES  259 

mistake.  We  still  insist  that  without  the  validity  of  some 
universals  there  can  be  no  knowledge.  But  this  does  not 
imply  their  thinghood  in  any  case,  nor  remove  the  fact  that 
a  great  many  universals  are  relative  to  ourselves.  The 
mind  needs  watching  in  all  its  elements  aind  functions.  The 
particular  needs  watching,  lest  the  mind  lose  itself  in  a 
meaningless  chaos  of  details.  The  universal  needs  watch- 
ing, lest  tlie  mind  lose  reality  altogether  in  its  devotion  to 
abstractions.  For  finding  the  golden  mean  there  is  no 
rule  which  can  be  mechanically  applied.  The  mind  itself, 
alert  and  critical,  in  contact  with  the  facts,  is  the  only 
standard. 

A  third  great  source  of  error  is  language  itself.  This 
has  already  been  referred  to  in  treating  of  the  notion,  but 
some  elaboration  may  be  permitted  here.  Such  errors  may 
be  called  fallacies  of  language.  In  some  respects  they  are 
closely  related  to  the  preceding  fallacies,  but  they  have 
some  features  peculiar  to  themselves. 

Words,  from  their  structure  and  associations,  come  to 
have  a  force  of  their  own  which  is  quite  distinct  from  their 
logical  connotation.  In  this  way  they  often  have  a  parallax 
with  our  real  meaning.  Popular  thought,  also,  when  it  is 
not  busied  with  sense  objects,  is  so  dependent  on  the  word 
that  it  soon  identifies  it  with  the  thing;  so  that  to  change 
the  word  is  to  change  the  thing,  and  whatever  the  word 
implies  is  true  of  the  thing.  It  is  this  fact  that  gives  nick- 
names and  epithets  their  power.  In  a  rational  world  they 
would  have  no  significance ;  for  every  one  would  pass  be- 
hind the  word  to  the  object,  and  would  see  that  this  is  the 
same,  whatever  we  call  it.  In  the  actual  world,  which  is 
not  rational,  we  have  constant  illustration  of  what  Dr. 
South  calls  "  the  fatal  imposture  and  force  of  words." 
Popular  discussion  is  largely  vitiated  by  them.     Things  are 


260  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

displaced  by  question-begging  epithets,  often  of  odious  asso- 
ciation and  connotation.  "Trenchant  arraignments"  are 
made  ;  insults  are  exchanged  ;  "■  replies  "  abound ;  but  the 
matter  itself  is  left  untouched. 

The  fallacy  of  language  in  this  form  is  simply  a  move- 
ment of  human  pugnacity  and  passion  made  articulate  by 
speech  ;  it  has  no  rational  character.  The  fallacy  is  a  little 
higher  in  the  familiar  ai'gument  from  the  word  rather  than 
the  thing.  Often  the  word  is  more  definite  than  the 
thought,  and  shows  no  trace  of  the  necessary  limitations. 
In  such  cases  we  trust  to  the  good  sense  or  knowledge  of 
others  to  supply  the  limitations.  Or  we  use  various  ex- 
pressions, and  approach  the  subject  from  different  stand- 
points, in  order  to  show  that  we  must  not  stop  in  the  ex- 
pression, but  must  go  on  to  the  tiling.  Such  expressions 
always  suffer  when  they  fall  into  the  hands  of  persons  who 
interpret  them  by  the  dictionary,  or  who  are  without  fair- 
ness or  good  sense.  Instances  of  dictionary  interpretation 
occur  when  literary  men  wander  into  some  scientific  field, 
and  begin  to  interpret  doctrines  by  the  literary  or  every-day 
uses  of  the  terms.  Then  some  astounding  nonsense  is 
pretty  sure  to  be  evolved.  Physical,  biological,  economical 
doctrines  often  undergo  the  most  grotesque  distortions  in 
this  way. 

But  the  greatest  man  at  this  fallacy  is  the  maker  of 
"  logical  consequences,"  who  is  generally  a  "  practised  de- 
bater." These  are,  as  a  rule,  only  verbal  consequences,  but 
with  the  uninitiated  they  are  often  very  effective.  The 
godlessness  of  the  Constitution  and  the  schools,  the  poten- 
tial, if  not  probable,  treason  of  those  who  believe  in  a  higher 
law.  or  who  hold  that  it  is  better  to  obey  God  than  man, 
are  illustrations  of  this  sort  of  thing.  The  right  of  revolu- 
tion, the  word  of  God,  the  supremacy  of  the  church  or  of 
the  state,  are  phrases  well  adapted  to  this  kind  of  treat- 


SOME    STRUCTURAL   FALLACIES  ^61 

raent,  and  they  have  suffered  from  it  accordingly.  The 
terrible  consequences  sure  to  result  from  this  or  that  social 
chancre,  or  doctrinal  raodilication,  are  reached  in  the  same 
way.  The  common  mark  of  such  persons,  when  they  are 
honest,  is  that  they  are  totally  destitute  of  the  sense  of 
reality.  They  seem  to  have  no  idea  of  how  living  men 
think,  or  of  how  language  is  used.  It  is  w^ell  known  that 
about  everything  worth  having  is  logically  impossible  or 
self -destructive.  Our  federal  government  is  logical]  v  self- 
destructive  ;  for  it  is  logically  possible  for  Congress,  or  the 
Executive,  or  the  Judiciary  to  block  the  governmental  ad- 
ministration. Whatever  they  can  do  they  will  do,  of  course, 
and  the  government  must  perish.  The  English  Constitu- 
tion is  logically  non-existent,  for  Parliament  may  do  what 
it  pleases.  Universal  suffrage  has  the  most  fearsome  pos- 
sibilities. The  admission  of  the  laity,  and  especially  of 
women,  to  a  voice  in  ecclesiastical  administration  is  logi- 
cally nothing  less  than  the  abomination  of  desolation  stand- 
ing where  it  ought  not.  There  is  nothing  that  is  not  open 
to  quibble  or  cavil  if,  from  dulness  or  other  causes,  any  one 
inclines  to  it.  The  answer  to  all  such  scarecrow  reasoning 
is  that  back  of  all  logic,  and  conditioning  its  use,  is  the  men- 
tal and  moral  sanity  of  the  individual  and  the  community. 
While  this  lasts  the  logical  consequences  will  remain  the 
nightmares  of  weak  minds,  and  if  this  should  vanish  no 
theory  could  save  us. 

Another  form  of  the  fallacy  of  language  consists  in  ar- 
guing from  the  metaphor  involved  in  the  word.  Heredity 
and  natural  selection  owe  a  good  part  of  their  efficacy  in 
solving  biological  problems  to  the  metaphor  implicit  in 
them.  The  explanations  of  current  psjxhology  are  mainly 
figures  of  speech,  and  a  good  part  of  traditional  theology 
is  an  exegesis  of  misunderstood  metaphors.  In  both  of  the 
latter  fields  speech  must  be  metaphorical  in  the  nature  of 


262  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT   AND   KNOWLEDGE 

the  case,  and  thus  the  mind  is  put  upon  the  special  task  of 
using  metaphorical  language,  and,  at  the  same  time,  of 
guarding  against  mistaking  the  metaphor  for  the  thing. 
This  can  be  done  only  by  the  cultivation  of  a  critical  habit 
and  by  varying  the  expression,  so  that  the  mutual  incom- 
patibility of  the  metaphors  shall  force  us  to  the  insight  that 
they  are  not  the  truth  but  only  its  adumbration.  Psychol- 
ogy, theology,  and  the  religious  life  in  general  would  be 
vastly  helped  by  a  determined  effort  to  reduce  their  meta- 
phors to  their  net  significance.  We  should  still  use  them 
thereafter,  for  there  is  nothing  else  to  use ;  but  we  should 
be  freed  from  bondage  to  them.  It  might  also  appear  that 
there  is  a  choice  in  metaphors.  In  the  slow  development 
of  humanity  we  grow  away  from  the  customs  and  modes  of 
thought  which  once  made  forms  of  speech  intelligible  and 
expressive,  and  we  need  new  forms  for  the  best  expression 
of  the  growing  thought  and  life.  But  of  this  the  tradi- 
tionalist, ignorant  of  the  nature  of  language  and  unsuspi- 
cious of  its  imperfection  as  an  instrument  of  expression, 
never  dreams,  and  devotes  himself  with  pathetic  blindness 
to  the  letter  which  killeth,  while  grievously  missing  the 
spirit  which  giveth  life. 

Finally,  we  may  mention  the  fancy  that  a  new  name 
means  a  new  thing.  This  form  of  the  fallacy  is  by  no  means 
without  potency.  By  means  of  it  a  deal  of  shop-worn  ma- 
terial has  been  worked  off  at  a  profit  under  such  titles  as 
the  "  j^ew  Education,"  the  "  New  Psychology,"  the  "  New 
Philosophy,"  the  "  New  Pedagogy."  Enterprising  con- 
ductors of  teachers'  institutes  and  publishers  of  educational 
works  have  found  no  small  advantage  in  this  form  of  verbal 
illusion.  In  this  way  matter  which  scarcely  goes  beyond 
the  wisdom  of  the  nursery  is  made  to  look  like  a  new  dis- 
covery. In  such  cases  the  passivity  of  the  disciples'  judg- 
ment is  often   as  striking  as  that  shown  in  the  absolute 


SOME    STRUCTURAL    FALLACIES  263 

credulity  of  dreams.  To  this  fancy  may  be  added  the  allied 
notion  that  a  name  implies  some  corresponding  thing.  This 
makes  it  possible  to  constitute  a  new  science  to  order  by 
simply  constructing  a  well-sounding  name  of  classical  origin. 
These  fallacies  of  the  universal,  of  abstraction  and  of 
language,  I  have  called  structural  fallacies  of  the  human 
mind.  They  lie  very  much  deeper  than  the  familiar  fal- 
lacies of  logical  treatises,  and  only  a  careful  critical  pro- 
cedure can  guard  us  against  them.  They  have  wrought, 
and  still  work,  the  greatest  ravage  and  devastation  in  human 
thinking,  reducing  a  very  large  part  of  speculation  and  dis- 
cussion to  tedious  and  sterile  formalisms  and  verbal  disputes 
— sterile,  that  is,  of  good,  but  sadly  prolific  of  evil. 

Herewith  we  close  the  discussion  of  thought  and  pass 
to  the  problem  of  knowledge.  We  have  learned  something 
of  the  nature  and  ideal  aims  of  thought,  and  we  have  seen 
how  far  those  aims  are  from  being  realized. 


part  in 
THEOKY  OF  KNOWLEDGE 


CHAPTER  I 

PHILOSOPHIC    SCEPTICISM 

Our  study  thus  far  has  been  mainly  of  thought  as  a  sub- 
jective activity  with  various  forms  and  laws.  Its  relation 
to  knowledge  has  been  only  implicitly  considered.  Thought 
u.s  leading  to  knowledge  is  the  next  subject  for  considera- 
tion. 

It  is  quite  conceivable  that  one  should  allow  the  main 
results  of  our  previous  study  as  a  description  of  the  thought 
process,  and  should  at  the  same  time  doubt  or  deny  that 
thought  mediates  for  us  any  valid  knowledge  of  reality. 
Thought  may  exist  as  fact,  and  may  even  have  laws  pe- 
culiar to  itself ;  but  this  does  not  secure  the  validity  of 
knowledge.  In  the  form  of  philosophic  scepticism  this 
doubt  has  been  an  important  factor  in  the  history  of 
thought. 

Our  present  purpose  is  to  expound  this  problem  of  scep- 
ticism, with  the  aim  not  of  refuting,  but  rather  of  under- 
standing it.  This  will  enable  us  to  estimate  the  logical 
standing  of  scepticism,  and  will  free  us  from  bondage  to 
names  and  authorities.  We  do  not  seek,  then,  to  convince 
the  sceptic,  but  to  understand  scepticism.  Conviction  itself 
is  a  matter  into  which  the  personal  equation  enters  too 
largely  to  be  wholly  amenable  to  argument  and  logic. 

Knowledge  as  a  form  of  subjective  conviction  is  familiar 
to  all,  and  admits  of  no  definition.  It  also  admits  of  no 
question.     What  we  experience  we  experience.     But  know- 


268  THEORY    or    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

ing  claims  to  be  more  than  a  subjective  experience.  As  a 
mental  event  it  is,  of  course,  only  an  occurrence  in  the  con- 
sciousness of  some  one ;  but  in  addition  to  being  a  particu- 
lar mental  event  it  claims  also  to  be  an  apprehension  of 
independent  fact  or  truth.  This  is  what  we  have  before 
referred  to  as  the  objectivity  of  thought.  It  is  this  aspect 
of  thought  which  constitutes  the  philosophical  problem. 
There  is  no  doubt,  indeed,  that  thought  spontaneously 
takes  on  the  form  and  conviction  of  knowing;  but  whether 
the  apparent  knowledge  is  valid,  or  the  extent  to  which  it 
is  valid,  remains  an  open  question. 

Chronologically,  this  question  is  second  and  not  first  in 
our  mental  development.  We  have  repeatedly  pointed  out 
that  thought  goes  straight  to  its  objects  in  complete  uncon- 
sciousness of  its  own  complex  processes.  Objective  valid- 
ity is  implicit  in  all  thinking.  Our  objects,  too,  all  seem 
to  be  so  immediately  and  manifestly  given  that  to  question 
their  realit}'^  appears  wanton  and  absurd.  This  primal 
trust  of  the  mind  in  knowledge  is  shaken  only  as  diffi- 
culties, inconsistencies,  and  contradictions  are  discovered 
among  our  apparent  cognitions.  These  prove  the  fact  of 
error  and  make  doubt  possible.  Having  once  begun,  this 
doubt  may  spread  over  the  entire  intellectual  life  until  the 
validity  of  all  cognition  is  called  in  question.  Such  is  tiie 
genesis  of  philosophic  scepticism. 

Very  little  of  concrete  belief  or  unbelief  is  the  outcome 
of  rational  reflection  on  the  part  of  the  disciples.  There  is 
vehement  partisanship,  but  no  understanding.  This  is  a 
necessary  consequence  of  the  hearsay  form  in  which  the 
mental  life  of  the  individual  always  begins  and  largely  con- 
tinues. We  believe  and  disbelieve  alike  on  authority  rather 
than  on  reason.  In  this  way  it  often  happens  that,  instead 
of  a  knowledge  of  our  own  faith  or  unfaith,  we  have  onlv 
a  repetition  of  its  phrases.     Such  is  especially  the  case  at 


PHILOSOPHIC    SCEPTICISM  269 

present  with  the  subject  of  scepticism  in  its  various  forms 
of  agnosticism,  relativity,  phenomenahsra,  etc.  Opponents 
shudder  rhetorically,  and  disciples  proudly  profess;  but  nei- 
ther party  seem  to  have  any  settled  notions  of  the  problem 
itself,  or  of  the  method  of  its  solution.  Such  a  mental  con- 
dition is  not  favorable  to  understanding  or  progress ;  for,  as 
Locke  says,  it  is  all  one  to  go  about  to  draw  those  men  out 
of  their  mistakes  who  have  no  settled  notions  as  to  dispos- 
sess a  vagrant  of  his  habitation  who  has  no  settled  abode. 
In  order  to  bring  the  problem  out  of  this  amorphous  state 
we  note  several  conditions  which  scepticism  must  fulfil  if 
it  is  to  have  any  rational  standing  whatever. 

First,  if  scepticism  is  not  to  be  pure  arbitrariness  and 
ipsedixitism,  it  must  be  supported  by  reasons.  Belief  and 
unbelief  alike,  as  subjective  facts,  have  no  rational  signifi- 
cance. They  become  rational  only  through  the  grounds  by 
which  they  are  justified.  The  mere  fact  that  the  sceptic 
doubts  means  no  more  than  the  opposite  fact  that  the  be- 
liever believes,  and  neither  fact  means  anything  apart  from 
the  reasons  that  may  be  rendered.  The  sceptic  acquires 
importance,  not  through  the  doubts  he  utters,  but  through 
those  which  he  rationally  justifies.  The  judicial  critic,  there- 
fore, must  compel  the  sceptic  to  take  his  place  along  with 
other  theorists,  and  give  reasons  for  the  unfaith  that  is  in 
him.  Until  he  does  this  his  position  is  arbitrary,  capricious, 
and  irrational. 

Strangely  enough,  this  manifest  dictate  of  logic  has  often 
been  overlooked  in  the  history  of  speculation,  and  dogmatic 
denial,  especially  if  it  be  of  some  important  practical  in- 
terest, has  been  judged  to  have  high  speculative  significance. 
The  ease  with  which  good  people  have  been  stampeded  by 
unsupported  denial  is  one  of  the  humorous  features  of  the 
history  of  philosophy. 

Secondly,  the  attempt  to  give  reasons  presupposes  valid 


270  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

laws  of  thinking  and  reasoning,  whereby  the  consistent  and 
consequent  may  be  distinguished  from  the  inconsistent  and 
inconsequent.  Without  such  laws  there  can  be  no  thought 
whatever,  and  of  course  no  inference.  Hence  the  sceptic 
must  fall  back  on  arbitrary  and  unsupported  assertion,  and 
must  refrain  from  all  criticism  of  opposing  views,  or  he 
must  admit  the  laws  and  principles  of  logic  as  binding 
upon  all  thought  as  at  least  negative  conditions  of  truth. 

Thirdly,  if  the  sceptic  expects  his  doctrine  to  be  more 
than  an  individual  whim  of  his  own  he  must  assume  the 
community  and  identity  of  intelligence,  so  that  truth  for 
one  ought  to  be  truth  for  all.  Otherwise  his  faith  or  un- 
faith  would  be  his  private  possession,  and  nothing  about 
which  others  need  in  any  way  trouble  themselves.  With- 
out the  assumption  of  a  common  truth  and  a  common  rea- 
son speech  itself  w^ould  be  impertinence. 

Fourthly,  in  addition  to  the  community  of  intelligence 
the  sceptic  must  also  assume  the  identity  of  the  object  in 
experience.  Whatever  view  we  may  take  of  the  nature  of 
the  object,  we  must  assume  that  we  all  have  the  same 
object  in  experience.  Without  this  assumption  we  have  no 
common  ground  and  no  possibility  of  mutual  understand- 
ing. All  diversity  of  intelligence  and  experience  must  be 
interpreted  in  accordance  with  this  fundamental  community. 
It  must  be  referred  to  difference  of  development  or  of  stand- 
point, and  not  to  any  essential  difference  of  intellect  or  of 
objects. 

Fifthly,  something  must  be  known.  Where  nothing  is 
known  nothing  can  be  inferred  or  doubted.  Hence  the 
question  finally  becomes  one  of  more  or  less,  and  not  of 
knowledge  or  no  knowledge.  Scepticism  must  know  some- 
thing in  order  to  exist  at  all  as  a  rational  theory.  Absolute 
scepticism  is  a  contradiction,  and  exists  only  as  an  academic 
abstraction. 


PHILOSOPHIC    SCEPTICISM  271 

Now  these  assumptions  are  far-reaching,  and  carry  the 
matter  pretty  deep.  They  in  no  wise  admit  of  demon- 
stration, and  yet  they  are  manifestly  necessary  as  the 
conditions  of  a  rational  life.  They  carry  with  them  some 
profound  mysteries,  but  they  cannot  be  rejected  without 
rejecting  reason  itself.  Whatever  system  claims  to  have 
rational  standing  can  have  it  only  on  these  conditions. 
When  they  are  not  fulfilled  nothing  remains  but  volition, 
obstinacy,  conceit,  and  caprice.  A  scepticism  of  this  kind  is 
indeed  always  possible,  but  criticism  must  ignore  it  as  be- 
longing to  mental  or  moral  pathology.  The  problems  of 
thought  must  be  solved  within  thought  by  thought  itself, 
and  in  accordance  with  its  own  laws ;  and  any  theory  which 
does  not  recognize  those  laws  must  be  treated  as  non-exist- 
ent. Thought  must  accept  itself,  and  rational  scepticism 
can  arise  only  from  the  discovery  of  insoluble  contradictions 
within  our  thought  system.  Only  as  we  insist  on  this  rule 
can  we  escape  from  random  babblers  and  tedious  airers  of 
small  conceits. 

The  beginnings  of  sceptical  doctrine  with  the  Greek 
sophists  owed  their  form  largely  to  the  crude  and  undevel- 
oped condition  of  logical  and  metaphysical  theory  at  that 
time.  Their  theories  of  perception  and  their  metaphysical 
doctrines  made  it  possible,  as  a  play  of  logic,  to  deny  (1)  the 
existence  of  truth;  (2)  its  knowability, supposing  it  to  exist; 
and  (3)  its  communicability,  supposing  it  to  be  known.  The 
purely  verbal  character  of  such  denial,  and  its  self-contradic- 
tion, are  manifest.  The  only  question  about  such  scepticism 
is  not  whether  it  be  rational,  but  how  did  it  arise. 

Scepticism,  Ave  have  said,  must  know  something.  Ac- 
cordingly we  find  that,  historicall}^  scepticism  has  com- 
monly been  an  inference  from  a  doctrine  held  as  true.  As 
just   said,  ancient  philosophy  explains  ancient  scepticism. 


272  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

Both  the  Eleatic  and  the  Heraclitic  metaphysics  lend  them- 
selves readily  to  sceptical  conclusions.  In  modern  times 
also  scepticism  has  generally  been  derived  from  antecedent 
theories.  This  was  the  case  with  the  scepticism  of  Hume 
and  Mill.  They  regarded  the  sensational  theory  of  knowl- 
edge as  established,  and  their  sceptical  conclusions  resulted 
as  a  consequence.  Scepticism  of  the  Kantian  type  has  the 
same  derivative  character.  It  is  the  outcome  of  a  theory 
of  knowledge  which  is  believed  to  be  true,  and  which  rests 
upon  a  special  conception  of  the  relation  of  the  mind  to  the 
world.  Plainly  all  of  these  derived  scepticisms  stop  short 
of  absolute  scepticism,  since  they  would  lose  all  rational 
warrant  if  their  theoretical  foundation  were  disputed.  To 
reject  their  basal  assumptions  would  discharge  the  resulting 
scepticism.  Scepticism  not  only  must  know  something,  but 
it  actually  has  a  large  supply  of  knowledge  on  hand.  It 
may  not  appear  among  the  published  assets,  but  it  is  a  very 
important  part  of  its  stock  in  trade. 

In  further  exposition  of  the  general  problem  we  first 
inquire  what  is  meant  by  the  doubt  or  denial  of  truth. 

Every  judgment,  we  have  seen,  presupposes  or  relates 
itself  to  a  fixed  order  which  exists  independently  of  the 
knowledge  and  volition  of  the  individual.  This  order  we 
do  not  make,  but  discover.  We  do  not  produce  it ;  we  re- 
produce it.  This  order  may  be  one  of  fact  or  one  of  reason. 
In  the  order  of  fact  there  are  certain  things  in  certain 
relations  and  with  certain  laws.  In  the  order  of  reason 
there  are  certain  ideas  which  belong  together  and  others 
which  are  mutually  repugnant.  Judgments  are  true  which 
agree  with  this  order ;  those  are  false  which  depart  from  it. 
Important  truths  are  those  which  relate  to  the  abiding  facts 
and  relations  of  this  independent  order.  They  may  be 
called  general  truths.  They  are  not  limited  by  time  or 
place,  and  are  expressed  in  universal  form.     The  laws  of 


PHILOSOPHIC    SCEPTICISM  273 

physics  and  the  truths  of  mathematics  are  examples.  They 
are  not  accidents  of  the  individual,  but  express  abiding  re- 
lations among  cosmic  facts  or  rational  ideas.  Besides  these 
there  are  truths  which  express  simple  facts  of  consciousness, 
or  items  of  individual  experience,  or  particular  historical 
events.  Thus,  I  feel  cold;  or,  John  was  here  yesterday;  or, 
Caesar  crossed  the  Kubicon.  Sucli  particular  facts  have 
no  such  abiding  and  theoretical  significance  as  truths  of  the 
former  class. 

Of  course  the  sceptical  doubt  may  be  extended  to  every- 
thing, but  it  has  theoretical  importance  onl}'^  in  the  case 
of  general  truth.  A  scepticism  which  should  dispute  the 
present  fact  of  consciousness,  or  the  general  trustworthi- 
ness of  memory,  or  the  reality  of  all  historical  facts,  would 
soon  break  down  from  the  weight  of  its  own  dulness  and 
tedium.  The  doubt  of  truth  has  commonly  been  a  doubt 
whether  in  the  nature  of  things  there  are  any  fixed  rela- 
tions, or  whether  all  things  and  laws  may  not  be  comprised 
in  a  process  of  change  which  shall,  sooner  or  later,  break 
up  all  those  conjunctions  which  to  us  seem  fixed.  In  that 
case,  what  we  call  truths  would  represent  no  fixed  rational 
connection,  but  only  an  accidental  and  shifting  conjunc- 
tion ;  and  this  would  be  equivalent  to  a  denial  of  truth 
altogether. 

When  abstractly  stated,  with  careful  abstinence  from 
concrete  application,  such  a  view  meets  with  little  protest 
from  the  passive  intellect.  Indeed,  it  may  even  seem  at- 
tractive, as  it  readily  lends  itself  to  sentimental  treatment. 
By  making  the  rate  of  change  very  slow  we  can  easily 
secure  "  a  reasonable  degree  of  extension  "  of  apparent  truth 
"to  adjacent  cases,"  and  thus  escape  the  practical  absurdity ; 
and  by  vaguely  dreaming  of  some  ineffable  £eonian  evolu- 
tion we  can  to  our  own  satisfaction  persuade  anything  to 
dissolve  into  anything,  and  even   into   nothing.     But   the 

18 


274  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

critic  remembers  that  when  a  theory  has  been  stated  the 
next  thing  is  to  prove  it.  Hence,  before  despairing  of  knowl- 
edge he  asks  the  sceptic  for  his  argument. 

The  objects  of  thought  fall  into  two  great  classes :  truths 
of  reason  and  truths  of  objective  fact.  Corresponding  to 
these,  the  sceptical  doubt  divides  into  two :  first,  a  doubt 
Avhether  there  be  any  truth  in  reason;  and,  secondly,  a  doubt 
concerning  what  seems  to  be  objective  knowledge.  Besides 
these  leading  doubts  there  is  a  cloud  of  minor  ones  which 
call  for  no  consideration. 

The  first  doubt  often  takes  the  form  of  denying  that 
reason  has  any  laws  of  its  own,  or  that  it  is  anything  more 
than  a  copy  of  experience  made  coherent  by  association. 
This  is  the  claim  of  sensationalism.  Reason  is  product. 
As  such  it  is  purely  passive,  and  quite  unable  to  say  what 
may  or  may  not  be  in  the  nature  of  things.  Reason  being 
only  a  shadow  of  sense,  it  can  report  nothing  which  cannot 
be  presented  in  sense ;  and  if  it  seems  to  report  more,  the 
surplus  must  be  reckoned  an  illusion.  Hence  the  various 
unpicturable  relations  and  categories  which  seem  to  be  in 
the  understanding  are  illusory,  and,  for  aught  we  know, 
two  and  two  may  make  five  in  some  other  part  of  space  and 
time.  The  mind,  being  passive,  can  never  prescribe  what  its 
experience  shall  be,  but  must  wait  and  see. 

This  doubt  of  reason  can  be  justified  only  by  proving  the 
psychology  on  which  it  is  based.  Unfortunately,  more  at- 
tention has  been  devoted  to  drawing  conclusions  from  that 
psychology  than  to  proving  it.  It  has  been  too  handy  a 
polemical  weapon  not  to  be  appreciated  by  the  voluble,  and 
the  labor  of  investigation  is  tedious  and  exacting.  More- 
over, since  the  time  of  Kant  sensationalism  has  been  kept 
alive  only  by  ignorance  of  the  fact  that  it  is  dead.  He 
showed,  once  for  all,  that  experience  itself  is  possible  only 


PHILOSOPHIC    SCEPTICISM  275 

through  lormative  and  constructive  principles  inherent  and 
immanent  in  the  nature  of  reason. 

But  scepticism  is  tenacious  of  life.  The  doubt  arising 
from  sensationalism  was  discharged  by  showing  the  forma- 
tive principles  which  make  experience  possible.  But  this 
very  result  gives  birth  to  the  old  doubt  again  in  a  more  sub- 
tle form.  Let  us  admit  that  there  are  laws  of  thouirlit 
Avhich,  as  expressions  of  our  mental  make,  must  govern  our 
thinking;  it  does  not  follow  from  this  that  they  must  be 
universal,  and  must  lead  to  true  knowledge.  These  very 
laws  may  themselves  belong  to  error,  and  thus  may  shut  us 
up  to  hopeless  illusion.  What  they  give  us  is  not  a  knowl- 
edge of  universal  truth,  but  a  shadow  of  the  human  mind. 
Hence  even  the  truths  of  reason  have  no  universal  valid  it  v, 
but,  as  transcripts  of  our  mental  nature,  are  true  only  for  us. 

Concerning  this  claim,  it  is  to  be  admitted  that  every 
thinking  being  must  think  as  determined  by  his  mental 
constitution.  In  this  sense  all  our  knowledge  is  necessarily 
relative  to  our  cognitive  faculties.  We  cheerfully  make 
the  sceptic  a  present  of  this  admission.  If  mind  were  other- 
wise it  would  be  otherwise.  If  there  were  anything  essen- 
tially unrelated  to  our  faculties  we  could  never  know  that 
thing.  But  from  this  abstract  relativity  it  does  not  follow 
that  there  is  not  a  universal  element  in  our  intelligence,  so 
that  what  is  true  for  one  may  be  true  for  all.  At  the  utmost, 
all  that  follows  is  the  abstract  possibility  that  our  intelli- 
gence may  be  particular  and  individual ;  and  then  the  ques- 
tion of  fact  remains  open,  and  must  be  decided  by  evidence 
or  argument.  The  claim  that  we  think  as  we  do  because 
our  intellect  is  constituted  as  it  is  is  as  true  and  as  barren 
as  the  equally  important  proposition  that  the  properties  of 
the  circle  are  relative  to  the  constitution  of  the  circle. 

Turning  now  to  the  question  of  fact,  it  is  plain,  first  of 
all,  that  every  one  spontaneously  assumes  intelligence  to 


276  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

have  universal  elements.  There  is  one  truth  for  all,  and 
the  individual  does  not  own  it,  but  shares  in  it.  One  logic, 
one  arithmetic,  one  geometry  suffice  for  all.  Variations  of 
opinion  are  explained  as  resulting,  not  from  essential  differ- 
ences of  mental  nature,  but  from  difference  of  standpoint 
or  grade  of  development.  Even  the  relativist  assumes  this 
community  of  mental  nature.  Truth  is  relative,  not  to  me, 
but  to  us ;  not  to  a  human  mind,  but  to  the  human  mind. 
In  all  of  this  it  is  tacitly  assumed  that  the  individual  can 
transcend  the  limits  of  his  own  ])ersonality  and  discern  the 
truth  for  other  minds  as  well.  Finally,  even  the  thorough- 
going individualist  who,  with  Protagoras,  holds  that  each 
man  is  the  measure  of  his  own  truth,  implicitly  assumes  the 
community  and  identity  of  intelligence,  for  he  holds  that 
whoever  will  listen  to  him  and  candidly  weigh  his  argu- 
ments must  come  to  his  conclusion. 

In  this  state  of  affairs,  then,  knowledge,  or  the  appear- 
ance of  knowledge,  has  the  field,  and  it  is  incumbent  on  the 
sceptic  to  justify  his  demurrer;  until  he  does  this  his  po- 
sition depends  on  caprice  rather  than  reason.  How  this 
community  of  individual  intelligences  is  possible  is  a  ques- 
tion by  itself,  and  one  well  worthy  of  study.  Eeflection 
might  show  it  to  be  possible  only  through  an  all-embracing 
intelligence,  the  source  and  creator  of  finite  minds.  But 
the  fact  of  such  community  is  the  necessary  condition  of 
social  existence,  and  can  never  be  denied  in  good  faith. 
That  it  is  necessary  in  order  to  give  scepticism  itself  any 
rational  character  we  have  already  seen.  The  limitation 
of  community  to  human  minds  removes  the  practical  ab- 
surdity, but  only  at  the  expense  of  a  logical  inconsistency. 
It  allows  the  individual  to  transcend  the  limits  of  his  own 
personality,  which  is  the  point  of  metaphysical  difficulty, 
and  fails  to  give  any  reason  for  limiting  him  to  the  human 
sphere.     For  as  the  individual  transcends  himself  by  virtue 


PHILOSOPHIC    SCEPTICISM  277 

of  the  intelligence  common  to  all  he  can  be  limited  only 
by  the  sphere  of  intelligence  as  such.  If  by  intelligence 
other  than  human  something  is  meant  which  is  not  intel- 
ligence tliere  is  nothing  to  argue  about,  for  the  terras  have 
no  longer  any  meaning. 

In  the  formal  and  metaphysical  laws  of  thought,  and 
especially  in  mathematics,  we  have  a  great  body  of  what 
reports  itself  as  true  and  is  accepted  as  such.  Some  of 
these  truths  are  self-evident,  and  the  others  are  deduced 
from  them  by  cogent  logic.  They  have,  then,  all  the  marks 
by  which  truth  can  be  known,  and  all  the  evidence  w^hich 
truth  itself  could  offer.  Hence,  in  order  to  maintain  his 
denial  of  truths  of  reason,  the  sceptic  must  overturn,  or  at 
least  throw  doubt  upon,  these  apparent  truths,  and  that  not 
by  assertion,  but  by  valid  argument. 

This  doubt  also  must  be  brought  out  of  its  abstraction 
and  put  into  concrete  form,  so  that  its  meaning  may  be 
understood.  If  the  sceptic  will  not  allow  that  every  event 
must  have  a  cause,  then  he  holds  that  events  may  happen 
without  a  cause,  and  he  should  be  called  upon  to  support 
his  position.  If  he  will  not  allow  that  two  and  two  make 
four  everywhere  and  always,  then  he  holds  that  two  and 
two  make  something  else— say,  three  or  five,  or  fifty  or  noth- 
ing— and  he  should  be  asked  to  prove  his  paradox.  By  ig- 
noring blank  assertion,  and  by  putting  the  burden  of  proof 
upon  the  sceptic,  where  it  belongs,  the  matter  may  be 
brought  to  an  issue.  This  plain  dictate  of  logic,  we  repeat, 
has  been  too  much  neglected  in  the  past,  and  the  sceptic  has 
won  undue  importance  accordingly.  Tliere  has  been  so  lit- 
tle understanding  of  the  logic  of  the  case,  and  so  little  men- 
tal balance  also,  that  the  mere  utterance  of  conceits  has 
served  to  scare  whole  bodies  of  supposed  thinkers.  In  logic, 
however,  there  is  no  occasion  for  alarm  until  the  sceptic  has 
given  reasons  for  his  doubts  or  denials.     In  the  meantime, 


27«  TIIEOKY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

propositions  which  are  self-evident  and  consistent,  or  which 
are  deduced  from  such,  may  be  accepted  as  true. 

A  formal  justification  of  the  general  doubt  may  be  at- 
tempted as  follows :  Our  determination  of  rational  truth 
necessarily  depends  upon  reason  itself.  We  identify  the 
true  with  the  rational,  and  to  the  question,  What  is  true  ? 
we  respond  by  showing  what  is  rational.  And  when  we 
come  to  pass  upon  the  competency  of  reason  itself  we  can 
only  fall  back  upon  reason,  whereas  for  perfect  assurance 
we  ought  to  have  an  objective  standard,  independent  of 
reason,  whereby  reason  might  be  tested.  Indeed,  to  invoke 
reason  to  settle  its  own  claims  can  hardly  seem  other  than 
a  begging  of  the  question. 

This  is  verbal  rather  than  real.  It  is  evident  that  the 
demand  here  made  could  not  be  met  by  any  intelligence  what- 
ever. The  notion  of  an  official  speculative  standard  apart 
from  mind,  a  kind  of  philosophical  standard  metre,  is  absurd. 
Mind  is  necessarily  its  own  standard  and  judge.  At  bottom 
the  s^^stem  of  knowledge  must  rest  upon  self-evident  princi- 
ples, or  principles  which  the  mind  takes  on  its  own  warrant. 
It  is  mere  pedantry  to  demand  proof  for  these,  for  if  the 
proof  were  possible  it  could  give  us  no  more  than  the  in- 
sight we  had  at  the  start.  We  can  test  our  mental  dicta 
only  by  comparing  them  with  some  more  ultimate  dictum, 
and  the  final  standard  can  be  known  as  such  only  by  the 
self-evidence  with  which  it  appeals  to  the  mind,  or  by  the 
necessity  with  which  it  forces  itself  upon  our  recognition. 
Every  rational  being  must  at  last  trust  his  rational  insight. 
The  only  way  of  shaking  this  trust  would  be  to  show  funda- 
mental inconsistency  in  the  nature  of  reason  itself.  Until 
this  is  done  the  mind  will  insist  that  the  self-evident,  with 
whatever  may  be  deduced  therefrom,  is  true. 

But  we  may  still  say.  This  does  not  carry  us  beyond  the 
rational,  whereas  we  are  after  the  true.    Mav  not  these  laws 


PHILOSOPHIC    SCEPTICISM  279 

of  thought  themselves  belong  to  error?  May  not  our  con- 
stitution be  such  as  to  cause  the  false  to  appear  true  to 
us?  This  doubt  is  forever  irrefutable  and  forever  baseless. 
Rational  it  is  not,  as  it  expressly  disputes  the  authority  of 
reason,  and  appeals  from  it.  It  will  always  be  possible  for 
the  sceptic  to  suggest  that  truth  is  altogether  other  thar 
we  think  it;  that  two  and  two  are  anything  but  four;  that 
events  may  happen  without  a  cause;  that  things  may  not  be 
equal  to  themselves;  and  that  a  broken  line  is  the  shortest 
distance  between  two  points  in  space.  But  these  utterances 
are  not  born  of  reason,  but  of  unreason,  and  must  be  left  to 
their  own  irrationality.  They  are  not  supported  by  any 
rational  grounds,  but  depend  on  the  bare  possibility  of  con- 
structing the  phrases.  In  fact,  they  are  only  conjunctions 
of  words  to  which  no  positive  thought  corresponds.  Such 
doubting  can  go  on  forever,  but  it  ought  not  to  be  exalted 
as  a  profound  or  brilliant  performance. 

The  sum  is  this :  There  is  a  large  body  of  apparent  truths 
of  reason  which  have  all  the  marks  of  truth  possible  in  the 
nature  of  intelligence.  They  are  self-evident,  or  are  founded 
on  self-evidence,  and  they  are  consistent  and  harmonious. 
The  sceptic  who  disputes  them  must  overturn  this  self-evi- 
dence and  this  harmony.  In  default  of  disproof,  scepticism 
must  be  reckoned  as  only  verbal  and  volitional,  and  as  con- 
taining no  ground  for  alarm  and  panic.  When  the  sceptic 
suggests  that  rational  truth  is  relative  to  us,  and  hence  may 
not  be  valid  for  other  orders  of  being,  it  will  be  in  place  for 
him  to  show  (1)  that  these  hypothetical  beings  exist;  (2)  that 
their  truth  contradicts  ours;  and  (3)  that,  in  case  of  contra- 
diction, they  are  in  the  right  and  we  are  in  the  wrong. 
"When  all  these  points  are  established  the  subject  will  de- 
serve consideration. 

If  from  the  truths  of  reason  we  could  deduce  the  forms 


280  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

and  details  of  cosmic  existence  the  field  of  scepticism  would 
be  confined  to  rational  truth.  For  us,  however,  no  analysis 
of  reason  will  give  the  world  of  perception.  We  reach  this 
by  the  perceptive  process,  and  this  fact  gives  another  occa- 
sion for  scepticism.  The  validity  of  our  knowledge  of  ob- 
jective reality  is  disputed.  This  doubt,  too,  is  an  old  one; 
but  both  its  form  and  the  reasons  offered  have  been  various. 
The  arguments  of  the  early  Greek  sceptics  were  largely 
drawn  from  their  antiquated  theories  of  sense-perception. 
These  have  long  been  obsolete.  In  general  the  ancient 
sceptic  did  not  doubt  that  reality  was  knowable  in  itself;  he 
held  only  that  the  evidence  leaves  us  in  balance  and  uncer- 
taint}'.  Reality  was  unknowable  because  our  data  give  no 
unambiguous  results.  In  this  sense  we  say  it  is  unknowable 
Avhether  the  stars  are  inhabited  or  not.  In  modern  times 
the  doctrine  has  o^enerallv  taken  the  form  of  denving  that 
we  can  know  things  in  themselves.  The  mind  by  its  very 
nature  masks  realitv,  and  makes  it  inaccessible  to  us.  Our 
knowledge,  then,  is  limited  to  appearances  or  phenomena, 
and  never  grasps  the  thing  as  it  truly  is.  This  form  of  the 
doctrine  we  are  now  to  consider. 

This  view  depends  on  the  Kantian  theory  of  knowledge. 
Kant  overturned  once  for  all  the  naive  theories  of  percep- 
tion and  experience  which  had  ruled  before  his  time.  He 
showed  that  perception  is  no  passive  reception  of  ready- 
made  knowledge,  but  involves  a  complex  constructive  activ- 
ity on  the  part  of  the  mind,  whereby  the  object  is  put  before 
consciousness.  The  object  we  perceive  is  really  the  object 
Ave  mentally  construct.  This  fact  makes  it  possible  to  hold 
that  our  apparent  objects  are  not  independently  existing 
realities,  but  only  projections  of  our  own  conceptions.  The 
laws  and  forms  of  thought  have  only  a  subjective  validity, 
and  instead  of  revealing  reality  to  us  they  mask  it  by  cov- 
ering it  with  their  own  image. 


PHILOSOPHIC    SCEPTICISM  281 

In  further  exposition  of  this  view  it  is  well  first  to  note 
what  it  assumes.  Some  of  the  earliest  sceptics  maintained 
that  each  man  makes  his  own  truth,  so  that  truth  and  real- 
ity are  purely  relative  to  each.  Even  they,  however,  ad- 
mitted the  coexistence  of  persons  as  a  fact  beyond  question. 
For  the  rest,  their  view  rested  largely  upon  a  misunder- 
standing of  the  function  of  the  senses  in  knowledge.  The 
senses  are  individual,  and  do  not  of  themselves  contain  the 
warrant  for  a  universal  affirmation.  My  sweet  may  be 
your  bitter,  my  agreeable  your  disagreeable.  But  the  view 
in  question  equally  assumes  the  coexistence  of  real  persons, 
though  not  with  the  clearest  theoretical  I'ight,  and  then 
provides  for  the  identity  of  objective  experience  through 
the  work  of  the  understanding.  This  faculty,  which  is 
supposed  to  be  common  to  all  human  beings,  transforms 
the  raw  material  of  the  sensibility  into  the  rationalized 
forms  of  experience.  In  this  way  a  common  world  is  pro- 
duced. The  theory,  then,  assumes  a  world  of  coexistent 
persons,  and  also  a  common  world  of  experience  for  them. 
But  here,  as  in  the  case  of  rational  truth,  no  good  reason  is 
given  why  the  world  common  to  the  human  understanding 
may  not  be  common  to  all  understanding,  in  so  far  as  it  is 
understanding.  To  find  a  middle  way  between  the  uni- 
versal object  which  is  common  to  all  and  the  private  dream 
which  is  confined  to  the  individual  has  always  been  a  task 
of  exceeding  difficulty. 

The  admitted  coexistence  of  persons  also,  as  just  sug- 
gested, is  a  point  of  much  obscurity  in  the  theory.  It  has 
never  been  made  clear  how  persons,  who  are  never  phe- 
nomenal, can  be  reached  in  a  theory  of  purely  phenomenal 
knowledge.  The  method  seems  to  be  to  lump  them  under 
the  one  term,  mind,  or  subject,  and  then  mistake  the  ab- 
stract subject  for  a  plurality  of  ontologically  distinct  sub- 
jects. 


283  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE 

In  the  next  place,  this  scepticism  assumes  the  reality  of 
things,  and  doubrs  only  whether  our  knowledge  can  reach 
them.  This  assumption  is  implicit  in  all  its  leading  terms 
and  phrases.  Phenomena,  appearances,  things  in  them- 
selves alike  imply  the  reality  of  things.  If  behind  phe- 
nomena or  appearances  there  were  nothing  as  their  real- 
ity the  phenomena  would  be  all,  and  in  knowing  these  we 
should  know  all  there  is  to  know.  And,  on  the  other  hand, 
it  is  hard  to  say  in  what  sense  a  phenomenon  can  be  such 
unless  it  really  manifests  the  thing.  A  manifestation  in 
which  nothing  is  manifested,  or  an  appearance  in  which 
nothing  appears,  would  be  a  somewhat  obscure  notion. 
The  utmost  that  could  be  made  of  it  would  be  an  event  in 
an  individual  consciousness  which  pointed  indeed  to  an  ex- 
ternal cause,  but  w^hich  revealed  no  existing  fact. 

Further,  there  is  a  tacit  assumption  that  the  real  thino-g 
are  external  and  antithetical  to  all  thought  whatever. 
Spontaneous  realism  easily  mistakes  the  existence  of  things 
apart  from  our  thought  for  their  existence  apart  from  any 
and  all  thought,  and  the  doctrine  in  question  follows  it  in 
this  fancy.  Only  thus  can  it  maintain  the  unknowability 
of  things ;  for  if  they  were  the  product  and  expression  of 
some  creative  thought  they  might  well  be  commensurate 
with  our  intelligence.  In  that  case  there  w^ould  be  as  little 
reason  for  thinking  of  an  unknowable  thing  in  itself  be- 
hind the  apparent  thing  w^e  perceive  as  there  is  for  think- 
ing of  an  unknowable  thought  in  itself  in  our  neighbor's 
mind  behind  the  thought  we  comprehend.  This  theistic 
suggestion  in  this  connection  deserves  more  consideration 
than  it  has  ever  received.  If  things  originated  in  thought 
and  express  thought  there  is  no  difficulty  in  principle  in 
their  reappearing  in  thought.  Such  difficulty  as  exists  is 
simply  the  mystery  of  personal  communion  and  mutual 
understanding. 


PHILOSOPHIC    SCEPTICISM  283 

But  this  point  is  ignored  in  the  discussion,  and  things  in 
themselves  are  set  up  as  external  to  intellect  and  beyond 
its  grasp.  These  things,  however,  are  only  a  transforma- 
tion of  the  crude  realism  of  the  senses.  The  uncritical  mind 
projects  its  objects,  not  merely  beyond  its  own  conscious- 
ness, but  in  lumpish  externality  to  all  consciousness ;  at  the 
same  time  it  assumes  that  it  has  immediate  knowledge  of 
tbem.  Then,  when  a  little  reflection  has  shown  that  the 
mind  can  grasp  objects  only  through  ideas,  the  sceptic,  in- 
stead of  doubting  those  extra-mental  objects  of  uncritical 
thought,  retains  them  as  things  in  themselves,  and  laments 
our  inability  to  reach  them.  But  in  so  doing  he  proceeds 
most  uncritically,  and  falls  a  prey  to  one  of  the  spontaneous 
prejudices  of  common-sense.  There  is  a  debate  of  long 
standing  in  philosoph}'^  as  to  the  nature  of  the  external 
world,  and  as  to  the  place  and  mode  of  its  existence.  No 
one  has  ever  doubted  that  there  is  something  not  ourselves, 
but  the  idealist  has  offered  a  good  many  weighty  reasons 
for  thinking  that  the  objects  of  perception  exist  in  no  such 
brute  lumpishness  and  externality  to  intelligence  as  is  com- 
monly assumed.  The  scepticism  with  which  we  are  deal- 
ing ignores  this  dispute,  and,  taking  the  things  for  granted, 
doubts  our  power  to  know  them.  It  is,  then,  based  upon 
the  assumption  that  the  thing  is  external  and  unrelated  to 
thought. 

And  here  again  the  sceptic  proceeds  uncritically.  He 
assumes  that  things  are  the  first  and  undoubted  fact,  and 
that  thought  has  the  function  of  copying  them.  In  truth, 
however,  in  the  order  of  knowledge  experience  is  first  and 
basal,  and  things  are  only  the  assumptions  we  make  in  order 
to  explain  and  express  experience.  But  they  do  this  only 
as  they  have  an  intelligible  content.  When  they  have  not 
this  they  are  not  only  the  unknowable,  they  are  the  un- 
affirmable.     Phenomena  and  things  inferred  from  them  are 


284  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE 

amenable  to  our  thought ;  beyond  these  we  have  no  war- 
rant for  saying  anything.  The  sceptic,  instead  of  assuming 
things  and  proclaiming  that  they  cannot  be  known,  should 
rather  consider  whether  he  has  any  right  to  affirm  any 
other  than  those  known  things  which  our  thought  posits. 
That  things,  external  to  all  thought  and  essentially  unre- 
lated to  thought,  are  unknowable  is  self-evident ;  but  be- 
fore we  despair  of  knowledge  the  sceptic  must  prove  that 
such  things  exist.  Unfortunately,  he  has  never  bethought 
himself  to  furnish  this  proof.  The  unsophisticated  disciple 
of  the  senses  finds  himself  in  the  presence  of  a  system  which 
he  did  not  make  and  which  in  no  way  depends  on  him. 
This  independence  of  his  thought  he  mistakes  for  an  in- 
dependence of  all  thought,  and  this  existence  apart  from 
his  consciousness  he  identifies  with  existence  apart  from  all 
consciousness.  This  rather  crude  ontology  is  unhesitating- 
ly accepted  by  the  sceptic,  and  w^hen  it  is  united  with  the 
theory  of  perception  we  have  relativity  and  the  rest. 

These  considerations  show  that  the  theory  in  question  is 
b}'  no  means  presuppositionless.  On  the  contrary,  it  rests 
upon  a  definite  theory  of  knowing  and  being ;  and  its  theory 
of  being,  so  far  from  being  established,  admits  of  no  estab- 
lishment. 

Returning  now  to  the  claim  that  objective  knowledge 
arises  only  through  a  subjective  activity  determined  by 
principles  within  the  mind  itself,  it  is  plain  that  this  fact 
alone  does  not  w^arrant  a  sceptical  conclusion.  In  the  first 
place,  modern  psychology  has  made  it  clear  that  knowledge 
must  arise  in  this  way  in  any  case.  If  we  suppose  the 
world  to  be  as  real  as  the  most  unsophisticated  rustic  as- 
sumes, the  knowledge  of  the  same  is  not  provided  for.  The 
world  cannot  know  itself,  neither  can  it  pass  in  its  reality 
into  the  knowing  mind.     The  former  can  only  awaken  con- 


PHILOSOPHIC    SCEPTICISM  285 

• 

cei)tions  in  the  latter,  and  these  conceptions  can  only  be  a 
mental  reaction  against  external  action.  But  this  is  as  ti'ue 
for  oui-  knowledge  of  persons  as  for  our  knowledge  of 
things  ;  and  if  a  sceptical  conclusion  is  to  be  based  upon 
the  process  of  knowledge  alone,  it  cannot  be  restricted  to 
things,  but  must  also  be  extended  to  persons.  If  this  be 
done,  scepticism  becomes  farcical ;  if  not  done,  it  is  convicted 
of  arbitrary  inconsistency. 

In  the  next  place,  the  fact  at  best  would  only  prove  a 
possibilit}^ ;  the  question  of  fact  would  still  remain  open. 
The  knowledge  arising  within  the  mind  according  to  men- 
tal laws  might  still  lie  parallel  to  things,  existing  according 
to  their  laws.  My  conceptions  of  my  neighbors  reproduce 
a  real  existence  ;  it  is  equally  possible,  at  least  so  far  as  the 
knowing  is  concerned,  that  my  conceptions  of  things  repro- 
duce real  existence.  And  since  this  assumption  is  spon- 
taneously and  universally  made,  it  is  incumbent  upon  the 
sceptic  to  show  that  such  is  not  the  case.  The  bare  possi- 
bility of  doubting  my  neighbor's  existence  leads  to  nothing ; 
the  same  possibility  of  doubting  things'  existence  is  in  logic 
equally  barren. 

Further,  it  is  to  be  noted  that  a  dogmatic  denial  of  knowl- 
edge based  upon  the  subjectivity  of  the  laws  of  thought  is 
not  only  illogical  but  self  -  destructive.  It  is  illogical,  be- 
cause the  fact  only  makes  doubt  possible  ;  it  does  not  com- 
pel it,  and  still  less  does  it  warrant  denial.  It  is  self-destruc- 
tive,  because  t\iien  no  law  of  thought  is  allowed  to  be  valid 
for  things,  the  things  themselves  become  not  only  unaffirm- 
able,  but  also  meaningless  and  empty  of  all  contents.  If  all 
the  categories  are  subjective  to  us,  then  the  independent 
reality  is  neither  one  nor  many  ;  for  unity  and  plurality  are 
categories.  It  is  then  neither  a  thing  in  itself  nor  things  in 
themselves ;  for  either  phrase  supposes  number,  which  is 
ruled  out  by  hypothesis.     The  reality  also  is  neither  cause 


286  THEOKY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

nor  effect ;  for  these  too  are  categories,  and  hence  without 
application  to  objective  reality.  Reality,  again,  is  neither 
substance  nor  attribute,  neither  thing  nor  quality  ;  for  these 
also  are  categories.  Finally,  it  is  not  even  real  or  unreal ; 
for  reality  and  negation  are  categories,  and  hence  without 
application.  What,  then,  is  it?  If  these  denials  are  to  be 
taken  strictly  it  is  nothing,  either  subjective^  or  objective- 
ly. It  is  neither  a  thing  nor  a  thought ;  it  is  only  a  verbal 
phrase,  to  which  neither  reality  nor  conception  corresponds. 
If  we  relax  the  denial  sufficiently  to  bring  it  under  the 
general  head  of  existence,  even  then  we  have  no  positive 
thought  or  thing ;  we  have  only  the  bare  category  of  being 
"  suspended  in  vacuo  by  the  imagination."  As  such  it  has 
oxAy  the  abstract  conceptual  existence  of  class  terras,  and, 
like  them,  is  objectively  nothing.  The  unknowable  reali- 
ty then  vanishes,  leaving  only  verbal  phrases  in  its  place. 
With  this  result  the  scepticism  based  thereon  also  vanishes, 
for  there  being  nothing  to  know  w.e  cannot  be  expected  to 
know  it. 

To  this  result  every  doctrine  of  unknowability  must 
come  which  is  based  upon  a  denial  of  the  objective  validity 
of  the  laws  of  thought.  It  must  finally  reject  its  unknow- 
able as  only  a  form  of  words,  and  must  reinstate  knowledge 
by  leaving  known  phenomena  the  only  reality  to  be  known. 
The  theory,  too,  in  its  best  estate  introduces  an  unmanage- 
able dualism  into  philosophy.  On  the  one  hand  are  things 
utterly  unrelated  to  thought,  and  on  the  other  is  thought 
utterly  unrelated  to  things.  Neither  accounts  for  the  other, 
neither  can  do  anything  with  the  other.  They  stand  on 
opposite  sides  of  an  impassable  gulf  without  any  means  of 
communication.  This  Manichasism  of  philosophy  results 
from  uncritically  adopting  the  assumed  opposition  of  thought 
and  thing  which  rules  in  spontaneous  thought  and  making 
it  universal.     The  relation  of  thought  and  thing  in  finite 


PHILOSOPHIC    SCEPTICISM  287 

thought  cnnnot  be  determined  without  some  theory  of  their 
relation  in  fundamental  being.  The  adoption  of  the  crude 
realistic  view  produces  only  the  most  inconsistent  of  scepti- 
cisms. It  must  affirm  things,  and  can  find  no  reason  for 
so  doing.  It  is  equally  impossible  to  give  any  articulate 
contents  to  the  things  which  it  affirms.  It  is  not  surprising 
that  reason,  seeing  itself  in  such  straits,  denied  the  irrational 
reality  outright  and  took  refuge  in  idealism.  This  it  did 
do  historically,  and  this  it  must  do  in  logic.  Keality  must 
either  come  within  the  reach  of  thought  or  go  out  of  ex- 
istence. 

To  what  extent  Kant  himself  accepted  these  implica- 
tions of  his  system  is  far  from  clear.  When  summoned 
by  Fichte  to  give  up  the  things  in  themselves  under  penalty 
of  his  disesteem,  Kant  chose  the  disesteera.  This  suggests 
that  Kant  meant  that  his  system  should  be  understood  from 
its  anti-dogmatic  side  rather  than  by  a  verbal  exegesis  of 
his  own  statements.  The  dogmatists  had  unhesitatingly 
confounded  the  order  and  connection  of  ideas  with  the 
order  and  connection  of  things,  and  Kant  showed,  in  op- 
position, how  much  there  is  that  is  relative  and  subjective 
in  our  thinking.  Hence,  over  against  the  dogmatists,  he 
maintained  the  subjectivity  of  the  categories,  without  think- 
ing overmuch,  however,  of  the  consequences  and  inconsist- 
encies of  a  thoroughgoing  relativity.  It  remained  for  his 
followers  to  develop  these.  As  a  consequence  of  Kant's 
work  and  of  later  criticism,  philosophy  has  to  steer  between 
a  naive  dogmatism  which  criticism  has  made  impossible 
and  an  absolute  relativity  which  criticism  shows  to  be  self- 
destructive. 

The  affirmation  of  an  essentially  unknowable  is  suici- 
dal. Instead  of  it,  scepticism  can  only  affirm  an  unknown, 
and  that  upon  two  general  grounds.  We  may  claim  that 
the  evidence  is  so  conflicting  that  we  are  unable  to  reach 


288  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

any  conclusion,  or  we  may  fall  back  upon  the  strict  sense 
of  knowledge,  and  deny  that  anything  is  known  which  is 
not  either  self-evident  or  demonstrated. 

In  the  first  claim  we  return  to  the  position  of  the  ancient 
sceptics,  and  abandon  the  attempt  to  establish  scepticism 
once  for  all  on  some  general  theory  of  the  human  mind. 
This  claim  would  have  to  be  established  by  examining  each 
special  case.  For  instance,  the  sceptic  would  have  to  show 
that  we  have  as  good  reason  for  thinking  that  the  sun  goes 
round  the  earth  as  the  converse ;  that  the  law  of  the  inverse 
square  of  the  distance  is  no  better  established  as  the  law  of 
gravity  than  the  law  of  the  inverse  cube,  or  any  other  law 
whatever.  The  other  claim  mentioned  is  harmless.  It  only 
contends,  what  every  one  admits,  that  objective  knowledge 
is  not  a  matter  of  absolute  demonstration  or  of  speculative 
certainty,  but  involves  certain  elements  of  assumption.  This, 
however,  while  leaving  doubt  formally  possible,  constitutes 
no  practical  justification.  Here  again,  to  justify  any  speci- 
fic and  concrete  doubt,  the  sceptic  must  give  specific  reasons 
other  than  the  formal  possibility  of  doubting.  Formally  I 
can  doubt  even  my  neighbors'  existence,  but  it  would  not  be 
wise  to  do  so  on  that  account. 

Yet  this  question  has  been  so  befogged  with  phrases  that 
without  doubt  the  question  has  long  been  recurring  in  the 
reader's  mind :  Can  we,  after  all,  know  things  in  themselves, 
or  anything  more  than  appearances?  And  if  we  should 
once  see  things  as  they  reaUy  are,  should  we  not  find  them 
altogether  different  from  what  they  seem  to  us  ?  These 
questions  are  best  answered  by  asking  others.  And,  first, 
What  is  meant  by  knowing  a  thing  in  itself,  or  as  it  really 
is?  That  we  can  know  things  only  as  they  exist  for  intelli- 
gence is  manifest,  and  that  all  minds  are  in  the  same  plight 
is  equally  manifest.  If  by  knowing  things  in  themselves  is 
meant  a  knowing  in  which  the  mind  gets  out  of  itself  and 


PHILOSOPHIC    SCEPTICISM  289 

becomes  the  thing,  or  does  something  else  than  form  a 
conception  of  the  thing,  the  phrase  is  strictly  unintelli- 
gible. If  we  can  know  things  as  they  exist  for  intelligence, 
we  can  dispense  with  a  knowledge  of  them  as  they  do  not 
exist  for  intelligence,  especially  as  this  latter  existence  is  an 
inconsistent  fiction.  Let  the  sceptic  first  show  that  there  is 
anything  in  itself  beyond  the  intelligible  things  which  our 
thought  affirms,  and  then  it  will  be  in  order  to  consider  its 
knowability. 

But,  it  is  sometimes  said,  our  knowledge  extends  only 
to  qualities  and  activities,  and  never  grasps  the  real  essence 
of  the  thing  or  the  thing  in  itself.  Thus,  we  do  not  know 
what  the  soul  is  in  itself,  but  only  its  phenomena.  That 
this  should  be  regarded  as  a  limitation  of  knowledge  is  a 
striking  testimony  to  the  power  of  confusion.  At  bottom 
it  rests  upon  a  fanc}'^  that  being,  to  be  truly  known,  should 
be  presented  to  the  senses  or  in  sense  forms.  But  being, 
in  speculative  thought,  has  long  since  passed  over  into  the 
unpicturable  categories  of  causation  and  activity,  and  hence 
has  no  way  of  manifesting  itself  except  in  its  activities 
and  laws.  But  these  furnish  us  a  valuable  knowledge  of 
the  thing,  and  it  would  puzzle  any  one  to  tell  what  other 
knowledge  is  possible  to  any  intelligence  whatever.  At 
all  events,  before  we  deplore  our  loss  we  ought  to  be  told 
precisely  what  it  is  we  miss. 

-  But  we  know  only  appearances.  This  utterance  also  is 
unclear.  Through  the  senses,  of  course,  we  know  only 
appearances,  and  these  appearances  are  the  data  for  all 
further  knowledge  of  things.  But  if  we  really  knew  only 
appearances  the  claim  itself  would  be  impossible.  For 
these  appearances  present  themselves  as  things,  and  it  is 
only  as  the  mind,  working  over  its  sense  data,  comes  to  the 
conviction  that  things  are  to  be  conceived  as  other  than 
they  appear,  that  the  distinction  between  reality  and  ap- 

19 


290  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

pearance  arises.  But  if  this  conception  be  repudiated  the 
appearance  resumes  its  ancient  form  of  thing  and  becomes 
all  there  is  to  know.  Indeed,  as  already  hinted,  there  is 
very  great  obscurity  in  the  current  doctrine  of  phenomenal 
knowledge  and  in  the  current  conception  of  the  relation  of 
the  phenomenal  to  the  real.  A  phenomenon  as  such  ex- 
ists only  in  relation  to  a  percipient,  and  is  a  pure  absurdity 
when  conceived  as  external  to  intelligence.  As  used  by  the 
positivists,  the  doctrine  is  little  more  than  an  unconscious 
juggle  with  words,  whereby  a  sop  is  thrown  to  common- 
sense  and  a  handy  polemical  weapon  is  secured.  If  it  is  to 
be  taken  in  earnest  we  must  determine  the  perceiving  mind 
for  and  in  which  the  phenomena  exist.  If  we  say  the 
human  mind,  we  remember  that  the  realitv  of  the  human 
mind  is  a  plurality  of  particular  minds.  In  that  case  there 
would  be  no  common  world,  but  only  a  similarity  of  pres- 
entations in  these  individuals.  If  to  escape  this  collapse 
we  make  the  phenomena  independent  of  all  human  minds 
we  must  assume  a  cosmic  mind  as  their  condition.  Failing 
to  do  this,  we  have  no  new  ideas,  but  only  a  new  terminol- 
ogy. As  commonly  used,  the  doctrine  represents  no  clear 
conception,  but  only  a  convenient  device  for  postponing 
troublesome  questions,  and  for  making  occasional  onslaughts 
on  theology  and  metaphysics. 

The  relation  of  the  phenomenal  to  the  real  is  equally 
uncertain ;  indeed,  neither  term  is  used  with  exact  and  con- 
sistent meaning.  By  the  real  we  may  mean  the  ontologi- 
cal  fact,  and  we  may  mean  the  universal  in  experience. 
Whatever  is  neither  of  these  is  unreal,  fantastic,  fictitious. 
But  in  the  sense  of  universality  phenomen'a  belong  to  the 
real.  They  are  not  fictions  of  the  individual,  but  are  a  part 
of  universal  experience.  In  this  sense  the  whole  sense  world 
belongs  to  reality.  And  the  antithesis  of  phenomena  is  not 
noumena  conceived   as  something  which   the  phenomena 


PHILOSOPHIC    SCEPTICISM  291 

mask  or  vainly  seek  to  reveal,  but  noumena  conceived  as 
the  cause  of  the  phenomena.  Behind  the  phenomenal  world 
is  the  causal  world,  and  this  latter  can  be  grasped  only  in 
the  unpicturable  notions  of  the  understanding.  Noumena 
in  any  other  sense  are  fictitious.  Phenomena  and  their 
causes  exhaust  the  fact,  and  both  alike  are  needed  to  ex- 
press the  full  reality.  In  that  case,  in  knowing  phenomena 
we  are  knowing  reality  in  its  manifestation,  and  we  dismiss 
the  elusive  noumenon  altogether.  But  in  much  of  the  dis- 
cussion of  the  subject  the  noumenon  appears  to  be  some- 
thing which  the  mind  might  grasp  if  the  masking  phe- 
nomenon did  not  thrust  itself  between  them.  This  notion 
is  born  of  crude  realism  and  the  desire  to  grasp  reality  in 
sense  forms. 

As  to  our  seeing  all  things  to  be  different  if  our  eyes 
were  opened,  this  also  is  an  unclear  notion.  It  may  mean 
that  we  should  see  different  things  in  the  event  mentioned, 
and  to  this  there  is  no  objection.  No  one  contends  that  we 
are  cognizant  of  all  existence.  It  may  mean  that  we  should 
see  the  same  things  to  be  different,  and  this  in  turn  may 
mean  that  we  should  gain  a  more  extensive  knowledge  of 
things,  should  see  them  to  stand  in  relations  unsuspected 
at  present,  and  it  may  mean  that  we  should  get  views  of 
things  which  contradict  our  present  knowledge.  The  last 
meaning  is  the  only  one  relevant  to  the  problem  of  scepti- 
cism, and  if  we  are  to  accept  it  we  must  have  proof.  Until 
proof  is  furnished  the  suggestion  is  only  the  ever-recurring 
doubt  whether,  after  all,  our  entire  life  be  not  illusion.  This, 
as  said,  is  forever  irrefutable  and  forever  irrational.  It 
may  be  entertained  in  an  academic  fashion  when  there  is 
no  demand  for  action,  and  life  with  its  brusque  contradic- 
tion is  at  a  distance ;  but  it  is  rationally  unfruitful,  or,  rather, 
non-existent. 

In  closing  this  chapter  we  recall  the  aim  announced  at 


293  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

the  beginning.  This  was  not  to  refute  but  to  understand 
scepticism.  As  the  result  of  our  study  we  find  scepticism 
as  a  system  of  thought  unclear  in  both  its  doubts  and  its 
denials,  and  especially  so  in  the  reasons  given  for  them. 
We  find  the  doctrine  of  the  unknowable  meaning  any  one 
of  many  things,  some  truisms  and  some  absurd.  The  doc- 
trine of  relativity  is  equally  confused  and  indefinite.  In 
popular  writers  of  this  school  there  is  no  consistent  thought, 
and  often  no  thought  whatever,  but  onl}'-  a  repetition  of 
inherited  or  remembered  phrases.  Instead  of  being  pre- 
suppositionless,  scepticism  in  most  of  its  forms  depends  on 
undemonstrated  psychological  and  metaphysical  theories. 
Its  most  pretentious  form  rests  upon  the  assumed  truth  of 
the  crudest  realism  of  the  crudest  common-sense.  This  form 
is  so  inconsistent  with  itself  that  it  is  impossible  without 
this  realistic  assumption ;  and,  in  turn,  it  makes  that  as- 
sumption impossible.  The  theory  is  unintelligible  without 
a  "  thing  in  itself,"  and  a  contradiction  with  a  "  thing  in 
itself."  Hence,  instead  of  viewing  scepticism  as  the  su- 
preme example  of  logical  acumen,  the  critic  can  only  regard 
it  as  a  confused  compound  of  instinct  and  reflection,  in 
which  the  elements  are  mutually  incompatible,  and  in  which 
we  miss  all  clear  comprehension  of  the  cognitive  problem, 
and  all  consciousness  of  logical  obligation.  This  state  of 
affairs  will  continue  until  the  critical  faculty  sufficiently 
recovers  from  the  panicky  state  to  insist  that  the  profes- 
sional sceptic  shall  define  and  defend  the  unfaith  that  is  in 
him.  This  demand  would  put  the  matter  in  its  true  light, 
and  would  reduce  scepticism  to  something  like  its  real  di- 
mensions. In  short,  we  must  replace  scepticism  as  system 
by  scepticism  as  rational  criticism.  The  former  is  indeed 
more  picturesque,  but  the  latter  is  more  useful. 

The  dependence  of  traditional  scepticism  on  antecedent 
theories  suggests,  what  reflection  confirms,  that  the  problem 


PHILOSOPHIC    SCEPTICISM  293 

of  knowledge  can  never  be  solved  by  itself  and  in  advance 
of  all  concrete  investigation,  but  only  in  the  actual  exercise 
of  all  the  cognitive  powers.  We  learn  that  we  can  walk  by 
walking,  and  in  the  same  way  we  learn  that  we  can  know 
by  knowing.  Academic  discussions  of  the  standard  of  cer- 
tainty or  of  the  criterion  of  truth  are  barren  of  any  valuable 
result.  There  is  no  general  standard  which  the  mind  can 
mechanically  apply.  The  standard  is  the  mind  itself,  dealing 
with  particular  and  concrete  cases ;  and  any  given  item  of 
knowledge  must  stand  or  fall,  not  because  it  agrees  or  dis- 
agrees with  some  assumed  standard,  but  because  of  the  evi- 
dence with  which  it  presents  itself  to  the  living  mind  in 
contact  with  the  facts. 

An  illustration  of  the  confusion  resulting  from  abstract 
discussion  without  bringing  it  to  the  test  of  concrete  appli- 
cation is  found  in  the  debate  concerning  the  trustworthiness 
of  the  senses.  We  know,  on  the  one  hand,  that  the  senses 
do  sometimes  mislead  us,  and  we  know,  on  the  other,  that 
they  are  the  sources  of  the  highest  practical  certainty.  If 
this  question  were  discussed  academicall}^  we  should  never 
reach  a  solution  which  Avould  not  be  open  to  critical  cavil ; 
but  in  practice  the  problem  is  easily  solved.  Motion  can 
always  be  proved  by  walking,  whatever  theoretical  diffi- 
culties it  may  involve. 

Intelligence,  we  have  said,  must  assume  and  accept  itself. 
Rational  scepticism  can  arise  only  within  thought  and  as  a 
result  of  rational  criticism.  The  path  of  progress  lies  in  the 
following  direction : 

The  aim  of  thought  is  to  rationalize,  and  thus  to  compre- 
hend, experience.  In  spontaneous  thought  this  end  is  un- 
clearly  conceived  and  carelessly  followed.  There  is  need, 
then,  of  a  careful  and  systematic  workmg  over  of  the  ele- 
ments of  experience  in  order  to  see  to  what  results  thought 


294  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE 

really  leads  us.  Such  work  involves  a  careful  study  of  the 
given  facts  and  a  careful  criticism  of  our  inferences  from 
them.  When  we  have  at  last  determined  the  results  to 
which  thought  and  experience  lead  we  have  done  all  that 
we  can  do.  If  these  results  should  prove  inconsistent,  and 
should  defy  all  attempts  to  harmonize  them,  then  scepticism 
would  be  finally  installed,  for  reason  would  be  found  in  con- 
tradiction with  itself ;  but  if  tliey  should  be  necessary  in- 
ferences from  the  facts,  and  also  consistent  among  them- 
selves, then  scepticism  would  be  gratuitous. 

What  the  outcome  of  such  an  investigation  would  be  can 
be  known  only  by  making  it.  The  inquiry  would  doubtless 
compel  many  changes  in  our  spontaneous  convictions.  It 
might  reveal  that  many  features  in  our  thinking  are  relative 
to  ourselves,  and  have  nothing  corresponding  to  them  in 
reality.  Critical  inspection  might  show  that  many  aspects 
of  human  thinking  can  lay  no  claim  to  strict  universality. 
Criticism  would  then  have  the  task  of  separating  the  formal 
and  relative  elements  from  the  real  and  universal.  But,  in 
any  case,  rational  scepticism  must  come  at  the  end  and  not 
at  the  beginning  of  such  a  study. 

The  theory  of  knowledge,  therefore,  must  exchange  the 
question.  Is  knowledge  possible?  for  this  other,  How  is 
knowledge  possible?  That  is,  assuming  the  possibility  of 
knowledge,  we  may  study  the  implications  of  the  assump- 
tion. The  validity  of  knowledge  is  pretty  sure  to  get  itself 
recognized  in  the  long-run  in  spite  of  the  sceptic,  and  philos- 
ophy does  well  to  push  on  to  consider  what  is  involved  in  the 
assumption  of  a  knowable  universe  and  a  valid  knowledge. 
The  fact  that  scepticism  is  so  often  the  result  of  antecedent 
theories  shows  that  trust  in  the  mind  is  not  compatible 
with  every  theory  of  thought  and  being.  We  have  abun- 
dantly seen,  in  treating  of  sensationalism  and  the  problem 
of  error,  that  a  consistent  empiricism   or  necessitarianism 


PHILOSOPHIC    SCEPTICISM  295 

must  end  in  the  overthrow  of  reason  and  the  destruction 
of  knowledge.  This  may  not  prove  them  false,  but  it  does 
impose  upon  every  one  who  believes  in  the  i-eality  or  even 
the  possibility  of  knowledge  the  logical  obligation  of  re- 
jecting them. 


CHAPTER  II 
THOUGHT   AND   THING 

From  the  standpoint  of  the  Absolute,  things  may  possibly 
be  conceptions;  but  from  the  human  standpoint  it  is  impos- 
sible to  identify  things  with  our  conceptions.  Their  con- 
ceptual existence  in  our  thought  is  not  their  real  existence. 
They  do  not  begin  to  exist  when  we  conceive  them,  nor  do 
they  cease  to  be  when  we  go  to  sleep.  From  the  human 
standpoint,  then,  there  is  an  ineradicable  dualism  of  thought 
and  thing.  The  traditional  debate  on  their  relation  has  been 
hopelessly  confused  by  the  failure  to  keep  distinct  the  human 
and  the  absolute  points  of  view.  If  any  result  is  to  be 
reached  we  must  keep  them  distinct  and  discuss  them  in 
their  order. 

The  necessary  antithesis  of  thought  and  thing  in  human 
experience  when  combined  with  the  results  of  our  previous 
study  reveals  knowledge  to  be  a  highly  complex  process 
with  far-reaching  implications.  The  general  trustworthi- 
ness of  reason  presupposes  that  thought  is  a  free  activity 
based  on  rational  insight.  Objects  exist  for  us  only  as  the 
mind  builds  up  valid  conceptions  within  itself.  The  forms 
of  knowledge  are  primarih'  forms  of  thought,  and  we  can 
have  no  knowledge  which  is  not  determined  by  those  forms. 
Hence  it  follows  that  our  apparent  knowledge  can  have  no 
objective  validity  unless  our  objects  themselves  are  cast  in 
the  moulds  of  thought,  or  unless  the  laws  and  categories  of 
thought  are  also  laws  and  categories  of  being.     Without 


THOUGHT   AND   THING  297 

this  essential  identit}-,  or,  at  least,  parallelism,  between  our 
thought  and  things,  there  must  be  a  parallax  between  the 
conception  and  the  reality,  and  a  resulting  failure  of  knowl- 
edge. Without  assuming,  at  least  implicitly,  that  the  laws 
of  thought  are  valid  for  reality,  knowledge  is  impossible, 
and  the  theory  of  knowledge  vanishes  in  absurdity. 

But  from  the  dualistic  standpoint  we  here  find  ourselves 
in  very  great  complexity  which  soon  passes  into  correspond- 
ing perplexity.  We  seem  to  have  a  parallelism  of  two 
mutually  independent  series :  the  thing  series  and  the  thought 
series.  Neither  is  the  other,  and  neither  implies  the  other; 
yet  both  agree.  This  fact  itself  constitutes  a  new  problem. 
That  two  mutually  independent  series  should  yet  be  under 
the  necessity  of  agreeing  is  a  conception  not  easily  admitted 
as  an  ultimate  fact,  and  there  has  been  a  very  general  agree- 
ment among  all  speculators  for  whom  knowledge  is  a  prob- 
lem at  all  that  this  dualism  must  in  some  way  be  removed. 
Very  queer  things  have  been  said  about  the  subject  and 
the  object,  and  the  necessity  of  mediating  their  antithesis. 
Sometimes  the  two  have  been  united  in  a  transcendent 
third,  but  more  commonlv  the  aim  has  been  to  reduce  one 
of  the  series  to  the  other,  or  to  an  effect  of  the  other. 
Thought  has  been  presented  as  an  effect  of  things,  or 
things  have  been  viewed  as  produced  by  thought.  The 
former  view  has  lost  itself  in  the  superficialities  of  sense 
thinking,  and  the  latter  has  erred  and  strayed  from  the 
way  from  the  confounding  of  the  absolute  and  the  human 
point  of  view. 

Let  us  now  see  if  the  dualism  of  thought  and  thing  can 
be  removed  in  this  way.  And,  not  to  lose  ourselves  in  ab- 
stractions, we  once  more  point  out  that  our  present  concern 
is  with  the  relation  of  our  human  thinking  to  its  cosmic 
objects.  Tliis  may  lead  us  to  the  more  general  jxoblem 
of  the  relation   of  thought  and  being  in  the  fundamental 


298  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND   KNOWLEDGE 

reality,  but  for  the  present  w-e  deal  with  the  former  ques- 
tion. 

The  first  view  mentioned  is  materialism.  Tliing-s  pro- 
duce thought.  The  laws  of  things  are  first  and  essential ; 
those  of  thought  are  secondary  and  derived.  Instead  of 
saying  that  the  former  agree  with  the  latter  we  must  rather 
say  that  the  latter  are  copies  or  shadows  of  the  former. 
Their  agreement  or  identity,  then,  does  not  point  to  a  ra- 
tional origin  of  things,  but  to  a  material  origin  of  thoughts, 
and  is  in  no  way  surprising. 

This  view  has  been  extensively  held,  and  when  criti- 
cism is  asleep  it  is  not  without  plausibility.  But  some  diffi- 
culties appeal'  on  examination.  To  begin  with,  things  are 
not  to  be  taken  in  the  phenomenal  sense.  This  chair,  this 
table,  this  pen,  this  paper,  and  no  collection  of  similar 
things,  could  ever  produce  a  knowledge  of  themselves.  If 
any  kind  of  things  is  to  produce  thouglit  it  must  be  the  in- 
visible things  of  metaphysical  theory.  Phenomenal  things 
are  altogether  out  of  the  question. 

But  that  the  invisible  things,  as  atoms  and  molecules, 
with  their  mvsterious  forces,  should  do  something  in  this 
line  seems  quite  possible,  until  our  thought  is  cleared  up. 
The  mystery  of  the  molecule  impresses  the  imagination,  and 
readily  leads  to  the  fancy  of  its  all-sufficiency  in  this  matter. 
But  an  elementary  acquaintance  with  physics  teaches  us 
that  the  activity  of  the  molecule,  so  far  as  known,  consists 
entirely  in  producing  movements  and  groupings  of  one  kind 
or  another  in  space ;  and  thought  can  in  no  way  be  identi- 
fied with  such  movement  or  grouping.  An  equally  slight 
acquaintance  with  the  nature  of  thought  shows  that  thought 
can  never  be  put  together  from  the  outside  in  any  such  way. 
We  must  have  abiding  thinking  subjects  with  highly  complex 
mental  activities.  There  is  no  thought  or  knowledge  in  gen- 
eral, but  only  specific  thoughts  and  definite  acts  of  knowing. 


THOUGHT    AND    THING  299 

This  view,  then,  would  need  to  show,  first,  how  things, 
conceived  as  impersonal  and  unthinking,  can  ever  produce 
personal  and  thinking  subjects.  Since  the  mind  is  only  an  ab- 
stract term  for  individual  minds,  this  view,  next,  would  have 
to  show  how  things  can  produce  minds  all  of  the  same  rational 
pattern.  It  would  finally  have  to  show  how  things  can  and 
must  produce  individual  minds  able  to  react  upon  their  cos- 
mic causes  and  correctly  grasp  them  in  thought.  Tliese 
several  steps  are  distinct,  and  form  a  graded  series.  Things 
might  form  minds  on  no  fixed  pattern,  and  knowledge 
would  vanish  into  individualism.  And  if  things  formed 
minds  on  a  common  pattern,  there  would  still  be  no  security 
that  the  rational  nature  would  be  so  related  to  the  objec- 
tive fact  as  to  secure  valid  coo^nition.  The  form  of  cos- 
nition  might  be  given  to  mental  movements  which  had  no 
objective  significance  whatever,  as  in  hallucination  and 
dream. 

These  demands  have  been  met,  not  so  much  by  ignoring 
them  as  by  being  ignorant  of  them.  There  has  been,  in- 
deed, a  deal  of  polysyllabic  utterance  about  the  adjustment 
of  inner  relations  to  outer  relations ;  but  few  have  be- 
thought themselves  to  inquire  into  the  meaning  and  impli- 
cations of  this  antithesis.  There  has  also  been  a  crude 
fancy  that  thought  originates  in  a  kind  of  raw  material, 
"mindstuff,"  and  that  this  may  be  variously  integrated  and 
differentiated  in  connection  with  the  organism,  and  by  the 
aid  of  association,  until  the  order  of  conscious  thought 
finally  emerges.  Hence  it  has  been  viewed  as  a  very  simple 
thing  to  produce  a  world  of  conscious  persons  from  a  world 
of  things,  which  are  not  only  unconscious,  but  are  essen- 
tially unrelated  to  consciousness.  Recipes  for  the  process 
abound ;  but  when  reduced  to  their  net  value  they  turn  out 
to  be  purely  verbal. 

And  this  is  but  the  beginning  of  sorrows.     Supposing  the 


300  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

work  done  up  to  this  point,  we  are  at  once  confronted  by  the 
diflBculty  arising  from  the  relativity  of  much  of  our  apparent 
knowledge  and  from  the  problem  of  error.  A  large  part  of 
what  is  apparently  objective  is  really  subjective,  and  a  large 
part  of  human  thinking  in  every  department  is  really  error. 
The  showiest  of  these  theories  respecting  the  adjustment  of 
inner  relations  to  outer  relations  reduces  the  outer  relations 
to  phenomena,  which  thus,  in  strictness,  become  inner  rela- 
tions, and  declares  the  real — that  is,  the  truly  outer — to  be 
strictly  unknowable.  Thus  the  progressive  adjustment  of 
the  inner  to  the  outer  turns  out  to  be  a  progressive  alien- 
ation,  or,  rather,  it  turns  out  to  have  no  connection  with 
reality  whatever.  This  is  one  of  the  most  extraordinary 
cases  of  anticlimax  in  the  histor}'^  of  thought. 

The  difficulty  in  the  problem  of  error  is  already  familiar 
to  us.  Error  arises  by  the  same  necessity  as  truth,  and  by 
the  action  of  the  same  causes,  and  we  are  left  without  an}'' 
standard  of  distinction  between  them.  We  appeal  in  vain 
to  evolution  and  natural  selection  to  help  us.  Such  appeals 
presuppose  that  thought  is  not  mechanically  determined, 
and  that  is  contrary  to  the  h3"pothesis.  On  the  plane  of 
natural  causation,  the  ideal  distinctions  of  truth  and  error, 
rational  and  irrational,  are  meaningless.  One  notion  is  as 
necessary  as  any  other  and  as  good  as  any  other  while  it 
lasts.  Scepticism,  rather  than  knowledge,  is  the  outcome. 
No  theory  of  knowledge  is  possible  on  this  view.  The  the- 
ory is  utterly  opaque  in  its  possibility,  and  as  soon  as  it  is 
admitted  it  proceeds  to  cancel  itself. 

Such  views  result  from  attempting  to  solve  unpicturable 
thought  problems  in  terms  of  the  imagination.  Hence  the 
notion  of  "  mindstuff,"  the  antithesis  of  inner  and  outer,  the 
building  up  of  thought  by  the  mechanical  cohesion  of  sensa- 
tional units.  They  show  the  unconscious  working  of  a  phil- 
osophical principle,  with  no  suspicion,  however,  of  its  true 


THOUGHT    AND    THING  301 

nature.  In  this  respect  they  resemble  the  crude  beginnings 
of  Greek  speculation,  in  which  genuine  rational  principles 
were  latent,  but  not  understood. 

That  things,  considered  as  external  to  thought  and  anti- 
thetical to  thought,  should,  nevertheless,  produce  thought  is 
an  unmanageable  thesis.  The  dualism  of  experience  can 
never  be  removed  in  that  way.  Let  us,  then,  try  the  oppo- 
site view,  and  say  that  thought  makes  things.  Possibly  here 
we  may  be  more  successful. 

But  here,  too,  we  meet  with  confusion.  In  itself  the  view 
is  unclear.  It  may  mean  that  things  are  nothing  but  a  sys- 
tem of  presentations,  as  in  the  common  view  of  Berkeley's 
theory,  and  it  ma}^  mean  that  thought  is  the  cause  and  source 
of  things.  Both  of  these  views  again  are  unclear.  In  the 
first  view  it  is  not  plain  where  and  for  whom  the  order  of 
presentations  exists.  If  it  be  independent  of  finite  minds 
our  knowledge  of  it  is  not  explained,  and  we  un wittingly 
and  to  no  purpose  stumble  out  of  epistemology  into  meta- 
physics. If  it  depend  on  finite  minds,  then  each  mind 
makes  its  own  world.  Either  alternative  has  its  special 
embarrassments. 

In  the  second  view  mentioned,  it  is  not  plain  whether 
finite  thought  or  absolute  thought  be  the  cause  of  things. 
The  former  view  is  absurd,  and  the  latter  does  not  advance 
the  problem.  No  finite  person  would  say.  My  thought  is 
the  creator  of  all  I  mean  by  earth,  and  sky,  and  stars ;  and 
even  if  one  should  say  so  it  w^ould  not  matter  much.  Some 
have  indeed  thought  it  worth  while  to  say  that  we  create 
our  thoughts,  and  thus  do  create  our  objects :  but  this  is  a 
very  cheap  wisdom.  In  this  sense,  the  worshipper  creates 
God  himself ;  but  there  is  still  a  difference  between  creating 
the  thought  of  a  thing  and  creating  the  thing  which  the 
thought  reports  or  apprehends. 


302  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

The  other  view,  that  absolute  thought  is  the  source  and 
cause  of  things,  is  incomplete,  and,  however  true  it  may  be, 
it  is  also  irrelevant  to  the  present  discussion.  It  is  incom- 
plete ;  for  thought  itself  is  only  an  abstraction  from  the 
living  activity  of  a  personal  spirit,  and  the  reference  of  any- 
thing to  thought  must  at  last  mean  its  reference  to  a  ra- 
tional agent.  It  is  iiTelevant ;  for  if  we  should  refer  things 
to  an  absolute  spirit  the  problem  of  finite  knowing  would 
remain  unsolved,  and  the  dualism  of  our  knowledge  would 
be  untouched.  We  have  once  more  the  perennial  confu- 
sion so  often  referred  to,  of  finite  thought  and  knowing 
with  an  assumed  absolute  thought  and  knowing,  or  of  the 
relation  of  thought  and  being  in  our  experience  with  their 
relation  in  an  assumed  absolute  reason.  Whenever  ideal- 
ists speak  of  thought  as  creating  its  objects,  or  of  conscious- 
ness as  embracing  all  reality,  they  implicitly  occupy  the 
standpoint  of  "Thought"  or  "Consciousness."  These  are 
supposed  to  be  universal  and  altogether  superior  to  any- 
thing occurring  in  the  "  history  of  the  individual."  Un- 
fortunately, it  has  never  been  made  clear  how  these  high 
considerations  solve  the  problem  of  human  knowing,  and 
this  is  the  question  of  immediate  interest.  In  fact,  we  have 
raerel}'^  stumbled  once  more  out  of  epistemology  into  meta- 
physics. We  shall  see,  hereafter,  that  these  considerations 
have  an  important  place  in  the  theory  of  knowledge,  but 
they  in  no  way  remove  the  dualism  from  human  knowing. 

The  most  elaborate  attempt  to  overcome  this  dualism 
and  identify  thought  and  thing  is  found  in  the  system  of 
absolute  idealism.  To  understand  this  system  we  must  note 
its  origin  in  the  Kantian  philosophy.  Kant  showed  that 
all  knowledge  must  be  relative  to  our  faculties.  But  he 
assumed,  with  common-sense,  that  things  are  external  and 
antithetical  to  thought,  and  these  things  in  themselves  he 


THOUGHT    AND    THING  303 

pronounced  unknowable.  At  most,  all  that  follows  from 
experience,  or  from  tiie  Kantian  premises,  is  that  things 
are  external  to  our  thought ;  that  is,  are  indepen<]ent  of  our 
thought.  It  does  not  follow  that  they  are  independent  of 
all  thought,  or  that  they  are  incommensurate  with  our 
thought.  But  the  independence  of  our  thought  was  mis- 
taken for  an  independence  of  all  thought,  and  the  doctrine 
of  the  unknowable  followed  as  a  matter  of  course.  Such 
things,  if  they  exist,  are  indeed  unknowable. 

If  they  exist,  that  is;  but  do  they  exist?  Fichte  soon 
showed  conclusively  that  such  things  are  not  only  unknow- 
able, but  also  unafRrmable.  The  same  argument  which 
proves  them  unknowable  proves  them  unreal.  Here,  again, 
the  true  conclusion  should  have  been  not  that  we  may  not 
affirm  things  independent  of  our  thought,  but  that  we  may 
not  affirm  things  independent  of  all  thought  and  unrelated 
to  thought.  But  the  ambiguous  conclusion  was  drawn  in- 
stead that  thought  can  recognize  nothing  beyond  itself, 
without  telling  us  w^hose  thought  or  what  thought  is  meant. 
Specification  on  this  point  would  have  been  embarrassing. 
In  this  way  reality  became  thought,  and  thought  became 
all-embracing  and  all  in  all.  The  idle  mystery  of  the 
"thing  in  itself"  vanished  along  with  the  uncritical  prej- 
udice on  which  it  rested. 

This  was  the  second  stage  of  the  development.  We  are 
clear  of  all  existence  beyond  thought.  It  only  remains  to 
develop  everything  within  thought  itself  as  a  necessary 
consequence  of  reason.  In  that  case  we  shall  not  only 
know  the  world,  but  we  shall  also  understand  its  genesis 
and  creation.  This  was  Hegel's  aim.  He  sought  to  show 
principles  of  movement  and  development  in  thought  itself, 
whereby  it  must  necessarily  pass  through  the  various  forms 
of  existence  until  it  emerges  as  absolute  spirit.  Such  was 
the  genesis  of  the  system  of  absolute  idealism. 


304  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

It  requires  patience  to  unravel  the  abstractions  and  am- 
biguities involved  in  this  doctrine.  It  derives  all  its  plausi- 
bility from  confounding  the  absolute  and  the  human  stand- 
point. From  the  former  point  of  view  conclusions  not 
altogether  unlike  these  might  be  drawn,  but  we  must  deal 
with  the  latter  first.  And  here,  unless  we  allow  the  hy- 
postasis of  the  human  reason,  the  Kantian  doctrine  leads 
at  once  to  pure  individualism.  Kant's  transcendental  ego 
forthwith  became  the  universal  ego  with  Fichte;  and  thus 
apparently  an  all-embracing  reality  was  secured.  Then,  by 
an  analysis  of  the  notion  of  egoity,  Fichte  proceeded  to  de- 
duce the  forms  and  facts  of  the  actual  world.  Hegel  carried 
the  abstraction  a  step  further.  Fichte  starts  with  the  self- 
positing  ego  ;  but  at  that  time,  or  in  that  stage  of  specula- 
tive development,  this  was  thought  to  stop  short  of  the  true 
first  principle.  This  Ilegel  found  in  thought  itself.  In 
the  beginning,  then,  was  thought,  developing  by  its  essen- 
tial laws  into  a  world  of  persons  and  a  world  of  things. 
The  world  movement  is  but  the  dialectical  unfolding  of 
thought  itself.  Criticism  must  direct  itself,  first,  to  the  al- 
leged identification  of  thought  and  being,  and,  secondly,  to 
the  development  of  pure  thought  into  its  concrete  forms; 
that  is,  to  the  deduction  of  the  world  from  thought. 

But  now  we  seem  to  have  thought  without  a  thinker,  and 
thought  developing  itself  into  a  thinker — both  of  which  no- 
tions are  sheer  fictions.  Either,  then,  we  must  see  our  view 
collapse  through  the  vanishing  of  its  most  important  term, 
or  we  must  make  a  distinction.  By  thought  we  ma}'^  mean 
thinking,  or  we  may  mean  the  rational  contents  grasped  in 
thinking.  The  thought  of  triangle  may  refer  to  the  mental 
activity  of  conception  or  to  the  contents  apprehended.  It 
is  only  in  the  latter  sense  that  thought  and  being  are  to  be 
identified.  Thought,  viewed  as  the  process  of  conceiving, 
comparing,  reflecting,  in  which  our  mental  Ufe  so  largely 


THOUGHT    AND    THING  305 

consists,  is  in  no  sense  identical  with  things.  No  particular 
occurrence  whatever  in  the  individual  consciousness  is  to  be 
mistaken  for  objective  reality.  Our  thoughts  as  mental 
acts,  or  mental  products,  are  never  things ;  it  is  only  their 
logical  contents  which  are  things.  But  these  contents  are 
all  with  which  the  mind  can  deal,  and  thej'^  are  subject  to 
logic.  The  laws  of  thought  are  their  laws.  There  is  no 
distinction  ;  they  are  strictly  the  same.  Having  thus  identi- 
fied thought  and  reality,  it  only  remains  to  find  in  thought 
some  principle  of  movement  whereby  it  is  set  a-going,  and 
we  shall  understand  the  deepest  mysteries  of  existence. 

The  possibility  of  such  a  claim  is  not  utterly  unintelligi- 
ble. There  is  a  dialectic  in  our  thought  whereby  we  are 
driven  from  one  position  to  another,  until  complete  consist- 
ency has  been  reached.  There  is  a  logic  in  events  which  in 
the  long-run  will  work  itself  out.  There  is  a  logic  in  a  sys- 
tem which  is  often  more  cogent  than  that  of  its  holders,  and 
which  at  last  forces  itself  upon  its  holders.  So  for  reason  in 
general.  A  thought  may  be  found  incomplete  or  contra- 
dictory until  another  thought  is  added.  The  lower  catego- 
ries, upon  analysis,  may  imply  the  higher.  And  this  may 
go  on  until  we  are  led  to  see  that  thought  itself  is  organic 
and  forms  a  systematic  whole.  If  now  we  can  persuade 
ourselves  that  thought  is  the  active  principle  of  reality,  then 
this  dialectic  of  thought  acquires  objective  significance,  and 
we  seem  to  be  ready  to  comprehend  existence  through  and 
through. 

But  here  again  it  is  plain  that  we  have  once  more  ex- 
changed the  problem  of  knowledge  for  one  of  metaphysics. 
"Whatever  value  there  might  be  in  this  view  for  a  theory 
of  the  nature  and  origin  of  the  world,  it  has  none  for  our 
present  purpose.  We  have  simply  identified  the  world  of 
things  with  the  contents  of  an  assumed  absolute  thought ; 
but  we  have  made  no  provision  for  our  knowledge  of  them. 

20 


906  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE 

Our  thoughts  as  conceptions,  as  subjective  and  mental,  are 
not  things.  Thinghood  belongs  only  to  their  contents;  and 
these  exist  apart  from  the  subjective  processes  of  the  indi- 
vidual as  objectively  real.  But  such  a  view  advances  the 
theory  of  knowledge  very  little.  Grant  that  there  is  a  uni- 
versal reason  whose  contents  are  reality,  and  whose  con- 
tents are  united  by  rational  necessity  into  an  organic  whole, 
the  problem  of  human  knowing  still  remains  untouched, 
unless  we  show  that  the  objective  reason  must  specialize 
itself  not  only  into  the  world  of  things,  but  also  into  the 
movements  of  human  thought.  Supposing,  then,  that  this 
universal  reason  means  anything,  before  we  can  use  it  we 
must  learn  how  this  universal  thought  is  related  to  our 
thinking,  and  how  it  secures  the  validit}^  of  our  individual 
conceptions.  Some  provision  must  be  made  for  our  shar- 
ing in  this  thought,  if  it  is  to  help  us  in  our  theorizing. 
Unfortunately,  this  provision  has  not  been  made.  The 
metaphysical  monism  of  thought  and  being  for  the  absolute 
leaves  the  epistemological  dualism  of  human  thought  and 
cosmic  being  as  undeniable  as  ever.  We  conclude,  then, 
that  the  identification  of  thought  and  being  is  a  somewhat 
obscure  doctrine  in  its  best  estate,  and  that  it  is  only  in- 
directly of  use  in  solving  the  problem  of  human  knowledge. 
In  truth,  this  doctrine  is  purely  metaphysical.  It  is 
simply  a  declaration  that  being  is  subject  to  logical  laws, 
and  may  be  comprehended  through  them  in  its  innermost 
essence.  It  only  remains  to  find  a  principle  of  develop- 
ment whereby  we  may  trace  being  from  its  simplest  form 
to  its  highest  manifestation.  When  being  is  conceived  as 
essentially  impersonal,  the  view  is  atheistic  or  pantheistic; 
and  the  difference  between  materialism  and  absolute  ideal- 
ism is  only  one  of  words.  This  brings  us  to  the  second 
subject  of  criticism,  the  development  of  being  into  mani- 
festation. 


THOUGHT    AND    THING  307 

By  analysis  of  the  space  intuition  we  build  up  the  sys- 
tem of  geometry  as  a  necessary  implication.  It  is  conceiv- 
able that,  in  like  manner,  the  notion  of  being  implies  the 
whole  scheme  of  concrete  existence  as  a  rational  necessity, 
or,  what  comes  to  the  same  thing,  that  the  system  of  reason 
implies  the  actual  world  with  all  its  concrete  details.  Analy- 
sis, however,  fails  to  reveal  the  necessity.  No  reflection 
upon  the  bare  notion  of  being  will  reveal  anything  beyond 
the  formal  categories  of  quality  and  causation.  Pure  being 
refuses  to  unfold  or  differentiate.  No  formal  category  en- 
ables us  to  deduce  any  specific  application  whatever.  Pure 
space  accounts  for  no  figures  in  space.  Pure  time  explains 
no  events  in  time.  The  idea  of  motion  provides  for  no 
specific  movements.  The  category  of  causation  alone  con- 
tains no  particular  effects.  Reason  as  a  system  of  princi- 
ples is  only  a  formal  outline  of  possibility,  and  contains 
nothing  specific  and  actual.  The  actual  is  found,  not  de- 
duced ;  it  is  a  fact  of  experience,  not  an  implication  of  rea- 
son. Within  the  objective  order  alone  we  find  three  fac- 
tors which  we  cannot  connect  by  any  logical  bond.  We  have, 
first,  the  necessary  truths  or  categories  of  reason.  Their 
presence  as  laws,  both  in  the  inner  and  outer  world,  unites 
the  two  realms  and  makes  communication  possible.  But 
these  categories  only  outline  a  possible  existence,  and  do 
not  contain  the  concrete  reality  as  a  necessary  implication. 
We  have  next  certain  general  laws  of  cosmic  procedure. 
These  cannot  be  deduced  from  the  categories  of  reason, 
though  they  are  specifications  under  them.  For  instance, 
the  various  forms  of  force  are  specifications  of  the  general 
category  of  causality,  but  no  consideration  of  the  latter  will 
yield  the  former.  The  actual  existence  and  nature  of  these 
general  laws  have  to  be  admitted  as  a  fact  without  any 
hope  of  deducing  them  as  rational  necessities.  Finally, 
neither  the  categories  of  reason  nor  the  general  laws  con- 


308  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

tain  any  account  of  the  detailed  facts  of  existence.  No 
reflection  upon  the  eternal  truths  of  reason  or  the  general 
cosmic  laws  would  deduce  a  boulder  or  any  other  concrete 
fact.  These  have  to  be  admitted  as  opaque  facts,  so  far  as 
reason  is  concerned ;  and  if  we  will  have  an  explanation,  it 
can  be  found  only  in  the  notion  of  purpose.  The  cosmic 
laws  could  serve  other  ends  as  well  as  the  actual,  and  for 
the  actual  we  must  have  recourse  to  the  idea  of  plan.  Nec- 
essary truths,  general  laws,  and  specific  facts  bound  up  in 
an  all-embracing  plan  are  the  elements  which  our  under- 
standino-  of  the  system  demands. 

For  us,  the  system,  so  far  from  being  a  necessity  of  rea- 
son, abounds  in  contingent  elements.  It  may  occur  to  us, 
however,  that  the  case  is  otherwise  from  the  standpoint  of 
the  absolute  reason,  and  that  the  inability  to  connect  all  the 
elements  of  existence  in  a  necessary  logical  scheme  is  due 
solely  to  our  lack  of  insight.  There  is  here  a  certain  ambi- 
guity of  reason  which  must  be  noted.  Reason  may  mean 
the  system  of  necessary  truth  involved  in  the  nature  of  the 
intellect ;  and  it  ma}'  be  extended  to  cover  design,  purpose, 
fitness,  and  character.  In  the  latter  sense,  existence  mav  be 
rational,  or  an  implication  of  the  highest  reason,  without 
being  such  in  the  former  sense.  But  the  implications  of 
reason  in  the  latter  sense  are  not  self-realizing  necessities  of 
logic,  but  imply  foresight  and  will  for  their  realization.  It 
is  onlv  in  the  first  sense  mentioned  that  the  claim  has  sio^- 
nificance  here ;  and  in  this  sense  the  claim  cannot  be  al- 
lowed without  immediate  speculative  shipwreck.  For  as 
the  logical  implications  of  a  thing  coexist  with  the  thing, 
if  the  universe  as  existing  were  a  logical  implication  of  the 
pure  reason  it  and  all  its  contents  would  be  eternal.  There 
would  be  no  room  for  change,  but  all  things  would  rigidly 
coexist.      In  this  view,  also,  finite  minds  with  all  their  con- 


THOUGHT    AND    THING  309 

tents  would  be  necessary  and  eternal ;  and  as  error  and  evil 
are  a  manifest  part  of  these  contents,  it  follows  that  they 
likewise  are  necessary  and  eternal.  Hence  we  should  have 
to  assume  an  element  of  unreason  and  evil  in  reason  itself, 
and  by  this  time  the  collapse  of  the  system  would  be  com- 
plete. Freedom  and  contingency  are  necessary  elements  of 
an  intelligible  universe. 

From  our  human  standpoint  the  dualism  of  thought  and 
thino-  is  ineradicable.  Our  thoughts  can  never  be  identified 
with  things  or  brought  into  line  with  them,  either  as  their 
source  or  as  their  product.  Experience  forces  upon  us  the 
admission  of  two  orders  of  movement,  one  subjective  and 
one  objective.  The  former  is  our  conscious  life ;  the  latter 
is  not  dependent  upon  us,  but  exists  for  all.  Whatever 
its  essential  nature,  it  is  not  our  product.  This  is  the 
fact  which  distinguishes  the  order  of  our  thought  from  the 
order  of  things.  But  if  knowledge  is  to  be  possible,  then 
this  double  order  must  be  harmonious  and  parallel ;  other- 
wise our  thought,  which  is  shut  up  to  conceiving  according 
to  mental  laws,  and  which  indeed  can  know  the  world  only 
through  conceptions  which  it  internally  constructs  as  a  re- 
action of  its  own  nature,  could  never  grasp  reality  as  it 
exists  apart  from  our  thought.  And  this  general  paral- 
lelism of  the  laws  of  our  thought  with  those  of  things  is 
only  one  factor  in  the  possibility  of  objective  knowledge. 
Since  this  knowledge  is  a  process  with  many  media  between 
the  known  object  and  the  knowing  mind,  it  is  plain  that 
without  a  profound  and  accurate  adjustment  of  the  nature 
of  the  media  to  the  nature  of  things,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
to  the  nature  of  thought,  on  the  other,  the  resulting  knowl- 
edge would  miss  its  mark.  There  is  no  way  of  deducing 
this  adjustment.  Knowledge  as  a  psychological  event  is  an 
effect  of  interacting  causes  mainly  subjective;  and  no  re- 
flection upon  it  as  effect  gives  the  slightest  hint  of  the  nat- 


310  THEORy    OF   THOUGHT   AND   KNOWLEDGE 

ure  of  its  objective  cause ;  at  least  no  reflection  reveals  tliat 
the  perceived  object  is  the  only  adequate  cause  of  tlie  per- 
ception. Indeed,  so  far  as  perception  goes,  the  object  is 
purely  passive  and  does  not  appear  as  causal  at  all ;  and,  so 
far  as  theory  goes,  the  object  enters  causally  into  the  men- 
tal effect  only  at  many  removes  of  mediated  causation. 

The  relation  of  our  thought  to  cosmic  being  involves, 
then,  a  dualism  and  a  parallelism.  A  dualism,  for  our 
thought,  though  able  to  grasp  objects  only  through  concep- 
tions, is  not  able  to  view  its  conceptions  as  real,  but  only  as 
valid  for  reality.  It  likewise  involves  a  parallelism,  as  other- 
wise thought  would  not  grasp  realit3\  And,  finally,  the  rep- 
resentation of  the  thing  series  in  the  thought  series  is  possi- 
ble only  through  a  highly  complex  activity  within  the  latter. 
But  while  this  is  the  case  for  finite  thought,  it  is  impossible 
to  view  it  as  expressing  the  ultimate  relation  of  thought  and 
being  in  fundamental  existence.  We  have  frequently  com- 
plained of  the  idealist  for  overlooking  the  dualism  of  our 
knowing  in  the  interests  of  a  metaphysical  monism.  It  is 
now  in  order  to  complain  of  our  traditional  philosophers 
that  they  generalize  the  dualism  of  our  knowing  into  a  ne- 
cessity of  all  knowing.  Our  thoughts  are  not  things,  but 
are  valid  for  things;  nevertheless,  we  must  at  last  come 
down  to  a  thinker  whose  thoughts  are  things ;  that  is,  to  a 
thinker  whose  objects  are  only  his  realized  thoughts. 

If  we  should  posit  over  against  this  thinker  an  indepen- 
dent and  eternal  cosmic  existence  as  the  object  of  his  thought, 
we  should  fall  into  a  hopeless  metaphysical  dualism.  Meta- 
physical considerations  compel  us  to  admit  one  fundamental 
existence  upon  which  all  else  depends,  and  the  conception  of 
two  entities,  mutually  independent  yet  groundlessly  paral- 
lel, is  impossible.  If  fundamental  existence  be  impersonal, 
there  is  no  way  to  thinking  existence.  If  there  be  a  self- 
existent  thinking  being  and  self-existent  impersonal  being, 


THOUGHT    AND    THING  311 

there  is  no  way  of  bringing  them  together  without  cancelling 
the  self-existence  of  one  or  the  other.  The  only  way  out  is 
to  view  thinking  existence  as  fundamental,  and  all  imper- 
sonal or  physical  existence  as  a  manifestation  or  product  of 
the  same.  At  this  point  we  must  go  with  the  absolute 
idealists  and  hold  that  thought  is  all-producing  and  all-em- 
bracing. 

In  further  discussion  of  the  problem  we  may  get  some 
light  by  calling  Kant  to  our  aid.  He  distinguished  three 
ideas  of  the  reason — the  soul,  the  world,  and  God.  The  soul 
stands  for  the  finite  knower,  the  world  stands  for  the  system 
of  objective  existence,  and  God  is  at  once  their  presupposi- 
tion and  bond  of  union.  In  our  theory  of  knowledge  we 
need  something  of  the  same  sort.  We  must  recognize  the  ob- 
jective system  as  something  independent  of  us.  We  must  also 
recognize  the  finite  thinker  as  something  which  can  in  no  way 
be  identified  with  the  objective  system.  The  subject  and  the 
object,  in  this  sense,  are  in  unchangeable  antithesis.  Here 
is  a  dualism  which  cannot  be  removed  from  the  finite  sys- 
tem, but  in  which,  nevertheless,  it  is  impossible  to  rest.  We 
must  go  behind  both  the  finite  subject  and  the  finite  object 
to  their  common  ground  and  bond  of  union,  if  any  theory  of 
knowledge  is  to  be  possible.  The  dualism  of  the  finite  must 
be  both  founded  and  transcended  in  a  monism  of  the  infinite. 

In  a  way  this  conclusion  has  been  quite  generally  recog- 
nized; and  monism,  at  least  in  word,  has  become  almost 
universal.  Even  materialists  are  given  to  calling  themselves 
monists.  And  this  suggests,  what  is  the  fact,  that  while 
there  is  pretty  general  insight  into  the  necessity  of  a  basal 
monism,  there  is  no  corresponding  insight  into  the  true  nature 
of  monism.  Hence  many  have  thought  to  find  an  adequate 
monism  in  atomistic  materialism.  Here  a  certain  all-alike- 
ness  in  the  elements  is  made  to  cover  up  the  extreme  plural- 


312  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

isni  of  the  doctrine.  A  better  conception  is  found  in  the 
notion  of  a  fundamental  reality  with  a  dualism  of  nature. 
The  dualism  is  supposed  to  provide  for  the  antithetical 
manifestation  in  the  finite,  and  also  to  be  transcended  in 
the  unity  of  the  fundamental  being. 

Tills  notion  has  long  been  a  favorite  with  speculators. 
It  finds  its  classical  expression  in  the  system  of  Spinoza, 
and  has  been  repeated  with  variations  in  more  modern 
systems.  According  to  Spinoza  the  infinite  substance  is 
one,  but  it  has  two  attributes,  thought  and  extension.  Ac- 
cording to  later  writers,  matter  and  mind  are  opposite  sides, 
faces,  aspects,  manifestations,  of  the  basal  reality. 

In  these  utterances  all  that  is  clear  is  the  conviction 
that  a  basal  monism  must  be  reached;  but  it  is  very  far 
from  clear  that  we  have  reached  it.  Sometimes  Spinoza 
talks  of  the  attributes  in  such  a  way  that  they  require 
tliouo'ht  for  their  distinction.  The  attributes  are  said  to 
represent  ways  of  looking  at  things.  In  that  case  thought 
would  lie  behind  the  dualism  of  attributes  as  its  source,  for 
the  ways  of  looking  would  belong  to  thought  and  not  to 
the  infinite  substance.  But  in  general  he  regards  the  attri- 
butes as  separate ;  and  then  several  questions  arise  : 

First,  how  can  the  unity  of  the  substance  be  maintained 
when  the  attributes  are  incommensurable,  especially  as  each 
attribute  is  supposed  to  express  the  essence  I 

Secondly,  since  knowing  as  a  form  of  thinking  belongs  to 
the  thought  attribute,  how  can  thought  reach  things  at  all? 

Thirdly,  granting  that  thought  and  extension  in  the 
abstract  are  attributes  of  the  basal  reality,  how  can  we 
deduce  from  the  abstract  attributes  concrete  extended 
bodies  and  particular  and  specific  conceptions  "i 

To  these  questions  there  is  no  answer.  The  unity  be- 
comes purely  formal.  We  have  an  unmediated  dualism  of 
nature  and  a  groundless  parallelism  of  antithetical  manifes- 


THOUGHT    AND    THING  313 

tations.  We  might  call  such  a  being  one,  but  no  one  could 
tell  in  what  its  oneness  consists.  Again,  the  thought  side, 
being  separated  from  the  thing  side,  could  never  reach  the 
thing  side ;  and  logic  would  never  rest  until  it  had  denied 
the  thing  altogether.  The  dualism  remains  ineradicable 
until  thoutilit  is  seen  to  be  the  source  of  things,  or  to  be 
the  activity  whereby  things  exist.  Finally,  if  we  allow  the 
abstract  attributes  of  thought  and  extension,  they  lead  to 
nothing.  They  are  merely  class  terms  which  apply  to  all 
the  members  of  the  chiss  without  implying  any  of  them. 
They  impl}^  specific  thoughts  and  things  as  little  as  the 
thought  of  motion  implies  any  specific  movement.  We 
have  here  the  fallacy  of  the  universal. 

Similar  criticisms  apply  to  the  doctrine  of  a  double-faced 
substance,  in  whatever  form.  The  monism  reached  is  only 
verbal.  We  never  escape  "the  infamous  two."  And  we 
never  shall  escape  it  until  thought  is  allowed  to  pervade 
and  possess  and  constitute  all  the  reality  which  it  recog- 
nizes. Until  then  the  problem  of  knowledge  remains  in- 
soluble. 

Thought,  then,  is  the  supreme  condition  of  any  real 
monism.  But  this  thought  must  be  more  than  a  passive 
conception  in  a  mirroring  consciousness.  It  must  be  a 
complex  activity — must  be,  in  fine,  a  thinker  and  a  doer. 
Both  elements  are  needed  to  meet  the  case.  The  produc- 
tion of  reality  cannot  be  reached  by  any  analysis  of  concep- 
tions, but  only  by  a  free  actualization  of  conceptions.  Tiie 
conception  in  the  understanding  must  be  completed  by  the 
energizing  in  the  will.  In  other  w^ords,  creation  is  the  only 
solution  of  finite  existence  in  which  our  thought  can  rest. 
The  finite  subject  and  the  cosmic  object  must  find  their 
common  ground  and  bond  of  union,  not  in  some  one  imper- 
sonal substance,  but  in  the  absolute  thought  and  will. 

In  this  way  we  escape  the  impossible,  or  unintelligible, 


314  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

identification  of  thought  with  being.  At  the  same  time  we 
reach  a  true  monism  which  provides  for,  while  it  transcends, 
the  finite  dualism.  We  provide  also  for  the  element  of 
freedom  or  contingency  necessary  to  prevent  both  specula- 
tive and  ethical  collapse.  Finally,  we  make  some  provision 
for  the  problem  of  human  knowledge.  The  world  itself, 
though  more  than  a  thought,  is  essentially  the  expression  of 
a  thought,  and  hence  lies  open  to  intelligence.  If  we  as- 
sume that  the  world  expresses  thought  and  that  our  thought 
has  something  universal  in  it,  the  ground  of  the  parallelism 
between  our  thought  and  the  system  becomes  apparent,  and 
there  is  no  longer  any  speculative  reason  wh}^  finite  minds 
should  not  grasp  the  cosmic  fact.  Things,  as  products  of 
the  creative  thought,  are  commensurable  with  our  intelli- 
gence and  are  essentially  knowable.  Both  human  minds  and 
cosmic  things  must  be  traced  to  a  common  source  in  the 
creative  thought  and  will.  Only  thus  can  the  antithesis  of 
thought  and  thing  be  transcended  and  mediated.  The  uni- 
verse, though  not  founded  in  our  thought,  is  yet  founded  in 
thought ;  though  independent  of  our  will  it  is  still  depend- 
ent on  will.  It  is  not  an  hallucination  of  the  individual, 
and  it  does  not  exist  in  brute  lumpishness  out  of  all  relation 
to  intelligence. 

"What  wild  things  have  not  been  said  about  the  relation 
of  subject  and  object,  without  first  inquiring  what  subject 
and  what  object!  In  general  we  have  had  a  confused  oscil- 
lation between  the  finite  subject  and  the  absolute  subject. 
The  impossibility  of  identifying  the  finite  subject  with  the 
cosmic  object  is  fairly  apparent ;  and  the  impossibility  of 
viewing  the  cosmic  object  as  independent  of  the  absolute 
subject  is  equally  clear.  Out  of  a  vague  perception  of  this 
difficulty  have  arisen  many  statements,  as  that  thought  and 
thing  are  opposite  sides  of  the  one  reality,  or  that  they  are 
the  same,  but  viewed  from   different   standpoints,  or  tliat 


THOUUHT    AND    THING  315 

subject  and  object  are  identical  in  the  absolute.  These 
views  are  so  unintelligible  that  Schelling  had  to  demand  a 
special  intellectual  intuition  on  the  part  of  those  who  would 
grasp  the  identity  of  subject  and  object.  Yet  one  can  easily 
understand  the  dialectic  which  produces  this  view.  So  long 
as  the  cosmic  object  is  separated  by  an}'  distinction  of  inde- 
pendent being  from  the  absolute  subject,  knowledge  is  not 
possible;  but  not  having  risen  to  the  conception  of  free 
creation,  there  is  no  way  out,  except  to  affirm  an  unintelli- 
gible identification  of  subject  and  object,  with  a  resulting 
impossibility  of  differentiating  them  again,  except  by  another 
act  of  violence.  There  is  no  escape  from  this  deadlock  save 
in  the  notion  of  a  free  creation  whereby  the  cosmic  object  is 
produced  by  the  absolute  subject,  and  whereby  the  cosmic 
object  may  be  so  related  to  the  human  subject  that  each  in 
a  sense  exists  for  the  other. 

The  dualism  of  the  human  subject  and  the  cosmic  object 
is  at  once  transcended  and  explained  in  the  unity  of  the  ab- 
solute subject.  This  conclusion  we  may  hold  with  clear 
insight  and  conviction.  But  a  great  deep  of  mystery  re- 
mains behind.  We  may  ask  how  creation  is  possible;  and 
there  is  no  answer  except  the  negative  one  that  it  involves 
no  contradiction.  We  may  ask  how  the  fundamental  reality 
gives  itself  objects  or  becomes  its  own  object ;  and  again 
there  is  no  answer  that  is  not  purely  formal  or  verbal,  as 
when  we  say  that  the  selfhood  of  the  absolute  depends  upon 
sundry  immanent  acts  of  self-distinction,  whereby  objec- 
tivity and  otherness  are  produced.  But  after  even  so  pro- 
found an  utterance  the  psychology  of  the  absolute  remains 
somewhat  obscure.  Finally,  we  may  inquire  into  that 
structure  of  the  absolute  reason  which  implies  the  possi- 
bility of  the  finite  system.  Behind  all  volition  we  are 
compelled  to  assume  a  rational  nature  on  which  possibility 
itself  depends.     Here  the  clue  eludes  us.     To  escape  the 


316  THEOKY    OF    THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE 

fatalism  of  the  pnreh^  logical  reason  we  have  to  appeal  to 
freedom,  and  to  escape  the  abyss  of  chance  and  arbitrariness 
we  have  to  unite  the  fixity  of  the  intellect  with  the  free- 
dom of  volition  in  the  notion  of  purpose,  itself  fixed  and 
determined  by  the  notion  of  the  good.  But  we  have  little 
insight  into  the  nature  and  implications  of  that  purpose,  or 
into  its  relations  to  the  supreme  good.  The  gloom  is  deep, 
and  we  have  to  walk  circumspectly  and  with  great  wari- 
ness, testing  our  results  not  so  much  by  the  possibility  of 
positive  comprehension  as  rather  by  the  negative  insight 
that  any  other  view  is  fatal.  The  attempt  to  interpret  and 
deduce  the  internal  and  eternal  thought  life  of  the  abso- 
lute as  a  necessity  of  logic  we  have  already  seen  to  be  a 
failure,  and  we  have  also  seen  that  the  notion  itself  shat- 
ters on  the  problem  of  error.  We  must,  then,  at  all 
events,  keep  clear  of  that  view,  whatever  mystery  that  life 
may  contain.  It  is  also  impossible  to  deduce  and  inter- 
pret the  contingent  purposes  of  the  system,  or  to  relate 
the  great  bulk  of  experienced  facts  in  any  scheme  of  pur- 
pose whatever.  At  the  same  time,  we  cannot  abandon 
the  belief  in  purpose  without  giving  up  all  hope  of  ever 
rationally  construing  the  system.  Every  theory  of  knowl- 
edge must  reach  the  theistic  conclusion  or  suffer  col- 
lapse. 

At  the  close  of  the  last  chapter  it  Avas  suggested  that, 
instead  of  debating  the  possibility  of  knowledge  with  the 
sceptic,  we  should  rather  push  on  to  study  the  implications 
of  knowledge,  or  to  establish  certain  fundamental  condi- 
tions, in  accordance  with  which  a  theory  of  knowledge 
must  be  worked  out.  We  gather  out  of  our  previous  work 
a  few  points  as  aids  to  reflection  : 

1.  If  the  sensational  theory  of  knowledge  leads  to  the 
impossibility  of  knowledge  (and  Hume  showed  that  it  does), 


THOUGHT    AND    THING  317 

then  sensationalism  must  be  eschewed  by  every  one  who 
views  knowledge  as  possible. 

2.  If  materialism  has  similar  consequences  (and  it  cer- 
tainly has),  then  materialism  must  be  rejected  by  every 
believer  in  knowledge. 

3.  If  all  fatalistic  theories,  whether  of  finite  minds  or  of 
the  basal  reality,  engulf  thought  in  hopeless  scepticism 
(and  they  unquestionably  do),  then  they  also  are  to  be 
ruled  out  as  fatal  to  the  lirst  condition  of  all  theorizins' — 
trust  in  our  power  to  know. 

■i.  If,  finally,  atheism  is  but  another  name  for  some  or 
all  of  the  above  -  named  theories,  and  hence  has  the  same 
bearing  upon  knowledge  (and  the  identit}'  is  unquestionable), 
then  atheism  is  to  be  rejected  as  essentially  inadmissible,  as 
being  the  destruction  of  all  theory,  itself  among  the  rest. 

These  subjects  for  reflection  are  respectfully  submitted. 
The  implications  of  the  theories  mentioned  may  not  prove 
them  false,  but  they  do  prove  that  we  cannot  consistenth' 
allow  them  to  be  true  and  retain  uny  system  of  knowl- 
edge. Even  the  theories  themselves  would  lose  all  logical 
foundation  as  the  result  of  their  own  consequences.  And 
this  is  the  point  we  especially  emphasize.  Not  every  the- 
ory of  knowledge  is  compatible  with  knowledge,  and  there 
can  be  no  speculative  progress  until  this  question  is  con- 
sistently settled.  For  unreflective  thought  the  question 
does  not  exist,  and  knowledge  is  taken  for  granted.  The 
basis  of  instinct  is  the  best  possible  foundation  for  practical 
life ;  but  it  cannot  do  the  work  of  reflective  speculation.  It 
is  necessary  to  make  the  problem  of  knowledge  the  subject 
of  special  study  and  to  subject  our  theories  of  knowledge  to 
a  searching  criticism.  In  this  way  we  shall  discover  the  an- 
achronistic and  suicidal  character  of  many  current  theories, 
and  shall  definitely  place  them  among  the  views  of  which 
the  raising  indicates  an  uninstructed  or  belated  intellisfence. 


CHAPTER  III 

REALISM    AND    IDEALISM 

This  question  belongs  about  equally  to  epistemology 
and  metaphysics.  As  a  theory  of  the  object  it  belongs  to 
metaphysics,  but  the  arguments  adduced  are  largely  taken 
from  epistemology.  Moreover,  any  sharp  distinction  of  the 
two  realms  is  impossible,  as  the  previous  discussion  has 
abundantly  illustrated.  Hence  we  propose  to  treat  of  it 
here,  but,  as  in  the  case  of  scepticism,  mainly  in  the  way  of 
exposition.  We  aim  to  understand  the  problem  and  the 
line  of  argument.  In  advance  of  a  final  decision  from 
metaphysics,  there  is  some  work  to  be  done  in  clearing  up 
the  field.     And  first  we  must  inquire,  What  is  idealism  i 

In  casting  about  for  an  answer  to  this  question  we  dis- 
cover that  idealism  exists  in  many  forms.  There  is  an 
idealism  springing  from  the  sensational  philosophy,  accord- 
ing to  which  things  are  only  groups  of  sensations,  real  or 
possible.  There  is  also  the  Berkeleian  idealism,  which  views 
things  as  a  system  of  presented  ideas  without  any  material 
substance.  Closely  akin  to  this,  with  some  metaphysical 
differences,  is  the  doctrine  of  phenomenalism,  which  leduces 
things  to  phenomena  or  appearances.  In  addition,  we  have 
the  absolute  idealism  of  the  Hegelian  school,  which  has 
been  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter.  These  idealisms 
have  many  and  profound  metaphysical  and  epistemological 
differences.     The  name  is  one,  but  the  thing  is  manifold. 

This  fact,  that  idealism  has  many  forms,  explains  the 


REALISM   AND    IDEALISM  319 

indifference  with  which  reputed  idealists  often  regard  the 
most  titanic  belaborinofs  of  idealism  bv  some  realistic  Bo- 
anerges.  If  now  we  look  for  some  common  element  in 
these  forms  we  lind  it  in  the  claim  that  what  we  call  mate- 
rial things  and  the  whole  system  of  material  things  exist 
only  for,  and  in  relation  to,  mind  and  consciousness.  The 
realistic  contention,  on  the  other  hand,  is  that  things  exist 
bv  themselves  as  material  elements  and  bodies,  or  at  least 
as  impersonal  realities  of  some  kind,  outside  of  and  apart 
from  mind,  and  in  antithesis  to  mind  and  consciousness. 
At  any  rate,  this  is  to  be  the  meaning  of  the  terms  in  the 
following  discussion. 

As  with  so  many  other  speculative  problems,  the  ques- 
tion itself  does  not  exist  for  spontaneous  thought;  and  if 
by  any  chance  it  should  be  raised  it  would  be  at  once  dis- 
missed as  absurd.  Idealists  and  lunatics  are  ranked  together 
in  popular  thought,  with  the  distinction  that  the  lunatic  is 
thought  to  be  the  less  insane  of  the  two.  Things  exist  and 
are  known  as  a  matter  of  course.  There  is  nothing  obscure 
in  the  process;  indeed,  there  is  no  process,  but  the  mind 
stands  over  against  the  thing,  and  forthwith  knowledge 
results. 

This  naive  confidence  in  perception  is  invaluable  for 
practical  life.  It  results  necessarily  from  the  objectivit}'- 
of  thought  when  uncritically  understood.  But  a  little  re- 
flection serves  to  shake  this  confidence  as  a  speculative 
finality.  To  begin  with,  perception  itself  admits  of  being 
viewed  in  two  ways.  It  claims  to  be  an  apprehension  of 
something  objectively  existing,  and  it  is  also  a  mental  event. 
Primarily,  and  as  mental  event,  it  is  a  psychological  re- 
action against  some  other  action,  and  it  results  in  placing 
certain  objective  presentations  before  consciousness.  But 
these  presentations  are  purely  a  product  of  the  percipient 
mind  ;   and  if  the  appropriate  stimulus  were  given  they 


320  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

would  be  there,  even  if  there  were  no  corresponding  facts 
in  reahty. 

The  study  of  perception  as  process,  or  as  psychological 
effect,  makes  it  possible  to  think  of  the  apparent  object  in  a 
somewhat  idealistic  fashion.  Many  realists  have  thought 
to  escape  the  idealistic  suggestions  of  such  study  by  appeal- 
ing- to  the  law  of  causation.  We  find  ourselves  coerced  in 
our  experience.  We  cannot  have  or  dismiss  objects  at  will. 
This  proves  that  there  is  objective  reality.  We  also  find 
that  the  object  itself  coerces  us,  that  it  has  laws  and  powers 
of  its  own  ;  and  thus  our  assurance  of  the  object  becomes  as 
immovable  as  our  intuition  of  causation. 

The  first  part  of  this  claim  would  be  significant  if  the 
aim  were  to  disprove  solipsism  ;  but  it  is  quite  irrelevant  to 
the  question  respecting  the  nature  and  existence  of  the  ap- 
parent object.  An  idealist  might  admit  the  claim,  and  still 
persist  in  maintaining  the  phenomenality  of  the  object. 
The  attempt  to  demonstrate  the  object  by  the  law  of  causa- 
tion is  equall}^  unfortunate.  The  law  only  says  that  per- 
ception as  mental  event  must  have  a  cause ;  but  it  does  not 
tell  us  where  to  seek  it,  or  what  it  must  be.  Leibnitz  found 
the  cause  in  the  nature  of  the  soul  itself,  and  not  in  any  ex- 
ternal action  upon  the  soul.  If  we  are  not  satisfied  with 
this  view,  and  determine  to  look  for  a  cause  other  than  the 
soul,  we  are  quite  at  a  loss  to  connect  the  effect  with  the 
apparent  object  as  its  only  possible  cause.  The  object  itself 
does  not  seem  to  cause  anything,  and,  so  far  as  causation  is 
concerned,  appears  to  be  entirely  inactive.  The  causation 
in  the  case  is  by  no  means  given  in  the  perception,  but  is 
imported  into  the  problem  by  the  mind  itself. 

If,  nevertheless,  we  insist  on  finding  causation  in  the  ob- 
ject, it  turns  out  that  the  immediate  cause  is  neither  the  ob- 
ject nor  anything  like  it.  The  immediate  external  antecedent 
of  perception  is  said  to  be  some  form  of  nervous  change  in 


REALISM    AND    IDEALISM  331 

the  brain ;  and  this  is  totally  unlike  the  object,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  the  mental  effect,  on  the  other;  and,  besides,  it  is 
itself  only  hypothetically  and  very  obscurely  known.  N"o 
reflection  upon  the  mental  effects  shows  that  it  can  have 
only  one  cause,  and  that  a  nervous  change.  Anything  else 
whatever  seems  as  well  fitted  to  produce  the  effect.  We 
have  next  to  reason  our  way  from  the  hypothetical  nervous 
change  to  the  apparent  object  as  its  only  adequate  cause ; 
and  by  the  time  we  have  fairly  mastered  the  conditions  of 
the  problem  it  is  seen  to  be  impossible  to  deduce  any  neces- 
sary connection  between  the  mental  effect  and  the  perceived 
object. 

To  have  perceptions,  all  that  is  needed  is  the  appropriate 
stimulus  ;  and  there  is  no  way  of  necessarily  connecting  this 
stimulus  with  the  independent  existence  of  the  object.  Often 
the  perception  takes  place  when  there  is  nothing  really  ob- 
jective, as  in  dreams,  delirium,  and  insanity.  Of  course, 
perception  takes  place  only  under  the  form  of  subject  and 
object ;  but  this  psychological  form  in  no  way  secures  the 
independent  reality  of  the  object.  However  valid,  then, 
perception  may  be,  and  however  convinced  we  may  be  of  its 
validity,  there  is  no  logical  or  metaphysical  way  of  deducing 
the  object  as  an  independent  existence  from  the  psychologi- 
cal experience. 

Accord ingl3%  realistic  speculators  of  the  better  sort  have 
given  up  attempts  to  demonstrate  the  object,  and  have 
sought  to  connect  the  perception,  as  mental  state,  with  the 
object  as  externally  existing  by  "a  law  of  our  nature,"  of 
which  no  further  account  can  be  given,  or  which  may  be 
founded  on  the  divine  veracity.  But  the  matter  is  some- 
what complicated  by  the  fact  that  there  is  very  general  agree- 
ment among  theorists,  physical  and  psychological  alike,  that 
a  good  part  of  the  apparent  object  is  purely  phenomenal, 
and  has  only  a  subjective  existence.     The  subjectivity  of 

21 


322  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

sense  qualities  has  become  an  abiding  part  of  both  physical 
and  psychological  theory ;  and  this  fact  itself  is  something 
of  a  stumbling-block  to  the  "unsophisticated  consciousness." 
We  distinctly  perceive  and  are  immediately  conscious  of  many 
qualities  as  inhering  in  the  object,  which,  nevertheless,  exist 
only  in  and  for  our  sensibility.  Here,  if  anywhere,  we  seem 
to  have  an  undeniable  working  of  the  law  of  our  nature,  an 
immediate  utterance  of  the  unsophisticated  consciousness ; 
and  yet  we  are  led  to  modify  it.  This  has  gone  to  such  an 
extent  that  the  world  of  sights  and  sounds,  of  heat  and  cold, 
of  all  pleasant  and  painful  sensations — the  world  of  the  un- 
sophisticated consciousness,  in  short — is  affirmed  to  have 
only  a  subjective  existence,  while  the  truly  real  is  placed 
beyond  the  reach  of  sense  altogether.  Such  realism  as 
remains  is  very  properly  called  "  transfigured  realism,"  and 
the  transfiguration  is  so  foreign  to  spontaneous  thought  that 
Berkeley  was  not  entirely  out  in  his  claim  that  he  alone 
agreed  with  common-sense.  The  transfigured  view  he  stig- 
matized as  the  parent  of  all  manner  of  scepticism  and  un- 
belief. 

But  if,  to  escape  the  transfigured  realism,  we  fall  back 
on  the  divine  veracity,  we  are  met  by  the  fact  that,  while 
a  law  of  our  nature  leads  to  spontaneous  realism,  a  still 
deeper  law  of  our  nature  leads  to  the  transfiguration, 
when  reflective  criticism  begins.  When  the  mind  comes  to 
work  over  its  experiences,  so  as  to  harmonize  them  with 
itself  and  with  one  another,  it  finds  it  impossible  to  do  so 
without  distinguishing  between  things  as  they  appear  and 
things  as  they  are.  This  result  does  not  depend  upon  a 
distrust  of  our  faculties,  but  upon  a  trust  in  them  ;  and  it 
is  onl}'^  in  this  way  that  all  the  demands  of  our  cognitive 
nature  can  be  met.  And  if  we  are  to  appeal  to  the  divine 
veracity,  it  must  be  in  a  larger  way  than  is  common  in  thic 
discussion.     That  veracity  can  hardly  be  held  responsible 


REALISM    AND    IDEALISM  323 

for  anything  beyond  the  truth  and  harmony  of  our  nature 
as  a  whole.  Certainly  it  would  be  a  sorry  sort  of  veracity 
which  should  leave  perception  and  reflective  thought  in 
hopeless  contradiction,  which  would  be  the  case  if  we  are  to 
suppose  the  impressions  of  spontaneous  thought  to  be  final. 

We  shall  have,  then,  to  admit  that  our  first  thought  of 
things  may  not  be  the  truest,  or  may  not  be  the  final  utter- 
ance of  the  mind.  And  to  reach  this  utterance  we  shall 
have  to  undertake  a  critical  analysis  both  of  the  knowing 
process  and  of  the  known  object.  When  this  is  done,  and 
we  have  found  what  our  faculties  really  give  us,  then  we 
may  appeal  to  some  fundamental  veracity  as  the  warrant  of 
our  trust  in  the  result;  but  nothing  could  be  more  barren, 
superficial,  and  impertinent  than  such  an  appeal  against 
speculative  conclusions  because  they  depart  from  the  un- 
reasoned assumptions  of  sense  experience. 

The  more  we  study  perception  as  an  effect,  the  plainer  it 
becomes  that  the  ontological  and  independent  existence  of 
the  apparent  object  is  no  necessary  factor  of  it.  All  that  is 
needed  is  an  orderly  excitation  of  sensations ;  and  if  our 
present  set  of  sensations  were  produced,  no  matter  how,  by 
some  law  of  the  soul,  as  Leibnitz  supposed,  or  by  the  direct 
action  of  God,  as  Berkeley  held,  the  assumed  world  of  things 
might  fall  away  without  our  ever  missing  it,  or  without  in 
any  way  modifying  the  apparent  w^orld.  We  must,  then, 
allow  that  idealism,  in  the  sense  of  the  phenomenal  or  sub- 
jective existence  of  the  world  of  things,  is  possible,  and  ad- 
mits of  no  decisive  refutation.  The  admission  is  all  the 
more  easily  made  from  the  fact  that  so  much  of  what  com- 
mon-sense regards  as  undoubtedly  objective  is  confessedly 
subjective. 

Our  study  of  the  process  of  perception  has  led  to  the  con- 
viction that  idealism  admits  of  no  direct  disproof,  and  real- 


324  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AXD    KNOWLEDGE 

ism  admits  of  no  demonstration ;  but  we  need  to  be  on  our 
guard  against  hastily  concluding  to  the  truth  of  idealism. 
Because  the  object  of  perception  is  priraaril}'"  the  contents 
of  our  conceptions  projected  as  real,  some  idealists  have  con- 
cluded that  it  is  always  and  only  such.  Of  course  the  object 
itself  can  never  pass  bodily  into  the  mind,  nor  can  the  mind 
get  outside  of  itself  so  as  to  grasp  the  object  otherwise  than 
through  the  conceptions  formed  of  it.  Perception  takes 
place  only  as  the  mind  projects  the  contents  of  its  concep- 
tions under  the  form  of  reality.  In  this  sense  all  our  objects 
are  primarily  a  projection  of  our  own  conceptions ;  but  to 
conclude  from  this  that  they  are  nothing  more  is  hasty  and 
leads  to  absurdity. 

The  conclusion  is  hasty  because  the  alleged  fact  would 
be  true,  however  real  the  world  of  things  might  be.  If 
things  were  as  real  as  the  veriest  rustic  thinks  them,  it 
would  still  be  true  that  they  become  known  to  us  only 
through  the  conceptions  they  awaken  in  us,  and  that  for 
our  knowledg^e  the  thing  can  onlv  be  the  contents  of  our 
conceptions  projected  as  real.  But  it  would  still  be  possi- 
ble that  our  conceptions  truly  reproduce  a  reality  existing 
apart  from  them. 

The  conclusion  is  also  absurd,  for  to  deny  the  possibility 
just  mentioned  would  lead  at  once  to  the  absurdity  of  solip- 
sism. For  our  knowledge  of  other  persons  is  reached  only 
as  we  form  the  conception  of  personal  existence  out  of  the 
materials  of  our  own  consciousness  and  project  it  as  real. 
Here  the  conception  is  our  own  product  as  much  as  in  cases 
of  sense  perception,  and  yet  we  cannot  without  absurdity 
deny  that  it  reproduces  for  us  a  reality  existing  apart  from 
itself. 

Again,  in  our  apprehension  of  another's  thought  we  grasp 
the  thousrht  onlv  bv  thinking  it  ourselves,  and  the  only 
thing  we  can  possibly  have  in  our  consciousness  is  our  own 


KEAl.llr^M    AND    IDEALISM  325 

thought ;  and  yet,  if  all  personal  intercourse  and  under- 
standing be  not  delusive,  this  subjective  thought  of  ours 
reproduces  for  us  a  thought  existing  beyond  the  range  of 
our  personal  consciousness.  It  is  indeed  true  that  we  can- 
not prove  that  these  other  persons  and  tliouglits  exist  apart 
from  our  consciousness :  and  it  is  also  true  that  a  beinjr 
able  to  control  our  sensations  could  produce  for  us  an  ap- 
parent world  of  persons  as  well  as  of  things  without  their 
substantial  existence ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  equally 
true  that  it  is  strictly  impossible  for  any  one  to  hold  to 
solipsism.  No  one  could  ever  persuade  himself  that  all 
past  history  has  occurred  only  in  his  own  consciousness; 
that  his  neighbors  exist  only  as  his  mental  states ;  that  a 
blizzard  is  onlv  a  tumult  among  his  states  of  consciousness; 
that  a  city  with  its  busy  life  is  only  a  complex  mental  state 
of  bis  own,  which  vanishes  when  he  goes  to  sleep.  It 
may  be  forever  impossible  for  us  to  tell  how  our  thoughts, 
which  arise  and  exist  only  in  our  consciousness,  should  yet 
grasp  reahties  independent  of  our  consciousness,  but  none 
the  less  are  we  compelled  to  admit  the  fact.  And  if  we 
have  to  admit  it  in  one  case,  there  is  no  theoretical  reason 
why  it  should  be  denied  in  any  case  where  the  facts  seem 
to  call  for  it. 

Without  doubt,  many  of  the  traditional  arguments  for 
idealism  are  short-sighted.  The  general  claim  that  the  indi- 
vidual mind  can  know  nothing;  but  its  own  states,  which  is 
so  often  made  by  idealists,  is  distinctly  false  as  to  psycho- 
logical form.  Objectivity  is  the  universal  form  of  percep- 
tion ;  and  things  are  not  known  as  mental  states,  but  as 
independent  objects.  The  claim  can  only  mean  that,  how- 
ever objective  and  independent  things  may  seem,  they  are, 
after  all,  only  our  own  projected  conceptions.  In  this  form 
the  claim  rests  upon  various  grounds.  There  is  first  the 
fact,  already  dwelt  upon,  that  knowing  can  take  place  only 


326  THEOKY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

through  subjective  conceptions  which  are  products  of  the 
mind's  own  activity  ;  but  this  fact  does  not  exclude  the 
possibility  that  those  conceptions  reproduce  an  existence 
independent  of  the  conceptions  themselves.  Then  there  is 
the  further  fact  that  we  are  quite  unable  to  tell  how  our 
minds  can  grasp  realities  external  to  ourselves;  but  this 
negative  impotence  decides  nothing  as  to  the  positive  fact. 
,  If  the  fact  were  given  as  real,  we  should  have  only  another 
instance  of  the  common  experience  of  having  to  admit  as 
facts  things  whose  full  rationale  we  are  unable  to  give. 
Admitting  the  fact  as  real,  however,  reflection  might  reveal 
certain  general  metaphysical  relations  between  the  mind 
and  its  objects  as  necessary  implications  of  the  fact ;  but 
those  relations  would  be  deduced  from  the  fact,  and  not 
the  fact  from  the  relations. 

The  claim  that  the  mind  can  know  only  its  own  states 
is  further  supported  by  the  philosophy  of  sensationalism. 
In  this  doctrine  the  mind  is  a  passive  impotency,  or,  rather, 
a  mere  cluster  of  experiences.  But  experience  in  the  last 
analysis  reduces  to  impressions,  vivid  or  faint,  and  beyond 
these  there  is  nothing.  Of  course,  a  mind  which  is  only  a 
sum  of  impressions  can  never  transcend  the  impressions. 
The  impressions  being  all,  it  is  hard  enough  to  see  how 
they  can  know  themselves ;  and  there  being  nothing  else  for 
them  to  know,  it  is  needless  to  inquire  how  they  know  it. 
A  nihilistic  idealism  is  the  immediate  result.  This  ar^u- 
ment  has  the  same  value  as  the  sensational  pliilosophy  in 
general,  and  hence  is  worthless ;  and  the  general  claim 
which  we  are  considering,  by  whatever  arguments  support- 
ed, leads  necessarily  to  solipsism  and  must  be  abandoned. 

The  conclusion  is  (1)  that  both  traditional  realism  and 
traditional  idealism  have  been  hasty  and  superficial,  and 
(2)  that  no  tenable  idealism  can  be  founded  on  a  theory 
of  the  knowing  process  alone.      Such  idealism  must  either 


REALISM    AND    IDEALISM  327 

lapse  into  solipsism,  or  it  must  be  arbitrary  and  inconsist- 
ent. In  the  latter  case  it  would  admit  that  thought  some- 
times grasps  external  reality,  and  it  would  have  no  reason 
for  limiting  the  range  of  knowledge  as  demanded  by  the 
theory.  If  any  idealism  is  to  be  held,  therefore,  it  must 
be  based  upon  an  analysis  of  the  object  known,  rather  than 
of  the  knowing  process.  A  study  of  the  object  and  of  the 
system  of  objects  must  show  that  they  are  meaningless, 
and  hence  impossible,  apart  from  mind  and  consciousness, 
in  and  for  which  they  exist.  As  a  world  of  ideas  demands 
the  conception  of  a  mind  as  the  condition  of  its  being,  and 
as  a  world  of  sensations  would  be  absurd  when  conceiv^ed 
as  existing  apart  from  consciousness,  so  it  must  be  shown 
that  the  world  of  things  is  so  completely  a  world  of  ideas 
as  to  have  no  meaning  except  in  relation  to  mind  and  con- 
sciousness. This  is  the  only  idealism  worthy  of  considera- 
tion. The  vast  difference  between  it  and  the  cheap  ideal- 
isms of  negation  and  sensationalism  is  self-evident.  It  does 
not  dispute  our  mental  competence,  or  the  testimony  of  our 
faculties,  but  aims  rather  to  find  what  our  faculties  really 
give  when  they  become  critical  and  reflective.  It  takes  the 
apparent  as  a  datum  from  which  to  find  the  real ;  it  accepts 
the  S3'stem  of  experience  as  a  subject  of  critical  analysis, 
with  the  aim  of  finding  how  much  of  it  is  apparent  and 
how  much  of  it  is  real.  And  it  points  out  that  this  inquiry 
is  no  private  freak  of  the  speculator,  for,  by  common  con- 
sent, a  good  part  of  objectivity  has  only  apparent  existence 
in  distinction  from  ontological  reality.  The  critic  only  ex- 
tends the  realm  of  the  apparent  still  further,  but  by  argu- 
ments identical  in  principle. 

The  difference  between  this  idealism  and  the  traditional 
conception  of  idealism  is  also  manifest.  The  common 
thought  of  idealism  is  that  it  denies  the  system  of  experi- 
ence altogether  as  something  common  to  all,  and  reduces 


328  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE 

the  external  world  to  an  atomistic  and  discontinuous  set  of 
impressions  in  scattered  minds,  which  may  possibly  be  simi- 
lar, but  which  have  no  common  object  beyond  this  similarit}' 
of  distinct  impressions.  Crude  realism  always  represents 
reality  by  the  conception  of  space  full,  and  unreality  b}'' 
space  empty,  and  so  its  typical  conception  of  idealism  is  that 
it  affirms  a  real  space,  but  empty.  Yonder  Avhere  that  tree 
or  house  is,  tliere  is  nothing.  This  is  supposed  to  be  the 
idealist's  faith  ;  and  hence  the  ironical  exhortations  to  knock 
his  head  against  a  post  or  enter  a  closed  door.  But  the 
idealist  who  understands  himself  is  so  far  from  believing  in 
a  real  space  filled  with  phantoms  that  he  reckons  the  space 
itself  as  a  part  of  the  phenomenon,  and  as  without  any  onto- 
logical  existence. 

But  it  is  not  our  purpose  to  deduce  the  idealism  in  ques- 
tion, but  rather  to  expound  it  and  give  some  general  idea  of 
its  leading  arguments.  The  point  of  view  may  best  be 
learned  by  considering  the  following  questions: 

1.  Is  there  any  tiling  in  existence  but  myself?  The 
answer  is,  Yes.  To  escape  the  absurdity  of  solipsism  I 
must  admit  at  least  the  existence  of  other  persons. 

2.  Does  the  world  of  apparent  objects  exist  for  me  only  ? 
No ;  it  exists  for  others  also,  so  that  we  live  in  a  common 
world. 

3.  Does  this  common  world  consist  in  anything  more  than 
a  similarity  of  impressions  in  finite  minds,  so  that  the  world 
apart  from  these  is  nothing?  This  view  cannot  be  dis- 
proved, but  it  accords  so  ill  with  the  impression  of  our  total 
experience  that  it  is  practically  impossible. 

4.  Is,  then,  the  world  of  things  a  continuous  existence 
of  some  kind  independent  of  finite  thought  and  conscious- 
ness? This  claim  cannot  be  demonstrated,  but  it  is  the 
only  view  which  does  not  involve  insuperable  difficulties. 


REALISM    AND    IDEALISM  329 

5.  What  is  the  nature  and  where  is  the  place  of  this  cos- 
mic existence?  That  is  the  question  at  issue  between  real- 
ism and  the  idealism  under  discussion.  Realism  views  things 
as  existing  in  a  real  space  as  true  ontological  realities.  Ideal- 
ism views  both  them  and  the  space  in  which  they  are  sup- 
posed to  be  as  existing  only  in  and  for  acosmic  intelligence, 
and  apart  from  which  they  are  absurd  and  contiadictory. 

If  it  were  not  for  the  last  point  idealism  and  realism 
would  seem  to  agree.  And  doubtless  many  a  realist  would 
find  in  the  answers  to  the  first  four  questions  a  full  confes- 
sion of  the  realistic  faith.  A  world  which  we  did  not  make, 
and  which  is  independent  of  all  finite  thought  and  con- 
sciousness, what  is  this  but  realism  pure  and  simple?  We 
reply  that  this  is  probably  all  there  is  in  realism ;  but  to 
make  the  distinction  clear  between  this  and  unreasoned 
realism,  we  point  out  that  there  is  a  difference  between 
being  independent  of  our  thought  and  being  independent  of 
all  thought,  between  existing  apart  from  our  consciousness 
and  existing  apart  from  all  consciousness  in  a  lumpish 
materiality,  which  is  the  antithesis  and  negation  of  con- 
sciousness. 

There  is  much  uncertainty  in  the  terminology  of  this 
subject  which  needs  clearing  up.  Subjective  and  objective 
primarily  denote,  respectively,  appertaining  to  the  subject  or 
to  the  object,  or  having  the  position  of  a  subject  or  an  ob- 
ject. The  distinction,  moreover,  is  primaril}'  made  by 
thought  itself,  and  lies  within  consciousness  itself.  Objects 
are  first  of  all  whatever  we  think  about;  ourselves,  our 
affections,  our  thoughts,  our  neighbors,  as  well  as  things, 
may  be  objects  in  this  sense.  Sometimes  the  distinction  is 
psychological,  referring  to  the  antithesis  of  the  thinker  and 
his  objects,  be  they  persons  or  things.  Sometimes  it  is  meta- 
physical, and  expresses  the  antithesis  of  conscious  mind  and 
impersonal  thing.    Speculation  has  suffered  not  a  little  from 


33U  THEOKi'    OF   THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE 

confusing  these  two  points  of  view.  Many  things  might  be 
true  of  the  object  conceived  as  material  tiling  which  would 
not  be  true  of  the  object  conceived  as  something  thought 
about.  The  subject  itself  may  be  an  object  in  the  latter 
sense. 

Again,  objective  is  applied  to  all  the  elements  of  experi- 
ence to  which  we  give  space  relations,  and  subjective  applies 
to  the  other  elements  to  which  we  give  only  time  relations. 
But  both  classes  are  subjective  in  depending  on  thought  for 
their  existence.  Objective  and  subjective  here  have  the  same 
meaning  as  the  familiar  antithesis  of  external  and  internal. 
Psychologically,  this  antithesis  must  be  interpreted  in  the 
way  suggested  ;  it  must  not  be  taken  in  a  spatial  sense. 

But  objective  and  subjective  have  still  another  meaning. 
Universality  is  the  special  mark  of  truth.  The  common  to 
all  is  true,  the  special  to  me  is  illusion.  Hence  objectivity 
is  identified  wath  universality,  and  subjectivity  is  identified 
with  illusion.  When  this  fact  is  combined  with  the  refer- 
ence to  independent  existence  implicit  in  the  judgment,  the 
object  is  easily  transformed  into  an  extra -mental  reality 
which  exists  apart  from  mind  altogether.  This  multiplicity 
of  meaning  warns  us  to  be  on  our  guard  in  the  use  of  these 
terras. 

We  easily  understand  how  spontaneous  thought  comes 
to  this  conception  of  extra-mental  reality  as  the  truly  and 
only  real.  It  is  rightly  convinced  that  our  objects  are  not 
our  own  products  or  private  property,  and  it  knows  of  no 
way  of  expressing  this  conviction  except  by  saying  that 
they  exist  extra-raentally.  But  the  general  admission  that  a 
large  part  of  apparent  objectivity  has  only  phenomenal  ex- 
istence shows  that  the  subjective  and  the  illusory  are  not 
always  to  be  identified.  We  have  at  length  become  accus- 
tomed to  the  idea  of  universality  in  the  phenomenal,  and 
are  eraduallv  y-rowing  able  to  distinguish  between  phenom- 


KEALISM   AND   IDEALISM  331 

enality  and  illusion.  This  makes  it  possible  to  maintain  at 
once  the  subjectivity  and  the  universality  of  the  world  ;  tLiat 
is,  that  it  exists  only  for  mind  and  not  in  itself,  and  yet  that 
it  exists  for  uU  minds. 

Moreover,  it  is  extremely  doubtful  whether  the  notion  of 
extra-mental  objects  represents  any  clear  conception.  To  be 
sure,  the  imagination,  l)y  means  of  its  space  forms  and  by 
locating  the  mind  inside  of  the  body,  represents  the  idea 
Avith  perfect  clearness  and  self-evidence ;  but  when  we  come 
to  define  the  idea,  it  is  hard  to  escape  an  implicit  reference 
to  a  percipient  mind.  The  illusory  object  is  such  because  it 
is  not  there  for  all,  and  the  real  object  is  no  illusion  be- 
cause it  is  there  for  all.  If  we  suggest  that  illusion  itself 
might  be  universal  we  only  grasp  the  conception  by  thinking 
of  some  universal  mind  for  which  the  illusion  does  not  exist, 
or  by  thinking  of  a  fault  in  finite  experience  whereby  the 
continuity  of  the  illusion  is  broken.  In  either  case  its  uni- 
versality is  denied.  But  if  the  universality  be  maintained, 
it  is  hard  to  see  in  what  the  truly  real  would  be  superior  to 
the  illusion,  or  in  what  its  special  reality  would  consist.  It 
is  extremely  difficult,  we  repeat,  to  define  the  object  as 
either  real  or  unreal  without  reference  to  the  subject ;  and 
hence  the  notion  of  strictly  extra-mental  objects  which  exist 
by  themselves  and  without  any  reference  to  a  conscious 
subject,  while  so  clear  to  the  imagination,  is  remarkably 
difficult  to  the  understanding. 

But  however  this  may  be,  it  is  plain  that  one  may  be- 
lieve in  the  subjective  existence  of  the  world  of  things  with- 
out thereby  making  it  a  particular  delusion  of  his  own,  and 
may  also  believe  in  the  universality  of  the  world,  or  in  its 
existence  for  all,  without  admitting  its  extra-mental  exist- 
ence. Such  an  idealism  would  differ  from  realism  only  on 
the  one  point  of  this  extra-mental  existence.  Both  alike 
would  have  an  orderly  and  universal  system  of  objects,  and 


332  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDOK 

both  would  be  equally  far  from  conceiving  this  system  as  an 
individual  delusion.  The  difference  concerns  the  essential 
nature  of  this  system,  and  the  place  and  mode  of  its  exist- 
ence. The  question  is  a  purely  speculative  one,  and  lies  en- 
tirely beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  the  senses.  The  attempt 
to  solve  it  by  the  customary  appeals  to  common-sense,  the 
unsophisticated  consciousness,  the  divine  veracity,  etc.,  indi- 
cates complete  inability  to  understand  the  problem,  to  say 
nothing  of  solving  it. 

The  onlv  way  of  vindicatinof  an  extra-mental  existence 
for  perceived  objects  is  to  bring  them  under  the  category 
of  causation,  and  to  claim  that  when  they  are  not  perceived 
or  thought  about  they  still  exist  in  manifold  interaction 
with  one  another.  This  would,  indeed,  remove  the  difficulty 
in  defining  what  we  mean  by  such  existence ;  but  it  would 
also  make  it  necessary  to  find  the  true  realities,  not  in  ob- 
jects as  the  senses  give  them  or  as  spontaneous  thought  finds 
them,  but  in  a  series  of  invisible  and  supersensible  things; 
that  is,  our  realism  must  be  "  transfigured." 

This  conclusion  has  generally  been  accepted  by  realistic 
speculators,  and  a  "  transfigured  realism  "  has  been  offered 
instead  of  the  crude  realism  of  common -sense.  The  sense 
world  has  been  unhesitatingly  handed  over  to  phenomenal — 
that  is,  subjective — existence.  Light,  sound,  heat,  etc.,  which 
seem  so  manifestly  extra-mental,  are  declared  to  have  exist- 
ence only  in  our  sensibility.  Of  course  the  realist  hastens 
to  remark  that  these  qualities  have  objective  realities  cor- 
responding to  them — namely,  vibrations  of  some  sort ;  and 
with  this  fact  he  fancies  he  removes  the  paradox  of  his  view 
for  the  unsophisticated  consciousness.  Indeed,  at  times  he 
even  grows  impatient  at  references  to  the  subjectivity  of 
sense  qualities  as  little  more  than  a  fetch  on  the  part  of 
idealists.  Heat,  sound,  light  are  objective  ;  of  course,  not  as 
common-sense  supposes.     But  vibrations  are  objective  ;  and 


REALISM    AND    IDEALISM  333 

though  they  are  never  objects  themselves,  still  they  are  the 
reality  of  the  object. 

The  ease  with  which  this  assurance  is  accepted  as  a  solu- 
tion of  the  difficulty  is  due  to  the  fact  that  anything  which 
looks  like  reasoning  will  do  for  a  foregone  conclusion.  The 
unsophisticated  consciousness  knows  nothing  of  vibrations 
in  sense  experiences.  It  knows  qualities  directly  as  proper- 
ties of  the  objects.  For  it  the  thing  is  no  compound  of 
qualities  partly  projected  from  the  thinker  and  partly  exist- 
ing in  the  thing,  but  the  whole  thing  is  objective  and  ex- 
ternal. Transfigured  realism  has  an  altogether  different 
set  of  objects  from  common-sense  realism.  The  things  of 
the  latter  are  the  phenomena  of  the  former,  and  the  reali- 
ties of  the  former  are  undreamed  of  by  the  latter.  Each 
believes  in  the  reality  of  things,  but  the  things  of  one  are 
not  those  of  the  other.  The  things  of  common-sense  are 
the  objects  of  perception,  bodies  in  space  with  various  ap- 
parent projierties.  The  things  of  transfigured  realism  are 
sundry  deductions  of  theory  which  the  senses  do  not  give. 
The  former  realism  believes  in  what  the  senses  give,  and  falls 
back  on  the  unsophisticated  consciousness.  The  latter  real- 
ism sets  aside  what  the  senses  give,  and  allows  as  real  only 
what  the  senses  do  not  and  cannot  give  ;  and  yet  it  too, 
upon  occasion,  falls  back  on  the  unsophisticated  conscious- 
ness. All  that  the  two  realisms  have  in  common  is  the  con- 
viction that  the  apparent  system  is  not  arbitary  and  ground- 
less, or  a  private  fiction  of  the  individual ;  and  this  conviction 
they  share  with  idealism. 

It  is  doubtful,  as  we  said  in  treating  of  scepticism,  if  the 
current  doctrine,  that  we  know  only  phenomena,  however 
true  it  may  be  for  the  objects  of  sense  perception,  has  been 
fully  apprehended  in  all  its  consequences  by  the  rank  and 
file  of  its  holders.  If  we  take  it  in  earnest,  it  follows  that 
the  whole  apparent  world  has  only  a  subjective  existence, 


334  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

and  that  its  very  nature  is  to  be  perceived.  If  we  make 
this  subjectivity  individual,  the  apparent  world  is  onlv  a 
series  of  similar  presentations  in  different  minds.  If  we 
reject  this  view  we  must  provide  some  cosmic  consciousness 
as  the  source  and  seat  of  cosmic  phenomena ;  for  phenom- 
ena apart  from  a  consciousness,  for  and  in  which  they  exist, 
are  nonsense. 

We  are  no  better  off  if  we  say  that  the  apparent  world 
is  the  form  under  which  the  cosmic  realities  appear,  for  ap- 
pearance also  presupposes  a  mind  to  which  things  appear. 
Besides,  it  is  hard  to  see  in  what  sense  phenomena  are  the 
appearances  of  the  alleged  realities.  These  realities  may  be 
the  cause  of  the  appearance,  but  they  can  hardly  be  said  to 
appear  in  the  effect.  The  sensation  of  light  may  be  caused 
by  a  vibrating  ether ;  but  the  ether  cannot  be  said  to  ap- 
pear in  the  sensation,  or  to  be  in  any  sense  an  object  of  per- 
ception. A  mind  which  should  see  the  ether  as  it  is  would 
see  no  light,  and  one  which  saw  light  would  see  no  ether. 
Thus  the  actual  object  of  experience  becomes  inevitably 
subjective,  while  the  reality  is  put  beyond  any  range  of  the 
senses. 

Nor  do  we  much  mend  the  matter  by  deciding  that  the 
object  is  partly  mental  and  partly  extra-mental,  as  in  the 
distinction  of  primary  and  secondary  qualities ;  for  the  line 
between  the  subjective  and  the  objective  is  hard  to  draw, 
and  the  distinction  itself  seems  like  an  affront  to  the  unso- 
phisticated consciousness.  Supposing  it  made,  however,  it 
is  not  clear  how  the  subjective  qualities  are  to  be  regarded. 
If  they  are  to  be  excluded  from  reality,  reality  itself  begins 
to  seem  poverty-stricken,  so  much  so  as  to  be  only  a  bare 
skeleton  of  existence  without  life  or  meaning.  In  that  case 
a  knowledge  of  the  real  would  reveal  very  little  worth  know- 
ing, and  all  the  value  and  significance  of  existence  would  be 
in  the  unreal   subjective  world.      The  subjective  qualities 


KEALISM    AND    IDEALISM  335 

which  are  supposed  to  be  nothing  apart  from  consciousness 
do,  nevertheless,  appear  as  an  important  system  of  objects 
for  consciousness  and  have  the  utmost  jiractical  value.  Tiiis 
difficulty  can  never  be  escaped  as  long  as  we  make  the  dis- 
tinction of  real  and  unreal  depend  upon  the  antithesis  of 
mental  and  non-mental.  In  that  case  the  real  must  ever 
grow  poorer  and  poorer,  and  less  and  less  worth  knowing ; 
for  the  solid  things  of  crude  realism  are  perpetually  vanish- 
ing into  phenomena. 

By  this  time  the  realism  of  spontaneous  thought  has 
vanished  almost  entirely.  Transfigured  realism  has  re- 
duced all  apparent  realities  and  properties  to  manifesta- 
tions of  hidden  realities ;  and  these  it  regards  only  under 
the  causal  categories  of  force,  energy,  etc.  Whether  the 
hidden  reality  be  one  or  many  is  not  decided.  Many  will 
have  it  that  it  is  only  one.  and  that  so-called  things  are 
but  relatively  constant  phases  of  an  all-embracing  power. 
When  we  follow  this  doctrine  into  its  consequences  we  find 
that  it  has  nothing  in  common  with  crude  realism  beyond 
the  general  belief  in  an  extra-mental  existence,  and  possibly 
the  additional  assumption  that  this  existence  is  in  objective 
and  independent  space. 

Before  proceeding  to  consider  this  question,  attention 
must  be  called  to  a  fundamental  change  in  the  problem 
itself,  as  the  result  of  the  previous  considerations.  We  have 
seen  that  the  antithesis  of  phenomenal  and  noumenal  leads 
to  the  notion  of  a  noumenon  behind  or  within  the  ]ihe- 
nomenon,  which  is  ever  trying  to  manifest  itself,  but  ever 
failing  because  masked  by  the  phenomenon.  We  have  also 
seen  the  impropriety  of  regarding  the  phenomenon  as  a 
manifestation  of  the  noumenon  unless  it  really  manifests  it. 
We  have  further  seen  that  transfigured  realism,  from  seek- 
ing the  real  only  in  the  extra-mental,  can  at  best  reach  only 


3iJ6  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE 

a  real  of  growing  poverty  and  worthlessness.  All  of  these 
difficulties  are  outgrowths  of  the  uncritical  common-sense 
notions  of  knowledge.  These  notions  are  built  on  the  as- 
sumption of  a  reality  beyond  and  antithetical  to  thought ; 
and  when  criticism  shows  the  phenomenality  of  much  that 
is  apparently  real,  instead  of  revising  the  definition  of 
reality,  superficial  thought  takes  the  direction  of  trans- 
figured realism  with  its  elusive  or  unknowable  noumena,  or 
things  in  themselves.  Again,  there  is  complete  oversight 
of  the  fact  that  mind  and  life  also  are  in  some  sense  parts 
of  reality,  and  hence  the  attempt  to  constitute  reality  in 
complete  separation  from  them,  and  to  form  a  theory  of 
knowledge  without  any  theistic  reference,  solelj'  on  the 
basis  of  our  crude  native  realism,  brightened  up  b}"  a  little 
not  very  profound  reflection.  The  result  is  the  incongruous 
collection  of  notions  we  have  been  considering. 

Our  thought  in  this  field  can  be  brought  into  harmony 
with  itself  and  with  experience  only  by  a  restatement  of 
the  problem.  Phenomena  and  noumena  must  be  replaced 
by  phenomena  and  their  causes.  And  phenomena  must  be 
taken  for  what  they  report  themselves  to  be,  and  not  as 
the  mask  of  hidden  noumena  which  they  ought  to  reveal 
but  only  distort.  The  truth  and  reality  of  phenomena  are 
the  phenomena  themselves,  and  the  only  remaining  ques- 
tion concerns  their  cause  or  causes.  Behind  the  apparent 
light  or  sound  there  is  no  noumenal  light  or  sound,  but 
certain  conditions  or  causes.  Thus  in  an  important  sense 
we  save  the  truth  of  appearances,  as  Berkeley  claimed  that 
he  did ;  for  we  accept  the  sense  report,  and  go  behind  it, 
not  in  the  way  of  denial,  but  of  explanation. 

In  the  next  place,  reality  must  be  seen  to  be  double.  By 
objective  reality  we  may  mean  the  common  to  all  in  exter- 
nal experience,  and  we  may  mean  ontological  or  metaphys- 
ical reality.     The  former   is    phenomenal   reality,  and   is 


REALISM    AND    IDEALISM  387 

distinguished  from  individual  illusion  by  the  fact  of  its  uni- 
versality. The  sense  world  is  an  illustration.  This  world 
has  only  phenomenal  existence,  and  yet  it  is  the  great  field 
of  common  experience.  Concerning  it,  the  true  question 
is  not.  Is  it  real?  but.  What  kind  of  reality  does  it  have? 
or,  In  what  does  its  reality  consist  ?  Common-sense  insists 
that  the  sense  world  is  real.  Criticism  shows  that  it  is 
neither  an  ontological  fact  nor  a  property  of  ontological 
facts,  but  rather  a  constant  effect  of  unseen  causes.  Its 
reality  is  simply  its  universality.  Metaphysical  reality,  on 
the  other  hand,  consists  in  causality.  In  this  sense  only 
the  causal  is  real. 

"With  this  elimination  of  noumena  as  misleading  or  ficti- 
tious, and  with  this  distinction  of  phenomenal  from  onto- 
logical reality,  we  escape  many  of  the  misunderstandings 
which  have  infested  this  region,  and  even  bring  idealism 
into  some  kind  of  harmony  with  common-sense ;  at  least, 
we  show  common-sense  that  idealism  does  not  mean  to 
den}^  any  reality  that  experience  gives,  but  only  to  inquire 
what  kind  of  reality  our  objects  have.  We  have  seen  that 
there  is  no  resting  in  the  sense  world  as  a  finality.  We 
are  compelled,  not  to  modify  it,  but  to  supplement  it  b}' 
going  behind  it.  We  find  transfigured  realism  handing 
over  the  whole  world  of  sense  qualities  to  phenomenal  ex- 
istence, and  idealism  suggests  that  the  whole  world  of  spa- 
tial objects  in  like  manner  has  only  phenomenal  existence. 

And  now  there  seems  to  be  no  escape  from  an  excursion 
into  metaphysics.  The  theory  of  knowledge  cannot  be  set- 
tled by  simply  studying  the  psychological  process  of  per- 
ception, and  by  appealing  to  the  intuitions  of  the  unsophis- 
ticated consciousness.  We  must  leave  the  standpoint  of 
the  finite  and  particular  individual,  and  form  some  concep- 
tion of  the  general  relation  of  thought  and  being  in  the 

22 


338  THEORY  OF  THOUGHT  AND  KNOWLEDGE 

fundamental  reality.  In  the  previous  chapter  we  have  seen 
that  the  absolute  reality  must  be  viewed  as  a  free  intelli- 
gence, and  that  all  other  existence  must  depend  on  it. 
Combining  this  result  with  the  realistic  view  of  space,  we 
should  have  three  kinds  of  reality :  (1)  Independent  think- 
ing existence,  (2)  dependent  things,  and  (3)  space  as  some- 
thing quite  distinct  from  the  others,  and  as  sui  generis  in 
its  existence. 

That  this  view  of  space  seems  self-evident  is  unquestion- 
able ;  indeed,  it  stands  high  among  the  traditional  intuitions ; 
but  timt  it  can  be  harmonized  with  reason  is  not  so  plain. 
And,  first,  we  need  to  know  what  is  the  relation  of  space  as 
existing  to  that  fundamental  reality  which  is  the  source  of 
things.  If  the  two  be  independent  we  collide  with  the  de- 
mand of  reason  for  unity  in  the  fundamental  reality.  We 
should  be  equally  at  a  loss  to  express  the  ontological  rela- 
tion of  these  two  independent  existences.  The  space  which 
is  declared  to  be  real  would  at  the  same  time  be  so  like  the 
negation  of  existence  that  the  only  possible  relation  between 
the  two  would  be  that  space  contains  the  reality,  or  the 
reality  is  in  space.  But  here  again  we  should  be  unable  to 
tell  what  difference  such  a  relation  would  make  to  either, 
and  hence  to  tell  what  we  mean  by  it.  If  the  space  does 
nothing  to  the  being,  and  the  being  does  nothing  to  space, 
the  two  seem  to  be  out  of  all  real  relation.  Moreover,  if  we 
allow  the  fundamental  reality  to  be  in  space,  we  collide  also 
with  its  unity ;  for  whatever  is  in  space  must  be  subject  to 
the  laAvs  of  space,  must  be  extended,  therefore,  and  hence  has 
parts,  and  is  no  proper  unit.  The  affirmation,  then,  of  the 
mutual  independence  of  space  and  being  makes  it  absurd  to 
predicate  any  relation  between  them.  On  the  other  hand, 
it  is  impossible  to  view  space  as  the  source  of  being,  or  being 
as  the  creator  of  space,  viewed  as  something  real.  It  is 
ontologically  so  near  a  negation  that  many  have  identified 


REALISM    AND    IDEALISM  339 

it  outright  with  non-existence ;  at  the  same  time,  they  have 
not  scrupled  to  furnish  it  with  divers  geometrical  proper- 
ties, and  to  insist  upon  its  reality,  as  if  the  non-existent  did 
nevertheless  exist.  All  that  such  persons  really  mean  is  to 
afWrm  that  space  is  not  an  illusion,  and  they  know  of  no 
way  of  expressing  themselves  except  by  contradiction  and 
nonsense. 

It  seems,  then,  that  the  existence  of  an  ontological  space 
cannot  be  maintained,  whether  we  view  it  as  containing 
and  conditioning  the  fundamental  reality,  or  as  produced  or 
created  by  it.  In  the  former  case  the  necessary  unit}^  of  the 
first  principle  would  be  violated,  and  creative  reality  is 
made  subject  to  an  hypostasized  negation.  We  should  have 
a  something  which  is  nothing,  and  a  nothing  which  is  yet 
something;  and  this  something -nothing  would  be  law -giv- 
ing for  the  causal  reality  itself.  In  the  other  case,  we  should 
first  find  it  impossible  to  get  any  positive  notion  of  our  own 
meaning,  and  then  we  should  have  an  infinite  regress  on  our 
hands,  as  each  created  space  either  would  need  another  to 
hold  it,  or  would  be  preceded  by  another  quite  as  good  as 
itself. 

Now,  rational  idealism  never  dreams  of  questioning  the 
existence  of  space  as  the  form  of  external  experience.  It 
never  tries,  therefore,  to  conceive  external  objects  apart 
from  space  relations.  Those  objects  are  so  largely  consti- 
tuted by  space  -  relations  that  they  would  be  nothing  intel- 
lio-ible  when  abstracted  from  them.  Neither  need  idealism 
deny  that  this  form  of  space  is  universal  for  all  intelligence, 
so  that  the  same  objects  have  the  same  space-rules  and 
space  -  relations  for  all.  This  question  lies  in  another  field, 
and  must  be  debated  there.  The  essential  denial  of  ideal- 
ism touches  the  existence  of  an  ontological  space,  separate 
from,  and  yet  containing,  all  active  reality.  And  the  essen- 
tial affirmation  is  that  space  is  only  the  form  of  experience 


340  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

or  the  form  of  phenomena,  and  hence  is  absurd  and  impos- 
sible when  abstracted  from  consciousness  as  its  fundamental 
condition.  The  world,  then,  as  universal,  may  have  a  uni- 
versal space-form,  or  one  which  is  valid  for  all.  Hence  it  is 
no  individual  delusion  ;  at  the  same  time,  it  has  no  extra- 
mental  existence,  and  in  this  sense  is  subjective.  These 
considerations  remove  much  of  the  paradox  from  the  ideal- 
istic view. 

The  subjectivity  of  space  carries  with  it,  of  course,  com- 
plete idealism  as  to  all  that  appears  in  space,  or  that  is 
spatially  determined.  Hence,  not  only  the  world  of  sense- 
qualities,  the  world  of  sounds  and  colors  and  odors  and 
temperature,  but  also  the  world  of  form  and  extension,  the 
world  of  apparent  things,  in  short,  are  to  be  viewed  as 
having  only  subjective  existence;  that  is,  as  existing  only 
for  and  in  consciousness.  By  this  time  not  a  shred  of 
every-day  realism  remains.  The  entire  world  of  objects 
has  become  phenomenal.  Their  laws  and  inter-relations  re- 
main as  important  subjects  of  study,  and  they  may  express 
a  universal  order;  but  neither  the  phenomena  nor  their 
laws  have  any  significance  except  with  reference  to  intelli- 
gence. And  if  it  be  absurd  to  suppose  that  these  phe- 
nomena exist  only  for  our  intelligence,  and  equally  absurd 
to  suppose  that  they  exist  apart  from  all  intelligence,  it  only 
remains  to  infer  that  an  all-embracing  intelligence  is  the 
condition  of  cosmic  being,  not  only  its  original  cause  but 
its  constitutive  condition,  apart  from  which  it  would  not 
even  have  meaning,  to  say  nothing  of  existence. 

Locke's  conclusion  was  that  relations  are  the  work  of  in- 
telligence, and  hence  represent  nothing  extra-mental.  In 
this  conclusion  he  was  certainly  correct  so  far  as  the  formal 
relations  are  concerned.  Such  are  the  relations  of  space, 
of  formal  logic,  of  classification,  etc.  No  one  can  tell  what 
is  meant  by  these  relations  except  as  the  objects  are  re- 


REALISM    AND    IDEALISM  341 

lated  in  consciousness.  But  Locke  was  led  by  the  preju- 
dice of  extra-mental  existence  to  overlook  the  fact  that  such 
formal  relations  may  still  have  a  universal  element  in  them, 
so  that,  while  meaningless  apart  from  intelligence,  they  are 
still  true  for  all  intelligence.  He  was  also  led  to  look  for 
the  real  in  something  quite  unrelated,  and  hence  able  to  exist 
on  its  own  account.  But  as  our  objects  as  known  are  known 
only  as  related,  and  can  be  known  only  as  such,  this  view 
leads  at  once  to  the  conclusion  that  the  real  is  unknowable. 
Reality  and  intelligence  are  opposed  beyond  any  possibility 
of  reconciliation.  The  reality  as  unrelated  cannot  be  known 
or  even  affirmed,  and  if  affirmed  it  can  in  no  way  be  used 
as  a  basis  of  our  cognitive  system.  To  such  contradiction 
we  are  sure  to  come  when  we  exclude  intelligence  as  a  con- 
stitutive factor  of  the  cosmos,  and  seek  to  found  it  upon  an 
extra-mental  reality.  But  possibly  Locke  was  right  only  for 
the  formal  relations  of  things.  Their  metaphysical  relations 
of  causation  and  interaction  may  be  supposed  to  exist  among 
non-spatial  and  extra-mental  realities.  Here  would  be  the 
last  stand  even  of  the  most  transfigured  realism. 

The  study  of  this  question  would  take  us  far  into  the 
metaphysics  of  being  and  interaction,  and  it  would  at 
length  appear  that  between  the  phenomena  and  the  funda- 
mental spiritual  reality  there  is  no  place  for  any  dependent 
impersonal  existence.  We  should  find  all  such  being  van- 
ishing into  law  and  process  without  any  proper  substan- 
tiality beyond  continuity,  uniformity,  and  universality.  But 
into  this  field  we  forbear  to  enter.  Nor  is  it  necessary  for 
our  purpose.  After  we  have  reduced  the  world  of  apparent 
things  with  all  its  space-relations  to  phenomena,  the  chief 
speculative  question  remaining,  even  for  realistic  thought, 
concerns  the  cause  of  phenomena.  This  cause  cannot  be 
thought  of  as  spatial  or  mechanical,  but  must  be  of  an 
essentially  spiritual  or  rational  nature,  in  order  to  prevent 


343  THEOKY    OF   THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

our  theory  of  knowledge  from  falling  into  contradiction 
with  itself.  For  just  so  surely  as  the  world  of  things  in 
space  is  phenomenal,  just  so  surely  can  it  have  its  existence 
only  in  intelligence ;  and  just  so  surely  as  it  does  not  de- 
pend upon  our  intelligence,  just  so  surely  must  we  affirm  a 
cosmic  intelligence  as  its  abiding  seat  and  condition. 

The  world  exists  only  in  and  for  a  supreme  mind ;  but 
how?  We  may  conceive  it  to  be  merely  a  conception  in 
that  mind,  just  as  any  conception  may  exist  in  the  imagi- 
nation. There  is,  then,  no  cosmic  activity,  no  world  process, 
but  only  a  passive  conception  in  the  divine  mind.  This 
view,  which  is  often  presented  as  the  teaching  of  idealism, 
is  hopelessly  poverty-stricken,  and  little  less  than  a  specu- 
lative collapse.  Berkeley  seems  not  to  have  had  a  very 
clear  conception  of  the  relation  of  his  ideal  world  to  the 
divine  mind,  and  much  that  he  says  leads  to  this  view  ; 
but  idealism  is  by  no  means  shut  up  to  it.  For  the  funda- 
mental reality  is  not  merely  mind  or  understanding ;  it  is 
also  will  or  agent.  We  may  say,  then,  that  the  world  is 
not  merely  an  idea ;  it  is  also  an  act.  It  exists  not  only 
as  a  conception  in  the  divine  understanding,  but  also  as  a 
form  of  activity  in  the  divine  will.  It  is  this  fact  which 
constitutes  its  real  existence  in  distinction  from  a  purely 
conceptional  one.  In  traditional  thought  this  reality  is 
secured  by  the  world's  being  outside  of  God,  external  to 
God,  etc.,  but  these  phrases  lose  all  intelligible  meaning 
when  space  itself  is  seen  to  be  only  the  form  of  the  world. 
And  even  if  space  were  real  they  could  not  be  taken  in 
earnest  without  making  God  a  being  with  space  limits.  Let 
us  say,  then,  that  the  world  is  essentially  a  going  forth  of 
divine  causality  under  the  forms  of  space  and  time,  and  in 
accordance  with  a  rational  plan.  The  outcome  of  this 
activity  is  the  phenomenal  world,  which  is  neither  outside 
nor  inside  of  God  in  a  spatial  sense,  but  which  exists  in  un- 


REALISM    AND    IDEALISM  343 

picturable  dependence  upon  the  divine  will ;  as  our  thoughts 
are  neither  outside  nor  inside  of  the  mind  in  a  spatial  sense, 
but  depend  upon  the  mind  as  their  cause  and  subject. 
This  world,  being  independent  of  us,  has  all  the  continuity, 
uniformity,  and  objectivity  which  an  extra-mental  system 
could  have;  and,  as  distinct  from  individual  delusion,  is 
real  and  universal.  Indeed,  it  is  hard  to  say  what  this  view 
should  be  called.  In  distinction  from  the  idealism  of  sen- 
sationalism, it  is  realism.  In  distinction  from  the  ideal- 
ism which  reduces  the  world  to  a  set  of  similar  but  discon- 
tinuous presentations,  it  is  realism.  It  is  realistic,  also,  in 
affirming  an  objective  cosmic  system  independent  of  finite 
thinking.  It  is  idealistic,  on  the  other  hand,  in  maintaining 
that  this  system  is  essentially  phenomenal,  and  exists  only 
in  and  for,  as  well  as  through,  intelligence.  Over  against 
the  human  reason  whereby  nature  exists  for  us  is  a  supreme 
reason,  through  and  in  which  nature  has  its  real  existence. 

Thus  we  have  sought  to  give  the  meaning  of  idealism, 
and  also  an  idea  of  the  general  arguments  by  which  it  is 
supported.  The  discussion  can  be  completed  only  by  meta- 
physics.  Epistemology  prepares  the  way  and  opens  the  case. 


CHAPTER  IV 
APEIORISM    AND   EMPIRICISM 

Knowledge  has  two  factors,  form  and  matter,  or  princi- 
ples furnished  by  the  mind  and  raw  material  given  in  the 
sensibility.  Without  the  former,  thought  is  chaotic ;  with- 
out the  latter,  thought  is  vacuous.  The  former  is  the  apriori, 
the  latter  is  the  empirical  element.  Philosophers  have  been 
distinguished  as  apriori  or  empirical,  according  as  they  em- 
phasized one  or  the  other  of  these  elements.  Sometimes, 
with  the  natural  one-sidedness  of  the  human  mind,  the  at- 
tempt has  been  made  to  eliminate  one  or  the  other  of  these 
elements  entirely.  This  has  been  the  case  especially  with  the 
empiricists.  They  have  claimed  to  find  in  experience  a  suf- 
ficient account  of  all  knowledge,  whether  of  things  or  prin- 
ciples.    Matter  and  form  alike  are  to  be  traced  to  experience. 

This  question  has  been  implicitly  treated  in  much  of  our 
previous  discussion.  Little  remains  to  be  done  except  to 
gather  up  into  connected  statement  the  conclusions  already 
reached. 

The  debate  between  the  two  schools  has  been  marked 
historically  by  great  unclearness  of  thought  on  both  sides. 
Each  party  has  had  a  clear  conviction  of  the  error  of  the 
opposing  view,  but  neither  party  has  always  had  a  clear 
conception  of  its  own  position.  Apriorisra  has  often  been 
put  forth  as  a  doctrine  of  innate  ideas,  a  doctrine  which 
easily  lends  itself  to  misunderstanding,  and  which  in  its  ob- 
vious sense  is  false.    The  empiricists,  on  the  other  hand,  have 


AI'KIORISM    AND    EMPIRICISM  345 

seldom  had  any  clear  idea  of  what  experience  is,  and  have 
even  been  led  by  the  association  of  words  to  think  that  they 
are  inductive  philosophers,  while  their  opponents,  by  force 
of  the  antithesis,  appear  as  deductive  dreamers  of  the  palae- 
ontological  type.  In  truth,  empiricism  never  proceeds  on 
properly  inductive  principles.  A  truly  inductive  philosophy 
would  be  concerned  only  to  know  what  the  mind  is,  not 
what  it  must  be.  It  would  aim  at  an  exact  determination 
of  our  mental  powers,  operations,  principles,  ideas,  without 
distorting  or  explaining  them  away.  Empiricism,  on  the 
other  hand,  has  been  a  speculative  theory  of  mind,  and 
actual  experience  has  had  few  rights  that  empiricism  felt 
bound  to  respect. 

The  earlier  empiricists,  as  Locke,  held  that  all  knowl- 
edge is  from  experience.  We  find  all  the  categories  given 
in  experience.  Time,  space,  number,  identit3\  causation 
are  objects  of  direct  experience,  and  by  abstraction  we  get 
the  corresponding  general  ideas.  The  mind  is  purely  pas- 
sive and  receptive,  and  simply  reads  off  what  is  imposed 
or  impressed  upon  it. 

This  claim  is  almost  self-evident  to  superficial  reflection. 
Thought  is  so  quick  and  spontaneous  that  only  trained  and 
developed  thought  can  detect  itself.  It  is,  then,  perfectly 
easy  for  crude  thought  to  mistake  its  own  products  for 
something  found  without.  Again,  we  might  ask,  where 
can  any  object  of  knowledge  whatever  be  given  but  in  ex- 
perience ?  Does  not  any  and  everything,  so  far  as  known, 
thereby  become  an  object  of  experience,  and  hence  is  not 
experience  manifestly  the  only  source  of  knowledge  ? 

With  this  extension  of  the  terra,  of  course  the  question 
itself  would  vanish.  In  some  sense  experience  is  all- era- 
bracing.  But  experience  as  Locke  used  it,  and  as  it  must 
be  used  to  give  the  question  any  meaning,  is  that  in  which 
the  mind  is  purely  passive  and  receptive.     The  mind  was 


846  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT   AND   KNOWLEDGE 

supposed  to  be  a  blank  tablet,  a  sheet  of  white  paper,  and 
marks  were  supposed  to  be  made  on  this  tablet  from  with- 
out. Those  marks,  singly  and  collectively,  are  experience. 
Its  distinguishing  feature  is  that  the  mind  is  passive  therein. 
It  adds  nothing,  but  only  receives. 

But  this  view  had  a  double  criticism  to  meet.  First, 
Hume  showed  that  the  categories  of  thought  could  never 
be  found  in  a  passive  experience,  and  that,  assuming  the 
mind  to  be  passive,  experience  must  be  cut  down  to  sense 
impressions.  All  else  must  be  illusion,  and  even  the  illu- 
sion can  be  explained  only  by  assuming  in  the  mind  a  mys- 
terious propensity  to  feign.  This  propensity  is  the  real 
source  of  the  fictitious  cateofories  of  the  understanding. 
With  this  result  the  possibility  even  of  any  rational  experi- 
ence vanished  altogether.  In  the  next  place,  Kant  said  that 
we  do  indeed  have  an  articulate  experience,  but  that  it  is  pos- 
sible only  because  the  ideas  supposed  to  be  abstracted  from 
it  are  immanent  in  the  mind  as  conditions  of  experience. 
We  may,  then,  abstract  the  categories  as  formal  ideas  from 
experience,  but  only  because  the  categories  are  the  imma- 
nent princ;iples  which  make  experience  possible. 

The  empiricist,  then,  has  two  leading  questions  of  about 
equal  difficulty  to  answer.  If  by  experience  he  means  that 
in  which  the  mind  is  purely  passive,  he  must  consider  how 
to  escape  Hume's  results.  If  by  experience  he  means  any- 
thing rationally  articulate,  he  must  answer  the  Kantian 
question.  How  is  experience  possible  ?  The  impossibility 
of  answering  these  questions  so  as  to  save  empiricism  is 
already  familiar  to  us.  We  have  seen  that  experience, 
apart  from  the  constitutive  action  of  the  mind,  is  an  elu- 
sive phantasmagoria  without  intelligible  contents,  and  that 
articulate  experience  is  possible  onl}'  as  the  mind  imposes 
its  own  rational  forms  on  the  sense  matter. 

These  considerations  definitely  vacate  empiricism  as  a 


APKIOKISM    AND    EMPIRICISM  347 

tenable  theory.  Any  further  interest  in  it  must  be  such 
as  we  have  in  tracing  the  genesis  of  any  error  and  supersti- 
tion. We  look  for  the  grounds  of  its  plausibility  in  the 
naive  oversights  of  spontaneous  thought  and  the  crudeness 
of  superficial  reflection.  From  this  point  of  view  it  is  an 
interesting  and  profitable  subject  of  study. 

Historically,  empiricism  has  been  in  a  state  of  chronic 
uncertainty  as  to  the  meaning  of  experience.  Sometimes  it 
has  meant  an  unqualified  impression  in  the  sensibility,  and 
sometimes  it  has  meant  such  impression  as  variously  quali- 
fied by  reference  to  both  the  mental  subject  and  the  ex- 
ternal object.  Empiricism  is  about  equally  unclear  as  to 
the  meaning  of  our  mental  passivity.  The  mind  is  spoken 
of  as  passively  receptive,  and  the  notion  has  been  thought 
perfectly  clear.  This  clearness,  however,  is  entirely  due  to 
the  imagination.  The  mind  is  conceived  as  an  extended 
substance,  and  marks  or  impressions  are  made  on  it.  But 
even  if  we  allowed  this  grotesque  notion  we  should  have  to 
affirm  some  kind  of  action  to  make  even  this  possible.  The 
material  lump  itself  exercises  a  reaction  equal  to  the  action. 
Or,  and  this  is  the  more  common  fancy,  knowledge  is  con- 
ceived as  something  that  can  be  handed  along,  and  that  can 
be  received  by  the  mind  as  a  vessel  receives  material  poured 
into  it  from  without.  Or,  again,  sensations  may  be  con- 
ceived as  originating  in  the  nerves  and  brought  by  them  to 
the  mind,  which  simply  receives  them  ready-made,  and  in 
which  they  combine  according  to  the  laws  of  association. 
All  such  notions  vanish  as  soon  as  we  see  that  nothing  can 
exist  for  the  mind  except  through  the  mind's  own  action, 
that  even  sensation  is  nothing  put  into  the  mind  from 
without,  but  is  properly  a  reaction  of  the  mind  against  ex- 
ternal action. 

If  there  be  any  mind,  the  mental  nature  must  be  a  de- 
termining factor  in  knowledge ;  and  the  denial  of  such  nat- 


348  THEOKY    OF    THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE 

ure  leaves  the  mind  so  nearly  nothing  that  the  next  thing  is 
to  pass  on  to  its  denial  altogether.  This  tendency  appears 
throughout  the  history  of  empiricism.  The  mind  vanishes 
Avhen  all  its  functions  are  determined  from  without.  Re- 
flection shows  that  such  a  being  is  nothing ;  and  thus,  finally, 
mind  disappears,  and  only  body  and  nerves  are  left.  This 
tendency  is  strengthened  by  the  desire  to  conceive  the  sub- 
ject in  terms  of  the  imagination.  Even  sensation  and  associ- 
ation become  at  last  too  elusive  for  the  empirical  thinker, 
and  he  proceeds  to  steady  his  thought  by  substituting  for 
them  some  physical  fact  and  process.  These  are  the  phvsi- 
cal  basis  of  the  sensations  and  their  association.  These 
also  admit  of  easy  construction  in  imagination,  and  all  is 
clear — at  least,  to  the  imagination. 

The  road  from  empiricism  to  materialism  seems  easy,  and 
has  often  been  travelled.  But  this  is  one  of  the  chronic  su- 
perficialities of  the  doctrine.  There  is  really  no  thorough- 
fare in  either  direction.  Since  the  time  of  Berkeley  and 
Hume  it  has  been  patent  to  all  critical  thinkers  that  consist- 
ent empiricism  must  destroy  materialism  altogether.  The 
world  of  things  and  laws  to  which  materialism  so  confi- 
dently appeals  turns  out  to  be  something  which  empiricism 
makes  impossible  as  an  object  of  knowledge,  or  even  of  faith. 
And,  to  make  matters  worse,  consistent  materialism,  on  the 
other  hand,  overthrows  empiricism.  For  materialism,  so  far 
as  it  claims  to  be  scientific,  must  build  on  the  notion  of  fixed 
elements  with  fixed  forces  and  fixed  laws ;  and  hence,  if 
matter  should  attain  to  thought,  the  laws  of  thought  must 
be  viewed  as  a  part  of  the  nature  of  things,  as  much  so  as 
the  laws  of  physics  and  chemistry.  The  mental  manifesta- 
tion, when  it  comes,  is  as  much  rooted  in  the  nature  of  mat- 
ter as  any  physical  manifestation.  In  that  case  antecedent 
experience  is  as  little  needed  for  intellectual  insight  as  for 
chemical  action.     Both  alike  are  expressions  of  the  essential 


APRIORISM    AND    EMPIRICISM  349 

nature  of  matter  under  the  circumstances,  and  all  that  is 
needed  for  either  is  the  appropriate  physical  condition. 
This  is  so  much  the  case  that,  if  we  suppose  the  physical 
double  of  any  person  produced  directly  from  the  inorganic, 
his  mental  double  would  also  be  produced.  There  would  be 
the  same  insight,  memory,  and  expectation  in  both  cases. 
Thus  the  empirical  deductions  and  explanations  by  reference 
to  experience  would  vanish  altogether.  But  in  crude  thought 
this  is  entirelj'  unsuspected,  and  materialism  and  empiricism 
live  alono-  tofjether  on  the  best  of  terms,  and  without  the 
slightest  suspicion  of  their  mutual  contradiction. 

A  vast  deal  of  irrelevant  argument  on  the  part  of  empir- 
icists has  arisen  from  a  misunderstanding  of  their  opponents' 
view.  That  view  was  long  called  the  doctrine  of  innate 
ideas,  which,  we  have  said,  readily  lends  itself  to  misconcep- 
tion. It  was  supposed  to  mean  that  these  ideas  are  in  all 
minds  unconditionally,  irresistibly,  and  antecedent  to  all  ex- 
perience. Accordingly,  all  that  was  necessary  to  test  the 
theory  was  to  look  into  experience  and  see  if  the  ideas  were 
really  there.  Under  the  influence  of  this  illusion  Locke  set 
to  rummaging  in  the  minds  of  babies,  idiots,  and  savages,  and 
had  rare  success  in  finding  failing  cases.  In  this  monstrous 
ignoratio  elenchi  he  has  had  many  followers. 

Before  Locke's  time,  Descartes,  whom  Locke  had  espe- 
cially in  mind,  had  explained  that  innate  ideas  were  not  to 
be  understood  in  any  such  way.  Leibnitz  afterwards  set  the 
matter  in  a  clear  light  in  commenting  on  the  maxim  that 
there  is  nothing  in  the  intellect  which  was  not  previously  in 
sense.  To  this  he  added  the  clause,  "  Except  the  intellect 
itself."  That  is,  the  intellect  is  organic,  and  when  it  acts  it 
acts  in  accordance  with  its  own  constitution  and  laws.  But 
this  notion  of  an  organic  law,  though  having  its  analogue  in 
all  laws  of  growth  and  development,  has  been  hard  to  grasp 
for  the  average  empiricist.     His  implicit  notion  that  knowl- 


350  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE 

edge  can  be  handed  along,  that  sensations  and  experience 
can  be  poured  into  the  mind  from  without,  leads  to  the  fancy 
that  to  see  what  is  native  to  the  mind  we  must  look  in  upon 
it  anterior  to  experience,  or,  as  Mr.  Mill  has  it,  we  must  look 
into  "  the  mind  of  the  infant  as  it  lies  in  the  nurse's  arms." 
To  one  who  regards  the  analogies  of  growth  this  is  like 
claiming  either  that  we  must  find  the  oak  sensuously  pres- 
ent in  the  acorn,  or  else  that  we  must  view  the  oak  as  the 
accidental  product  of  the  acorn  without  any  governing  law. 
The  real  question  is  whether  we  can  understand  mental  ac- 
tivity and  unfolding  without  the  thought  of  a  conditioning 
rational  nature  which  manifests  itself  in  both. 

The  demonstrable  impossibility  that  anything  should  ex- 
ist for  the  mind  except  through  the  activity  of  the  mind 
rules  out  once  for  all  the  notion  of  a  purely  passive  intellect. 
The  generally  received  doctrine  of  the  subjectivity  of  sense 
qualities  puts  an  end  to  the  fancy  that  the  mind  merely 
reflects  and  reads  off  what  is  there.  The  empirical  claim 
when  modified  to  meet  this  fact   would  be  that  the  only 

4' 

reaction  of  the  mind  is  that  to  which  sensations  are  due, 
and  that  all  else  is  due  to  the  modification  and  combina- 
tion of  the  sensations  according  to  the  laws  of  association. 
The  mind,  then,  is  able  to  have  sensations.  This  is  a 
primary  and  irreducible  quality ;  but  nothing  more  is 
needed  beyond  the  mechanics  of  sensation.  All  else  in 
mind  is  product. 

Underlying  this  view  is  the  analogy  of  molecular  physics. 
We  analyze  masses  into  molecules  and  atoms,  and  we  com- 
bine atoms  and  molecules  into  masses.  After  a  fashion, 
too,  we  analyze  complex  mental  states  into  simple  states, 
and  we  combine  the  simple  states  into  the  complex  states. 
Indeed,  what  is  judgment  in  general  but  such  a  combina- 
tion ?  Thus  a  mind  on  the  sense  plane  is  easily  led  to  fancy 
that  thought  can  be  construed  after  the  analogies  of  molec- 


APRIORISM    AND    EMI'IKICISM  351 

ular  mechanics.     The  simple  sensations  are  the  data;   all 
else  is  but  their  combination. 

This  view  is  perfectly  clear  to  the  imagination,  and  is 
highly  plausible  in  the  picturing  stage  of  thinking.  With 
deepening  reflection,  however,  it  becomes  doubtful  if  the 
doctrine  be  anything  more  than  an  exegesis  of  misleading 
metaphors  and  analogies.  A  more  careful  study  reveals 
the  unique  and  lonely  nature  of  the  mental  facts,  and  the 
impossibility  of  grasping  them  through  any  of  the  cate- 
gories of  sense. 

In  the  further  discussion  two  questions  are  to  be  dis- 
tinguished :  (1)  the  origin  of  articulate  experience  and  in- 
tellectual forms,  and  (2)  the  ultimate  warrant  of  knowledge 
and  belief.  The  first  question  is  psychological,  the  second 
philosophical.  On  the  first  question  the  doctrine  of  em- 
piricism is  that  the  sufficient  origin  of  the  higher  mental 
forms  is  to  be  found  in  sensation.  The  doctrine  of  aprior- 
ism  is  that  while  the  occasion  of  their  manifestation  is 
found  in  sense,  the  forms  themselves  are  the  expressions  of 
principles  immanent  in  the  mind.  On  the  second  question 
empiricism  holds  that  experience  is  the  only  ground  for  be- 
lieving anything.  Apriorism  holds  that  experience  is  the 
Avarrant  for  believing  many  things,  and  that  the  mind  has 
the  warrant  in  its  own  insight  for  believing  some  other 
things.     These  two  questions  are  quite  distinct. 

In  treating  of  the  categories  and  of  the  way  in  which 
the  mind  gets  objects  we  have  sufficiently  discussed  the 
origin  of  experience  from  the  positive  side.  We  recall  the 
main  difficulties  in  the  empirical  view. 

Experience,  reduced  to  its  true  dimensions  on  this  view, 
sinks  to  impressions  on  the  sensibility.  These  are  supposed 
to  be  united  by  association  into  various  groups  of  coexistent 
and  sequent  clusters,  and  when  they  are  sufficiently  com- 


352  THaOKY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 


pacted  by  repetition  they  form  the  complete  contents  of 
consciousness.  But  this  work,  we  saw,  is  possible  only 
through  and  for  a  mental  subject  whose  consciousness  unites 
and  comprehends  the  impressions.  A  consciousness  com- 
posed of  impressions  externally  juxtaposed  would  be  no 
consciousness  at  all. 

The  theory  commonly  identifies  the  impression  with  sen- 
sation, and  hence  is  called  sensationalism  ;  and  as  the  prin- 
ciple of  movement  and  s^mthesis  is  found  in  association,  it  is 
called  associationalism.  But  we  saw  the  impossibility  of 
passing  from  the  impression  as  occurring  to  the  sensation 
as  anything  articulate,  without  an  activity  of  fixation  and 
generalization.  Particular  impressions  or  sensations  are 
perishing  existences.  There  is  nothing  in  them  that  abides 
or  that  can  be  recalled.  It  is  not  the  particular  sensation 
that  recurs  or  that  is  associated,  but  rather  the  logical  uni- 
versal. Before  the  theory  can  move  at  all  there  must  be  a 
logical  activity  above  and  upon  sensation.  Without  doubt 
the  fact  of  association  has  great  significance  for  our  mental 
development.  It  is  of  the  nature  of  habit;  and,  like  habit 
in  general,  is  a  condition  of  growing  facility  in  the  use  of 
our  powers.  But  when  the  universalizing  intellect  is  not 
presupposed  the  doctrine  vanishes  either  into  grotesque 
psychological  mythology,  or  into  a  physiological  function  of 
the  nerves.  Associationalism  is  absurd  without  the  univer- 
sals  which  it  sets  out  to  generate. 

Omitting  to  press  this  difficulty,  w^e  next  note  that  as- 
sociation working  upon  sensations  cannot  make  anything 
new  out  of  them  except  by  appealing  to  some  other  prin- 
ciple. Since,  by  hypothesis,  we  have  only  sensations,  asso- 
ciation can  onl}"  give  us  associated  sensations.  If  we  put 
only  sensations  in  we  can  get  onl}'^  sensations  out — sensations 
variously  grouped,  perhaps,  but  sensations,  after  all.  With 
only  such  data  no  one  can  assign  the  least  reason  why  the 


APRIORISM    AND    EMPIRICISM  353 

product  should  ever  be  anything  but  associated  associations. 
Not  even  a  fictitious  objectivity  or  fictitious  rational  con- 
nection is  possible  on  this  view.  Just  as  little  can  we  give 
any  reason  why  the  homogeneous  sense  data  should  build 
up  such  various  mental  forms,  unless  we  assume  somewhere 
a  peculiar  ground  for  those  forms.  Hume,  as  we  have  so 
often  said,  found  the  theorv  would  not  work  without  as- 
suming  on  the  part  of  the  mind  a  special  "  propensity  to 
feign,"  and  this  propensity  turned  out  to  be  the  real  source 
of  rational  categories. 

That  a  rationally  passive  mind  could  never  attain  to 
articulate  consciousness  at  all  is  clear,  but  certain  naive 
oversights  have  shielded  the  theory  from  its  own  fatuity  : 

1.  The  distinction  between  the  particular  sensation  and 
the  logical  universal  has  been  overlooked.  Unwittingly 
the  theory  has  operated  with  the  latter,  and  thus  has  not 
seemed  to  talk  manifest  nonsense  in  its  theory  of  associa- 
tion, recurrent  sensation,  etc. 

2.  There  has  been  a  perpetual  and  unsuspected  shuffle 
between  sensation  as  unqualified  impression  and  sensation 
as  various  qualified  by  reference  to  both  a  subject  and  an 
object.  With  sensation  qualified  as  a  state  of  a  subject, 
and  as  a  quality  or  effect  of  an  object  in  space,  it  would 
not  be  difficult  to  deduce  several  rational  categories. 

3.  Growing  out  of  this  uncertainty  is  still  another  as  to 
the  place  of  the  outer  world  in  the  theory.  For  the  more 
thorough-going,  as  Mr.  Mill,  the  world  is  simply  a  function 
of  sensation,  and  they  lapse  into  solipsism  unless  they  make 
sensation  independent  of  the  particular  consciousness,  and 
attribute  to  it  a  species  of  universality.  Others,  as  Mr. 
Spencer,  assume  the  world  of  things  and  laws  as  a  matter 
of  course,  and  suppose  that  the  only  problem  is  to  generate 
in  consciousness  a  mental  reproduction  of  that  world.  But 
this  view  presupposes  the  whole  set  of  rational  ideas  for  its 

23 


354  THEOKY    OF    THOUGHT    AKD   ZKOWLEDGE 

understanding,  and  its  account  of  knowledge  all  depends 
CR  our  knowing  beforehand  what  is  to  be  done.  Its  theory 
of  thought  makes  the  knowledge  of  such  a  world  impos- 
sible, and  if  we  have  real  knowledge  of  such  a  world  its 
theory  of  thought  is  thereby  overthrown. 

4.  There  is  also  an  oversight  of  the  objective  intention 
of  the  judgment,  and  of  the  distinction  between  the  con- 
junctions of  association  and  the  connections  of  reason.  The 
former  are  always  particular  events  in  a  particular  con- 
sciousness, and  can  never  take  us  beyond  solipsism.  The 
common  to  all  slips  in  unobserved— a  piece  of  great  good- 
fortune  to  the  theory. 

5.  The  constructive  part  of  the  theory  depends  on  as- 
suming the  ideas  it  rejects.  With  its  denial  of  connection 
all  further  speculation  should  cease.  Instead  of  this  the 
speculator  next  proceeds  to  deduce  the  ideas  of  reason. 
But  this  deduction  consists  entirel}'^  in  telling  how  the  ideas 
are  produced.  But  as  efficiency  is  not  a  sense  impression, 
and  the  mind  may  not  contribute  anything,  this  is  hope- 
lessly inconsistent.  There  is  no  production.  Nothing  is 
due  to  anything.  Everything  is  groundless.  Beliefs,  as 
well  as  other  things,  come  and  go,  and  for  no  reason  what- 
ever. Some  things  were,  and  some  other  things  are,  but 
there  is  no  connection.  In  that  case  all  the  deductions, 
explanations,  and  geneses  vanish,  and  by  sheer  excess  of 
empiricism  we  transcend  it  altogether,  and  come  back  to  a 
queer  kind  of  apriorism.  We  cannot  be  even  empiricists 
without  assuming  the  unpicturable  reality  of  causation. 

6.  The  same  inconsistency  appears  in  the  account  of  sen- 
sations. If  they  are  not  produced  by  anything  a  curious 
solipsistic  phantasmagoria  results.  If  they  are  produced 
we  have  the  very  idea  which  is  to  be  deduced  invoked  to 
explain  its  own  production. 

For  the  sake  of  clearness   and  progress  at  this  point 


APKIORISM    AND    EMPIRICISM  365 

the   empiricist   should  wrestle   with   the   following  ques- 
tions : 

1.  What  does  he  mean  by  experience?  If  only  affections 
of  sense,  how  can  the  laws  and  categories  of  thought  be 
generated  ?  If  he  means  the  articulate  experience  of  com- 
mon-sense, how  is  experience  possible  ? 

2.  What  is  the  place  of  the  outer  world  in  his  theory  ? 
real  or  unreal,  a  determining  ground  of  our  sensations,  or 
only  a  projection  of  our  sensitive  states  ?  If  the  former, 
whence  the  notion  of  determination  ?  If  the  latter,  how 
does  he  escape  solipsism?  If  there  is  no  determination 
anywhere,  what  becomes  of  his  own  view  ? 

3.  How  can  the  subjective  grouping  of  sensitive  states  in 
a  particular  consciousness  ever  transform  itself  into  the  af- 
firmation of  the  existence  and  rational  connection  of  objects 
beyond  the  particular  consciousness. 

While  he  is  puzzling  over  these  points  we  will  go  on  to 
the  second  leading  question  mentioned:  the  warrant  of 
knowledge. 

Knowledge  exists  in  the  form  of  the  judgment,  and  is  ex- 
pressed in  propositions.  But  the  judgment  affirms  some 
kind  of  connection  between  subject  and  predicate.  How  do 
we  know  that  there  is  any  connection?  Empiricism  says, 
by  experience.  Apart  from  experience  the  mind  could  af- 
firm nothing.  The  only  reason  we  have  for  saying  that  any 
elements  belong  together  is  that  we  find  them  coming  to- 
gether in  experience. 

The  plausibility  of  this  view  is  largely  due  to  its  ambigu- 
ity. It  may  mean  that  conjunction  is  the  mark  of  rational 
connection,  and  it  may  mean  that  conjunction  is  the  true 
meaning  of  connection.  In  the  latter  case  we  fall  a  prey  to 
Hume's  destructive  criticism,  and  reason  vanishes  entirely. 
In  the  former  case  we  say  nothing  to  the  purpose.     Of 


356  THEOKY    OF   THOUGHT    AITO    KNOWLEDGE 

course  a  rational  mind,  one  impelled  by  its  nature  to  seek 
connection,  will  surely  take  a  continuous  coming  together  as 
a  mark  of  belonging  together.  But  this  is  not  to  deduce 
connection  from  conjunction ;  it  is  to  apply  the  principle  of 
rational  connection  to  the  explanation  of  empirical  conjunc- 
tions. The  truths  of  inductive  science  are,  indeed,  in  a  way, 
won  from  experience ;  but  not  by  simply  reading  off  what 
is  given  in  sense,  but  rather  by  transforming  the  sense  data 
through  the  application  of  a  rational  idea. 

But  all  this  is  possible  only  to  the  rational  mind,  and 
not  to  the  passive  and  receptive  mind.  For  the  latter 
continuous  recurrence  can  be  no  warrant  for  expectation, 
for  expectation  can  only  rest  on  the  idea  of  fixed  law  and 
connection.  Without  this  the  data  lie  rationally  dead  and 
motionless,  however  they  may  be  whisked  about  by  associ- 
ation. For  the  passive  mind  there  is  no  way  from  external 
adherence  to  inner  connection,  and  the  active  mind  finds 
it,  not  in  experience  but  in  itself.  It  is  a  principle  which 
it  brings  with  it  for  the  interpretation  of  experience. 

Any  further  plausibility  the  view  may  have  is  due  to  the 
assumption,  implied  or  expressed,  of  a  fixed  objective  order. 
This  independent  order  has  its  uniformities  of  connection ; 
and  these  reproduce  themselves  in  uniformities  of  experi- 
ence, and  these  in  turn  become  uniformities  of  thought. 
This  view  has  all  the  superficialities  of  empiricism  in  gen- 
eral ;  and  in  addition,  as  we  have  already  pointed  out,  it  has 
its  own  special  inconsistencies,  in  that  it  dogmatically  as- 
sumes a  system  of  metaphysics  impossible  to  empiricism. 
Nevertheless,  this  has  become  the  prevailing  form  of  em- 
pirical doctrine,  and  in  the  form  of  mental  heredity  has 
introduced  a  novelty  into  the  discussion.  This  we  have 
now  to  consider. 

The  aim  of  empiricism  is  to  generate  the  conviction 
of  connection  by  recurrent  association.     The  strength  of 


APKIORISM    AND    EMPIKICISM  357 

association  varies  with  frequency,  and  hence  invariable 
and  uniform  association  must,  it  was  claimed,  generate  ne- 
cessities of  thought  and  belief.  To  this  the  rather  super- 
ficial answer  was  given  that  the  most  assured  beliefs  often 
appear  very  early  in  the  experience  of  the  individual,  and 
that  the  time  was  too  short  for  association  to  work  its 
wonders.  To  be  sure,  the  empiricists  ground  away  at  the 
associational  mill  with  the  utmost  briskness,  but  they  found 
it  increasingly  difficult  to  furnish  a  full  set  of  faculties  in 
the  early  years  of  infancy  and  childhood.  When,  in  addi- 
tion, the  various  facts  of  mental  heredity  became  promi- 
nent, the  bankruptcy  of  the  doctrine  became  manifest. 

But  this  particular  argument  had  the  misfortune  to  mis- 
lead criticism  by  a  side  issue.  It  contained  the  suggestion 
that  the  great  difficulty  with  empiricism  is  the  lack  of  time 
for  working  its  transformations,  which  is  a  sad  mistake. 
The  essential  difficulty  with  the  doctrine  is  the  complete 
incommensurability  between  its  data  and  its  assumed  prod- 
ucts, and  the  longest  time  is  as  powerless  as  the  shortest 
to  remove  this  fact.  "When  the  doctrine  is  taken  in  ear- 
nest it  is  intelligible  only  because  it  is  false.  But  the  mis- 
leading suggestion  having  been  made  that  lack  of  time  is 
the  chief  shortcoming,  it  was  natural  to  look  about  to  see 
if  this  failing  could  not  be  remedied.  And  a  remedy  was 
found.  By  combining  the  facts  of  mental  heredity  with 
the  current  theory  of  biological  evolution,  it  seemed  possi- 
ble to  substitute  for  the  experience  of  the  individual  the 
experience  of  the  race,  and  even  the  experience  of  all  our 
prehuman  and  subhuman  ancestors.  Thus  an  immense 
extension  of  time  was  secured,  and  with  the  new  capital 
acquired  by  the  brilliant  stroke  empiricism  set  up  business 
again,  and  is  now  operating  almost  exclusively  on  this 
basis. 

The  new  conception  of  a  race  experience  has  been  espe- 


358  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

cially  emphasized  by  Mr.  Spencer,  and  has  been  put  forward 
by  him  as  reconciling  apriorism  and  empiricism.  The  for- 
mer is  true  for  the  individual ;  the  latter  is  true  for  the  race. 
There  is  a  great  deal  in  the  individual  which  cannot  be  ex- 
plamed  by  his  own  experience.  His  experience  is  preformed 
in  its  great  outlines,  and  in  this  sense  is  innate.  But  there 
is  nothing  in  the  individual  which  cannot  be  explained  by 
the  experience  of  the  race ;  for  these  inborn  outlines  in  the 
individual  are  but  the  net  result  of  all  ancestral  experience, 
consolidated  by  indefinite  repetition  and  handed  on  by 
heredity. 

Protests  were  not  wanting  from  the  more  logical  empir- 
icists when  this  doctrine  was  first  put  forth.  It  seemed  to 
them  to  be  a  surrender  of  empiricism  in  the  only  field  where 
it  can  be  tested,  in  order  to  recover  it  again  by  the  aid  of 
an  uncertain  biological  speculation.  Moreover,  the  new  view 
had  a  most  formidable  metaphysical  basis,  and  one  which 
consistent  empiricism  could  never  reach  or  justify.  But 
these  protests,  though  well-founded  in  logic,  had  little  ef- 
fect. Empiricism  in  general,  being  largely  a  product  of 
sense  thinking,  needs  no  argument  beyond  metaphors  which 
can  be  readily  grasped  by  the  imagination.  Hence  the  no- 
tion of  a  race  experience  was  so  peculiarly  satisfying  and 
all-explaining  that  it  was  taken  up  without  criticism,  and 
even  without  understanding,  by  the  great  majority  of  em- 
piricists. The  result  is  a  great  falling  off  in  mental  precision 
in  the  present  generation  of  empirical  philosophers.  We 
seem  to  have  fallen  back  into  the  pre-Kantian  and  pre- 
Humian  empirical  dogmatism.  No  one  cares  to  inquire 
what  experience  is  to  mean,  or  how  experience  is  possible. 
The  important  thing  is  to  say  that  experience,  whatever  it 
may  mean  and  no  matter  what  it  may  mean,  is  the  sole 
source  of  knowledge.  The  proof  of  this  proposition  is  no 
longer  to  be  found   in   careful   logical  and   psychological 


APKIORISM    AND    EMPIRICISM  359 

analysis,  but  in  biological  speculations  of  uncertain  mean- 
ing, set  forth  in  an  exceedingly  profuse  vocabulary  of  poly- 
syllabic terms  of  classical  origin. 

The  truth  or  falsehood  of  the  biological  doctrine  of  de- 
scent is  not  here  in  question,  but  only  whether  it  has  any 
significance  for  philosophical  empiricism ;  and  the  answer  is 
that  it  has  no  significance.  Consciousness  by  its  very  nature 
must  depend  on  a  unitary  activity  which  organically  unfolds 
from  within.  It  can  never  be  produced  by  an}--  mechanical 
juxtaposition  of  particular  states  from  without.  Knowl- 
edge, also,  by  its  very  nature  can  never  be  handed  along, 
but  must  exist  for  the  knower  onlv  in  and  throuo^h  his  own 
act.  More  or  less  time  is  irrelevant.  If  we  conceive  an  in- 
dividual living  through  all  past  time,  there  would  be  no  way 
of  lifting  him  from  sense  to  thought  by  the  mechanical  op- 
erations of  association.  The  seeming  significance  of  the 
doctrine  of  descent  lies  in  its  appeal  to  the  imagination,  and 
in  the  mistaken  fancy  that  with  time  enough  association 
might  do  anything.  The  imagination  can  readily  see  that 
knowledge  may  be  passed  along,  and  thus  the  experience 
of  the  race  may  be  integrated  for  posterity  to  any  desired 
extent. 

For  thought,  in  distinction  from  imagination,  the  doc- 
trine alters  the  case  for  empiricism  in  no  respect,  except 
in  the  apparent  increase  of  time.  This  is  reached  by  the 
notion  of  a  race  experience.  This  notion  deserves  closer 
inspection. 

A  race  experience  is  a  perfectly  clear  notion  so  long  as 
thought  is  quiescent ;  but  a  brief  reflection  serves  to  show 
that  the  race  is  composed  of  an  indefinite  number  of  indi- 
viduals, and  that  the  experience  of  the  race  can  only  be 
the  experiences  of  these  individuals.  At  once  the  appear- 
ance of  unity  and  identity  vanishes  into  indefinite  plurality. 
Or  if  we  take  a  genealogical  line,  of  which  A,  B^  C,  and  D 


360  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

are  successive  members,  it  is  plain  that  the  line  is  noth- 
ing and  that  the  members  are  all.  There  is  no  common 
experience,  and,  except  in  a  figurative  sense,  there  is  no 
transmitted  experience.  If  the  members  are  only  phe- 
nomenal phases  of  an  ontological  movement  there  is  no 
transmission  of  any  kind,  but  only  succession,  as  in  a  series 
of  sounds.  The  mental  manifestations  are  not  the  result  or 
integral  of  anything  that  has  been,  but  simply  the  appropri- 
ate expression  of  their  ontological  ground  in  its  actual  phase. 
If  the  members  are  real,  transmission  is  only  a  metaphor. 
Experience  is  inalienable.  It  cannot  pass  from  A  and  it 
cannot  pass  into  B. 

We  commonly  hide  these  difiiculties  from  ourselves  by 
a  word.  Heredity  is  their  solution.  The  later  members 
of  the  series  inherit  the  experience  of  the  earlier  members. 
But  heredity  is  another  metaphor.  The  facts  for  which  it 
stands  are  the  problem  itself  rather  than  its  solution. 
Even  if  it  were  not  so,  empiricism  is  not  helped ;  for 
heredity  can  only  transmit  what  is  possessed ;  it  can  pro- 
duce nothing.  Making  a  will  creates  no  property.  Thus 
the  tranformation  has  to  be  worked,  after  all,  in  the  experi- 
ence of  the  individual,  where  analysis  shows  it  to  be  im- 
possible. 

Again,  in  what  sense  does  B  inherit  the  experience  of  A  ? 
Seeing  that  experience  cannot  be  separated  from  its  sub- 
ject and  that  knowledge  cannot  be  passed  bodily  along,  we 
must  say  that  B  in  no  sense  inherits  A's  experience.  If 
A  and  B  are  only  phenomena,  then,  as  we  have  just  pointed 
out,  there  is  nothing  but  succession  of  experiences  :  there 
is  no  connection  in  experience.  HA  and  B  are  real  sub- 
jects, then  the  fact  is  that  the  power  which  posits  both 
A  and  B  posits  B  with  a  measure  of  similarity  to  A  and 
also  with  a  measure  of  dissimilarity.  The  similarity  is  the 
fact  in  what  we  call  heredity ;  the  dissimilarity  is  the  fact 


APKIORISM    AND    EMPIRICISM  361 

in  what  we  call  variation.  The  ultimate  reason  for  this 
order  must  be  sought  in  the  nature  or  plan  of  the  funda- 
mental reality  itself.  While,  then,  we  must  seek  the  ulti- 
mate ground  for  the  likeness  of  A  and  B  in  their  relations 
in  the  world-ground  or  world-plan,  the  actual  experience 
of  B  must  always  be  immediately  founded  in  B^s  own 
nature,  and  can  never  be  looked  upon  as  anything  trans- 
mitted from  without.  Hence,  finally,  whatever  the  nature 
and  number  of  any  one's  ancestors,  his  experience  is  his 
own,  and  is  determined  by  his  own  mental  nature. 

The  popular  appeal  to  biology  has  the  full  sanction  of 
the  Zeitgeist,  and  has  also  been  ably  supported  by  another 
great  empirical  philosopher,  Ignoratio  Elenchi.  Neverthe- 
less, on  critical  inspection,  empiricism  is  seen  to  derive  no 
real  logical  advantage  from  this  appeal.  Question- begging 
metaphors  and  cloudy  imaginations  abound,  largely  owing 
to  the  efforts  of  that  prince  of  empiricists,  Petitio  Prin- 
cipii;  but  when  these  are  reduced  to  their  net  value  only 
a  zero  result  emerges.  The  question  remains  what  it  al- 
wa3's  has  been — a  question  for  logical  and  psychological 
analysis. 

Are  there,  then,  any  truths  of  reason  which  are  intuitively 
discerned,  or  which  the  mind  takes  on  its  own  warrant? 
This  question  divides  into  two :  (1)  Are  there  any  universal 
truths  ?  and  (2)  How  do  we  discover  them  ?  From  failure 
to  separate  these  questions,  the  doctrine  of  empiricism  has 
always  been  vague  and  unsteady.  Many  empiricists  have 
held  that  there  are  universal  truths,  but  that  we  gather  them 
from  experience.  Others  hold  that  we  know  nothing  of 
universal  truth,  but  only  of  empirically  discovered  rules 
which  are  valid  only  within  the  limits  of  experience  with 
what  has  pleasantly  been  called  "  a  reasonable  degree  of 
extension  to  adjacent  cases,"  In  the  former  view  we  have 
the  naive  dogmatism  of  Locke  and  all  who  hold  his  ambigu- 


362  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

ous  notions  of  what  experience  is ;  in  the  latter  view  we 
have  implicit  the  scepticism  which  emerged  in  Hume. 

The  former  view  is  forced  to  pass  over  into  the  latter. 
For  since  the  truth  is  not  known  by  direct  insight,  it  must 
in  some  way  be  derived  from  experience,  and  we  have  to 
sliow  how  the  particular  experience  itself  is  possible,  and 
how  it  can  prove  a  universal  truth.  And  even  supposing  the 
experience  possible,  it  could  not  carry  us  beyond  itself  with- 
out the  aid  of  some  general  principle  ;  and  if  that  principle 
itself  is  not  self-evident,  it  also  needs  proof.  Strict  proof, 
then,  is  impossible  without  some  principles  somewhere 
which  the  mind  takes  on  its  own  warrant;  for  in  that  case 
proof  would  never  come  to  an  end,  and  nothing  would  be 
proved.  Hence,  either  we  must  credit  the  mind  with  a 
power  of  knowing  some  things  on  its  own  account  and  war- 
rant, or  we  must  pass  on  to  the  second  phase  of  empiricism, 
and  hold  that  we  have  no  ground  for  holding  that  any 
truth  is  strictly  universal. 

But  once  started  on  this  road  it  is  not  easy  to  stop  short 
of  denying  truth  outright.  "  A  reasonable  degree  of  exten- 
sion to  adjacent  cases  "  seems  to  be  an  illuminating  formula 
until  we  bethink  ourselves  to  ask  what  degree  of  extension 
and  adjacency  would  be  reasonable,  and  then  it  leaves  us  in 
the  lurch.  When  all  principles  are  eliminated  from  experi- 
ence, experience  itself  vanishes,  and  leaves  nothing  articu- 
late, not  even  a  rack,  behind.  A  passive  mind  can  have 
no  rational  experience  of  any  sort,  particular  or  universal. 
Hence  the  second  form  of  empiricism  must  end  in  the  de- 
nial of  truth  altogether,  and  the  dissolution  of  consciousness 
into  a  series  of  vanishing  and  meaningless  shadows. 

To  empiricism  in  all  forms  mathematics  has  been  a  per- 
ennial stumbling-block.  The  attempts  to  deduce  it  from 
experience  rest  upon  a  superficial  notion  of  both  experience 
and  mathematics.     It  has  been  supposed  that  a  passive  ex- 


APKIOKISM   AND    KMPIKICISM  363 

perience  of  number  and  of  space  forms  and  relations  is  pos- 
sible, and  that  by  abstraction  from  this  experience  we  get 
the  elementary  notions  of  mathematics.  The  error  of  the 
first  part  of  the  supposition  is  already  familiar  to  us,  and 
the  error  of  the  second  is  manifest  upon  inspection.  The 
elements  of  mathematics  exist  nowhere  in  external  experi- 
ence in  the  pure  form  which  the  science  demands.  All 
mathematical  conceptions  in  their  pure  form  are  generated 
by  the  mind  itself,  and  most  of  them  have  no  analogue 
whatever  in  experience.  Roots,  powers,  logarithms,  differ- 
entials, integrals,  functions,  are  examples.  The  mind 
evolves  all  such  notions  out  of  itself  and  for  itself,  and  tests 
them  by  its  own  insight.  And  even  in  cases  where  the  con- 
ceptions admit  of  representation,  objective  experiment  is 
still  unable  to  deal  with  them  because  of  their  vastness,  or 
the  fineness  of  perception  and  measurement  required.  The 
products  of  large  numbers,  the  properties  of  curves,  the 
ratio  of  the  circumference  of  the  circle  to  its  diameter  are 
illustrations.  In  all  these  cases  the  mind  works  by  methods 
of  its  own  invention,  and  tests  these  methods  by  its  own  in- 
sight. Proof  and  disproof  are  alike  impossible  to  any  form 
of  sense  experience.  That  10  raised  to  the  power  .301030 
equals  2  is  a  proposition  which  a  passively  registering  intel- 
lect would  have  difficulty  both  in  comprehending  and  estab- 
lishing. 

Consistent  empiricism  cannot  explain  mathematics  even 
as  a  form  of  error  without  imputing  to  the  mind  a  very  ac- 
tive propensity  to  feign.  The  truth  of  mathematics  it  can- 
not allow  at  all.  This  was  admitted  by  Mr.  Mill  in  a  mo- 
ment of  special  frankness.  For  aught  we  know,  he  said, 
two  and  two  may  make  five  in  some  other  planet.  But 
why  five  rather  than  fifty,  or  five  hundred,  or  three,  or 
nothing,  would  be  hard  to  say ;  or  why  in  another  planet, 
and  not  in  another  street,  or  another  moment,  or  for  another 


364  THEOKY    OF    THOUGHT   AND   KNOWLEDGE 

person,  would  be  equally  hard  to  say.  Indeed,  it  would  be 
hard  to  give  any  good  reason  why  it  should  not  be  equal  to 
all  of  these  things  at  once,  and  a  good  many  more  besides. 
The  condition  of  absurdity  is  the  existence  of  a  rational 
standard,  and  when  the  standard  is  gone  there  is  no  longer 
anything  irrational  or  absurd. 

That  articulate  experience  is  impossible  without  a  con- 
stitutive action  of  the  mind  wherebv  the  sense  elements  are 
given  a  rational  form  is  clear.  That  this  activity  must  pro- 
ceed according  to  principles  immanent  in  intellect  itself  is 
equally  plain.  That  the  source  of  these  principles  cannot 
be  found  in  anything  external  to  the  mind  is  likewise  mani- 
fest. They  are  not  conscious  possessions  of  the  mind  prior 
to  all  experience,  but  they  reveal  themselves  in  and 
through  the  experience  which  they  alone  make  possible. 
In  this  sense  we  may  look  upon  apriorism  as  established. 

If  the  apriori  truths  covered  the  whole  field  of  knowledge 
no  more  need  be  said.  In  fact,  however,  the  apriori  only 
outlines  a  possible,  and  does  not  determine  what  shall  be 
actual  within  the  limits  of  the  possible.  If  experience  is  to 
be  possible  it  must  take  on  certain  forms,  but  those  forms 
are  compatible  with  an  indefinite  variety  of  experience. 
This  is  the  contingent  element  of  experience,  and  it  can 
never  be  deduced  from  apriori  principles.  It  must  be  learned 
from  experience  itself.  This  is  the  true  field  of  induction 
and  experiment,  and  nothing  can  replace  it.  If  empiricism 
has  often  been  narrow  in  ignoring  the  apriori  element  in  ex- 
perience, apriorism  has  often  been  equally  narrow  in  ig- 
noring the  contingent  element  in  experience.  The  necessity 
of  both  elements  is  evident. 

In  this  field  of  the  contingent  we  come  upon  a  special 
difficulty.  Necessary  connection  can  be  affirmed  only  where 
logical  necessity  can  be  discovered.    What  shall  we  make  of 


APKIOKISM    AND    EMPIKICISM  365 

those  connections  where  no  such  necessity  can  be  discovered? 
Most  of  the  laws  of  nature  are  of  this  sort.  They  are  given 
only  as  uniformities  of  happening,  but  the  mind  cannot  re- 
gard them  as  only  uniformities  of  happening.  We  must 
find  some  reason  for  them.  We  cannot  turn  them  into  log- 
ical necessities  without  speculative  disaster  ;  and  when  we 
view  them  as  ontological  necessities  we  not  only  lose  our- 
selves in  words,  but  we  get  no  real  relief. 

If  we  affirm  such  ontological  necessity  and  persuade  our- 
selves that  we  know  what  we  mean,  we  are  at  a  loss  to 
understand  its  implications.  What  warrant  have  we  for 
thinking  that  this  necessity  will  always  remain  the  same  in 
manifestation?  So  far  as  we  can  see,  it  may  take  any  di- 
rection whatever  within  the  outlines  of  possibility  drawn  by 
the  pure  reason.  That  the  necessity  is  compatible  with 
change  we  know  from  experience,  and  how  much  change  it 
may  involve  is  quite  beyond  us.  Even  the  most  determined 
apriorist,  so  long  as  he  refrains  from  volitional  dogmatism, 
must  allow  that  we  have  no  speculative  security  that  the 
laws  of  nature  are  eternal.  And  so  finally  it  turns  out  that 
both  apriorism  and  empiricism  leave  a  very  important  ques- 
tion unanswered;  namely.  Can  the  nature  of  things  be  practi- 
cally trusted  ?  or,  Can  w^e  depend  on  the  nature  of  things  ? 
For  concrete  knowledge  this  question  is  as  important  as  the 
more  general  one  of  empiricism. 

To  this  question  no  answer  can  be  found  in  the  field  of 
the  speculative  reason.  Empiricism  leaves  us  hopelessly  in 
the  lurch,  but  apriorism  does  not  bring  us  far.  It  contains 
no  security  for  any  of  the  contingent  elements  of  knowledge, 
and  these  elements  make  up  the  bulk  of  practical  life.  In- 
deed, we  cannot  extend  apriorism  to  them  without  turning 
them  into  necessities,  and  then  we  make  shipwreck  of  reason. 
The  only  way  of  escaping  the  speculative  disaster  involved 
in  the  notion  of  necessity,  and  the  lawless  irrationalitv  at- 


366  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

taching  to  the  notion  of  chance,  is  to  look  upon  the  cosmic 
uniformities  as  noted  in  purpose  and  maintained  by  free- 
dom. But  then,  for  any  absolute  science,  we  should  need  to 
know  what  that  purpose  is  and  what  it  implies ;  and  as  no 
one  can  pretend  to  any  such  knowledge,  it  follows  that  we 
have  no  absolute  concrete  science  whatever,  and  that  such 
science  as  we  have  has  a  considerable  element  of  assumption 
attached  to  it.  How  far  it  is  valid  and  how  long  it  will  re- 
main valid  is  known  only  to  the  uncritical  dogmatist,  who 
mistakes  the  monotonies  of  his  thinking  for  the  changeless 
laws  of  existence. 

The  conclusion  of  the  whole  matter  is  that  we  must 
keep  clear  of  dogmatic  finalities  in  the  concrete  realm,  and 
must  confine  our  concrete  science  to  "  a  reasonable  degree 
of  extension  to  adjacent  cases."  Having  made  merry  over 
this  phrase  as  applied  to  the  formal  sciences,  it  is  now  in 
order  to  reinstate  it  as  the  sum  of  our  wisdom  in  the  con- 
crete sciences.  And  if  we  are  asked  to  explain  it  and  tell 
what  degree  of  extension  is  reasonable,  and  what  consti- 
tutes adjacency,  the  answer  must  be  found  in  the  range  of 
practical  interest ;  that  is,  our  faith  must  be  practical  rath- 
er than  speculative,  and  must  become  vague  and  uncertain 
when  the  matter  is  far  and  permanently  removed  from  any 
practical  interest.  Of  course  the  dogmatist  is  likely  long 
to  be  with  us,  and  magazine  science  with  its  clear  knowl- 
edge of  the  infinities  and  eternities  will  abound.  The 
sceptic,  on  the  other  hand,  will  perennially  assure  us  that 
he  has  succeeded  in  destroying  knowledge.  Meanwhile  life 
will  go  on  its  way,  and  the  wise  man,  like  Candide^  will 
continue  to  cultivate  his  garden.  As  Pascal  has  it,  criti- 
cism confounds  the  dogmatists,  and  nature  is  too  strong 
for  the  sceptics. 


CHAPTER  V 


KNOWLEDGE    AND    BELIEF 


Our  previous  conclusions  represent  only  the  general  con- 
ditions of  reproducing  reality  in  any  form  for  our  conscious- 
ness. Given  a  world,  or  an  order  of  fact  or  reason,  which  we 
do  not  make  but  find,  what  are  the  general  conditions  of  its 
being  an  object  for  us?  The  answer  has  been  given  in  the 
previous  discussion.  A  word  must  now  be  said  about 
knowledge  from  the  subjective  side. 

From  this  side  our  convictions  may  vary  all  the  way 
from  opinion  to  certainty.  They  all  agree  in  this,  that  they 
are  held  for  true;  and  hence  the  objective  reality  and  con- 
nection affirmed  is  the  same  in  all  these  cases.  This  fact 
constitutes  their  objectivity.  The  difference  lies  in  the 
attitude  of  the  mind  towards  them,  or  in  the  nature  of  the 
grounds  on  which  they  are  held. 

Now  with  regard  to  propositions  held  for  true  the  sub- 
jective assurance  is  highly  variable.  The  degree  of  cer- 
tainty is  not  constant  even  in  the  same  case,  and  it  varies 
greatly  from  one  case  to  another.  xVnd  when  the  assurance 
is  complete  it  may  be  well  or  ill  founded,  ranging  all  the 
way  from  rational  conviction  to  superstition  and  infatua- 
tion. Hence  propositions  held  for  true  form  diverse  classes 
according  to  the  measure  of  assurance,  or  the  nature  and 
cogency  of  the  grounds.  Thus  we  have  knowledge,  belief, 
faith,  opinion,  assumption,  postulate,  and,  jfinally,  whim, 
prejudice,  and  superstition. 


3(58  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

These  classes  exist  only  subjectively.  Apart  from  our 
thought  only  the  reality  exists,  and  this  shows  none  of  the 
distinctions  which  emerge  on  the  subjective  side.  Again, 
no  perfectly  sharp  distinction  can  be  drawn  between  these 
classes.  They  shade  into  one  another.  Popular  language 
also  is  very  variable  and  uncertain.  Leaving  out  the  irra- 
tional classes,  we  might  distinguish  as  fundamental  knowl- 
edge and  belief.  Some  would  incline  to  distinguish  faith  as 
a  special  type  of  belief  because  of  the  aesthetic  and  ethical 
character  of  its  grounds  and  the  religious  nature  of  its 
object. 

If  we  thus  distinguish  knowledge  and  belief,  knowledge 
must  be  defined  as  that  which  is  self-evident  in  the  nature 
of  reason,  or  which  is  immediately  given  in  experience,  or 
which  is  cogently  inferred  from  the  given.  The  subjective 
form  of  knowledge  is  certainty  of  the  truth  of  its  con- 
tents ;  but  this  certainty  is  so  often  the  product  of  thought- 
lessness that  we  have  to  test  it  by  denying  the  alleged  knowl- 
edge, and  seeing  if  the  mind  can  entertain  the  denial.  If 
it  can,  then  we  have  at  best  only  probability.  If  it  cannot, 
then  we  have  the  highest  objective  certainty  possible.  It 
is  illuminating  sometimes  to  apply  this  test.  We  find  to 
our  surprise  that  pure  thought  can  entertain  without  shock 
the  denial  of  a  great  many  items  of  supposed  knowledge. 

The  certainty  of  knowledge  is  inexpugnable  in  the  case 
of  the  truths  of  reason  and  the  facts  of  immediate  experi- 
ence. The  matter  is  not  so  clear  when  we  come  to  inter- 
pret these  facts.  For  instance,  the  Copernican  theory,  the 
wave  theory  of  light,  the  atomic  theory  of  matter,  shade 
away  from  knowledge  into  belief.  Even  if  such  interpre- 
tation were  necessary  from  the  side  of  the  present  facts, 
we  have  seen,  in  treating  of  explanation,  that  it  rests  upon 
postulates  concerning  nature  which  are  everything  but  ob- 
jects of  knowledge.     There  is,  then,  even  in  the  reahn  of 


KNOWLEDGE    AND    BELIEF  369 

objective  knowledge,  no  fixed  frontier  between  knowledge 
and  belief.  From  the  definition  of  knowledge  it  is  plain 
that  only  a  small  part  of  our  convictions  can  lay  claim  to 
be  matter  of  knowledo^e.  In  everv  field  the  bulk  of  our 
supposed  knowledge  is  properly  belief. 

The  general  character  of  rational  belief,  in  distmction 
from  knowledge,  is  that  it  is  a  conviction  based  on  reasons 
which  lend  some  support,  but  do  not  compel  it.  These  may 
make  it  probable,  but  do  not  prove  it.  When  we  cannot 
separate  and  accurately  express  our  reasons,  as  is  often  the 
case,  we  have  the  informal  reasoning  of  common  -  sense  on 
which  daily  life  so  largely  depends. 

The  grounds  of  belief  may  be  both  subjective  and  objec- 
tive. Many  beliefs  make  no  appeal  to  subjective  interest, 
and  their  grounds  may  be  objectively  set  forth.  This  is  the 
case  with  most  scientific  beliefs,  and  with  matters  of  histori- 
cal fact.  Such  beliefs,  so  far  as  they  are  rational,  are  based 
upon  objective  facts  and  evidence.  To  be  sure,  a  deal  of 
subjective  bias  can  be  shown  in  connection  even  with  such 
matters ;  but  every  one  sees  that  this  bias  is  irrelevant  as 
proof.  Whether  a  given  scientific  theory  is  correct,  or 
whether  a  given  historical  statement  is  true,  could  never  be 
decided  by  the  state  of  our  feelings.  But  many  beliefs  are 
not  thus  objective  in  their  grounds.  They  have  their  roots 
in  feeling  and  our  system  of  mental  interests.  Their 
grounds,  then,  cannot  be  objectively  presented,  but  must  be 
sought  rather  in  life  itself. 

Beliefs  of  the  former  class  are  both  logically  and  psycho- 
logically simple,  and  they  offer  no  difficulty.  Beliefs  of  the 
latter  class  have  been  largely  misunderstood.  Tliey  have 
often  been  set  aside  as  groundless,  and  have  been  variously 
stigmatized.  There  is  some  reason  for  this  in  the  fact  that 
feeling  and  sentiment  are  frequently  put  forward  as 
grounds  of  belief  when  they  are  totally  irrelevant.     Lofty 

21 


370  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

feelings  and  beautiful  sentiments  have  often  clustered 
around  irrational  conceptions,  and  have  been  appealed  to 
hide,  or  save,  the  irrationality.  Historically,  there  has  been 
a  good  deal  to  justify  suspicion  of  and  impatience  with  ap- 
peals to  feeling  in  any  form  as  reasons  for  belief. 

But  this  impatience  is  itself  short-sighted.  First,  it  over- 
looks the  fact  that  there  are  feelings  and  feelings.  There 
are  particular  fancies,  and  there  are  the  great  catholic  senti- 
ments of  the  race.  There  are  individual  desires,  and  there 
are  the  great  fundamental  human  interests  in  which  life  itself 
roots.  Feelings  of  the  former  class  might  have  no  signifi- 
cance, while  feelings  of  the  latter  class  might  express  the 
very  substance  of  the  soul.  No  doubt  there  are  many 
beliefs  whose  grounds  must  be  purely  objective ;  but  that 
does  not  decide  that  there  may  not  be  other  beliefs,  even 
more  important,  whose  grounds  may  be  subjective. 

Secondly,  this  impatience  is  at  least  equally  open  to  the 
charge  of  bad  logic.  The  assumption  that  subjective 
grounds  are  no  reasons  for  belief  is  quite  as  illogical  as  the 
opposite  assumption.  And  considering  the  assumption  of  a 
parallelism  and  harmony  between  our  mental  nature  and 
the  nature  of  things,  which  is  implicit  in  every  theory  of 
knowledge,  we  may  even  say  that  the  rejection  of  subjec- 
tive grounds  of  belief  is  far  more  illogical  than  their  accept- 
ance. The  mind  itself,  its  nature  and  needs,  are  certainly 
parts  and  products  of  reality,  and  we  are  not  to  suppose 
them  misleading  without  good  reason. 

Thirdly,  the  objection  overlooks  the  practical  nature  of 
belief.  There  is  here  a  tacit  assumption  that  the  mind  is 
pure  intellect,  without  practical  interests  and  necessities, 
and  that  it  has  nothing  to  do  but  argue  and  weigh  evi- 
dence. This  is  an  ancient  superstition  of  intellectualism 
which  is  due  to  treating  this  subject  academically,  and 
which  is  almost  ludicrous  in  its  inapplicability  to  human 


KNOWLEDGE    AND    BELIEF  371 

conditions.  Man  is  not  only  nor  mainly  intellect.  He  is 
also  and  chiefly  a  practical  being ;  and  his  thought  is  de- 
termined less  by  speculative  reflection  than  by  the  pressure 
of  practical  necessities.  Belief  is  a  means  rather  than  an 
end.  It  is  valuable  for  what  it  helps  us  to,  and  its  grounds 
lie  quite  as  much  in  its  practical  necessity  as  in  its  specula- 
tive foundation.  Evidently  we  need  a  profounder  study  of 
the  nature  and  grounds  of  belief. 

It  is  often  easier  to  maintain  an  extreme  than  a  moder- 
ate doctrine.  The  extreme  is  clear,  while  the  moderate 
doctrine  has  an  air  of  vagueness  and  compromise  about  it. 
This  makes  the  latter  obnoxious  to  all  those  who  crave 
finality  and  sharp  definition,  forgetting  that  reality  declines 
to  be  too  sharply  defined.  In  the  present  case  it  would  be 
simpler  to  maintain  that  belief  is  either  speculative  or  prac- 
tical, whereas  it  is  both  speculative  and  practical ;  and  it 
is  not  easy  to  draw  any  sharp  line  of  distinction.  We  must 
seek  to  bring  both  aspects  into  view. 

If  we  were  looking  about  for  an  ideal  conception  of 
mental  method  it  would  run  something  like  this :  Let  us 
first  find  some  invincible  fact  or  principle,  something  which 
cannot  be  doubted  or  denied  without  absurdity,  and  from 
this  let  us  deduce  by  cogent  logic  whatever  it  may  imply. 
When  we  reach  the  end  of  our  logic  let  us  stop.  In  other 
words,  admit  nothing  that  can  be  doubted.  Make  no  as- 
sumptions and  take  no  step  which  is  not  compelled  by  rig- 
orous logic.  And,  above  all,  let  no  feeling  or  sentiment  or 
desire  have  any  voice  in  determining  belief. 

This  is  certainly  a  method  of  rigor  and  vigor,  as  Matthew 
Arnold  would  call  it,  and  commends  itself  to  closet  think- 
ers and  debating  youths.  It  is  also  exceedingly  effective 
in  polemic,  as  it  makes  it  easy  to  show  what  sorry  stuff"  any- 
thing we  may  dislike  is.     But  there  is  a  doubt  whether  this 


372  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

be  a  counsel  of  perfection  for  rare  souls,  or  whether  all  alike 
are  to  follow  this  method.  As  soon  as  we  come  out  of  the 
closet  we  perceive  that  we  have  not  to  deal  with  an  abstract 
man  or  with  abstract  mind,  but  with  human  beings  in  all 
grades  of  development  and  with  the  most  various  mental 
powers.  The  mass  of  human  beings,  in  the  nature  of  the 
case,  must  always  live  intellectually  by  hearsay.  This  is 
manifestly  the  case  with  children  and  largely  the  case  with 
men.  Nothing  could  be  more  absurd  than  to  require  the 
great  majority  of  human  beings  to  think  for  themselves  in 
any  field  whatever.  They  have  neither  the  knowledge  nor 
the  faculty  required.  Instead  of  advising  them  to  think  for 
themselves,  the  only  safe  and  wise  advice,  both  for  them 
and  for  the  community,  is  to  think  like  other  people.  And 
even  the  wisest  man,  because  of  the  shortness  of  life  and 
its  practical  necessities,  must  take  a  very  large  part  of  his 
knowledge  on  trust.  The  intellect  of  the  communitv — that 
is,  the  conceptions  and  customs  which  represent  the  net 
result  of  the  thought  and  experience  of  the  community — 
must  always  be  the  great  law  of  the  individual.  On  no 
other  condition  can  he  or  society  exist. 

It  is  this  fact  which  constitutes  the  great  significance 
of  mstitntions  for  human  development.  They  conserve  the 
experience  and  wisdom  of  the  past,  and  form  the  bond  of 
continuity  between  the  ages.  They  furnish  the  channels 
of  custom  along  which  the  individual  may  develop  in  every 
department  of  thought  and  action.  Language,  the  social 
order,  the  customs  and  conventions  and  the  gathered  knowl- 
edge of  the  community  are  the  mental  and  moral  matrix 
of  the  individual  ;  and  he  finds  his  way  into  life  not  so 
much  by  reasoning  as  by  instinctive  imitation  and  submis- 
sion to  social  authority.  If  we  were  laying  down  a  rule 
for  the  procedure  of  an  abstract  and  non-embodied  intel- 
lect it  might  do  to  talk  of  taking  nothing  for  granted ;  but 


KNOWLEDGE    AND    BELIEF  373 

if  we  are  to  deal  with  human  beings  we  must  take  account 
of  their  actual  conditions,  and,  taking  these  into  account, 
nothinsr  could  well  be  more  absurd  than  the  mental  method 
proposed. 

This  is  self-evident  as  soon  as  it  is  brought  to  our  atten- 
tion. Men  in  general  must  live  by  authority.  It  is  only 
the  use  of  such  abstractions  as  thought  or  reason  which 
hides  it  from  us.  But  still  we  may  think  that  the  things 
to  be  believed  must  admit  of  demonstration  somewhere. 
I  may  accept  a  mathematical  or  physical  truth  on  author- 
ity, but  I  must  believe,  nevertheless,  that  the  authorities 
themselves  have  demonstrated  it.  This  is  the  condition 
in  Avhich  most  of  our  knowledge  exists.  We  accept  it  on 
authority,  but  we  believe  that  the  authority  is  based  on 
reason.  Reason,  then,  must  be  the  final  test  of  truth,  and 
thus  the  method  of  rigor  and  vigor  is  once  more  set  up. 

In  this  claim  there  is  implicit  the  ideal  of  a  transparent 
rational  connection  in  the  system  of  truth.  If  we  knew  all 
we  should  find  everything  to  be  reasonable.  The  unreason- 
able would  be  the  unreal  and  fictitious.  We  might  possi- 
bly allow  this  claim  as  an  ideal,  and  we  might  also  insist 
that  the  ideal  is  realized  from  the  standpoint  of  the  abso- 
lute reason,  but  it  would  not  follow  that  we  had  anything 
of  practical  value  for  ourselves.  For  it  might  be  that  our 
limitations  are  such  that  we  have  to  follow  other  than  the 
high  apriori  road.     And  this  is  the  case. 

If  man  were  a  purely  speculative  being  he  would  not 
get  far  by  the  way  of  demonstration.  This  applies  only 
to  the  formal  sciences,  and  these  are  subjective.  They  can 
never  be  applied  to  reality  without  certain  postulates  or 
assumptions.  At  the  beginning  of  the  modern  speculative 
era  Descartes  applied  the  method  of  doubting  everything 
that  could  be  doubted,  and  found  only  one  invincible  fact: 
that  he,  the  doubter,  existed   doubting.     But  this  single 


374  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGK 

premise  led  to  no  conclusion  beyond  solipsism.  The  world 
of  things,  persons,  and  laws  lay  among  the  doubtful  mat- 
ters. And  we  have  seen  in  our  previous  study  how  large 
an  element  of  assumption  runs  through  our  cognitive  pro- 
cedure. We  assume  that  things  form  a  rational  and  intel- 
ligible whole,  that  the  system  of  law  is  all-embracing,  that 
the  laws  of  our  thought  are  parallel  with  the  laws  of  things  ; 
but  we  cannot  be  said  to  demonstrate  any  of  these  things. 

Again,  we  never  rest  in  things  as  they  appear,  but  work 
them  over  in  highly  complex  ways,  until  we  get  a  realizing 
sense  of  the  truth  that  things  are  not  what  they  seem.  But 
this  interpreting  activity  proceeds  on  the  assumption  that 
what  we  must  think  about  things  is  the  truth  of  things, 
and  that  what  we  need  to  make  things  intelligible  to  us 
is  really  necessary  to  their  existence.  Thus,  our  thought 
makes  itself  very  much  at  home  in  the  world,  and  will  allow 
nothing  to  be  real  until  it  has  brought  it  into  a  form  satis- 
factory to  itself.  Our  entire  cognitive  procedure  rests  upon 
postulates  of  this  sort,  and  these  are  so  far  from  being  dem- 
onstrated that,  when  abstractly  stated,  many  of  them  seem 
almost  self-evidently  false.  They  spring  out  of  our  cogni- 
tive nature  and  cognitive  interests,  and  if  we  ask  for  their 
ultimate  ground  we  find  that  they  have  no  other  than  the 
energy  of  the  mental  life  itself.  The  abstract  understand- 
ing can  entertain  their  denial  without  anv  shock  of  con- 
tradiction ;  but  the  living  mind  rejects  the  denial,  because 
its  own  life  is  thereby  rendered  futile  and  meaningless. 

A  more  abstract  statement  would  be  as  follows :  The  test 
of  formal  truth  is  the  law  of  contradiction.  Matter  of  which 
the  mind  can  conceive  the  contradiction  is  not  founded  in 
the  nature  of  intelligence.  The  test  of  concrete  truth  is 
practical  absurdity.  Solipsism  involves  no  contradiction, 
and  is  easily  conceivable,  so  far  as  logic  goes.  The  irration- 
ality and  uninterpretability  of  nature  are  by  no  means  diflOl- 


KNOWLEDGE    AND    BELIEF  375 

cult  conceptions.  That  nature  is  the  abode  and  manifesta- 
tion of  the  ugly,  the  stupid,  the  non-moral,  rather  than  the 
beautiful,  the  rational,  and  the  good,  does  not  traverse  the 
law  of  contradiction.  The  absurdity  which  emerges  is  prac- 
tical rather  than  speculative.  Life  is  crippled.  Thought 
has  no  object,  action  no  aim.  There  is  a  practical  contra- 
diction of  our  nature  and  interests,  but  there  is  no  formal 
contradiction  of  the  laws  of  thought.  The  test  is  aes- 
thetic, ethical,  practical,  not  theoretical.  The  argument  in 
such  cases  consists  entirely  in  analyzing  and  setting  forth 
the  feelings  and  interests  involved,  and  in  pointing  out  the 
aesthetic  and  practical  bearings  of  the  question.  Such  argu- 
ment has  cogency  only  for  one  who  has  the  appropriate  sen- 
timents. Unless  we  keep  these  two  tests  distinct,  the  pro- 
cedure of  the  living  mind  must  remain  a  sealed  book  unto  us. 

The  method  of  rigor  and  vigor  would  doubt  everything 
that  can  be  doubted.  The  actual  method  is  to  assume  the 
truthfulness  of  our  own  nature  and  the  nature  of  things, 
and  to  doubt  nothing  until  we  are  compelled  to  doubt,  to 
assume  that  everything  is  what  it  reports  itself  until  spe- 
cific reasons  for  doubt  appear.  The  law  of  rigor  and  vigor 
is  this  :  Nothing  may  be  believed  which  is  not  proved.  The 
law  the  mind  actually  follows  is  this :  The  apparent  truth 
of  things,  physical  and  mental  alike,  must  never  be  departed 
from  without  specific  reasons  other  than  the  formal  possi- 
bility of  doubting.  All  fruitful  work  proceeds  under  the 
latter  law ;  most  speculative  criticism  and  closet  philosophy 
proceed  under  the  former.  Hence  their  perennial  barren- 
ness. 

The  system  of  belief  exists  as  a  great  social  fact,  and 
there  can  be  no  question  of  beginning  from  the  start.  All 
that  the  critic  can  do  is  to  criticise  it.  Applying  to  it  the 
method  of  demonstration  ot  which  the  law  of  contradiction 
is  the  test,  the  critic,  if  at  all  keen,  finds  himself  condemned 


376  THEORY    OF   THOUGH  r    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

to  a  barren  subjectivity  and  a  lifeless  registration  of  his  own 
experiences.     This  is  the  end  of  rigor  and  vigor. 

Underlying  this  rigorous  method  is  the  tacit  assumption 
that  belief  is  always  the  product  of  formal  logical  processes. 
This  is  one  of  the  superstitions  of  a  superficial  intellectual- 
isra.  Man  has  been  considered  solely  as  an  intellect  or  un- 
derstanding, whereas  he  is  a  great  deal  more.  Man  is  will, 
conscience,  emotion,  aspiration ;  and  these  are  far  more 
powerful  factors  than  the  logical  understanding.  Man  is 
also  a  practical  being,  in  highly  complex  interaction  with 
his  fellows  and  with  the  system  of  things.  Before  he  ar- 
gues he  must  live ;  before  he  speculates  he  must  come  to 
some  sort  of  practical  understanding  with  himself,  with  his 
neighbors,  and  with  the  physical  order.  This  practical  life 
has  been  the  great  source  of  human  belief  and  the  constant 
test  of  its  practical  validity ;  that  is,  of  its  truth.  The 
beliefs  of  a  communit}^  —  scientific,  moral,  and  religious 
alike — have  a  very  complex  psychological  and  historical 
origin  and  a  sort  of  organic  growth.  While  reason  may  be 
implicit  in  them,  the  reflective,  analytic,  and  self-conscious 
reason  commonly  has  little  to  do  with  their  production.  A 
good  description  of  their  origin  would  often  be  :  they  grew. 
This  growing  is  the  mind's  reaction  against  its  total  experi- 
ence, internal  and  external ;  it  is  the  mental  resultant  of 
life ;  it  is  the  mind's  movement  alone;  lines  of  least  resist- 
ance.  The  product  is  not  a  set  of  reasoned  principles,  but 
a  body  of  practical  postulates  and  customs  which  were  born 
in  life,  which  express  life,  and  in  which  the  fundamental 
interests  and  tendencies  of  the  mind  find  their  expression 
and  recognition.  There  is  no  one  specific  reason  on  which 
they  are  founded,  and  no  one  root  from  which  they  spring. 
In  this  respect  they  have  been  compared  to  a  large  sum  of 
money  which  has  been  raised  by  small  subscriptions,  and  of 
which  the  original  list  of  subscribers  has  been  lost. 


KNOWLEDGE    AND    BELIEF  377 

Insight  into  this  fact  is  gradually  producing  an  impor- 
tant change  in  our  way  of  regarding  the  great  organism 
of  behef.  As  long  as  we  viewed  belief  as  consciously 
wrought  out  by  formal  logical  processes  it  seemed  per- 
missible, and  even  obligatory,  to  test  it  by  syllogistic  forms 
and  the  law  of  contradiction.  But  when  it  is  seen  that 
belief  is  made  for  us  as  well  as  by  us,  that  it  is  wrought 
out  in  action  rather  than  in  speculation,  that  the  great 
outlines  of  belief  are  the  products  of  life  itself,  then  the 
basal  catholic  beliefs  of  humanity  and  the  unfolding  ten- 
dencies to  believe  begin  to  acquire  the  significance  of  any 
other  great  natural  product.  They  show  the  direction  of 
the  evolving  movement,  the  trend  of  the  universe  of  mind. 
They  are  no  longer  accidents  or  whims  of  the  individual, 
but  are  as  much  entitled  to  be  viewed  as  belonging  to  the 
nature  of  things  as  the  law  of  gravitation  itself. 

But,  it  may  be  said,  this  only  describes  the  psychological 
origin  of  belief  ;  it  does  not  decide  its  logical  value.  No 
doubt  beliefs  spring  up  as  a  kind  of  natural- history  prod- 
uct, but  logic  must  try  the  beliefs  as  well  as  the  spirits. 
And  have  not  we  ourselves  made  the  distinction  between 
rational  and  irrational  beliefs  to  consist  in  this,  that  while 
all  beliefs  have  psychological  causes,  rational  beliefs  have 
loi2:ical  o^rounds  ? 

This  is  indeed  true,  and  in  a  system  of  necessity  it  is 
fatal,  as  we  have  seen.  We  must  find  in  human  freedom, 
in  our  wilfulness  and  carelessness,  an  explanation  in  prin- 
ciple of  the  whims  and  aberrations  of  thought.  But  when 
we  have  done  this  we  cannot  discredit  the  great  catholic 
beliefs  and  tendencies  of  humanity  without  involving  the 
whole  system  of  knowledge  in  disaster.  Their  universal- 
ity and  necessity  in  human  life  are  the  best  of  grounds  for 
belief.  Even  the  higher  moral  and  religious  beliefs  can  be 
questioned  only  by  a  gratuitous  scepticism    based  on  the 


378 


THEORY    OF   THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 


suicidal  principles  of  mechanical  atheism,  or  on  the  thought- 
less assumption  that  the  five  senses  exhaust  reality,  and 
that  anything  beyond  tliem  is  a  dream. 

But  the  general  assumption,  implicit  in  every  theory 
of  knowledge,  of  the  essential  harmony  of  thought  with 
reality  forbids  any  such  notion.  On  a  theistic  basis  it  is 
altogether  incredible  that  the  human  mind  should  be  so 
badly  made  as  necessarily  to  wander  off  into  delusion,  and 
on  any  scheme  such  a  view  can  only  lead  to  the  destruction 
of  knowledge.  That  evolution  should  have  produced  the 
correspondence  of  thought  and  thing  in  the  sense  life,  and 
non-correspondence  and  alienation  in  the  higher  life  of  the 
spirit,  is  something  absolutely  incredible  to  one  who  has  not 
first  dementalized  himself  by  making  sense  the  supreme 
arbiter  of  truth  and  test  of  reality.  When  we  provide  in 
freedom  a  sufficient  explanation  of  error  there  is  much  to 
be  gained  by  viewing  beliefs  from  the  standpoint  of  their 
history  and  origin.  Then  they  are  often  seen  to  be  no 
whim  of  the  individual,  but  something  which  the  power 
behind  the  universe  is  producing  for  us  and  in  us.  And 
when  we  see  that  thought,  as  it  develops  and  lifts  itself 
above  its  own  crude  beginnings,  moves  along  certain  lines 
and  towards  certain  conclusions,  we  cannot  fail  to  find  in 
such  an  historical  fact  a  very  significant  ground  of  belief. 

In  this  development  the  implicit  aim  of  the  mind  has  been 
to  adjust  itself  to  reality  and  reality  to  itself,  so  that  the  full- 
est and  largest  life  possible  may  be  attained,  or  so  that  the 
fundamental  interests  of  the  mind  shall  be  recognized  and 
secured.  And  these  interests  have  always  secured  recogni- 
tion, and,  no  doubt,  always  will.  History  shows  that  so  long 
as  any  such  interest  is  overlooked  or  ignored  there  can  be  no 
lasting  peace.  The  intellect  and  the  heart,  conscience  and 
religion,  the  life  that  now  is  and  that  which  is  to  come  have 
alike  made  good  their  claims  to  recognition.    This  has  often 


KNOWLEDGE    AND    BEUEF  379 

been  done  with  violence  and  in  one-sided  ways,  but  it  has 
been  done  nevertheless.  The  civil  war  of  the  faculties 
which  has  often  thus  arisen  has  not  sprung  from  any  log- 
ical contradiction,  but  from  the  necessity  the  mind  is  under 
of  making  itself,  with  all  its  interests,  at  home  in  the  uni- 
verse. And  as  life  grows  more  complex  in  manifestation 
and  richer  in  contents  the  system  of  belief  progresses  to 
correspond.  Even  where  the  forms  and  terms  of  belief  re- 
main the  same  the  contents  vary  nevertheless.  Christian 
theology  is  in  form  and  outline-conception  a  fairly  constant 
quantity,  but  Christian  thought  varies  from  age  to  age. 
The  child  and  the  saint,  the  savage  and  the  philosopher, 
alike  say  "  God,"  but  the  one  term  secures  no  identity  of 
conception.  The  thought  is  the  expression  of  the  thinker, 
and  varies  with  his  life.  It  is  by  this  contact  with  life 
and  reality  that  thought  grows,  and  not  by  a  barren  logic- 
chopping  or  verbal  haggling  about  proof.  Science  grows, 
not  by  debates  with  the  sceptic,  but  by  throwing  itself 
upon  the  system  of  things,  in  the  trust  that  it  will  not 
be  led  astray.  And  religion  grows,  not  by  philosophies  of 
the  infinite,  but  by  active  faith  in  God  and  righteousness. 

Thought  unfolds  itself  in  life,  and  justifies  itself  in  life. 
We  begin  with  the  sense  world  and  attain  to  practical  una- 
nimity. We  advance  to  the  \vorld  of  the  unseen,  and  here 
there  is  pretty  general  unanimity  as  to  its  existence,  with 
the  utmost  diversity  as  to  its  contents.  Those  on  the  sense 
plane  think  of  it  chiefly  in  terms  of  sense  or  of  a  crude  an- 
thropomorphism. But  as  life  develops  and  reflection  be- 
comes conscious  of  its  aims  and  ideals  we  find  thought 
rising  above  these  crude  conceptions  of  the  unseen,  and  re- 
placing them  by  others  higher  and  more  refined.  And  in 
this  growing  elevation  thought  is  perfectly  clear  that  it  is 
approaching  nearer  and  nearer  the  truth.  The  demands  of 
life,  the  interest  in  the  ideal,  the  belief  in  the  perfect,  are 


380  X     THEOKY    OF   THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

the  driving  force  of  the  development,  and  our  satisfaction 
with  the  result,  or  the  mind's  ability  to  rest  in  it,  is  our  chief 
logical  warrant.  As  an  academic  thesis,  or  logical  exercise, 
it  would  be  possible  to  maintain  that  the  Venus  of  Milo  is 
really  no  fairer  than  the  Hottentot  Venus,  but  it  is  not  pos- 
sible elsewhere.  So,  as  a  logical  exercise,  we  might  claim 
that  the  mind's  highest  conceptions  are  no  truer  than  its 
lowest,  but  man  will  not  long  listen  to  us.  Nevertheless, 
these  conceptions  find  their  warrant  far  less  in  any  objec- 
tive contemplation  of  inductively  discovered  facts  than  in 
the  energy  of  the  Hfe  which  produces  them.  But  by  study- 
ing the  history  of  this  movement  we  get  an  idea  of  the  es- 
sential tendencies  of  the  mind  from  which  the  narrowness 
and  one-sidedness  of  the  individual  are  eliminated. 

A  large  part  of  belief  has  its  origin  in  life.  In  addition 
we  must  note  that  a  large  part  becomes  real  only  in  life. 
The  understanding  is  unable  to  give  any  substance  to  many 
beliefs  until  they  are  put  into  practice.  If  man  were  not 
will,  as  well  as  understanding,  his  system  of  belief  would 
be  very  different.  In  the  preceding  chapter  we  have  seen 
that  by  way  of  speculation  we  can  attain  to  no  certainty 
in  the  contingent  matters  of  hfe.  Nor  is  it  altogether  clear 
what  a  purely  contemplative  mind  would  make  of  proba- 
bility in  general.  There  would  be  nothing  in  the  circum- 
stances of  such  a  mind  that  would  call  for  a  closing  of  the 
case,  and  with  the  case  forever  open  the  mind  would  re- 
main forever  in  balance.  Cases  of  this  kind  are  not  entirely 
lacking  in  human  experience.  The  mind  can  reach  no  de- 
cision. It  is  the  will  rather  than  the  understanding  which 
declares  the  case  closed,  and  it  is  the  practical  necessity  of 
doing  something  which  precipitates  or  compels  the  conclu- 
sion. In  such  cases  probabilit}^  means  at  bottom  a  willing- 
ness to  act  in  accordance  with  the  conclusion.     It  mav  be 


KNOWLEDGE    AND    BELIEF  381 

said  that  we  act  on  the  probability,  and  that  the  perception 
of  the  probability  precedes  the  act ;  but  whoever  will  enter 
into  himself  will  see  that  probability,  except  as  a  calculation 
of  ratios,  is  a  very  elusive  notion,  until  we  bring  it  into  con- 
nection with  a  possible  action. 

And,  conversely,  this  relation  of  belief  to  action  furnishes 
a  test  of  real  beliefs  in  distinction  from  mere  assent.  In  the 
hearsay  stage  of  mental  development  our  beliefs  are  largely 
verbal  assents  to  the  thought  of  the  community.  They  be- 
come real  beliefs  only  as  they  are  wrought  into  life,  or  as 
life  is  built  around  them.  Every  one's  beliefs  are  to  some 
extent  in  the  stage  of  formal  and  verbal  assent,  and  they 
pass  slowly  into  living  convictions.  These  are  not  the  prod- 
uct of  speculation  ;  they  have  to  be  achieved,  or  conquered, 
in  life  itself.  And  many  a  thing  which,  as  a  play  of  logic, 
can  be  speculatively  denied  imposes  itself  irresistibly  upon 
us  in  practice ;  and  many  another  thing,  for  which  much 
miglit  be  argumentatively  offered,  floats  in  the  air  like  a 
dream  because  it  has  no  practical  bearing. 

The  uniformity  of  nature  is  hard  to  define  as  a  specula- 
tive principle,  and  harder  still  to  defend.  Here  the  practi- 
cal necessities  of  life  come  to  our  aid,  and  make  it  impossible 
to  doubt  the  principle  in  practical  application.  And  that 
suffices  for  practical  purposes.  And  even  if  we  should  go 
to  the  extreme  of  denying  the  speculative  competency  of 
reason  altogether,  all  that  would  follow  would  be  that,  by 
way  of  speculation,  truth  could  not  be  attained.  But  life 
and  its  practical  needs  would  remain,  and  there  would  be 
nothing  to  forbid  our  making  any  practical  assumption 
whatever  which  might  be  found  necessary  in  order  to  live, 
and  to  live  our  best  and  highest  life.  The  fearful  logical 
inferences  which  might  be  drawn  in  such  a  case  would  have 
significance  only  on  the  assumption  that  logic  still  has  juris- 
diction, and  this  assumption  is  the  very  thing  denied.     The 


382  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

speculative  faculty  having  shown  itself  incompetent,  we  are 
under  no  further  obligation  to  regard  it.  Knowledge  is  de- 
stroyed, but  there  is  more  room  than  ever  for  practical 
belief.  Indeed,  logic  never  objects  to  our  making  any  as- 
sumptions or  postulates  whatever,  provided  we  do  not  set 
them  forth  as  demonstrated.  We  may  venture  beyond 
knowledge  as  far  as  we  will,  if  we  do  it  at  our  own  risk  and 
with  our  eyes  open. 

Hume  and  Kant  differed  greatly  in  their  psychology  and 
epistemology,  but  they  were  not  so  far  apart  in  their  prac- 
tical results.  Hume  claimed  that  reason  is  a  weak  and  con- 
tradictory faculty,  and,  left  to  itself,  gets  nowhere.  Kant 
claimed  that  the  pure  reason,  left  to  itself,  falls  into  contra- 
diction, and  can  speculatively  determine  nothing.  But  both 
alike  pointed  out  that  we  cannot  practically  rest  in  such  a 
conclusion.  Hume  referred  us  to  Nature  or  instinct  as 
sufficiently  disposing  of  the  sceptical  doubt  in  relation  to 
practice,  and  Kant  fell  back  on  the  "  practical  reason."  Life 
will  always  make  its  practical  postulates  with  an  amount  of 
extension  to  adjacent  cases  sufficient  for  practical  purposes ; 
and  as  any  case  by  the  time  it  is  a  real  one  will  always 
be  adjacent,  these  postulates  suffice  for  living,  which  is  the 
main  thing,  after  all. 

This  reference  to  Hume  and  Kant  is  made  not  to  express 
agreement  with  them,  but  to  illustrate  the  difference  between 
a  practical  postulate  and  a  speculative  principle,  and  to  show 
the  hasty  logic  of  those  who  reason  from  the  speculative 
incompetence  of  reason  to  the  abandonment  of  the  practical 
principles  by  which  humanity  lives.  It  was  also  worth 
while  to  point  out  that  credit  has  been  very  unequally  dis- 
tributed between  Hume  and  Kant  in  this  matter.  Such 
distinction  as  is  made  must  be  based  on  the  character  of  the 
men,  or  on  the  historical  associations  of  their  doctrines,  rather 
than  on  any  essential  difference  in  the  practical  outcome. 


KNOWLEDGE    AND    BELIEF  383 

We  see,  then,  that  belief  has  a  very  complex  root.  The 
living  mind,  reacting  against  its  total  experience  and  under 
the  influence  of  its  own  essential  tendencies  and  interests, 
has  built  up  the  great  organism  of  belief.  What  now  is 
the  function  of  the  logical  understanding  in  the  case?  Are 
we  to  stop  reasoning,  and  accept  every  belief  as  it  comes  or 
as  it  is  historically  evolved  ? 

To  do  this  would  be  the  abandonment  of  reason  alto- 
gether, and  a  more  excellent  way  exists.  This  question,  of 
course,  has  no  application  to  those  beliefs  which  are  ad- 
mittedly based  on  objective  evidence  which  must  be  ob- 
jectively presented.  But  even  in  the  case  of  beliefs  based 
on  mental  interests  and  tendencies,  logic  has  a  very  impor- 
tant function.  This  function  is  not  to  create  life  or  even 
to  justify  it,  but  to  formulate  it,  to  understand  it,  and  to 
help  it  to  self-knowledge.  The  justification  of  life  must 
be  left  to  life  itself.  But  our  mental  postulates  and  inter- 
ests exist  primarily  as  implicit  tendencies,  and  not  as  clearly 
defined  principles.  In  this  state  they  readily  lose  their  way. 
The  cognitive,  the  ethical,  the  religious  consciousness  are 
developed  into  self-possession  only  by  a  long  mental  labor 
and  experience  extending  over  centuries.  Left  to  them- 
selves and  without  the  guidance  of  criticism,  they  often 
fail  to  recognize  their  own  implications,  and  sometimes 
even  contradict  themselves.  Many  a  scientist's  theory  of 
knowledge  makes  knowledge  impossible.  Many  an  ethical 
theory  cancels  ethics,  and  many  a  theological  doctrine  has 
unwittingly  passed  into  blasphemy.  Hence  the  need  of  a 
critical  procedure  which  shall  help  the  mind  to  self-knowl- 
edge, define  and  clarify  its  aims,  secure  consistency  in  the  de- 
velopment of  its  practical  postulates,  and  adjust  their  mutual 
relations.  This  is  the  field  of  logic;  and  in  this  work  of 
development,  adjustment,  and  rectification  logic  has  its  in- 
alienable rights  and  a  function  of  supreme  importance. 


384  THEORY    OF    THOUGHT   AND    KNOWLEDGE 

The  claim  that  all  belief  should  be  rational  seems  to 
announce  something  self-evident,  but  in  truth  it  has  so  many 
meanings  as  to  admit  of  no  fruitful  discussion.  Rational 
belief  from  the  side  of  the  subject  may  mean  that  which 
is  demonstrated,  or  at  least  made  probable  by  objective 
evidence.  Rational  belief  in  its  contents  may  mean  har- 
mony with  the  general  laws  of  thought ;  or  it  may  have 
reference  to  purpose ;  or  it  may  refer  to  the  quality  of  the 
purpose,  as  one  worthy  of  a  rational  person  ;  or,  finally,  it 
may  mean  something  which  we  are  now  able  to  compre- 
hend. A  rational  world  may  be  one  in  which  the  cate- 
gories of  thought  are  valid,  or  which  expresses  a  worthy 
purpose,  or  wliich  is  transparent  to  our  intelligence.  A 
question  of  such  uncertainty  can  never  be  safely  answered. 
"We  replace  it,  therefore,  by  other  questions,  as  follows  : 

What  must  we  believe  ?  The  necessary  truths  of  intel- 
ligence. 

What  must  we  not  believe  ?  Whatever  contradicts  those 
truths. 

What  may  we  believe?  All  of  those  practical  principles 
which  are  necessary  for  the  realization  of  our  highest  and 
fullest  life. 

Of  course  these  questions  apply  only  to  those  beliefs 
which  root  in  life,  and  not  to  those  multitudinous  beliefs 
concerning  matters  of  detailed  fact  which  can  only  be  es- 
tablished by  objective  evidence.  It  is  also  to  be  noted  in 
the  case  of  beliefs  founded  in  life  that  they  become  real 
only  as  they  become  controlling.  As  purely  speculative 
principles,  they  will  always  be  open  to  cavil,  if  not  to 
question.     Life  itself  must  furnish  the  conviction. 

These  facts  in  the  natural  history  of  belief  must  be  kept 
in  mind  if  we  would  understand  our  mental  procedure  and 
development.  They  explain  how  it  is  that  we  have  many 
behefs  which  are  not  held  because  we  have  proved  them, 


KNOWLEDGE   AND    BELIEF  385 

but  which  we  try  to  prove  because  we  hold  them.  They 
also  explain  the  barrenness  of  purely  logical  criticism.  Fur- 
ther, they  throw  light  on  the  peculiar  variations  of  belief 
to  which  all  are  subject.  Since  the  roots  of  belief  often  lie 
in  the  sub-logical  realm  of  emotion,  interest,  aspiration,  our 
conviction  will  vary  as  the  tides  of  feeling  rise  or  fall.  All 
of  this  will  be  very  disturbing  to  persons  in  the  dogmatic 
stage  of  development.  They  will  feel  that  things  are  left 
at  very  loose  ends,  and  will  look  anxiously  about  for  a  stand- 
ard. But  they  must  learn  that  there  is  no  simple  and  com- 
pendious standard  which  will  give  the  truth  by  mechanical 
application.  The  living  mind  dealing  with  the  concrete 
facts  is  the  only  standard,  and  to  know  what  this  is  it  is 
not  enough  to  construct  syllogisms  in  the  closet,  but  we 
must  also  come  out  into  the  open  field  of  the  world  and  life 
and  history ;  for  there  is  where,  in  matters  of  practice,  the 
decisive  debate  is  carried  on. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  FORMAL  AND  RELATIVE  ELEMENTS  IN  THOUGHT 

Thought  as  product  claims  to  have  objective  validity,  or 
to  produce  for  us  the  independent  fact.  Thought  as  process 
is  a  subjective  activity,  many  of  whose  phases  are  instru- 
mental only  and  reproduce  nothing  in  the  fact  itself.  In 
this  process  we  reflect,  distinguish,  compare,  and  infer ;  but 
we  find  nothing  of  this  sort  in  the  things  themselves.  The 
thinking  is  the  ladder  by  which  we  climb  to  knowledge, 
but  it  makes  no  part  of  the  knowledge  when  we  reach  it. 
Inference,  we  have  seen,  is  a  mark  of  a  finite  understanding. 
The  same  may  be  said  of  thinking  in  general — at  least,  of 
human  thinking.  For  perfect  insight  truth  would  lie  open 
and  revealed  without  a  process.  But  whatever  may  be  true 
of  "Thought,"  our  thinking  cannot  claim  to  be  in  all  re- 
spects the  double  of  reality  itself.  When,  then,  we  aflBrm 
the  identity  of  the  laws  of  thought  and  those  of  things,  this 
must  not  be  taken  to  mean  that  the  processes  of  our  think- 
ing are  repetitions  of  objective  fact,  but  only  that  things 
exist  in  rational  forms  and  relations. 

Our  thought  contains  two  elements :  a  certain  rational 
content  or  insight,  and  a  variety  of  processes  by  which  this 
insight  is  reached.  The  former  is  the  objective  and  uni- 
versal element  of  thought ;  the  latter  is  formal  only,  and  it 
may  be  related  to  us.  On  this  account  our  reason  is  said  to 
be  discursive,  and  has  been  opposed  to  the  supreme  reason, 
which,  because  it  possesses  truth  in  immediate  vision,  is  said 


THE    FORMAL   AND   EELATIVE   ELEMENTS    IN   THOUGHT        387 

to  be  intuitive.  The  community  and  universality  of  in- 
tellect or  reason  does  not  consist  in  methods  or  processes, 
but  in  the  rational  contents. 

The  distinction  may  be  illustrated  by  the  propositions  of 
geometry  and  their  demonstrations.  The  former  belong  to 
reason  ;  the  latter  are  devices  of  our  own.  The  former  ex- 
ist in  their  own  right,  independently  of  any  demonstration  ; 
the  latter  are  simply  means  of  reaching  an  insight  which 
we  do  not  possess.  The  demonstration  makes  no  part  of 
the  truth,  and  has  significance  only  for  the  thinking  subject 
who  needs  it.  We  must,  then,  distinguish  between  the 
truth  itself  and  our  method  of  reaching  it.  The  methods 
may  be  many.     It  is  only  the  truth  that  is  one. 

The  possibility  of  reaching  objective  truth  by  subjective 
devices  may  be  illustrated  by  a  case  in  astronomy.  Thus, 
given  the  circumstances  of  a  planet's  motion  at  one  time  we 
deduce  its  path  and  its  position  at  another  time.  Our  work 
is  done  by  diagrams  and  various  devices  of  mathematics  and 
mechanics,  which  are  totally  unlike  anything  in  actuality ; 
and  yet  we  expect  the  planet  to  justify  the  calculation. 
Such  an  expectation,  of  course,  implies  the  essential  har- 
mony of  the  laws  of  thought  and  things ;  but,  nevertheless, 
how  much  there  is  in  the  calculation  of  a  purely  formal 
character,  leading,  indeed,  to  results  which  are  objectively 
valid,  but  without  likeness  to  any  process  in  reality. 

The  formal  aspect  of  thought  and  its  relation  to  reality 
is  illustrated  by  another  case  in  mathematics.  Take,  say, 
the  ellipse.  By  a  great  variety  of  devices  we  succeed  in 
proving  various  truths  about  this  curve.  Starting  from  a 
given  standpoint  we  reason  to  many  conclusions,  and  when 
the  curve  is  drawn  we  find  them  justified.  But  the  curve 
is  plainly  independent  of  these  devices,  and  they  are  just 
as  plainly  the  subjective  devices  by  which  we  reach  the 
truth.     This  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  these  conclusions 


388  THEORY    OF   THOUGHT    AND    KNOWLEDGE 

may  be  reached  in  any  one  of  several  ways.  We  may  re- 
gard the  ellipse  as  a  conic  section,  or  as  a  plane  curve,  or  as 
the  locus  of  a  point  moving  under  peculiar  conditions.  We 
may  express  its  equation  in  various  ways  and  according  to 
various  systems  of  co-ordinates,  and  may  get  the  same  re- 
sults by  the  most  diverse  methods.  Hence  it  is  plain  that 
the  nature  of  the  thing  is  really  indifferent  to  all  our 
methods.  They  have  reference  only  to  us.  They  are  the 
ground  of  our  knowing,  but  not  tlie  grounds  of  the  being 
and  nature  of  the  ellipse  itself.  These  are  found  in  the 
nature  of  reason  and  the  space-intuition. 

The  same  is  true  for  a  large  part  of  our  logical  procedure 
in  general.  It  is  relative  to  ourselves,  and  repeats  nothing 
in  the  thing.  Things  themselves  are  largely  formal,  being 
in  many  cases  only  hypostasized  phenomena.  Even  the  dis- 
tinction of  subject  and  predicate  is  mainly  formal  without 
any  metaphysical  significance.  Reasoning  is  formal.  Classi- 
fying as  a  process  is  of  course  subjective,  and  the  classes 
themselves  are  largely  relative  to  us.  The  analyses  and 
syntheses  of  scientific  procedure  are  equally  relative.  They 
are  a  kind  of  substituted  equivalent  for  the  fact,  whereby 
we  seek  to  make  it  amenable  to  our  calculus  when  it  eludes 
our  direct  apprehension.  In  this  respect  they  are  something 
like  the  trigonometrical  functions  whereby  we  are  enabled 
to  calculate  indirectly  values  which  cannot  be  directly  meas- 
ured. Even  the  laws  of  things  have  an  element  of  abstrac- 
tion about  them  which  warns  us  against  identifying  them 
with  reality  without  careful  inspection. 

If,  then,  we  should  make  a  careful  and  critical  inventory 
of  knowledge  we  should  find  a  great  deal  that  is  not  uni- 
versal, but  only  relative  to  ourselves — a  shadow  of  our  men- 
tal processes  rather  than  an  apprehension  of  the  independent 
fact.  We  might  still  believe  that  the  system  of  reality  is 
an  expression  of  the  absolute  reason,  and  that  its  factors  are 


THE    FORMAL    AND    RELATIVE    ELEMENTS    IN    THOUGHT       389 

all  found  together  in  transparent  rational  order.  But  how- 
ever firmly  we  might  maintain  that  this  ideal  is  realized 
somewhere  or  for  some  one,  there  is  nothing  in  it  which  frees 
us  from  exercising  due  critical  caution  and  looking  well  to 
our  logical  goings.  Such  transparent  connection  of  things 
may  exist  from  the  standpoint  of  the  absolute,  and  we  may 
conceivably  approximate  indefinitely  towards  it.  But  we 
are  not  now  at  the  centre  of  things.  The  order  of  our 
learning  is  in  no  w^ay  the  order  of  existence.  We  have  to 
find  our  way  from  fact  to  fact  as  best  w^e  can,  not  by  the 
highway  of  the  absolute  reason,  but  by  the  by-paths  of  our 
human  intelligence.  We  maintain  our  faith  in  perfect 
knowledge  as  an  ideal,  but  we  recognize  our  human  limi- 
tations. We  have  here  simply  the  reappearance  of  the  fa- 
miliar fact  that  our  thought  has  to  find  its  way  between 
extremes  without  any  simple  and  compendious  rule  for  de- 
ciding where  the  golden  mean  lies.  Pure  subjectivity  is  self- 
destructive  ;  naive  dogmatism  is  no  longer  possible.  There 
is  need,  then,  of  a  critical  procedure  which  shall  unite  these 
antitheses  in  the  truth  which  comprehends  them  both,  and 
which,  by  separating  the  formal  and  relative  from  the  real 
and  universal,  shall  teach  us  how  to  think  of  reality,  not 
merely  as  it  appears,  but  as  it  truly  is.  This  is  the  task  of 
metaphysics.  Accepting  the  results  of  logic  and  epistemol- 
ogy,  metaphysics  applies  them  to  this  highest  question  of 
philosophy:  How  shall  we  think  about  reality? 


TEE   'EKD 


INTRODUCTION    TO   POLITICAL 

SCIENCE 

By  JAMES  WILFORD   GARNER,  Ph.  D.,  Professor  of 
Political  Science,  University  of  Illinois 

$2.50 


THIS  systematic  treatise  on  the  science  of  government 
covers  a  wider  range  of  topics  on  the  nature,  origin, 
organization,  and  functions  of  the  state  than  is  found 
in  any  other  college  textbook  published  in  the  English  lan- 
guage. The  unusually  comprehensive  treatment  of  the  various 
topics  is  based  on  a  wide  reading  ot  the  best  literature  on  the 
subject  in  English,  German,  French,  and  Italian,  and  the 
student  has  opportunity  to  profit  by  this  research  work  through 
the  bibliographies  placed  at  the  head  of  each  chapter,  as  well 
as  by  means  ot  many  additional  references  in  the  footnotes. 
^  An  introductory  chapter  is  followed  by  chapters  on  the 
nature  and  essential  elements  of  the  state ;  on  the  various 
theories  concerning  the  origin  of  the  state ;  on  the  forms  of 
the  state ;  on  the  forms  of  government,  including  a  discussion 
of  the  elements  of  strength  and  weakness  of  each ;  on  sov- 
ereignty, its  nature,  its  essential  characteristics,  and  its  abiding 
place  in  the  state;  on  the  functions  and  sphere  of  the  state, 
including  the  various  theories  of  state  activity ;  and  on  the 
organization  of  the  state.  In  addition  there  are  chapters  on 
constitutions,  their  nature,  forms,  and  development ;  on  the 
distribution  of  the  powers  of  government;  on  the  electorate; 
and  on  citizenship  and  nationality. 

^[  Before  stating  his  own  conclusions  the  author  gives  an  im- 
partial discussion  of  the  more  important  theories  of  the  origin, 
nature,  and  functions  of  the  state,  and  analyzes  and  cridcises 
them  in  the  light  of  the  best  scientific  thought  and  practice. 
Thus  the  pupil  becomes  familiar  with  the  history  of  the  science 
as  well  as  with  its  principles  as  recognized  to-day. 


AMERICAN    BOOK    COMPANY 


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EDUCATION      IN     THE 
UNITED     STATES 

Edited  by   NICHOLAS   MURRAY   BUTLER,    President 
of  Columbia  University,  in  the  City  of  New  York 

^2.50 


THE   frequently    expressed   need    for   a    book  giving    a 
complete  view  of  American  education  in  outline  is  satis- 
factorily met  in  this  volume  entitled  **  Education  in  the 
United  States." 

^  The  volume  consists  of  the  twenty  careful  monographs, 
each  written  by  an  eminent  specialist,  on  various  phases  of 
American  education,  which  were  originally  planned  as  part 
of  the  American  educational  exhibit  at  the  International  Ex- 
positions held  at  Paris  in  1900  and  at  St.  Louis  in  1904. 
^  The  introduction  by  the  editor  sets  forth  the  underlying 
principles  governing  American  educational  activity  to  the 
present  time.  Among  the  authors  of  the  various  monographs 
are:  Commissioner  Draper  of  the  State  of  New  York,  the 
late  Dr.  William  T.  Harris,  formerly  Commissioner  of  Edu- 
cation of  the  United  States,  Dr.  Elmer  Ellsworth  Brown, 
Dr.  Harris's  successor  in  the  Commissionership,  Professor 
Edward  Delavan  Perry  of  Columbia  University,  Professor 
Andrew  F.  West  of  Princeton  University,  President  M.  Carey 
Thomas  of  Bryn  Mawr  College,  etc.,  etc. 
^  The  subjects  of  the  monographs  include  such  important 
topics  as  Educational  Organization  and  Administration,  Train- 
ing of  Teachers,  School  Architecture  and  Hygiene,  Profes- 
sional Education,  Education  oi  Defectives,  and  Summer 
Schools  and  University  Extension. 

^  For  the  benefit  of  teachers,  reading  circles,  and  classes  in 
universities,  colleges  and  normal  schools,  each  monograph 
will  be  published  separately  at  20  cents  and  will  be  furnished 
in  quantities  at  51  5-00  per  hundred  (net). 


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HISTORY    OF    EDUCATION 

By  LEVI  SEELEY,  Ph.D.,  Professor  of  Pedagogy 
New  Jersey  State  Normal  School 

51.25 


SEELEY'S  History  of  Education  is  a  working  book,  clear, 
comprehensive,  and  accurate,  and  sufficient  in  itself  to 
furnish  all  the  material  on  the  subject  that  is  required  by 
any  examining  board,  or  that  may  be  demanded  in  a  normal 
or  college  course. 

^  Each  educational  system  that  has  influenced  the  world  is 
taken  up  and  summarized  in  turn,  its  development  shown, 
and  its  important  lesson  pointed  out.  The  fullest  information 
obtainable  is  presented  in  simple  form  and  expressed  in  con- 
cise language.  The  topics  are  arranged  on  a  well  defined 
plan,  everything  being  practical,  useful,  and  directly  to  the 
point. 

^[  In  addition,  the  book  includes  biographical  sketches  ot  the 
great  educators  with  an  illuminating  account  of  their  systems 
of  pedagogy.  It  also  provides  a  general  outline  of  the 
educational  historv  of  ancient  countries,  and  affords  com- 
parisons of  the  educational  systems  of  the  leading  countries 
down  to  the  present  time.  In  short,  the  volume  gives  the 
student  an  accurate  view  in  perspective  of  the  educational 
progress  of  the  world.  Extensive  bibliographies  of  works  for 
reference  are  provided. 

^  The  work  presents  for  study  many  of  the  great  pedagogical 
problems  that  have  interested  thoughtful  men  in  every  age. 
It  shows  how  some  of  these  have  been  solved  in  the  past  and 
points  out  the  way  to  the  solution  of  others  of  no  less 
importance  in  the  near  future. 

^  It  should  form  an  indispensable  volume  in  every  teacher's 
library,  for  it  not  only  is  inspiring,  but  furnishes  valuable 
information.  Every  well  informed  teacher  must  know  how 
the  past  has  taught  in  order  to  cope  intelligently  with  the 
educational  problems  of  today. 


AMERICAN    BOOK    COMPANY 


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GRAY'S    NEW    MANUAL 

OF   BOTANY  —  SEVENTH 

EDITION 

Thoroughly  revised  and  largely  rewritten  by  BENJAMIN 
LINCOLN  ROBINSON,  Ph.D.,  Asa  Gray  Professor 
of  Systematic  Botany,  and  MERRITT  LYNDON 
FERNALD,  S.B.,  Assistant  Professor  of  Botany,  Harvard 
University,  assisted  by  specialists  in  certain  groups. 


Regular  edirion.      Cloth,  916  pages 

Tourist's  edition.      Flexible  leather,  926  pages 


3.00 


AMERICAN  botanists,  who  had  been  impatifently  await- 
ing the  revision  of  this  indispensable  work,  will  be  de- 
lighted to  know  that  a  seventh,  completely  revised,  and 
copiously  illustrated  edition  has  now  been  issued.  The  re- 
vision has  entailed  years  of  work  by  skilled  specialists.  No 
effort  has  been  spared  to  attain  the  highest  degree  of  clearness, 
terseness,  and  accuracy.  The  plant  families  have  been  re- 
arranged in  a  manner  to  show  the  latest  view  of  their  affin- 
ities, and  hundreds  of  species  have  been  added.  The  synonomy 
is  copious,  and  the  ranges  are  stated  in  considerable  detail. 
^  The  nomenclature  has  been  brought  into  thorough  accord 
with  the  important  international  rules  recently  established — a 
feature  of  great  significance.  Indeed,  the  Manual  is  the  only 
work  of  its  scope  which  in  the  matter  of  nomenclature  is  free 
from  provincialism  and  rests  upon  a  cosmopolitan  basis  of  in- 
ternational agreement.  Nearly  a  thousand  figures,  specially 
designed  for  this  edition,  have  been  added,  and  scores  of  brief 
and  lucid  keys  have  been  introduced  in  a  manner  which 
greatly  simplifies  the  problem  of  plant  identification.  The 
work  has  been  extended  to  include  Ontario,  Quebec,  and  the 
maritime  provinces  of  Canada. 


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SCIENTIFIC    MEMOIRS 

Edited  by  JOSEPH  S.  AMES,  Ph.D.,  Johns  Hopkins 

University 


The  Free  Expansion  of  Gases.  Memoirs  by  Gay-Lussac,  Joule,  and 
Joule  and  Thomson.     Edited  by  Dr.  J.  S.  Ames.     $0.75. 

Prismatic  and  Diffraction  Spectra.  Memoirs  by  Joseph  von  Fraun- 
hofer.      Edited  by  Dr.  J.  S.  Ames.     $0.60. 

R«6ntgen  Rays.    Memoirs  by  Rontgen,  Stokes,  and  J.  J.  Thomson.    Edited 

by  Dr.  George  F.  Barker.     $0.60. 
The  Modern  Theory  of  Solution.     Memoirs  by  Pfeffer,  Van't  Hoff, 

Arrhenius,  and  Raoult.      Edited  by  Dr.  H.  C.Jones.     $1.00. 
The  Laws  of  Gases.      Memoirs  by  Boyle  and  Amagat.      Edited  by  Dr. 

Carl  Barus.     ^o.75." 

The  Second  Law  of  Thermodynamics.  Memoirs  by  Carnot,  Clausius, 
and  Thomson.      Edited  by  Dr.  W.  F.  Magie.     ^0.90. 

The  Fundamental  Laws  of  Electrolytic  Conduction.  Memoirs 
by  Faraday,  Hittorf,  and  Kohlrausch.  Edited  by  Dr.  H.  M. 
Goodwin.      ^0.75. 

The  Effects  of  a  Magnetic  Field  on  Radiation.  Memoirs  by  Fara- 
day, Kerr,  and  Zeeman.     Edited  by  Dr.  E.  P.  Lewis.      $0.75. 

The  Laws  of  Gravitation.  Memoirs  by  Newton,  Bouguer,  and  Cav- 
endish.    Edited  by  Dr.  A.  S.  Mackenzie,     ^i.oo. 

The  Wave  Theory  of  Light.  Memoirs  by  Huygens,  Young,  and 
Fresnel.      Edited  by  Dr.  Henry  Crew.      $l.oo. 

The  Discovery  of  Induced   Electric  Currents.    Vol.  I.    Memoirs  by 

Joseph  Henry.      Edited  by  Dr.  J.  S.  Ames.      ^0.75. 
The  Discovery  of  Induced   Electric  Currents.     Vol.  II.      Memoirs 

by  Michael  Faraday.     Edited  by  Dr.  J.  S.  Ames.     $0.75. 
The  Foundations  of  Stereo-chemistry.       Memoirs  by  Pasteur,  Le  Bel, 

and   Van't   HofF,   together  with   selections  from   later  memoirs  by 

Wislicenus,  and  others.      Edited  by  Dr.  G.  M.  Richardson.     JjSi.oo. 
The  Expansion  of  Gases.    Memoirs  by  Gay-Lussac  and  Regnault.    Edited 

by  Prof.  W.  W.  Randall.     ;^i.oo. 
Radiation    and    Absorption.      Memoirs   by  Prevost,   Balfour  Stewart, 

Kirchhoff.  and  KirchhofF  and  Bunsen.      Edited  by  Dr.  DeWitt  B. 

Brace.     ;55i.oo. 


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FISHER'S  BRIEF  HISTORY  OF 
THE  NATIONS 

By  GEORGE  PARK  FISHER,  LL.D.,  Emeritus  Professor 
in  Yale  University 


THIS  is  an  entirely  independent  work,  written  expressly 
to  meet  the  demand  for  a  compact  and  acceptable  text- 
book on  General  History  for  secondary  schools  and  lower 
classes  in  colleges.  Some  of  the  distinctive  qualities  which  will 
commend  this  book  to  teachers  and  students  are  as  follows  : 
*^  It  narrates  in  fresh,  vigorous,  and  attractive  style  the  most 
important  facts  of  history  in  their  due  order  and  connection. 
It  explains  the  nature  of  historical  evidence,  and  records  only 
well  established  judgments  respecting  persons  and  events.  It 
delineates  the  progress  of  peoples  and  nations  in  civilization 
as  well  as  the  rise  and  succession  of  dynasties. 
^  It  connects,  in  a  single  chain  of  narration,  events  related 
to  each  other  in  the  contemporary  history  of  different  nations 
and  countries.  It  is  written  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
present,  and  incorporates  the  latest  discoveries  of  historical 
explorers  and  writers. 

^  It  is  illustrated  by  numerous  colored  maps,  genealogical 
tables,  and  artistic  reproductions  of  architecture,  sculpture, 
painting,  and  portraits  of  celebrated  men,  representing  every 
period  of  the  world's  history. 


FISHER'S  OUTLINES  OF  UNIVERSAL  HISTORY 

Revised,    $2.40 

Also  published  in  threa  parts,  prici>,  each,  Ji.oo.   Part  I,  Ancient  History. 
Part  II,  Mediaeval  History.     Part  III,  Modem  History. 

ANEW  and  revised  edition  of  tliis  standard  vvorlc.      Soon  after  the 
publication   of*  the   first  edition   of  this  history    the  author    was 
honored  by  the  University  of  Edinburgh  with  the  degree  of  Doctor 
of  Laws,  in  recognition  of  his  services  in  the  cause  of  historical  research. 
In  this  edition  the  book  is  brought  fjlly  up  to  date  in  all  particulars. 


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NINETEENTH    CENTURY 

ENGLISH    PROSE 

Critical    Essays 

Edited  with  Introductions  and  Notes  by  THOMAS  H. 
DICKINSON,  Ph.D.,  and  FREDERICK  W.  ROE, 
A.M.,  Assistant  Professors  of  English,  University  of  Wis- 
consin. 

^I.OO 


THIS  book  for  college  classes  presents  a  series  of  ten 
selected  essays,  which  are  intended  to  trace  the  develop- 
ment of  English  criticism  in  the  nineteenth  century. 
The  choice  of  material  has  been  influenced  by  something 
more  than  mere  style.  An  underlying  coherence  in  content, 
typical  of  the  thought  of  the  era  in  question,  may  be  traced 
throughout.  With  but  few  exceptions  the  selections  are  given 
in  their  entirety. 

^  The  essays  cover  a  definite  period,  and  exhibit  the  indi- 
viduality of  each  author's  method  of  criticism.  In  each  case 
they  are  those  most  typical  of  the  author's  critical  principles, 
and  at  the  same  time  representative  of  the  critical  tendencies 
of  his  age.  The  subject-matter  provides  interesting  material 
for  intensive  study  and  class  room  discussion,  and  each  essay 
is  an  example  of  excellent,  though  varying,  style. 
^  They  represent  not  only  the  authors  who  write,  but  the 
authors  who  are  treated.  The  essays  provide  the  best  things 
that  have  been  said  by  England's  critics  on  Swift,  on  Scott, 
on  Macaulay,  and  on  Emerson. 

^  The  introductions  and  notes  provide  the  necessary  bio- 
graphical matter,  suggestive  points  for  the  use  of  the  teacher 
in  stimulating  discussion  of  the  form  or  content  of  the  essays, 
and  such  aids  as  will  eliminate  those  matters  of  detail  that 
might  prove  stumbling  blocks  to  the  student.  Though  the 
essays  are  in  chronological  order,  they  may  be  treated  at  ran- 
dom according  to  the  purposes  of  the  teacher. 


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MASTERPIECES    OF     THE 
ENGLISH    DRAMA 

Edited  under  the  supervision  of  FELIX  E.  SCHELLING, 

Ph.  D.,  LL.  D.,  Professor  of  History  and  English  Literature, 

University  of  Pennsylvania 


Marlowe  (Phelps)  Middleton  (Sampson) 

Chapman  (Ellis)  Massinger  (Sherman) 

Beaumont  and  Fletcher  (Schelling)  Webster  and  Tourncur(Thorndike) 

Jonson  (Rhys)  Congreve  (Archer) 

Goldsmith  and  Sheridan  (Demmon) 
Each,   70  cents 

THIS  series  presents  the  principal  dramatists,  covering 
English  dramatic  history  from  Marlowe's  Tamburlaine 
in  1587  to  Sheridan's  School  for  Scandal  in  1777. 
Each  volume  contains  four  or  five  plays,  selected  with  refer- 
ence to  their  actual  worth  and  general  interest,  and  also 
because  they  represent  the  best  efforts  of  their  author  in  the 
different  varieties  of  dramas  chosen. 

^  The  texts  follow  the  authoritative  old  editions,  but  with 
such  occasional  departures  as  the  results  ot  recent  critical 
scholarship  demand.  Spelling  and  punctuation  have  been 
modernized,  and  obsolete  and  occasional  words  referred  to  the 
glossaries.  This  makes  the  volumes  suitable  for  the  average 
reader  as  well  as  for  the  advanced  scholar. 
^  Each  volume  is  furnished  with  an  introduction  by  a  British 
or  an  American  scholar  of  rank  dealing  with  the  dramatist 
and  his  work,  with  special  reference  to  the  plays  selected. 
Each  volume  contains  a  brief  biographical  note,  and  each 
play  is  preceded  by  an  historical  note,  its  source,  date  ot 
composition,  and  other  kindred  matters.  Adequate  notes  are 
furnished  at  the  end,  explaining  difficult  passages  in  Elizabethan 
grammar,  historical  and  literary  allusions,  and  other  points 
that  seem  obscure.  Besides  obsolete  and  unusual  terms  the 
glossaries  include  exceptional  meanings  of  common  words. 
Over-annotation,  however,  has  been  carefully  avoided. 
^  The  books  are  printed  in  good  clear  type,  are  of  convenient 
size  (i2mo),  and  are  handsomely  bound  in  uniform  cloth. 

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AN    INTRODUCTORY     COURSE    IN 
ARGUMENTATION     ....  |i.oo 

By  FRANCES  M.  PERRY,  Associate  Professor 
of  Rhetoric  and  Composition,  Wellesley  College. 


SIMPLIFIED  to  suit  the  understanding  of  students  in  the 
first  years  of  college  or  the  last  years  of  the  secondary 
school  without  lessening  its  educative  value.  Each  suc- 
cessive step  is  given  explicit  exposition  and  fully  illustrated, 
and  carefully  graded  exercises  are  provided  to  test  the 
student's  understanding  of  an  idea  and  fix  it  in  his  memory. 
The  beginner  is  set  to  work  to  exercise  his  reasoning  power 
on  familiar  material  and  without  the  added  difnculty  of  re- 
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are  provided  for,  so  that  there  is  no  dearth  of  work  during 
the  course  and  no  accumulation  of  work  at  its  close. 


PERRY'S   INTRODUCTORY  COURSE 
IN    EXPOSITION $i.oo 

A  SYSTEMATIZED  course  in  the  theory  and  practice 
of  expository  writing.  The  student  will  acquire  from 
its  study  a  clear  understanding  of  exposition — its  nature; 
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tion of  exposition  in  literary  criticism.  He  will  also  gain 
through  the  practice  required  by  the  course  facility  in  writing 
in  a  clear  and  attractive  way  the  various  types  of  exposition. 
The  volume  includes  an  interesting  section  on  literary 
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is  taken  from  many  and  varied  sources,  but  much  of  it  is 
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the  final  years  of  secondary  schools,  or  the  first  years  of  college. 


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HISTORY  OF  ENGLISH  AND 

AMERICAN   LITERATURE 

^1.25 

By    CHARLES    F.    JOHNSON,    L.H.D.,    Professor   of 
English  Literature,  Trinity   College,   Hartiord 


A  TEXT-BOOK  for  a  year's  course  in  schools  and  col- 
leges, in  which  English  literary  history  is  regarded  as 
composed  of  periods,  each  marked  by  a  delinite  tone 
of  thought  and  manner  of  expression.  The  treatment  fol- 
lows the  divisions  logically  and  systematically,  without  any 
of  the  perplexing  cross-divisions  so  frequently  made.  It  is 
based  on  the  historic  method  of  study,  and  refers  briefly  to 
events  in  each  period  bearing  on  social  development,  to 
changes  in  religious  and  political  theory,  and  even  to  advances 
in  the  industrial  arts.  These  all  receive  due  consideration, 
for  each  author,  if  not  entirely  the  product  of  social  con- 
ditions, is  at  least  molded  by  them.  In  addition,  the  book 
contains  critiques,  general  surveys,  summaries,  biographical 
sketches,  bibliographies,  and  suggestive  quesdons.  The  ex- 
amples have  been  chosen  from  poems  which  are  generally 
familiar,  and  of  an  illustrative  character. 


JOHNSON'S    FORMS    OF    ENGLISH     POETRY 

$1.00 


THIS  book  contains  nothing  more  than  every  young  person  should 
know  about  the  construction  of  English  verse,  and  its  luain  divisions, 
both  by  forms  and  by  subject-matter.  The  historical  development  of 
the  main  divisions  is  sketched,  and  briefly  illustrated  by  representative 
examples  ;  but  the  true  character  of  poetry  as  an  art  and  a  social  force  has 
always  been  in  the  writer's  mind.  Only  the  elements  of  prosody  are  given. 
The  aim  has  been  not  to  make  the  study  too  technical,  but  to  interest  the 
student  in  poetry,  and  to  aid  him  in  acquiring  a  well  rooted  taste  for  good 
literature. 


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DESCRIPTIVE 

CATALOGUE    OF     HIGH 

SCHOOL   AND    COLLEGE 

TEXTBOOKS 

Published  Complete   and   in   Sections 


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^  For  the  convenience  of  teachers  this  Catalogue  is  also 
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